Suvorov books, ww-2

Without pronouncing myself in any way on the hypothesis of Suvorov/Rezun (until recently I was a supporter of this hypothesis) I have to say that after the war in the memoirs of some German generals participants at Barbarossa operation, there is not a clue of a suspected intention of the soviets to attack soon! They led German major units who faced the Soviets in late June 1941 and have found no evidence that lead to such a hypothesis... no doubt they all reached a point to realize that Soviet military power far exceeded their estimates, but this does not clarify the moment July 1941 when it would have been the starting date of the hypothetical Soviet attack! I obviously have many elements little or no explained by the official theory which contradicts the Suvorov/Rezun hypothesis, but as I said, I don't take this hypothesis as a good one!

Besides the "Suvorov theory" (Hitler's pre-emptive strike) and the "Germans attacked the unsuspecting Soviets" one (the current mainstream version), there is a third theory, I advocate: both sides prepared for war against the other, but independently to each other, and would have attacked anyway at one point in time. It happened that Hitler stroke first, before Stalin.

See my paper on this, published in my book, From Barbarossa to Odessa, vol. 1 (and on this forum, too): http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?sh...indpost&p=59110

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on April 22, 2012 06:49 am

You're treating the ideological background as if we're discussing of today's politics...
The whole point has an ideological substrate : Stalin&co had the task to initiate the World Revolution. They breathe and live on that. It's their only goal in life and they put everything behind it, robbing banks in Tbilisi or destroying Russia in the attempt to prepare to liberate the world. Lenin tried and failed. In times of peace, nobody is interested in communist ideals. You need war, you need destruction, you need civil unrest, famine. Stalin knew that the moment he took power. All he did from that point was to finance the Comintern and build the worlds largest and most modern weapons industry in the world. If you think he did that being afraid of Finland, Romania, Poland, Mongolia, Japan, whatever, be my guest.

Actually is perfectly logical : Germany lost. Could the SU offer its aid and assistance ? No. Why ? Because the US , British and French army occupied it.
If Germany losses, the traditional power will fight off communism just like they did after ww1 and ww2. ( talk about hindsight )
Assume Germany conquers France. ( which happened btw ). One of the strongest forces in German occupied France was the french communist party. With the Red Army crushing Germany, they could offer direct assistance.

Isn't it the same thing ? What's the difference ? Didn't back down=declared war.

So he was speechless because they didn't back down or because they declared war ? Or is it the other way round ?

Apparently Hitler and the German HQ ( do I need to tell you Raeder's reaction ? ) weren't. And they expected to be Czechoslovakia round 2. Had Stalin told him : "Dear Adolf, we split Poland, no problem my friend, but be aware the England and France will declare war on you", Hitler wouldn't have attacked. In an instant he would have been in a no-win situation : blockaded and dependent on Stalin's benevolence.

That's evidence of how things were perceived at the time. Nowadays, after 60 years of general truth, you find a large contradiction between how our grandparents viewed it and our contemporary view. Now we're told Stalin did it out of fear. The world at the time didn't see a chicken Stalin.

LoL. You're doing a grave misjudgment here. In hindsight everything is clear. The problem is, you know [B] NOW, AFTER IT HAPPENED that 1940 would have been better.
Put yourself in Stalin shoes. Your plan is to release Hitler's hand over Europe and then free it as a savior. It is summer 1939. The tension between Germany and Poland increases, French and English delegations are asking for your help to build an alliance. You know that if you reject the allies and make a pact with Hitler, he will attack Poland. At the same time you know that will lead to war in the west. Even if Germany beats Poland in autumn 1939, they can't do anything in the west until 1940. So 1940 Germany is busy fighting in the west against France, England and the US supplying the allies. The war will last long, maybe a few years.
Keeping in mind the economic impact and the buildup necessary, 1941 is the earliest year the Red Army could attack. 1942 is far away, maybe the allies and Germany not wanting to get bogged down in a ww1 scenario will make peace.

