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WorldWar2.ro Forum > The Interwar Period (1920-1940) > Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940


Posted by: dragos August 30, 2005 06:04 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 30 2005, 12:37 PM)
Yes, defeat is always a fact. In 1940 too the defeat was a fact, so why risk firing a shot? Lets save the country (well, whats left of it anyways).

Yes, obviously in 1940 Romania alone did not stand a chance against Soviet Union, surrounded by enemies and with no allies left on the continent. And yes, the country was saved (what has left of it) and remained as a sovereign nation, able to fight back another day, rather than being occupied and splitted up among the aggressors, as it happened to Poland in 1939.

Posted by: Imperialist August 30, 2005 07:47 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 30 2005, 06:04 PM)
Yes, obviously in 1940 Romania alone did not stand a chance against Soviet Union, surrounded by enemies and with no allies left on the continent. And yes, the country was saved (what has left of it) and remained as a sovereign nation, able to fight back another day, rather than being occupied and splitted up among the aggressors, as it happened to Poland in 1939.


Romania had to do the normal thing - resist. That action alone could have changed the political situation on the continent, so we cannot really know if we wouldnt have gained new allies.
The country was left to fight another day? What good is that if it didnt fight when it was the most needed?
As for split up, it was. Not on the level of Poland, but its territory was split up. The difference is that Poland fought, Romania didnt.

Posted by: dragos August 30, 2005 08:12 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 30 2005, 10:47 PM)
Romania had to do the normal thing - resist. That action alone could have changed the political situation on the continent, so we cannot really know if we wouldnt have gained new allies.

It is hard to believe it would have changed the political situation on the continent in the matter of the weeks it would have taken the Soviets to reach Bucharest. Maybe you can offer some clues on this. And also about the presumable new allies.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
The country was left to fight another day? What good is that if it didnt fight when it was the most needed?


Again, how can you say it was most needed to fight then, when the outcome was an univocal defeat, and possibly the disbanding of the Romanian state?

QUOTE
As for split up, it was. Not on the level of Poland, but its territory was split up. The difference is that Poland fought, Romania didnt.


The difference is that Poland ceased to exist as a state for the period of the Second World War.

Posted by: Zayets August 30, 2005 08:40 pm
I believe Imperialist meant that Poland fought her aggressor.The fact that outcome was an inexistent Polish state after the fights was an error suddenly repaired after 1945.They fought and they have gained respect.

Posted by: dragos August 30, 2005 09:06 pm
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 30 2005, 11:40 PM)
I believe Imperialist meant that Poland fought her aggressor.The fact that outcome was an inexistent Polish state after the fights was an error suddenly repaired after 1945.They fought and they have gained respect.

The outcome was 5 years of brutal occupation, death of milions of people (including the Polish Jews), the destruction of 90% of Warsaw (after the uprising) etc.

You talk of all of these as an error suddenly repaired in 1945? huh.gif

QUOTE
They fought and they have gained respect.


They fought believing that Great Britain and France would come to their help. They didn't. Would they have fought knowing they are alone? I'm not so sure.

Posted by: Imperialist August 30, 2005 09:15 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 30 2005, 08:12 PM)
Again, how can you say it was most needed to fight then, when the outcome was an univocal defeat, and possibly the disbanding of the Romanian state?

The difference is that Poland ceased to exist as a state for the period of the Second World War.

QUOTE
Again, how can you say it was most needed to fight then, when the outcome was an univocal defeat, and possibly the disbanding of the Romanian state?


A state exists only to facilitate the proper development of the nation's forces, and the unified exercise of leadership of the most able men of the nation. In case of war its supposed to direct the whole efforts of the nation towards a certain goal.
The state/statesmen have no right to forfeit parts of the territory and people living there only to insure its own survival. What kind of survival is that if its main cost is decreasing the nation's unified force by giving up land and people?
A state that does that only weakens the nation's morale and unified force. The state is useful only if it gathers the entire forces available and directs them were fellow nationals need them. When the romanians in Basarabia needed the military action of Greater Romania for the first time, they were left alone. When the romanians in Transylvania needed the military action of Greater Romania for the first time, they were left alone. The action might not have made a big difference, but that is not an excuse for not doing it.
Compare Romania's forfeiture of Transylvania with Hungary's refusal in WWI to heed to some hints to cede Transylvania to Romania in order to ensure the latter's participation on the side of the Central Powers. Even at the cost of losing the war, that forfeiture was rejected.

QUOTE
The difference is that Poland ceased to exist as a state for the period of the Second World War.


And yet its still there. Losing a state is not the end, continuing to live with a state that hinders the nation's development and put a stop to the natural reaction to resist and help fellow nationals, and that acts as the agent of imposing a detrimental treaty is far worse.

Posted by: Imperialist August 30, 2005 09:32 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 30 2005, 09:06 PM)

The outcome was 5 years of brutal occupation, death of milions of people (including the Polish Jews), the destruction of 90% of Warsaw (after the uprising) etc.

You talk of all of these as an error suddenly repaired in 1945? huh.gif

They fought believing that Great Britain and France would come to their help. They didn't. Would they have fought knowing they are alone? I'm not so sure.

QUOTE
The outcome was 5 years of brutal occupation, death of milions of people (including the Polish Jews), the destruction of 90% of Warsaw (after the uprising) etc.


This is not the way to look at it. What you mention is not the fault of those resisting, its the fault of the attackers. Their aggressiveness lead to these destructions, the Poles did what they had to do -- they defended their own.
(I also found somewhat similar way of thinking relating to the guerilla actions in Irak. The fact that Iraki people continue to die and infrastructure is destroyed is the fault of the insurgents who continue to resist, not the fault of the occupiers who decided to go in that country).
Sorry for the digression.

QUOTE
They fought believing that Great Britain and France would come to their help. They didn't. Would they have fought knowing they are alone? I'm not so sure.


Probably. But I think their main thought when fighting was about believing they are doing their most to defend their country, with or without the brits or french doing something too. And believing they kill an invader who has no right to be there.
The cavalry charge against tanks says something about their state of mind. Probably if those men were to act like romanian politicians, they would have saved their lives in order to fight another day. Maybe when stronger allies are on their side too.

Posted by: dragos August 30, 2005 09:37 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 12:15 AM)
A state exists only to facilitate the proper development of the nation's forces, and the unified exercise of leadership of the most able men of the nation. In case of war its supposed to direct the whole efforts of the nation towards a certain goal.
The state/statesmen have no right to forfeit parts of the territory and people living there only to insure its own survival. What kind of survival is that if its main cost is decreasing the nation's unified force by giving up land and people?

What is this, some kind of definition teached at the university of political studies?

QUOTE (Imperialist)
The action might not have made a big difference, but that is not an excuse for not doing it.


The point is the the action would have made a big difference, because it would have led to the destruction of the very state, but with no effect to the goal the action was targetted to.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
Compare Romania's forfeiture of Transylvania with Hungary's refusal in WWI to heed to some hints to cede Transylvania to Romania in order to ensure the latter's participation on the side of the Central Powers. Even at the cost of losing the war, that forfeiture was rejected.


Totally different situations (Austro-Hungary in 1916 and Romania in 1940).

Posted by: dragos August 30, 2005 09:54 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 12:32 AM)
Their aggressiveness lead to these destructions, the Poles did what they had to do -- they defended their own.

A good point, albeit involuntary. In 1940 Romania knew about the experience of both Polish campaign and Winter War in Finland (what the aggressors did).

QUOTE (Imperialist)
Probably. But I think their main thought when fighting was about believing they are doing their most to defend their country, with or without the brits or french doing something too. And believing they kill an invader who has no right to be there.


From what I have read, I think the Poles were basing on the intervention of the Western Allies. Maybe a Polish member can shed more light on this.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
The cavalry charge against tanks says something about their state of mind. Probably if those men were to act like romanian politicians, they would have saved their lives in order to fight another day. Maybe when stronger allies are on their side too.


The cavalry charge against the German tanks is nothing but a myth according to the Polish sources.

Posted by: Imperialist August 30, 2005 09:56 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 30 2005, 09:37 PM)

What is this, some kind of definition teached at the university of political studies?

The point is the the action would have made a big difference, because it would have led to the destruction of the very state, but with no effect to the goal the action was targetted to.

Totally different situations (Austro-Hungary in 1916 and Romania in 1940).

QUOTE
The point is the the action would have made a big difference, because it would have led to the destruction of the very state, but with no effect to the goal the action was targetted to.


What is this state you keep talking about? The state was destroyed with the parts of territory ceded. The Romanian state 1918-1940 ceased to exist.
Also, this kind of political thought sounds good. Very good. Anybody with a territorial claim and enough force to intimidate is enough to make a demand and promise the sovereignty of what will remain out of Romania and we'll roll over. Avoid "unnecessary" destruction and death. Its obvious we'd lose. I wonder what destruction is necessary in romanian eyes, if the destruction endured in defense of own territory and people is so unwanted.

QUOTE
Totally different situations (Austro-Hungary in 1916 and Romania in 1940).


Different? Maybe, maybe not. Think about it.

QUOTE
What is this, some kind of definition teached at the university of political studies?


I dont learn definitions by heart, and I dont retype definitions here. It has something to do with political thought nevertheless.








Posted by: dragos August 30, 2005 10:03 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 12:56 AM)
What is this state you keep talking about? The state was destroyed with the parts of territory ceded. The Romanian state 1918-1940 ceased to exist.

I meant Romania as a sovereign state, and not a foreign occupation regime as in Poland. I thought it was obvious.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
QUOTE
Totally different situations (Austro-Hungary in 1916 and Romania in 1940).


Different? Maybe, maybe not. Think about it.


Austro-Hungary was part of the Central Powers in 1916. Romania had no allies in 1940.

Posted by: Imperialist August 30, 2005 10:24 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 30 2005, 10:03 PM)

I meant Romania as a sovereign state, and not a foreign occupation regime as in Poland. I thought it was obvious.

Austro-Hungary was part of the Central Powers in 1916. Romania had no allies in 1940.

QUOTE
Austro-Hungary was part of the Central Powers in 1916. Romania had no allies in 1940.