Two years allows the SU to put the industry on a war footing; triple army size and move it to the frontier. All this in secret. Ready to unleash it in summer 1941.

Open any official history book on ww2 and on the Soviet Union chapter it starts with : the Red Army was unprepared, poorly equipped, poorly trained and poorly led having all its senior officers shot in the purges.

Really ? From Konigsberg to Odessa there are 3000km ? Or are you calculating the karelian tundra as well.

You're missing the point. All those airfields were in mortal danger in case of an enemy attack. Being close to the border means little or no reaction time ( and they didn't have radars and Patriot missiles back then ). The result is known. Only in the first hours, the Luftwaffe destroyed over 2000 soviet planes on the ground, airfields were littered with destroyed planes. The massacre continued over the following weeks.

You do not do that if you're thinking even the slightest to DEFEND yourself. You do that, cram the airfields near the border and pack them with planes, only if you want to ATTACK so they can give quick support and maximize the number of missions per day. Just like the Luftwaffe did.

That's the wrap up; yes. I can point you to some authors if you want the full details. They are available.

This post has been edited by PaulC on April 23, 2012 07:00 pm

Well, the Stalin who was so aware of the task of world revolution had to explain to the top echelon of his regime the rationale behind signing a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. A move that not only came as a change in the USSR foreign policy after 1935, but was also ideologically problematic. Hence the speech. Hence his efforts to emphasize the advantages and paint a brilliant picture of the advantages.

So USSR can come to the help of a Sovietized France occupied by a victorious Germany, but can't come to the help of a Sovietized Germany occupied by France and Britain. Where's the logic?

The possibility of France and Britain declaring war was known, the fact that they actually did may have been a surprise for a Hitler that believed they wouldn't dare go at war over Poland. There is a difference.

First of all, Stalin was neither Hitler's babysitter nor his uncle. It wasn't his job to tell him anything. Secondly, what makes you think Stalin knew for sure what France and Britain were about to do?

First of all, you would need a far bigger sample of newspaper cartoons and articles to paint a relevant picture of how things were perceived at the time.

Secondly, I don't know who exactly tells us Stalin did it out of fear. The only ones I've recently heard say that were some Russian Communists on a forum.

No, I use no hindsight. 1940 was the year Hitler attacked France and left his Eastern borders very exposed. You have to use no hindsight to realize that if Stalin had set a trap for Germany and was willing to attack then this was the best moment to open a second front on an unsuspecting Germany.

Stalin wanted the 3 powers to stand up against Germany in the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1938 and what did France and Britain did? Munich 1938. Now the French and British came to propose action against Germany in the Polish crisis. But action would have meant certain war between Germany and the USSR. Stalin simply didn't want to enter war and allow France and Britain to sit on the sidelines and watch. He wanted that spot for himself.

And if Stalin had a grand plan to invade Germany that would have been a good moment to do it.

If you have a more exact figure why don't you present it.

Where's the proof that airfields were "crammed near the border"? Or "packed with airplanes"?

Also what you call an airfield packed with airplanes ready to attack someone else can call an airfield packed with airplanes ready to defend.

The occupied airfield number was around 670. The 2000 airfield figure is from here : link

I know Glantz's title is catchy, but that doesn't add a iota to his claims. Maybe once he had grown tired of visiting Moscow, he will write the truth. Until then, he's just keeping to the party line so the caviar and permits are renewed. New Russian historians like Petukhov and Meltiukhov strongly disagree with Glantz.

I'll happily play the number games with the purges.

It might be a surprise to some, but in each year in every army on this world people are discharged from the army. Some retire, some because they drink, others for being gay, etc , etc. The US Army discharged roughly 15000 people in the last decade over the "Don't ask, don't tell policy" !

So you have 54714 officers discharged according to you. Some of them were imprisoned and some of those imprisoned were killed. I don't want to suspect you of anything, but I find intriguing how you try to seed some subliminal messages by your choice and order of words.

How many people of those discharged were arrested ? How many of those arrested were shot ?