Yes, but Romania ceded Transylvania in order to gain Germany as an ally. Austria-Hungary did not cede Transylvania to ensure Romania's allegiance to the already existing alliance. If you want to look at the context, ofcourse you can find plenty of differences. But the idea is the principle of not cedeing territory. The same happened after 1871 with Alsace-Lorraine. Decades later it will be decryed as the biggest mistake the fact that Germany did not cede back Alsace-Lorraine in order to secure a friendly France. However, cedeing things that easy like Romania did is very hard to find in the policy of respectable nations, and I'm sorry to say that. Mostly because it does not ensure a favourable outcome, and it only means renouncing a favourable position and weakening the state/nation. As a matter of fact, was Romania even certain that the partitions of 1940 will not be followed by a partition a la Poland? How could it be sure? Czechoslovakia's example was pretty clear too, not only Poland's. Giving up territory did not ensure non-occupation, resisting did not ensure victory. It was a matter of principles, in my opinion.

Posted by: dragos August 30, 2005 11:44 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 01:24 AM)
Yes, but Romania ceded Transylvania in order to gain Germany as an ally. Austria-Hungary did not cede Transylvania to ensure Romania's allegiance to the already existing alliance. If you want to look at the context, ofcourse you can find plenty of differences.

To settle the things straight, Romania did not cede Transylvania in order to gain Germany as ally, but because she was threatened with an all-out attack if she did not give in to the demands. The fact that Germany and Italy were guaranteeing the new borders were only a consequence of the Romania's submission.

In WW1 Austro-Hungary had no reason in cedeing Transylvania, simply because there were no negociations between Romania and AH regarding this aspect. Even if AH would have been aware of the Romanian negociations with the Entente, it wouldn't have been so much worried about it, being power bound with Germany.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
However, cedeing things that easy like Romania did is very hard to find in the policy of respectable nations, and I'm sorry to say that.


Other examples of less respectable nations in your opinion: Czechoslovakia, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Letvia, Lithuania.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
As a matter of fact, was Romania even certain that the partitions of 1940 will not be followed by a partition a la Poland? How could it be sure? Czechoslovakia's example was pretty clear too, not only Poland's. Giving up territory did not ensure non-occupation, resisting did not ensure victory. It was a matter of principles, in my opinion.


As I have said before, after the Vienna Diktat, the new borders were guaranteed by the Axis. But after the Soviet ultimatum, no guarantees indeed. However, it is to be noted that Romania was one of the strongest military powers among the minor nations.

Posted by: Imperialist August 31, 2005 12:04 am


What if Romania refused to open its territory for german troops to pass through Bulgaria against Yugoslavia. What if Romania refused to open its territory for Barbarossa. What would have remained out of Romanian state's sovereignty and "guaranteed" borders?

Posted by: dragos August 31, 2005 12:30 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 03:04 AM)
What if Romania refused to open its territory for german troops to pass through Bulgaria against Yugoslavia. What if Romania refused to open its territory for Barbarossa. What would have remained out of Romanian state's sovereignty and "guaranteed" borders?

Your hypothesis is unrealistic.

After signing the Tripartite Pact it is hard to believe that something like this would have happened. At least this is what Romania has gained after the territorial losses, guarantees of the territorial integrity, German missions to train Romanian troops, German AA batteries to protect Ploesti. It is the same Antonescu said about his coming to power: the last card to play for Romania.

Posted by: Imperialist August 31, 2005 03:14 am
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 31 2005, 12:30 AM)

Your hypothesis is unrealistic.

After signing the Tripartite Pact it is hard to believe that something like this would have happened. At least this is what Romania has gained after the territorial losses, guarantees of the territorial integrity, German missions to train Romanian troops, German AA batteries to protect Ploesti. It is the same Antonescu said about his coming to power: the last card to play for Romania.

You will always say these were the only things to be done and anything else was preposterous. Having the advantage of historical events already played out, you will always get on top. But thats easy.

Do you think Romania should have fought in 1940, or not?



Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 05:33 am
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 30 2005, 09:06 PM)
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 30 2005, 11:40 PM)
I believe Imperialist meant that Poland fought her aggressor.The fact that outcome was an inexistent Polish state after the fights was an error suddenly repaired after 1945.They fought and they have gained respect.

The outcome was 5 years of brutal occupation, death of milions of people (including the Polish Jews), the destruction of 90% of Warsaw (after the uprising) etc.

You talk of all of these as an error suddenly repaired in 1945? huh.gif

QUOTE
They fought and they have gained respect.


They fought believing that Great Britain and France would come to their help. They didn't. Would they have fought knowing they are alone? I'm not so sure.

What I have said:
QUOTE
The fact that outcome was an inexistent Polish state after the fights was an error suddenly repaired after 1945.


What YOU say I have said
QUOTE
The outcome was 5 years of brutal occupation, death of milions of people (including the Polish Jews), the destruction of 90% of Warsaw (after the uprising) etc.

You talk of all of these as an error suddenly repaired in 1945?


Notice the the big difference.The rest is just speculation from you part.You have no way of knowing what would happen.

Pleasant dreams.

Posted by: Iamandi August 31, 2005 06:27 am
Is good or bad to fight against your enemys? Is better to let them take provinces of your land, then to fight with all price?

What we will find in history? What do we learn from history? We (romanians, and other minor countrys) fought in asymetric wars, and some time we obtain victory, or we obtain a partial victory enough to survive in peace for a while.

I'm not so proud about Romania in ww2. I have a question: those who fight, those who die and those who were wounded, or who were POWs in East... in the great picture of second world war... they were the bad guys?

Ok. When you ask a romanian, we know what type of answer will say. But, in the large context of ww2 is not like that. We were bad guys - we were the allies of the bad guys, we fought against Uk, US,etc... so, we fought in that context even against Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, our ex. friends, no?

Who cares about Bessarabia? Western powers don't gives a... for that. That was a problem of our own, made by our own leaders. What western can say? Simply: "why you let Russians to take your land? we fought against who tryed that with our lands - so, why you don't?" - because a world war represents interests of a team, a group of nations, the common interests... and not of one single country. And Romania is a single one country. Who cares about a single one? Allies win against Axis with a team concept, with small countrys fighting against big powers and loosing, just to permit in future (to give enough time) to big powers to win and to liberate them.

Idealistic concept. What happens after world war 2 was... was what we know and what we live even in present days.

Final of this post: i think our leaders made a mistake to not opose to Soviet Union in '40. I think our soldiers were disapointed about that, and was in shame against himselfs. An Army exist to protect borders, not to retreat in face of the enemy whitout fight.

Iama

Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 06:37 am
Yes,our leaders at that time they had a great Army.Too bad they didn't knew what is the purpose of an Army.
I am also saying that we should oppose Soviets in 1940. Afterall Fins did it with notable success.

Posted by: Iamandi August 31, 2005 07:40 am
And like Fins, we don't have a coutry full of plain lands. We may use our relief in our advantage.

We can try to do a topic dedicated to what if with this subject. wink.gif I hope im not the only one interested in this ideea... So, let's or let's not start?

Iama

Posted by: dragos August 31, 2005 08:46 am
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 31 2005, 08:33 AM)
What I have said:
QUOTE
The fact that outcome was an inexistent Polish state after the fights was an error suddenly repaired after 1945.


What YOU say I have said
QUOTE
The outcome was 5 years of brutal occupation, death of milions of people (including the Polish Jews), the destruction of 90% of Warsaw (after the uprising) etc.

You talk of all of these as an error suddenly repaired in 1945?


Notice the the big difference.The rest is just speculation from you part.You have no way of knowing what would happen.

Pleasant dreams.

What are you talking about? What did I write and is speculation? blink.gif

The difference between the two statements is that yours is an oversimplified version of the facts.

Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 08:58 am
QUOTE
What are you talking about? What did I write and is speculation?

Let me refresh your memory...
QUOTE
They fought believing that Great Britain and France would come to their help. They didn't. Would they have fought knowing they are alone? I'm not so sure.


QUOTE
The difference between the two statements is that yours is an oversimplified version of the facts.

I am glad that you see a difference.FYI I was only responding to your statement.Simple and to the object.The fact that you want to extend the context is another story.You can't blame me for your incomplete post.Here it is the phrase I was responding to:
QUOTE
The difference is that Poland ceased to exist as a state for the period of the Second World War.

Posted by: sid guttridge August 31, 2005 09:20 am
Hi Guys,

I don't think that Romania had much choice.

Romania's only contracted ally against the USSR, Poland, had been destroyed in September 1939.

Romania's main guarantor, France, had just been conquered and its other guarantor, Great Britain, had been chased from the continent at Dunkirk.

Germany had already agreed to the USSR having Basarabia in August 1939. When the USSR unexpectedly added Bucovina to the list the Germans, whose entire army was then in France, could only compromise and agree to Northern Bucovina.

When Romania approached Italy for support, Mussolini advised that the ballance of Europe required Romania to concede. The Little and Balkan Ententes had no relevance to a confrontation with the USSR.

This only leaves Romania versus the USSR, with Hungary (which mobilised when the USSR sent Romania its ultimatum) and Bulgaria hovering in the background. This was such a mismatch that defeat in Basarabia and Bucovina was inevitable and the whole country might well have gone down to catastrophe.

The condition of the Romanian Army was poor. Its mechanisation was very limited, many divisions contained large numbers of unreliable minorities and only a proportion of the armaments ordered in the late 1930s (particularly anti-tank guns) had so far been delivered. The narrow fronts and advantageous weather conditions that had helped the Finns for a few months in the winter of 1939-40 were also not available to Romania in Basarabia in high summer of 1940.

There is more to national consolidation than fighting at every available opportunity. Italy was united without winning a single major battle against foreigners in the 19th Century. The Czechs played little role over 1938-45, yet the Czech Republic was greatly consolidated as a result. In 1940 Romania decided to bide its time. It was not glorious, but it was the pragmatic, and therefore probably the right, decision.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Imperialist August 31, 2005 10:43 am
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Aug 31 2005, 09:20 AM)


There is more to national consolidation than fighting at every available opportunity. Italy was united without winning a single major battle against foreigners in the 19th Century. The Czechs played little role over 1938-45, yet  the Czech Republic was greatly consolidated as a result. In 1940 Romania decided to bide its time. It was not glorious, but it was the pragmatic, and therefore probably the right, decision.


4 million romanians were given up in 1940. No shots fired. Basarabia is still lost, 65 years after the event. Romanians suffered a process of russification in Basarabia, russian colonists were brought. Even last year, in the region of Transdniester romanian schools were forcibly closed.
What did the State bid time for? 65 years. Still bidding time. Lets be real about this, the losses in 1940 had no expire date on them. The New Order in Europe could have lasted decades. The territories were lost. By the course of events, we luckily got back Transylvania.
A state that gives up that easily parts of its territory and large numbers of its people has something rotten in it.

edit -- another source says 6,8 million

Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 10:51 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 10:43 AM)
4 million romanians were given up in 1940. No shots fired.

Neville Chamberlain called this appeasement.It failed,eventually. 60 years later we learned the lesson.You do not negociate with [put your word here *)]

*) Hint : agressor,terorist,invader

Posted by: Imperialist August 31, 2005 10:56 am
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 31 2005, 10:51 AM)
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 10:43 AM)
4 million romanians were given up in 1940. No shots fired.

Neville Chamberlain called this appeasement.It failed,eventually. 60 years later we learned the lesson.You do not negociate with [put your word here *)]

*) Hint : agressor,terorist,invader

Well, in mid 1990s Romania signed a treaty with Ukraine, giving up any claims on disputed territories. The aim of the romanian "pragmatists" was to enter NATO, a stronger alliance. So, like in the good old times, they had to give up something.
8-9 years later, Ukraine starts building the Bastroe Canal.

Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 10:59 am
Yah,we are in NATO.What this will mean for us,we'll just have to wait and see.NATO seems to be US & UK nowadays.

Posted by: Victor August 31, 2005 11:09 am
Stick to the inter-war period. You want to discuss the treaty with Ukraine, you can do it in another topic.

Posted by: Imperialist August 31, 2005 11:27 am
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 30 2005, 11:44 PM)

To settle the things straight, Romania did not cede Transylvania in order to gain Germany as ally, but because she was threatened with an all-out attack if she did not give in to the demands.

On April 19th King Carol II, in a meeting with PM Tatarescu, Gafencu and Urdareanu, decided to resist militarily to whoever attacks, be it Germany or USSR.
On May 29th, after a similar meeting Carol decided to rely exclusively on Germany as an ally in Europe.
As a consequence, in August,
the Romanian army had 24 divisions facing the USSR and only 10 facing Hungary, the latter having to face 23 hungarian divisions on the other side of the border.
At the time of the Vienna diktat/arbitration/etc. Carol accepted the arbitration mostly because of the German guarantees for the rest of the romanian borders.
Giving this, I dont see why I was wrong saying that Romania ceded Transylvania in order to gain Germany as an ally.

Posted by: dragos August 31, 2005 11:39 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 01:43 PM)
4 million romanians were given up in 1940.
edit -- another source says 6,8 million

The total population lost in 1940 is 6,829,238, of which 3,421,000 Romanians.

Posted by: dragos August 31, 2005 11:45 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Aug 31 2005, 02:27 PM)
At the time of the Vienna diktat/arbitration/etc. Carol accepted the arbitration mostly because of the German guarantees for the rest of the romanian borders.

Submision to arbitration was voted in the Crown Council of 29/30 August 1940 with 21 votes for and 11 against.

Posted by: dragos August 31, 2005 12:44 pm
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 31 2005, 09:37 AM)
Yes,our leaders at that time they had a great Army.Too bad they didn't knew what is the purpose of an Army.
I am also saying that we should oppose Soviets in 1940. Afterall Fins did it with notable success.

Actually the Romanian Army of 1940 was not such a great army. Romanian Army was definitely not prepared for war, and in a rather poor condition.

For example, on 15 June 1940 the Romanian Army had (in brackets the required qty.):

mortars: 598 (1,695)
anti-tank guns: 668 (1,667)
infantry guns: 150 (1,183)
field guns: 1,545 (1,992)
AA guns: 72 (195)
howitzers: 564 (990)
tankettes: 35 (884)
tanks: 200 (640)

Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 12:51 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Aug 31 2005, 12:44 PM)
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 31 2005, 09:37 AM)
Yes,our leaders at that time they had a great Army.Too bad they didn't knew what is the purpose of an Army.
I am also saying that we should oppose Soviets in 1940. Afterall Fins did it with notable success.

Actually the Romanian Army of 1940 was not such a great army. Romanian Army was definitely not prepared for war, and in a rather poor condition.

For example, on 15 June 1940 the Romanian Army had (in brackets the required qty.):

mortars: 598 (1,695)
anti-tank guns: 668 (1,667)
infantry guns: 150 (1,183)
field guns: 1,545 (1,992)
AA guns: 72 (195)
howitzers: 564 (990)
tankettes: 35 (884)
tanks: 200 (640)

That didn't stopped her one year later to "invade" USSR along Germany.Many things happened in one year,heh.
Romanian Army , quantity wise , is not even today "such a great army".Quantity is subjective.

Posted by: dragos August 31, 2005 01:33 pm
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 31 2005, 03:51 PM)
That didn't stopped her one year later to "invade" USSR along Germany.Many things happened in one year,heh.

Yes, during 190/41 it was a big effort to improve the situation of the Army. For example, in 40/41 was imported and received equipment worth of 26.7 bilion Lei, while in 39/40 the received equipment was only of 9.3 bilion Lei. For the military industry it was allocated 225 milion Lei, while in 39/40, for the same purpose, only 75 milion.

Also the German military mission improved considerably the quality of the training of some of the troops and officers.

QUOTE (Zayets)
Romanian Army , quantity wise , is not even today "such a great army".Quantity is subjective.


Not only quantity of equipment was insuficient, but also the quality of the troop's training was low. This was proved in the first year of war, by the high rate of casualties among the junior officers and NCOs. At home, many were trying to evade being sent to front.

Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 01:56 pm
I tell you what,Army will never have enough.This is a very known fact.Problem is what they receive.
Anyway.for the sake of statistics,what for Lei are those?Actual,old.

QUOTE
Not only quantity of equipment was insuficient, but also the quality of the troop's training was low. This was proved in the first year of war, by the high rate of casualties among the junior officers and NCOs. At home, many were trying to evade being sent to front.


Oh yes? And they formed in one year time such a great army in term of training? Probably you have done the miltary service , you'd know that in few months you barely learn how to shoot the darn thing. Of course,elite troops have intensive training,but given the fact that new equipment entered less than one year training on new equipment will make them elite rookies.And don't forget we talk regular army,lots of "trupeti"

Posted by: dragos August 31, 2005 02:26 pm
QUOTE (Zayets @ Aug 31 2005, 04:56 PM)
I tell you what,Army will never have enough.This is a very known fact.Problem is what they receive.
Anyway.for the sake of statistics,what for Lei are those?Actual,old.

Statistics are in Lei of that time. And the problem was not that Army would never have enough, but that it had very little according to the needs of a unit at full capacity.

QUOTE (Zayets)
Oh yes? And they formed in one year time such a great army in term of training? Probably you have done the miltary service , you'd know that in few months you barely learn how to shoot the darn thing. Of course,elite troops have intensive training,but given the fact that new equipment entered less than one year training on new equipment will make them elite rookies.And don't forget we talk regular army,lots of "trupeti"


I didn't say that. I just noted that the training methods improved somewhat during 40/41 than in the previous years.

Posted by: mabadesc August 31, 2005 07:44 pm
QUOTE
Many things happened in one year,heh.


A lot of things DID happen in one year. The officers had 12 more months to study the switch from French-influenced defensive warfare to the new style of German offensive warfare.
And the soldiers had 12 additional months of drills and practicing new formations, techniques, etc...

You can actually learn a lot in one year, you know.

QUOTE
Quantity is subjective.


One may perhaps say that quality is subjective, but quantity is certainly not.

Posted by: Zayets August 31, 2005 08:01 pm
QUOTE (mabadesc @ Aug 31 2005, 07:44 PM)
QUOTE
Many things happened in one year,heh.


A lot of things DID happen in one year. The officers had 12 more months to study the switch from French-influenced defensive warfare to the new style of German offensive warfare.
And the soldiers had 12 additional months of drills and practicing new formations, techniques, etc...

You can actually learn a lot in one year, you know.

QUOTE
Quantity is subjective.


One may perhaps say that quality is subjective, but quantity is certainly not.

You do learn many things in a year,for sure.But not reforming a whole army.That's another thing for sure.I don't think I have to give you examples.The most common one is transition of Eastern Block armies from Soviet standards to NATO standards.And officers were to be trained abroad for 1-2 years,some of them in multiple batches.Not to mention elite troops (aviation,mountain,marine infantry etc)
Our troops learned in 1 year (40-41) everything.And don't give me the doodoo with drills.I know very well what drill was in the army from 1920-1940.I had two grandfathers doing these drills.In peace time I did more "drills" than they did when the draft came.
If you want to argue on this , fine.One thing is clear.You can't train an army in one year.And certainly you don't learn all your troops to use the new techniques in one year.That's why I say,there was a great army even before 1940 otherwise they would take way more time for "drills".Geeez.

Posted by: Imperialist August 31, 2005 08:03 pm
QUOTE (mabadesc @ Aug 31 2005, 07:44 PM)
The officers had 12 more months to study the switch from French-influenced defensive warfare to the new style of German offensive warfare.
And the soldiers had 12 additional months of drills and practicing new formations, techniques, etc...


Study they could, but with what were they going to do what they were studying?
Also, I've read that Antonescu, while war minister already introduced the new type of ideas, somwhere around 1939 if I'm not mistaken. I'll try to see where I read it.

take care

Posted by: mabadesc September 01, 2005 03:18 am
QUOTE
In peace time I did more "drills" than they did when the draft came.


Then you should know that drills aren't exactly rocket science and you don't need a decade to instill them into the troops.

For officers, it takes a lot longer because they're dealing with tactical notions and battle plans. Even so, one year is enough for them to become much more efficient in warfare.

I don't want to argue about this either, but you have to agree that the Romanian Army in 1941 was both qualitatively and quantitatevly superior to the one in 1939.