I've added a file that shows that your number alone bears no reflection on the real impact, at most it confuses and spreads misinformation.

Period 1937-1939 ( Stalinist Terror, 2011 )
36898 were discharged
9579 arrested
11596 reinstated in the army by may 1940 ( 30% of those discharged )

Suvorov has this figures:
36761 discharged
10868 arrested
12461 reinstated

My figures and without the VVS. And not all of those arrested were shot.

What's more interesting is to see the impact at Army level.
1937 we have 144 300 officers in the Red Army - discharged as of May 1940 were only 7,7% ( 11034 people )
1938 we have 179 000 officers in the Red Army - discharged as of May 1940 were 3,7% (6742 people )
1939 we have 282 200 officers in the Red Army - discharged as of May 1940 were 0.08% ( 205 people )

But we were told the Red Army were decapitated, 50% of the officers shot, etc , etc. Utter bullshit!

What about the growth of the Army ?! Did the Wehrmacht have 282k officers in 1939 ? Somehow I doubt it.

yep. Tuhacevski, Egorov and Blucher. Voroshilov and Budeonii remained. Wouldn't have it been better had they shot all 5 ?

Actually there were 8 1st rank and they shot 5. Timoshenko, Shaphosnikov and Kulik. All 3 were marshals in 1940.

Have you heard of Frinovski Mikhail Petrovich ? He was the highest ranked of them. Too bad he had no relation whatsoever with the army. He was second in command of the NKVD and assisted Ejov in all the purges till spring 1939 when he himself was arrested. The killer becomes the victim. You see, most of those shot were Civil War stars, who's rise to fame was their cruelty and savagery. Pure chekists, they held military ranks.

Frinovski was narkom of the Navy, fleet commander. Someone who's real experience was fighting kulaks. Such a loss for the Navy!

link

Actually there were 10 2nd rank army commanders. How did they manage to shoot 12 ?

At the same time, the army was growing at a phenomenal rate. Everybody was moving up the ladder. It wasn't as if there was nobody to take the post.

The simply fact that most of whom survived finished the war in glory states that the purges did clean the Red Army of incapable blood thirsty chekists tugs who's only fame is having brought the Red Terror on the russian people. But since they held Army ranks, people assume they were true commanders.

Agenda? What's next, calling us nazi apologists because we don't buy the june 22 BS ?

Indeed. That's why millions of Red Army soldiers were hiding in the forests near the border in June 1941. They thought it's a nice idea to camp outside until 1942.

This post has been edited by PaulC on April 23, 2012 08:39 pm

Last I've heard, running a 22mil sq km country with 200million people isn't a one-man task.

In the 1st case they are liberators, in the 2nd they are seen as aggressors by western world.

You're playing semantics here.There was the possibility, but he believed they wouldn't so he was suprised. Does that make sense to you ? If we believed it was a possibility it shouldn't have been a surprise !

Yep. That's why they discussed 4 months in Moscow.

As you wish , US one :



Another one :



How interesting ! Friends, but ready to kill each other anytime..

How could he know in 1939 that Hitler would attack France in 1940 ? Secondly, as he said, he needed the western countries to exhaust themselves. He aim wasn't only to occupy Germany, but whole of western Europe. For that he needed western Europe to be in ruins.

Hitler asked danzig and the corridor. Had there been a common Anglo-French-Soviet front against him, he wouldn't have attacked Poland. That's why he sent Ribbentrop to Moscow, to get Stalin's neutrality, not the other way round !

You know that now. How could have he foreseen it in 1939 when German successes puzzled the Germans as much as everyone else ?

My google kung fu, says there are roughly 1800km.

A page above Victor you the Soviet Union had 9000 planes in the west. German reconaissance estimated 9500 as per my link. Germany had 1918 out of which 1280 operational ( I haven't heard anyone claim the Germans couldn't attack since they 40% of their planes were in need of repairs ). If the above difference, the number of the airfields, their proximity and the losses sustained don't ring any bells, I can't be anymore clear than that.