This does not mean that by 1941 they were ready and fully reformed. They still had a lot to learn, and their shortcomings were evidenced by various studies and comments made by battlefield generals at the end of the Bessarabia/Bukovina campaign, and later on after the Odessa siege.

But even though they still had a lot to learn, they were much more efficient than in 1939.

Posted by: Zayets September 01, 2005 05:30 am
QUOTE
I don't want to argue about this either, but you have to agree that the Romanian Army in 1941 was both qualitatively and quantitatevly superior to the one in 1939.


I do not contest that.All I wanted to say is that making an army in one year is just a dream.Besides,we talk about 1940-1941 timeframe.More precisely Sept 15th - June 22nd.You don't think that soldiers do everyday drills,do you? Because even in those times there was no big difference compared with today. And back then ,soldiers were from peaseants/workers category (that includes inferior officers),officers were educated people,often originating from wealthier people.Was no uniform pattern as today.Definitely army character was already formed by 1940,they didn't have to educate it one more year.Is practicaly impossible.And learning to use supposedly new technique AND BEING PROFICIENT takes time.More than a year.At least for the regular trooper.Officers,is adifferent story.If they have the good material,then he can apply what he learned in the school.You don't think Guderian learned the blitzkrieg in one year?He was just smart.And he had the good material.An army trained 5 years in a row combined with prussian officer type.That's a winner.But used by a maniac it will eventualy fail into oblivion.

Posted by: Zayets September 01, 2005 06:13 am
Interesting article in Jurnalul National Sept. 1st 2005.Link here :
http://www.jurnalul.ro/articol.php?id=5256

It has something to do with the subject of this thread

Posted by: sid guttridge September 01, 2005 10:16 am
Hi Guys,

I would suggest that the Romanian Army of 1941 was smaller, but qualitatively superior to that of 1940.

For a start, in 1940 there were large scale desertions by soldiers from the minorities, as a result of which the active 12th, 16th and 17th Divisions had to be disbanded. By contrast, in 1941 almost the entire Romanian Army manpower was ethnically Romanian and therefore much more uniformly reliable and motivated than in 1940.

(It should be pointed out that both the Poles and Yugoslavs had similar problems with the reliability of their minorities. It was a consequence of the still multi-ethnic composition of many of the supposedly national states created or expanded after WWI.)

In 1940 there were 11 very poorly equipped reserve divisions in the Romanian order of battle. Only one (35th) saw combat in 1941, suffered an early embarrassing reverse in Basarabia and all remaining reserve divisions were dissolved. Romania fought the rest of the war only with its better quality active divisions.

Over the winter of 1940/41 the German Military Mission to Romania trained 1st Armoured Division and 5th, 6th and 13th Infantry Divisions to more modern German standards.

As a result of the Oil Pact with Germany Romania got much Polish weaponry over the winter of 1940/41, including many hundred Bofors 37mm regimental anti-tank guns.

And so on......

The Romanian Army of 1941, although still suffering numerous weaknesses, was qualitatively significantly better than it had been in 1940. The Soviets apparently noticed this. The American journalist Alexander Werth, in his book "Russia at War" reports a Russian officer at Stalingrad as saying that the Red Army was surprised by the determination of the Romanian Army in 1941, given earlier events.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Imperialist September 10, 2005 09:09 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Aug 31 2005, 09:20 AM)
When the USSR unexpectedly added Bucovina to the list the Germans, whose entire army was then in France, could only compromise and agree to Northern Bucovina.

This only leaves Romania versus the USSR, with Hungary (which mobilised when the USSR sent Romania its ultimatum) and Bulgaria hovering in the background. This was such a mismatch that defeat in Basarabia and Bucovina was inevitable and the whole country might well have gone down to catastrophe.


The subtitle of the thread is "Implications".
I'll try some.

Given that the bulk of the German army was in France, Romania resisting the Soviets would have given an entirely new dimension to the situation in Europe. The Germans would have protested in advance any soviet pursuit of Romanian forces over the Prut, fearing that the oil fields would have fallen to the soviets. And I think the Soviets would have been satisfied with Bassarabia, and would have witheld further pursuit, not wanting to complicate the realtion with Germany unnecessarily.
If Hungary would have been hasty in entering Transylvania, in hope of winning it while the romanians were engaged in the East, the Soviet refusal to pursue over the Prut would have left them alone to face the Romania. I think that would make it a pretty balanced fight. By the time Germany turned around to settle the issue, and propose the Arbitration, the latter would have taken into consideration the military gains on the ground too, which presumably would have been at least more favourable than the actual Arbitration that we know in history, the Hungarians unable to penetrate that deep.
Bottomline, the resistance in Bassarabia would have been a token morale and experience resistance, not a decisive one. But in my view, it was necessary.

Now, this is the rough sketch of what I consider to be the "implications". I dont have time now to integrate into this all the numbers and military dispositions at the time.
I hope it will provide a framework for further debate for all of us here.

take care

Posted by: sid guttridge September 12, 2005 12:17 pm
Hi Imperialist,

So, in essence, by fighting for Basarabia, the result would have been exactly the same as not fighting for it, with the exception that Romanian losses would presumably have been much higher than the 30,000+ men actually lost during the "peaceful" withdrawal over 28 June - 3 July 1940.

It also strikes me that it would be far more likely that the Red Army would cross what is now the frontier if it was in a state of war with Romania than if Romania conceded the Basarabia and Northern Bucovina as actually happened. We know this because we have Zhukov's battle plan for exactly that eventuality. It included a major encirclement operation in which one armoured pincer from the direction of Cernauti was to sweep down behind the Prut and enter Iasi from the north-west, while a second reached Iasi from the east via Chisinau.

Furthermore, if Romania didn't concede at least Southern Bucovina (which was Stalin's originally intended demand) as well after the fall of Iasi, the Red Army would have had little choice but to pursue the war westwards on Bucharest and the oil fields until it was concluded.

It is difficult to be sure where the Red Army would have eventually stopped, but we can be pretty certain that it was nowhere north of Iasi.

The proposed benefits of such an unfortunate experience on morale are obscure, whereas the material damage to the Romanian Army and additional territorial losses are pretty clear.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: sid guttridge September 12, 2005 12:27 pm
P.S.

There is a map of Zhukov's proposed operation on:

http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/index.html

It can be entered at the bottom of the final page, where it is the fourth map down.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: dragos September 12, 2005 12:39 pm
Here it is:

user posted image

Posted by: Imperialist September 12, 2005 12:43 pm

QUOTE
It also strikes me that it would be far more likely that the Red Army would cross what is now the frontier if it was in a state of war with Romania than if Romania conceded the Basarabia and Northern Bucovina as actually happened. We know this because we have Zhukov's battle plan for exactly that eventuality.


No, we dont know that. Zhukov's was a battle plan, he was not empowered to take the political decision to cross the border. That was Stalin's decision to make, and considering its implications, I dont think we know he would have taken it.

QUOTE
Furthermore, if Romania didn't concede at least Southern Bucovina (which was Stalin's originally intended demand) as well after the fall of Iasi, the Red Army would have had little choice but to pursue the war westwards on Bucharest and the oil fields until it was concluded.


I dont think so. The war was a limited one, over Bassarabia. Pursuing the war westwards was not necessary.

QUOTE
It is difficult to be sure where the Red Army would have eventually stopped, but we can be pretty certain that it was nowhere north of Iasi.


Sure, it could have gone as far as Berlin... tongue.gif
The point is that we are not interested where the Red Army would have eventually stopped, we are interested where Stalin's politics would have stopped it.

QUOTE
The proposed benefits of such an unfortunate experience on morale are obscure, whereas the material damage to the Romanian Army and additional territorial losses are pretty clear.


And the goal is to keep the Army with no material damage? Why does the army receive money from the budget year after year, though it is peace? To make the best it can the moment its war, not turn around to avoid material damage...
The fact that later on material damage was bareable at Stalingrad, is ironic and sad.

Posted by: sid guttridge September 12, 2005 01:28 pm
Hi Imperialist,

There were two variants of the Soviet military plan. Variant 1 using full force, was to be employed if Romania fought. Variant 2, using lesser forces, was to be employed if Romania conceded peacefully. Variant 2 was actually employed. Stalin had already agreed to both and which was employed was entirely dependent on Romanian reaction.

Pursuing the war westwards would not have been necessary if Romania had conceded after the fall of Iasi. On the other hand, you would presumably have Romania fight on, which would have given the Red Army little choice but to do the same.

Damage to the army would be acceptable if it was likely to bear results not achievable by diplomatic means. In June 1940 in Basarabia and Bucovina no such results were likely.

Romania had watched two of its allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland, both disappear off the map completely in the previous two years and three more countries, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, in the previous fortnight. Romania was looking at the real possibility of extinction as a nation state if it fought. There was more at stake in mid 1940 than just Basarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea.

That Romania was not congenitally indisposed to fight for these provinces under any circumstances is illustrated by the successful campaigns in Basarabia in July 1941 and Northern Transilvania in September-October 1944. There the wider geo-political and military tide was with Romania, unlike in mid 1940, when it was very much against.

Fighting is not an end in itself. It is a tool to be employed at the right moment.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Victor September 12, 2005 01:44 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Sep 10 2005, 11:09 PM)
The subtitle of the thread is "Implications".
I'll try some.

Given that the bulk of the German army was in France, Romania resisting the Soviets would have given an entirely new dimension to the situation in Europe. The Germans would have protested in advance any soviet pursuit of Romanian forces over the Prut, fearing that the oil fields would have fallen to the soviets. And I think the Soviets would have been satisfied with Bassarabia, and would have witheld further pursuit, not wanting to complicate the realtion with Germany unnecessarily.

There were many provocations on the Romanian-Soviet frontier in August 1940, during the crisis involving Northern Transylvania. Stalin was ready t otake advantage of a probable Romanian-HUngarian conflict and annex morte territory. Somehow I am not very convinced he would have settled only with one half of Moldavia. Later that year, Soviet marines occupied some islands in the Danube Delta, killing several Romanian frontier-guards in the process, without fear of complicating the relationship with Germany.