Since when did Stalin care how the Western World viewed him, his actions and world revolution? Not to mention that a Sovietized Germany would have been the greatest success of world revolution. So - being seen as aggressors by western world vs. achieving the great success of defending a fellow Soviet Germany. Hmm, not really a tough choice.

I'm not playing any semantics. 1. The agreements between France, Britain and Poland to give the latter support in case of an attack were public knowledge prior to August 23, 1939. 2. Hitler was apparently surprised by the declaration of war. Logical conclusion - Hitler was aware that Britain and France were compelled by treaty to help out Poland but he hoped they were initimidated enough not to do it.

Yep. That's why they discussed 4 months in Moscow.

I can't be sure what they discussed. At any rate, provided they told Stalin and Stalin had reason to trust them (despite Munich 1938), since Stalin refused to be part of any effort against Germany, how exactly was he to know that his decision wouldn't change their mind since it radically changed the whole European calculations? Again, no point in Stalin telling Hitler anything. They weren't even allies.

And you can already see a change in how things were portrayed. The Polish newspaper cartoon you first posted shows Germany kneeling before Stalin, the American cartoons don't show it like that.

I wasn't talking about 1939. I was talking about 1940. You said Stalin had set Hitler up, had prepared a trap with the non-aggression pact, had a massive army and was willing to attack. You also claimed 1941 was the best time to do it. I simply pointed out that if that was so then Stalin should have attacked in 1940.

Also, you claim that Stalin needed Western Europe in ruins and the Western countries exhausted. So why would he attack in 1941 instead of letting Britain and Germany exhaust each other?

That common front died in Munich, in 1938.

I see... so the smart Stalin could foresee in 1939 that the R-M Pact "will lead to war in the west; even if Germany beats Poland in autumn 1939, they can't do anything in the west until 1940; so in 1940 Germany is busy fighting in the west against France, England and the US supplying the allies" (quoting you) but in 1940 it can't realize it's a good moment to open a second front on Germany if his plan is to invade?

Beginning on 22 June 1941, over 3.9 million troops of the Axis powers invaded the USSR along a 2,900 km (1,800 mi) front,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa

Why do you think 2,000 airfields deployed in an area 1,500-2,000 km long by 250 km deep is too much? What should have been the "correct" number?

Also, you seem to know very accurately how many airplanes the Luftwaffe had, but did the Soviets?

This post has been edited by Imperialist on April 23, 2012 10:12 pm

The idea was to have the capitalists sent you the rope with which they will later be hanged. Western aid for the Soviet Union started even before the war with US providing assistance and allowing soviet engineers it its armament factories. The first british shipment of arms to the Soviet Union departed on June 12, 1941. How interesting, Britain on the verge of defeat, send weapons to the neutral Soviet Union.

We're not getting anywhere with this so I'll leave it like that.

They weren't allies ? Look at the cartoon again. When you both invade a country and divide Eastern Europe, you're de facto in some sort of alliance.

Nah, the German wolf is in the same bed with the Russian bear. The point I was making if it didn't stick apparently : we were told Stalin acted out of fear. That's not how the world perceived it at that moment. Either in bed, or walking together or kneeling, there is nowhere to see any fear in Stalin's depiction. At worst , they're equals. At best, Germany asks for permission to invade.

You talk as if mobilizing millions of people, doubling and tripling the weapons industry and equipping all of them is as if we're playing Red Alert, a few clicks and you have a new mechanized unit. When you factor in the socio-economic impact, it's pretty clear you need at least 2 years to reach maximum capability. More than that and you're on a downward slope already, keeping tens of millions of people in the army and the armaments industry is only possible in war time. During peace it will bankrupt the country.

1941 was 2 years since the massive soviet mobilization began. Long enough to get the active Red Army to over 5 million and a massive superiority in weapons, but short enough not to ruin the economy.

1940 soviet armament industry grew 52% over 1939 level, Germany grew 76% ( although in absolute numbers, the soviet was much larger )
1941 another growth of 70% for the soviets ( and this was achieved in the first months, since in the 2nd half most of it was being disassembled and shipped to the Urals ) while for Germany the growth was 0 .

From this simple element, soviet weapons growth was phenomenal in late 1940 , first half of 1941. Had the Soviets attacked, the industry would have probably exceeded the combined weapons production of Germany, Britain and the US. ( Germany and ww2, Volume 5, Chapter 5 , page 605 ).

His goal is to occupy Europe. For example , the 8th airborne corp ( Germany had 1 division, the soviets 10 corps ) was filled with spanish republicans. Were do you think he wanted to parachute them ? In Mongolia or Berlin ?

Stalin knew war in the west will start. He didn't know what the outcome will be, but made sure by helping Germany that France and England will be in a serious situation. And like I've said earlier, he needed time to prepare. In the meantime, all he had to do was to ensure Germany is not defeated ( that's why millions of tons of oil, rare metals, rubber, grains, flowed from East to West, bypassing the British blockade ).

That's because it goes from Murmansk to Odessa. The Soviets had no intention of fighting again in Finland and focused on Poland and Romania. From Konigsberg ( East Prussia ) to Odessa, the distance is much smaller.

Try to see things from the other perspective, not from what happened.

Britain was defending itself with like 30 airfields (of course, when you have 400-800 planes it's enough ).
There isn't a correct number; the point was the number was incredible HUGE. You're talking about it as if they are bags of popcorn. Can you imagine the logistical effort to create and maintain this number of airfields ? How many people, trucks, fuel, spare parts, etc ?

That equals war preparation for attack of an unheard scale. Britain was saved because when the pressure was to high on southern airfields, they retreated north, out of the range of German fighter-bombers.

Had the soviets put their airfields on the old border, 400-500km from the front line, there were few Luftwaffe planes that could attack them at all. But instead, they put airfields so close to the border that some were destroyed by German artillery or even machine gun fire.

Considering how good their intelligence was, I suppose they knew very well. Besides, the task for them was much easier. Far fewer airfields and far fewer planes to destroy on the ground with a surprise attack.

You're trying to change the subject. What Britain did in 1941 is irrelevant, we were talking about Stalin's alleged Politburo speech in 1939 and the logical errors that show up in it because Stalin was trying to pitch an ideologically controversial decision by wrapping it up in world revolution rhetoric although the decision was to do a deal with Nazi Germany.

No, a cartoon is irrelvant.

Who are "we" and who told "us" this? Nobody of relevance told me that. No teacher, no book.

And looking at how the world perceives a decision is not really proof of why the decision was taken.

No, I'm saying 1940 was strategically the best moment for Stalin to attack. After that moment slipped away there was no point in attacking in 1941. Stalin was in a position to mass troops on the border and wait...

Earlier you said his goal was a prolonged war in the West. In that case he had to attack in 1940, because only by opening a second front against Germany would a prolonged war be possible. Otherwise, helping Germany to avoid the effects of the blockade and to concentrate on one front is no way of prolonging anything. Maybe you should reconsider what you were told.

No intention of fighting again in Finland doesn't mean you don't need airfields and airplanes to cover that area. Once again you're showing that in your view airfields and airplanes are only for offence.

The area is huge too. 1,800-2,900 km by 250 km. Do you realize what 250 km means? From Iasi to Odessa in a straight line.

I think you should also consider the airplanes' combat radius and the Soviet doctrine of defence through counter-attacks. Putting all your airplanes 500 km away from your border is nuts.

You asked : Why would Stalin care how the western powers saw him ? The answer is simple : he needed to be seen as an liberator and thus given aid.
My point that you're entirely missed is that Stalin maneuvered in such a way that western help started before he even engaged in the war !

The cartoons and newspaper articles reflect the perception at the time. There is a contradiction between how people perceived events back then and how we are told they perceived them. Should be fairly easy to understand.

"We" = people who have read a few books on history including those edited under communist times and/or written by Red Army officers. There are a certain number of myths regarding the war. This is one of them.