Posted by: Imperialist September 12, 2005 02:18 pm
QUOTE
Romania had watched two of its allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland, both disappear off the map completely in the previous two years and three more countries, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, in the previous fortnight. Romania was looking at the real possibility of extinction as a nation state if it fought. There was more at stake in mid 1940 than just Basarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea.


This is simply sad, because its the same foolish appeasement like in the late '30s. The falseness of the idea that there is anything to be "saved" by giving up territory was supposed to be a lesson learned from WWII.
Also, by the losses you mention, the Romanian nation state was severely hit in its demographic, economic and military potential. No one could guarantee that this was not one step in the complete piece-by-piece dismantling of the state. Given the Czechoslovak example, this was a highly likely possibility.

Posted by: sid guttridge September 13, 2005 11:40 am
Hi Imperialist,

I don't think that Poland can be accused of appeasement in September 1939, yet it, too, was extinguished as a nation state.

Romania was severely hit by the losses of 1940. However, it was not as severely hit as mere numbers would imply. Approaching half the population loss was of minorities, not Romanians.

Economically Romania was also severely hit, but the vital core of the economy, the oil fields, remained in Romania hands.

Militarily I would suggest that Romania was not much weakened. The USSR apparently returned some of the weaponry lost in Basarabia. No significant weaponry was lost elsewhere. It is true that 12th, 16th and 17th Infantry Divisions were disbanded after the territorial losses, but this was because the minorities in them had deserted in significant numbers. So they were not necessarily an asset in the first place. The severest military weakening was in the geo-strategic sphere. The buffer provinces had been stripped away and the core of the country was under much more direct threat. This was, indeed, serious.

Romania's solution to securing the core of the country was to get a German guarantee of its rump in 1940. This never turned into a German occupation, so Romania managed to retain internal sovereignty and a nation state, unlike the Czechs, the Poles, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, the Estonians and later the Yugoslavs.

Romania was in a virtually impossible situation in mid 1940 and it doesn't appear that fighting then could have done anything to improve it. However, it might well have made the situation very much worse.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Imperialist September 13, 2005 01:42 pm
QUOTE
Romania was severely hit by the losses of 1940. However, it was not as severely hit as mere numbers would imply. Approaching half the population loss was of minorities, not Romanians.


Well, the mere numbers are 4 million romanians lost, and 2 million minorities. Those minorities were integrate in the economy, despite their nationality.

QUOTE
Economically Romania was also severely hit, but the vital core of the economy, the oil fields, remained in Romania hands.


QUOTE
Romania's solution to securing the core of the country was to get a German guarantee of its rump in 1940. This never turned into a German occupation, so Romania managed to retain internal sovereignty and a nation state, unlike the Czechs, the Poles, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, the Estonians and later the Yugoslavs.


The "sovereignty" was conditioned. One could hardly talk about sovereignty. As long as Romania pomped oil and went along deep into Russia, the appearance of sovereignty was kept. Sure, there was some level of internal sovereignty, but that is not uncommon in any system of external domination, on condition the internal sovereignty does not interfere with the general lines of the relation.

Posted by: bogmih September 13, 2005 03:17 pm
Imperialist, Poland fought in 1939, yes, and gained the respect of the entire world. But after the end of the war, the Russians didn't give back the teritory occupied. It is logical to think the same would have happened with Basarabia and N. Bukovina, even if we had fought. Not fighting simply spared the lives, resources and - possibly - teritories of Romania. Who knows if Russia would have settled only for the original teritories with their armies in Bucharest?

Posted by: Imperialist September 13, 2005 04:31 pm
QUOTE (bogmih @ Sep 13 2005, 03:17 PM)
Imperialist, Poland fought in 1939, yes, and gained the respect of the entire world. But after the end of the war, the Russians didn't give back the teritory occupied. It is logical to think the same would have happened with Basarabia and N. Bukovina, even if we had fought. Not fighting simply spared the lives, resources and - possibly - teritories of Romania. Who knows if Russia would have settled only for the original teritories with their armies in Bucharest?

They had their armies in Bucharest.They settled with the whole country under their domination, territorially they only wanted Bassarabia. However, that happened after the germans lost the war. I doubt the russians would have marched into Bucharest in 1940.
One certainly cannot compare the Soviet capability of marching without impunity towards the west displayed in 1944-45 with the far more balanced and politically cautionary period of 1940.

Not fighting did not spare the resources and lives and territories of Romania. It spared "some" territories, "some" lives and "some" resources. By forfeiting others. Now, this might look very realpolitik to some, but actually it is not. Appeasement cannot be confused with realpolitik.

Posted by: dragos September 13, 2005 05:01 pm
I doubt the in case of war in 1940 the Soviets would have stopped in Moldavia. They tried to force the borderline before and after the ultimatum of June 1940. They were also ready to intervene in case of Romanian - Hungarian hostilities, under the pretext of backing Hungary's claims. Stalin's brutal interventionist policy was far from cautious.

Had Romania concluded, it is likely that Soviet Union would retain a larger territory than the previously demanded through ultimatum, as it happened to Finnland. And given the spheres of influence after the war, any territories ceded to Soviet Union would most likely have been lost forever.

Even if the troops of the Red Army wouldn't have entered Bucharest, in a country destabilized by war a puppet regime was easier to set, by either of the great powers interested in the region.

In all, the consequences resulting form an war without hopes with Soviet Union could only have been worse, not better.

Posted by: Imperialist September 13, 2005 08:37 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 13 2005, 05:01 PM)
In all, the consequences resulting form an war without hopes with Soviet Union could only have been worse, not better.

The people that reject war from the start because its without hope in their mind, close the doors to any hopes that could appear, and submit completely. Other states orient themselves and their interests in relation to the war. If resistence is not put up, to what will they orient to? The war comes first, hopes follow.

Stop speaking with hindsight and put yourself in that moment. Somebody asks you to cede territory or be attacked. Will you cede or will you resist? If you do cede, where will you stop? Who will demand something next and will you be ready to cede next? Given your smaller power from the previous forfeits, how will you resist now when you finally grasp whats next?
Romania would have had Czechoslovakia's fate if it werent for other plans for it.
To think that it didnt turn into a Czechoslovakia has something to do with the correctness of the decisions taken is absurd.

The question is no longer of better or worse, but right or wrong. Was it right for the romanian soldiers to die in the russian steppes while 1 year earlier they werent good enough to die for their land in the politicians' view? Were they "saved" at the price of romanian land so that they can be
better wasted on russian soil?

take care

Posted by: Dénes September 14, 2005 12:06 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Sep 12 2005, 06:43 PM)
QUOTE
It also strikes me that it would be far more likely that the Red Army would cross what is now the frontier if it was in a state of war with Romania than if Romania conceded the Basarabia and Northern Bucovina as actually happened. We know this because we have Zhukov's battle plan for exactly that eventuality.


No, we dont know that. Zhukov's was a battle plan, he was not empowered to take the political decision to cross the border. That was Stalin's decision to make, and considering its implications, I dont think we know he would have taken it.

We do know. The Soviet Union was prepared to resort to war if her demands would not met by Bucharest:

QUOTE
Telegram

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 23, 1940-9:26 p. m.

Received June 23, 1940-11:20 p. m.

No. 1200 of June 23

Reference your telegram No. 1065 of the 22d and my telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [76]


Molotov made the following statement to me today: The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The Soviet claim likewise extended to [the entire, D.B.] Bukovina, which had a Ukrainian population. (...)

SCHULENBURG

Posted by: Imperialist September 14, 2005 07:07 am
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 14 2005, 12:06 AM)

We do know. The Soviet Union was prepared to resort to war if her demands would not met by Bucharest:

QUOTE
Telegram

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 23, 1940-9:26 p. m.

Received June 23, 1940-11:20 p. m.

No. 1200 of June 23

Reference your telegram No. 1065 of the 22d and my telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [76]


Molotov made the following statement to me today: The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The Soviet claim likewise extended to [the entire, D.B.] Bukovina, which had a Ukrainian population. (...)

SCHULENBURG

I wasnt referring to the decision to resort to war, but to the decision to go beyond Bassarabia and Bukovina. That wasnt Zhukiv's decision to take, though he had plans ready in case Stalin decided to take it.

Posted by: dragos September 14, 2005 07:45 am
QUOTE (Imperialist)
The people that reject war from the start because its without hope in their mind, close the doors to any hopes that could appear, and submit completely. Other states orient themselves and their interests in relation to the war. If resistence is not put up, to what will they orient to? The war comes first, hopes follow.


I don't agree with this. A favorable moment can appear, as it happened in 1941. Some even consider that Romania was virtually at war with the Soviet Union since 28 June 1940, when Soviet Union became an aggressor forcing the border with military before Romania answered the ultimatum, and the evacution of Bessarabia and Bukovina was only a strategical retreat until 22 June 1941.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
Stop speaking with hindsight and put yourself in that moment. Somebody asks you to cede territory or be attacked. Will you cede or will you resist? If you do cede, where will you stop? Who will demand something next and will you be ready to cede next? Given your smaller power from the previous forfeits, how will you resist now when you finally grasp whats next?


I have stated my opinion regarding this specific situation. I can't answer your generic question.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
Romania would have had Czechoslovakia's fate if it werent for other plans for it.
To think that it didnt turn into a Czechoslovakia has something to do with the correctness of the decisions taken is absurd.


The risk of turning into the Czechoslovakia's case disappeared after the Vienna diktat, as Germany and Italy guaranteed the remaining borders.

QUOTE
The question is no longer of better or worse, but right or wrong. Was it right for the romanian soldiers to die in the russian steppes while 1 year earlier they werent good enough to die for their land in the politicians' view? Were they "saved" at the price of romanian land so that they can be
better wasted on russian soil?


Please don't come up with such simplifications. Who said that the Romanian soldiers were not good enough to die for their land? About carrying military operations on the territory of Soviet Union, yes, it makes sense from a strategic perspective. The way these operations were employed is a different story, but this is not the point here.

Posted by: Imperialist September 14, 2005 07:57 am
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 14 2005, 07:45 AM)
The risk of turning into the Czechoslovakia's case disappeared after the Vienna diktat, as Germany and Italy guaranteed the remaining borders.

Please don't come up with such simplifications. Who said that the Romanian soldiers were not good enough to die for their land? And about carrying military operations on the territory of Soviet Union, yes, it makes sense from a strategic perspective. The way these operations were employed is a different story, but this is not the point here.

The risk never disappeared. The very fact of trusting German and Italian guarantees was a risk. Nobody could have known if those were genuine guarantees or a way of making the politicians accept the first step in the weakening of the country.
I dont have the time to search now, but wasnt Czechoslovakia assured of its safety after the Sudetenlands were forfeited?

The decision to continue the ops in russian lands makes sense from a strategic point of view only because Romania was then completely in Germany's sphere of influence or domination. And the same strategic point of view was to appear when Romania was in Soviet sphere of domination and had to go beyond Transylvania.

Posted by: dragos September 14, 2005 08:14 am
With the guarantees of Germany and Italy, Romania had no option but to shift in the German sphere of influence, with a pro-German policy. I think you realize that Romania couldn't have remained isolated at the middle of interest of two great powers, in a moment when the fate of the European nations was being decided. It had to go with one side or another.

Posted by: Imperialist September 14, 2005 08:41 am
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 14 2005, 08:14 AM)
With the guarantees of Germany and Italy, Romania had no option but to shift in the German sphere of influence, with a pro-German policy. I think you realize that Romania couldn't have remained isolated at the middle of interest of two great powers, in a moment when the fate of the European nations was being decided. It had to go with one side or another.

Yes, and like I said (I think on this thread) Carol already decided in favour of Germany, placed the bulk of the Army to face the soviets whom he considered to be the main enemy and gave up the idea of resisting in the face of the Diktat, choosing to sign the Arbitration in return of being accepted in Germany's sphere.


Posted by: dragos September 14, 2005 08:57 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Sep 14 2005, 10:57 AM)
I dont have the time to search now, but wasnt Czechoslovakia assured of its safety after the Sudetenlands were forfeited?

No, the borders were guaranteed only by France and Britain. Hitler said that he would guarantee the borders only after Czechoslovakia would have appeased the demands of Hungary and Poland, but even after the First Vienna Award, Germany did not offer any guarantee.

Posted by: Dénes September 14, 2005 12:11 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 14 2005, 02:57 PM)
the First Vienna Award

Wasn't that one also a 'Diktat' to you? Or only the second one? biggrin.gif

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos September 14, 2005 03:42 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 14 2005, 03:11 PM)
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 14 2005, 02:57 PM)
the First Vienna Award

Wasn't that one also a 'Diktat' to you? Or only the second one? biggrin.gif

Gen. Dénes

I do not know much of the circumstances of this event, but my guess is that it had the same character of a diktat. Am I wrong?

Posted by: dragos September 14, 2005 04:35 pm
I think you are right. After the infamous act of appeasement of Hitler's demand of Sudetenland, the further aggressions on Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement were between the CHARGES AND PARTICULARS OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND ASSURANCES CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THE COURSE OF PLANNING, PREPARING AND INITIATING THE WARS:

QUOTE

XX

Charge : Violation of Assurances given on 11th March, 1938, and 26th September, 1938, to Czechoslovakia.

Particulars: In that Germany, on or about 15th March, 1939, did, by establishing a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under duress and by the threat of force, violate the assurance given on 11th March, 1938, to respect the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic and the assurance given on 26th September, 1938, that, if the so- called Sudeten territories were ceded to Germany, no further German territorial claims on Czechoslovakia would be made.

XXI

Charge: Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29th September, 1938.

[Page 46]
Particulars :

    (1) In that Germany on or about 15th March, 1939, did by duress and the threat of military intervention force the Republic of Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of the Czech people and country into the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.

    (2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakian State as provided for in Annex No. I to the Munich Agreement.




http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-01/tgmwc-01-01-10.html

It is safe to assume that both Vienna Arbitrations or Vienna Diktats had the same character of violation of international treaties, preparing and initiating the war.

Posted by: Carol I September 14, 2005 06:29 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 14 2005, 01:06 AM)
We do know. The Soviet Union was prepared to resort to war if her demands would not met by Bucharest:

QUOTE
Telegram

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 23, 1940-9:26 p. m.

Received June 23, 1940-11:20 p. m.

No. 1200 of June 23

Reference your telegram No. 1065 of the 22d and my telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [76]


Molotov made the following statement to me today: The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The Soviet claim likewise extended to [the entire, D.B.] Bukovina, which had a Ukrainian population. (...)

SCHULENBURG

Dénes, you forgot about Schulenburg's telegram No. 1244 dispatched on 27 June at 4:40 p.m.

QUOTE
Molotov just now informed me through his Chef de Cabinet that Soviet troops would cross the Romanian border early tomorrow morning, if the Romanian Government did not give a favourable reply to the Soviet demands today.

Posted by: dragos September 14, 2005 07:10 pm
According to the Soviet plan 1 (authorized to be used in case Romania rejected the ultimatum), the 12th and 9th Soviet Armies, supported by 5th Army, had to strike towards Jassy, in order to destroy the bulk of the Romanian troops in the north. The 9th Army had as the main objective the ocupation of Kishinev sector, then, together with 12th and 5th Armies had to complete the encirclement of the Romanian troops in northern Bessarabia. Between 11 and 26 June the Soviet units moved in position of attack. On 19 June, at Proscurov, took place special exercises, with the participation of the military councils and corps commanders, in order to familiarize with the plan of operations, and with the designated missions. By 23 June, each of the 40 Soviet divisions knew its combat mission thoroughly. It has been studied in detail a number of issues, such as the use of air force, the operations behind the combat zone, the evacuation and care of the wounded, the handling of POWs, the recording, usage, maintenance and evacuation of the war booty, the military-administrative organization of the occupied territories etc.

According to the plan of operations, in both variants, airborne assaults had to be carried out in order to cut off the enemy and to create diversions behind the Romanian lines. On 25 June 1940, the Air Force of the Southern Front received the order of dropping paratroops near the town of Târgu-Frumos (beyond the Prut River). The airborne assault had to be preceded by massive air bombardments on Romanian military objectives. In order to achieve the success of the operation, the Soviet forces carried out reconnaissance in force, such as the forcing of the Dniester River at 0435 hours of 28 June, near Kashilovka village (south of Kamenets-Podolsk), with two platoons, that initiated fight with Romanian troops. Behind the front, Marshal Timoshenko attested the setting up of a large number of field hospitals, anti-epidemic centres, mobile detachments of surgeons and 12 hospital trains. For the wounded were also available the hospitals of Lvov, Tarnopol and Proscurov, with the capacity of 32,400 beds.

Source: RIM 4(10), 1991

Posted by: Dénes September 14, 2005 09:03 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 14 2005, 10:35 PM)
It is safe to assume that both Vienna Arbitrations or Vienna Diktats had the same character of violation of international treaties, preparing and initiating the war.

Wrong. Both Vienna Arbitrations actually prevented war, not "preparing and initiating" a war, as you suggested.
But this is already off-topic.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos September 15, 2005 07:13 am
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 15 2005, 12:03 AM)
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 14 2005, 10:35 PM)
It is safe to assume that both Vienna Arbitrations or Vienna Diktats had the same character of violation of international treaties, preparing and initiating the war.

Wrong. Both Vienna Arbitrations actually prevented war, not "preparing and initiating" a war, as you suggested.
But this is already off-topic.

Gen. Dénes

Well, I'm sorry, but it's part of the charges of Nuremberg Trial.

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-01/

Naturally, there were also other aggressors ready to pick up the crumbs off the Hitler's table, such us Mussolini or Horthy.

Posted by: sid guttridge September 15, 2005 09:55 am
Hi Imperialist,

A point of information.

In your post of Sep 13 2005, 01:42PM you corrected my formulation, "Approaching half the population loss was of minorities, not of Romanians" by stating that "the mere numbers are 4 million Romanians lost, and 2 million minorities".

In fact, according to official Romanian figures, the total loss of population in Basarabia, Northern Bucovina, Morthern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea was 6,161,317, of whom 3,029,928 (49%) were minorities.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Imperialist September 15, 2005 01:28 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Sep 15 2005, 09:55 AM)


In fact, according to official Romanian figures, the total loss of population in Basarabia, Northern Bucovina, Morthern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea was 6,161,317, of whom 3,029,928 (49%) were minorities.


According to http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=2415&view=findpost&p=38095 the numbers are:

QUOTE

The total population lost in 1940 is 6,829,238, of which 3,421,000 Romanians.


I'd rather go with his numbers.

thanx


Posted by: sid guttridge September 16, 2005 10:34 am
Hi Imperialist,

My source is "Spatiul Istoric si Etnic Romanesc" Volume III (Editura Militara, Bucuresti, 1993), pp.76-77. Its source is "Harta Etnografica a Romaniei dupa Rezultatele Recensamentului din 1930" by Dr. Sabin Manuila (Director al Institutului Central de Statistica al Romaniei).

It contains two sets of statistics about the lost areas of 1940. The first (p.76) are the 1930 census figures. The second (p.77) are for the "situatia probabila in 1940".

I gave you some 1930 figures last time. The 1940 estimates are as follows:

Province - Total population - Romania population - Romanian percentage

Basarabia & N. Bucovina - 3,748,198 - 1,962,613 - 52.4%
N. Transilvania - 2,603,832 - 1,305,066 - 50.1%
S. Dobrogea - 407,515 - 106,534 - 26.2%
TOTAL of Lost Territories - 6,759,098 - 3,374,329 - 49.9%

These are very close to Dragos's numbers but very different from yours.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: sid guttridge September 16, 2005 10:46 am
Hi Dragos,

Given that 1940 population figures are all estimates,I guess there are bound to be differences in detail. Where are yours from?

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Zayets September 16, 2005 12:04 pm
Hi Sid,
I fail to see the problem.You said that Imperialist numbers are very different from yours.You also said that your numbers are very close to Dragos' ones. And Imperialist said before that he'd rather go with Dragos' numbers. What is your problem then?
Not to mention that you said :
QUOTE
In fact, according to official Romanian figures, the total loss of population in Basarabia, Northern Bucovina, Morthern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea was 6,161,317, of whom 3,029,928 (49%) were minorities.