And I'm saying that's bullshit since when Stalin ordered the secret mobilization to begin on August 19, 1939 he couldn't have possible known how 1940 would be unless he was related to Nostradamus which you seem to be in hindsight.

And you don't mass the troops on the border and wait, that's common sense. Why don't you camp out for a few month from April to July in the forests near the border, see the effect on condition, mental and physical, and on training.

A prolonged war was in his INTEREST, not his goal. His goal was a SOVIET EUROPE.

And helping Germany to avoid the blockade isn't prolonging the war ? How would Germany fight France and Britain without Soviet supplies ? Steam tanks and aircraft ?

Indeed. I'm generous : take 10 airfields and 200 planes to cover the finish 5 airfields in 100 planes. The fins have nothing better to do than to invade of their own the Soviet North.

30min for fighters and 50min for bombers. About the same distance during the Battle of Britain. Well inside the Luftwaffe umbrella and without early warning equipment it means a complete disaster. Which happened btw.

So what's your point ? That it was a good/neutral idea to have the airfields in that stretch ? That it doesn't matter ? Tell that to the thousands of pilots and thousands of planes destroyed in the early hours. The VVS disintegrated in the few days because if was "excellent" from a defense POV to have the airfields so close, run over by the Germans in the 2nd or 3rd day of operation.

There's no such things as defense through counter-attacks. Their plans were purely offensive and they were tested in January 1941 through massive war games. THey had 2 options, main attack in the north in Prussia or main attack in Galitia. The first option bogged down in the marshes and against German fortifications, the second was deemed viable and split the Wehrmacht in 2.

Had they put their plans 500km from the border and the troops 300km back ( on the Stalin line ) would have meant Barbarossa to end by late summer 1941, completely bogged down. The initial assault would have fallen in no mans' land, the Red Army is intact and same for the VVS. Whenever the Red Army entrenched ( Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, etc ) the German army couldn't break it's lines. Simply imagine the Panzer I and II storming massive fortifications...

But the soviets didn't care about defense at all. In fact, they left the fortified lines in shambles, when they needed them, they couldn't even find the keys to open the bunkers.

Not helping a Sovietized Germany because he needed "aid" from the capitalists is just silly. Makes absolutely no sense. An allied Soviet Germany was the Soviets' wet dream.

I understand, but I don't think perception is relevant for what we were talking about. I said Hitler and Stalin were not allies and you showed me some cartoon showing them holding hands or being in bed together. So what? That's no proof they were allies.

Was Stalin dead in 1940? No, he wasn't. So seeing Germany attacking France and being engaged in fighting with France and Britain, he could have opened a second front, taking Germany by complete surprise. Or maybe he couldn't. Fine. Then what's the point in attacking in 1941 if the propitious 1940 moment was lost?

According to Glantz that was exactly what the Soviet defence plan was, if my memory serves me well. Put the divisions at the border, on 3 echelons of various depth.

Yes, and that's why the idea that he wouldn't come to the aid of a Sovietized Germany is strange.

Not while you also allow Germany to concentrate all her might on one front!

My point is that you had to have airfields in that area.

The MiG-3 for example had a combat radius of 800 km. Putting it 500 kilometers from the border doesn't sound like a good idea to me. Also, giving the Germans 300 kilometers "for free" (no hard fighting) doesn't sound good either.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on April 24, 2012 05:38 pm

This is pointless so we'll agree to disagree on this.

No proof ? Division of Eastern Europe ? Common defeat of Poland ? Massive soviet supplies keeping the German war machine moving ? Discussions for the partition of spheres of influence ?
Not even Great Britain and France had that many things in common in 1940.

So in august 1939 he sets the date for the attack as summer 1941. At the same time orders are given to massively increase the Red Army. The industry is mobilized for the war effort. So are the transport, the naval infrastructure, etc. Millions are drafted.

9 months later, Germany attacks France and to everyone's surprise defeats it in just over a month. The opportunity was there, it was the best moment to strike the German army, all of it in the west.
But is it possible to cut your preparation, to shorten the schedule of 24 months to 10-12 ? I don't think so. In 1940, the Red Army was under a massive expansion, troops had to be trained, the coordination wasn't there, the factories were just ramping up producing the new models, stocks of fuel and ammunition weren't prepared, etc ,etc. The soviet rail system is slow, you can't quickly move troops around.


It's not like flipping a switch. Even if Stalin would have given the order on june 15 1940 to start the attack, the attack itself couldn't have come sooner than 3 months IMO. By that time, it's late September/October 1940, not exactly the best time to attack. The Germans have autobahns and lots of railways to move troops and supplies in the back. The soviets had marshes and dirt roads.

Really ? Did he produce any document, any memorandum, any report to present the wonderful defense plan that worked exceptionally well on June 22 ?

Let me help you with the real soviet plans. Until now, different sources show what their plans were for summer 1941 ( compiled by Mark Solonin ) :

Feel free to present the defensive plans of the Red Army for 1941.

This were the plans with actual deployment on a map :





What's interesting if we look at the disposition of forces : there are 2 bulges in the German line, one is at Bialostok, the other around Lvov and on the Carpathians ( Galitia ). The bulk of the soviet forces was positioned there. It was in strict accordance with the offensive plan. Marvelous position for attack, unrivaled disaster in waiting for defense.

What happened on june 22 ?

Panzer Group 3 and Panzer Group 2 acted as pincers, trapping the Bialostock bulge with the pincers meeting at Minsk on June 27. 420 000 soldiers, 4800 tanks and 9500 guns lost. The Western Front ceased to exist.

The Lvov bulge was destroyed in series of battles that culminated with the Uman, Sea of Azov and Kiev encirclements destroying the Southwestern front.

So where were those genius defense planned under which the soviets deployed ?

German might without oil and cut from the southern allies would have crumbled in days.

In the Soviet Union, a KV2 stopped the 6th Panzer for a day. I wonder with what would have the Germans stopped the T34s/KVs and tens of thousands of BTs and T26s/28 tanks...

The 300km were obtained for free when Poland was invaded. they would have given up land that they acquired 2 years before. What a tragedy...

Do you know why the Red Army survived 1942 ? Because it started to retreat. They realized they had so much land at their disposal that giving 300-500km was a no brainer. After Kharkov 1942, there were no more mass encirclement and hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Army Group South advanced over 500km from Kharkov to Stalingrad and over 1000km to Maikop without encountering major resistance. The German supply lines became drastically overextended and they stopped. That very moment the Red Army started to pounce on them.

To escape any pincer attack you need to retreat. Having left a 200-300km cushion would have made German advance clear and would have given the Red Army enough time to prepare proper counterattacks.

The French were defeated in the same way. They wanted to defend everything, but when you do that, you defend nothing. Had the French Army remained in France around Paris and not move to help Belgium, the German attack wouldn't have cut them in 2. I can only speculate on what would have happened if the French Army had been intact when the German main advance direction would be clear.

This post has been edited by PaulC on April 24, 2012 07:10 pm

To many of the questions raised by PaulC, I'll be very willing to hear an answer myself! In particular on the defense plans of the USSR, if it have even existed!

Yes, all those things don't make an alliance.

And this statement is based on what?

Nothing out of the ordinary in Europe in that period.

Do you know how many divisions Germany had in the East when it attacked France? Very very few, and of lesser quality than those committed in the West. The massive Red Army could easily have swept them away even if the preparation schedule you talk about was cut in half. The goal would have been to force Germany to divert units from the West, like in WWI, not to achieve complete victory.

If Stalin allowed this major opportunity to pass, although his goal was allegedly a repetition of WWI and prolonged war, why would he attack in the summer of 1941? After Germany settled the situation in Southern Europe and after it massed the bulk of its forces in the East? At that point Stalin's best move was to wait. The more time passes the more dependent Germany becomes of Soviet economic support. The more time passes the stronger the Soviet army becomes. The more time passes the higher the chances Germany would do something risky in the West (operation seelowe maybe?).