Then you come and say that :
QUOTE
Province - Total population - Romania population - Romanian percentage

Basarabia & N. Bucovina - 3,748,198 - 1,962,613 - 52.4%
N. Transilvania - 2,603,832 - 1,305,066 - 50.1%
S. Dobrogea - 407,515 - 106,534 - 26.2%
TOTAL of Lost Territories - 6,759,098 - 3,374,329 - 49.9%


The last count is very close to Dragos numbers (as you pointed out) but very different from what you said previously,yet you said Imperialist gave these numbers!!!

Posted by: Imperialist September 16, 2005 12:55 pm
QUOTE (Zayets @ Sep 16 2005, 12:04 PM)
And Imperialist said before that he'd rather go with Dragos' numbers. What is your problem then?

He wants me to admit publicly and for the record that my 4 million romanians - 2 million minorities were wrong.
Though I have a source for those numbers too, on closer scrutiny I decided the source could be wrong (being a personal recount of the events) and more accurate numbers are probably available. So, like I said, I do go with Dragos' numbers.
Sid is just doing his part in being "sanitarul forumului" laugh.gif and weeding out any deviations from 100% accuracy. However, I still maintain my main point, that the "numbers" are not minor at all, even if they go down from 4 million to 3,X million romanians "ceded".

take care

Posted by: Zayets September 16, 2005 01:06 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Sep 16 2005, 12:55 PM)
Sid is just doing his part in being "sanitarul forumului" laugh.gif and weeding out any deviations from 100% accuracy. However, I still maintain my main point, that the "numbers" are not minor at all, even if they go down from 4 million to 3,X million romanians "ceded".

One will have a problem thinking that Sid could ever be the board "sanitar" giveing the fact that he also posted numbers which are far from 100% accuracy.
Is like giving the wolf the sheperd stick the guard the sheeps.

Posted by: Dénes September 16, 2005 02:40 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 15 2005, 01:13 PM)
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 15 2005, 12:03 AM)
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 14 2005, 10:35 PM)
It is safe to assume that both Vienna Arbitrations or Vienna Diktats had the same character of violation of international treaties, preparing and initiating the war.

Wrong. Both Vienna Arbitrations actually prevented war, not "preparing and initiating" a war, as you suggested.
But this is already off-topic.

Gen. Dénes

Well, I'm sorry, but it's part of the charges of Nuremberg Trial.

Don't push the envelope, Dragos. dry.gif The Nuremberg Trials have nothing to do with the Vienna Arbitrations (the actual events, that is).

BTW, the trial's papers call the event as "Vienna arbitration", not 'diktat'. Even Ion Antonescu calls it the same way: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/02-12-46.htm

QUOTE
Naturally, there were also other aggressors ready to pick up the crumbs off the Hitler's table, such us Mussolini or Horthy.

You should not mix Horthy with Mussolini (or Hitler).
Now that you mentioned the Nuremberg Trials, Horthy was present there only as a witness. He was not convicted as a war criminal.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos September 16, 2005 05:11 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 16 2005, 05:40 PM)
Don't push the envelope, Dragos. dry.gif  The Nuremberg Trials have nothing to do with the Vienna Arbitrations (the actual events, that is).

Review my post of Sep 14 2005, 07:35 PM (GMT+2)
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=2415&view=findpost&p=38822

QUOTE (Denes)
BTW, the trial's papers call the event as "Vienna arbitration", not 'diktat'. Even Ion Antonescu calls it the same way: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/02-12-46.htm


Ok, you want me to find a statement of Antonescu where he calls it diktat ? smile.gif
Don't forget that for the Vienna Arbitration/Diktat there is a different topic.

QUOTE
You should not mix Horthy with Mussolini (or Hitler).
Now that you mentioned the Nuremberg Trials, Horthy was present there only as a witness. He was not convicted as a war criminal.


Why should I not mix them? Both were aggressors looking to exploit the achievements of Germany, for their illusionary imperialistic dreams.

Posted by: sid guttridge September 16, 2005 05:41 pm
Hi Zayets,

I think Imperialist has answered your point for me.

Now that he has adopted figures that are almost the same as those in my source, we have no further points of significant difference on this issue.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Dénes September 16, 2005 06:07 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 16 2005, 11:11 PM)
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 16 2005, 05:40 PM)
Don't push the envelope, Dragos. dry.gif  The Nuremberg Trials have nothing to do with the Vienna Arbitrations (the actual events, that is).

Review my post of Sep 14 2005, 07:35 PM (GMT+2)
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=2415&view=findpost&p=38822

I did, but I didn't get the point.

QUOTE
QUOTE (Denes)
BTW, the trial's papers call the event as "Vienna arbitration", not 'diktat'. Even Ion Antonescu calls it the same way: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/02-12-46.htm


Ok, you want me to find a statement of Antonescu where he calls it diktat ? smile.gif


Don't bother. I've already made my point.

QUOTE
QUOTE
You should not mix Horthy with Mussolini (or Hitler).
Now that you mentioned the Nuremberg Trials, Horthy was present there only as a witness. He was not convicted as a war criminal.


Why should I not mix them? Both were aggressors looking to exploit the achievements of Germany, for their illusionary imperialistic dreams.

Quote: "Don't forget that (...) there is a different topic."

Would you be so kind to specify what did Horthy actually do? (in the separate topic, of course).
As for the "illusionary imperialistic dreams" quote, I really have no comments. rolleyes.gif It sounds like an excerpt from CVT's or GF's speech.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Zayets September 16, 2005 09:08 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Sep 16 2005, 05:41 PM)
Hi Zayets,

I think Imperialist has answered your point for me.

Now that he has adopted figures that are almost the same as those in my source, we have no further points of significant difference on this issue.

Cheers,

Sid.

Sid,you are quite a character wink.gif

Posted by: Imperialist September 16, 2005 09:18 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Sep 16 2005, 05:41 PM)
Hi Zayets,

I think Imperialist has answered your point for me.

Now that he has adopted figures that are almost the same as those in my source, we have no further points of significant difference on this issue.

Cheers,

Sid.

OK, so the ~ 626,000 difference between my number and yours was a point of significant difference, or you wanted me to state something for the public record... tongue.gif
I think the latter is the case, because that ~ 626,000 difference doesnt affect the point that the numbers were intended to support (an important demographic loss after the Arbitration). Not a bit.

Posted by: sid guttridge September 17, 2005 10:39 am
Hi Imperialist,

Your original statistics were significantly misleading. You contended that twice as many Romanians as minorities were lost in the territorial cessions of 1940. In fact almost the same number of Romanians as minorities were lost, as we are now agreed.

Anyway, now that we are essentially in agreement on the figures, harmony reigns again.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: dragos September 17, 2005 02:07 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 16 2005, 09:07 PM)
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 16 2005, 11:11 PM)
QUOTE (Dénes @ Sep 16 2005, 05:40 PM)
Don't push the envelope, Dragos. dry.gif  The Nuremberg Trials have nothing to do with the Vienna Arbitrations (the actual events, that is).

Review my post of Sep 14 2005, 07:35 PM (GMT+2)
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=2415&view=findpost&p=38822

I did, but I didn't get the point.



For everyone to read again:

QUOTE

XX

Charge : Violation of Assurances given on 11th March, 1938, and 26th September, 1938, to Czechoslovakia.

Particulars: In that Germany, on or about 15th March, 1939, did, by establishing a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under duress and by the threat of force, violate the assurance given on 11th March, 1938, to respect the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic and the assurance given on 26th September, 1938, that, if the so- called Sudeten territories were ceded to Germany, no further German territorial claims on Czechoslovakia would be made.

XXI

Charge: Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29th September, 1938.

[Page 46]
Particulars :

    (1) In that Germany on or about 15th March, 1939, did by duress and the threat of military intervention force the Republic of Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of the Czech people and country into the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.

    (2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakian State as provided for in Annex No. I to the Munich Agreement.




http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-01/tgmwc-01-01-10.html

Absoultely nothing to do with the first Vienna Arbitration... laugh.gif


Posted by: Imperialist September 17, 2005 02:16 pm
On July 1st 1940 Romania renounces the british-french guarantees.
On July 2nd, King Carol II sends a letter to Hitler, asking for a military mission and a guarantee for the borders. Does anyone know Hitler's answer to the letter?
On July 11th Romania withdraws from the League of Nations.

Posted by: dragos September 17, 2005 02:47 pm
But this topic is about the Soviet ultimatum...

Posted by: Carol I September 17, 2005 05:58 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ Sep 17 2005, 03:16 PM)
On July 2nd, King Carol II sends a letter to Hitler, asking for a military mission and a guarantee for the borders.

"Yes" for the military mission but "not exactly" for the guarantee of the borders. Carol II only asked "to help and protect us in these trying times."

QUOTE (Imperialist @ Sep 17 2005, 03:16 PM)
Does anyone know Hitler's answer to the letter?

Hitler avoided to give a firm answer by sending the following reply on 3 July 1940: "In view of his desire to see peace and quiet preserved in the Balkans, the Führer would like for his part to learn the views of the King of Romania as to how and in what form he visualises the final pacification of the region after the Romanian-Russian revision question has been settled.”

Posted by: Carol I September 17, 2005 06:02 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ Sep 17 2005, 03:47 PM)
But this topic is about the Soviet ultimatum...

Carol II's message of 2 July 1940 - to which Imperialist makes reference - mentioned: "We possess reliable information indicating that the Russians intend to go beyond the fixed line of demarcation for the purpose of approaching or seizing the oil fields; this is also evident from their military operations."

Posted by: Victor September 18, 2005 05:22 am
QUOTE (Carol I @ Sep 17 2005, 07:58 PM)
"Yes" for the military mission but "not exactly" for the guarantee of the borders. Carol II only asked "to help and protect us in these trying times."

Carol II tried to obtain German guarantees several times before 1940. Talks with Göring often resulted in the impression for the Romanian diplomats that the Germans would give such guarantees and efforts were made to try make them happy.