You can also look at how desperate Stalin was for the Allies to open a second front after 1941. He was obviously not content with fighting Germany all by himself. This also explains why in 1941 he dismissed all intelligence he received about an incoming German attack. He couldn't believe that and he didn't want to do anything rash about it because he didn't want war on these terms. So I seriously doubt Stalin would have started anything in 1941.

Cutting Germany's oil trade with Romania would mean war so you might as well invade it from the East. Stalin did neither, thus allowing Germany to concentrate all of its might against France. The outcome was not hard to figure out.

You don't give something up without a fight.

A fighting withdrawal is different from just vacating a large swath of land and allowing the enemy to get it.

There was a "cushion". Screening forces were deployed close to the border, the main units being farther inside the territory. Creating a huge cushion of 200-300 km with no units whatsovere in it is senseless.

BTW, according to Glantz the Luftwaffe destroyed 1,200 Soviet planes on the first day, by attacking... 66 airfields. Since the Soviets had deployed around 7,000 planes in the West, we could make a mathematical guess that they were probably deployed in some 380 airfields. Anyway, this is only a guess, but they were probably less than 500, not the 2,000 you talk about.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on April 25, 2012 10:16 am

That's a de facto alliance. Formalizing it would have been the SU to join the Tripartite Pact.

By ordering the mobilization ( with a corresponding increase of 3x by the Red Army ) on August 19 1939. In 2 years they had to act or demobilize the man or the country would collapse from the economic strain.

First of all he didn't want a repetition of WWI. He wanted Germany to win over the western allies and conquer them. That would leave their colonial empires in shambles,.

Secondly, he couldn't kill Germany before it did its job ( defeat the western allies ). And when Germany attacked he couldn't have possibly know that France and the BEF would be defeated in a matter of weeks. He wasn't Nostradamus.

He didn't get anything by waiting. The Soviet Union was strongest in 1941. As days passed, Germany was getting stronger and he technical superiority enjoyed by the SU in 1941 would have rapidly eroded.

As if it's the same starting the war on your terms or getting attacked and having the front line army destroyed...

Why did he dismissed the intelligence ? He didn't believe it ( as if that's an answer ) ?

You don't give something up without a fight.

Try not to put in absolute form everything I'm saying. I don't expect the Red Army, had they prepared for defense, to vacate land without a fight. But the idea is to keep your main forces out of the range of the first attack. Thus you can't be encircled in frontier battles. This is what they've done in summer 1942 and it saved the Soviet Union even if it allowed the Germans to get as far as Stalingrad and Maikop.

BS. The main forces were right on the frontier. Hundreds of head quarters were overran in the very first day. Entire divisions and armies were left without command.
On june 13 the entire 1st echelon comprising of 170 divisions moved right on the state border. At the same time, the 2nd echelon comprising of 70 divisions moved from inside the SU towards the western border. When the attack came , the 1st echelon was destroyed in border battles, being encircles and having fled abandoning all equipment ( how else to you believe the Red Army lost 20 000 tanks and over 78000 guns, about 6x and 2x respectively what the Germans had ) in the first two months.
The second echelon forces came into combat directly from their train carriages. The infantry can jump out and fight, but how do you pull down the KV1 at 45t and the ML20 field guns weighing 8t ?

In the 3rd part of the Last Republic the confusion of the first days is vividly described by Red Army officer testimony. I can upload those pages, they are fascinating.

They didn't had forces to attack more airfields. Given 1200 Luftwaffe planes ( 600 something involved in the first attack ) it means 10 per airfield. The Luftwaffe simply did not have enough power to strike decisively more airfields . Even so, in the following days the VVS was destroyed both on the ground and in the air, their pilots having little or no air-to-air training whatsoever.

And the 1200 are those destroyed by the Luftwaffe ( altough I have figures of over 2000 ) and many more were destroyed by artillery and overran by motorised forces in the very first hours of the campaign. That's a clear testimony how prepared they were for defense, having the airfield in artillery range in case of enemy attack.