See this older thread: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1568

Posted by: Carol I September 18, 2005 09:58 am
QUOTE (Victor @ Sep 18 2005, 06:22 AM)
QUOTE (Carol I @ Sep 17 2005, 07:58 PM)
"Yes" for the military mission but "not exactly" for the guarantee of the borders. Carol II only asked "to help and protect us in these trying times."

Carol II tried to obtain German guarantees several times before 1940. Talks with Göring often resulted in the impression for the Romanian diplomats that the Germans would give such guarantees and efforts were made to try make them happy.

See this older thread: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1568

I was merely referring to Carol II's message of 2 July 1940. In it there is no direct mentioning of guarantees, only "help and protect", apparently in a general sense.

Posted by: Carol I September 18, 2005 07:11 pm
Reading through the diplomatic correspondence from the time of the Romanian-Russian crisis of June 1940, I have found an interesting paragraph according to which England recognised the Balkans as a Russian sphere of influence as early as 1940.

Telegram no. 2 (743) of 27 June 1940 sent by the German Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop) to the Legation in Romania:
QUOTE
It is particularly significant that recently the new English Ambassador in Moscow [Sir Stafford Cripps] - as Molotov openly informed the Italian Ambassador - practically encouraged the Soviet Government to take action in the Balkans by declaring to Molotov that hegemony in the Balkans belonged to Russia.


Do you have more information about this? Is there any official British document confirming this situation? Not necessarily a full agreement, but a telegram, report or memorandum specifying the recommended line of action for the British diplomats? This happened well before the October 1944 meeting between Churchill and Stalin when the south-eastern Europe was carved up into British and Soviet spheres of influence.

Posted by: Carol I September 18, 2005 07:18 pm
Even King Carol II suggested that England had agreed on the partition of Romania in June 1940.

Killinger's report of 30 June 1940 on Romania, with reference to the Russian crisis conversations with General Moruzov, Minister Urdăreanu and King Carol:
QUOTE
The King spoke as follows:
...
And do you realise that Russia and the others who are pursuing a pro-Russian policy in the Balkans are, in the last analysis, working for your enemy, England? You surely know of the celebration held by the British engineers at the Astra Română, where they got drunk and exclaimed: "Now is the time!" They celebrated even before we, you and I, knew anything about the Russian ultimatum. (This is a fact.)


Do you have more details on the episode involving the British employees at Astra Română?

Posted by: sid guttridge September 21, 2005 08:40 am
Hi Carol I,

The two references to British (not English) attitudes are pretty thin evidence of anything - a fourth-hand account transmitted by the Moscow diplomats of countries hostile to the UK and an ambiguous remark attributed to an anonymous drunken British engineer of no apparent official authority whatsoever! I think you are right to ask for more corroboration.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Carol I October 05, 2005 06:25 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ Sep 21 2005, 09:40 AM)
The two references to British (not English) attitudes are pretty thin evidence of anything - a fourth-hand account transmitted by the Moscow diplomats of countries hostile to the UK and an ambiguous remark attributed to an anonymous drunken British engineer of no apparent official authority whatsoever! I think you are right to ask for more corroboration.

I know there could be many explanations for the two quotes mentioned above (e.g., the former could have been a way to discourage the Romanians, while the latter was an attempt to raise some sympathy from the Germans). Nevertheless, as they are from official documents, I think they are worth pursuing somewhat further.

Posted by: Imperialist May 30, 2006 08:41 pm
Hi guys,

were you aware of the existence of a November 2nd 1939 letter from the Rmanian embassy in Moscow which informs MAE about a discussion with the american ambassador in which he said that the russians and some circles in France expect Bassarabia to be ceded without a fight the moment the demand for it is issued by USSR?

Posted by: Kosmo March 06, 2008 10:28 am
First of all I don't see the benefits of preserving the state and the army if they fail to defend the nation. As results of 1940 and 1944 Romania lost large parts of it's teritory and her independence for 50 years seriously compromising her future.
I'm not saying that fighting would have brought better results but the policy that was carried was an obvious failure. Fighting would have not brought an worse result.
Second, the military threat was not as great as it seems. The Red Army was huge but not very good and her offensive capabilities limited. They had lost most superior officers in the Great Purge, the soldiers were poorly trained and led and they had not sufficent trucks to mount rapid offensives. Nistru was a serious obstacle while Bukovina it's good defensive land with mountains and forests.
The hungarians were obviously in worse condition then romanians after a long period of disarmament. The number of units with good fighting capabilities was small.
The romanian army would have fought defensive battles, an easier task then it had to carry latter in Basarabia or Odessa. For a poorly equiped and led army defence it's much easier then attack while the equally strong enemies would have greater problems attacking.
Germany would have been forced to take a position on this war and to stop the soviets conquering or coming to close to the oil fields. The first things that they could do would be to stop the hungarians from attacking Romania and the second to wage war on the soviets. This is a "what if" but it's obvious that with the fall of the West Hitler was spoiling for a fight with the commies. A romanian-soviet prolonged war would have created the conditions for a change in german attitude towards Romania and USSR.
Even if Romania would have fell then she would have received better treatment at the end of the war from the Allies. After all we were defeated in WW1 but still Romania doubled in size at the peace negotations.

Posted by: Victor March 06, 2008 08:59 pm
QUOTE (Kosmo @ March 06, 2008 12:28 pm)
Even if Romania would have fell then she would have received better treatment at the end of the war from the Allies. After all we were defeated in WW1 but still Romania doubled in size at the peace negotations.

The situation was totally different from WW1 and the comparison is without value. I for one fail to see how you came to this conclusion.

See for reference Poland's case, which ended up with less territory and rampaged by war, even though it was the first enemy of Germany and its soldiers never set foot in Russia (except as POWs following Stalin's short military cooperation with Hitler). At least many parts of Romania were saved from the destruction and brutalities of war. That alone was an accomplishment.

I understand that there is a tendency in many Romanians to imagine what if scenarios that would have miraculously changed history and made the Communist nightmare go away. It is, in my opinion, pointless, as things could not have possibly been better unless both Nazism and Communism would have been destroyed, something which wasn't possible and does not constitute the purpose of this topic.

You made a lot of assumptions that can easily be countered with solid arguments.

1. The Red Army was not going to face the Wehrmacht, but a poorly equipped and organized Romanian Army (compared with 1941). Furthermore it only faced half of the Romanian armed strength. The following forces were concentrated in the Southern Front:
- 32 rifle divisions
- 2 motorized rifle divisions
- 11 tank brigades
- 6 cavalry divisions
- 3 airborne brigades
- 30 independent artillery regiments and various other units
These forces could have easily be multiplied or replaced in case of losses, as the Red Army was big enough. The Red Army was also superior in terms of tanks, airplanes and artillery. I can give you examples of successful (to a point) Soviet offensive actions in 1941, without any LL trucks. Only this time there was no German mobile reserve to save the day.

2. The Dnestr was a weak barrier without an appropriate in depth defense, which was impossible with so little forces and practically almost no reserves, something which was seen both in 1941 and in 1944. Romania had 20 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions and 1 mountain brigade facing the Soviet Union. Facing Hungary were 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 mountain brigades and one motorized brigade, while on the Bulgarian frontier were 4 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 1 frontier-guard brigade and one cavalry brigade. No real reserves existed. 9 of these "infantry divisions" were reserve units with little military potential. Resistance would have been short lived in the East under these circumstances.

3. With most of the Wehrmacht in the West, the battle of Britain just beginning, it is impossible to think that Hitler would take on the Soviet Union with his pants down. It is also debatable and would require some more information the influence Hitler could exert on Hungary once the Rubicon has been crossed and with the Soviets backing Hungary's claim on Transylvania.

4. Stalin was out to get as much as he could. If he was given the chance, tehre would have been a Romanian SSR after the war. not just the Moldovan SSR. A good example is the fact that initially Stalin wanted to annex the entire Bukovina and only the German opposition to the idea made him settle for the Northern part. During the August 1940 crisis, the Soviets created several provocations along the Prut and were probably ready to enter the rest of Moldavia, had a war with Hungary had started. In the autumn of 1940 Soviet marines occupied several islands in the Danube Delta, killing Romanian frontier-guards (the islands are now part of the Ukraine).

Posted by: Imperialist March 07, 2008 12:18 am
QUOTE (Victor @ March 06, 2008 08:59 pm)
See for reference Poland's case, which ended up with less territory and rampaged by war, even though it was the first enemy of Germany

At least many parts of Romania were saved from the destruction and brutalities of war. That alone was an accomplishment.

So one would expect Romania to be ahead of Poland because it was not devastated by war in 1940 in the degree it would have been if it would have decided to fight and not to give in. But it is not.

Maybe some parts were saved by the destruction of war but so were the enemies saved from any pain from their actions and they inexpensively got what they wanted.

Posted by: Kosmo March 07, 2008 09:01 am
1-2.
The soviets had not the ability to carry a rapid offensive so even if they pushed the romanian army back the front would have been shortened due to geographic position. In 1944 the romanian army did not defend the Dniestr so no comparison could be made. The Red Army in 1940 was very different then that in 1944.
Even with less organizations and weapons in 1940 the task of defence was easier then attack.

3. Hitler's effort against Britain was half harted so he would, maybe, welcome a distraction as an escuse to abandon the risky attack on Britain. Hitler's influence on Hungary was big enough to stop their actions against Slovakia in 1939. The risk of Germany fighting against the soviets would have made the hungarians more carefull in joining a soviet attack. Romanian relations were much better in 1940 then during the times of Titulescu.

4. Stalin wanted to get what he could, but he was extremely cautios about the risks he would face. He was actually the best politician of his age and would not make such error like anexing Romania. After all he did not anexed Finland despite his military victory and the fact that he wanted to restore tzarist borders.

Romania did not fight then but had to fight 4 years for her masters with enourmous losses, sufering invasion and massive bombardments only to have her army and the country thrown in slavery whith the borders amputated and the same occupant she managed to avoid before. I don't see any benefit from our policy. It was a disastrous improvisation with dire consequences that will never be completly mitigated. And moral is among those scars. We would have avoid giving up land, changing sides or making war crimes

In 1916 Little Romania attacked against overwhelming odds showing guts, lost the war, won the peace and large teritories toghether with respect.

Posted by: Iamandi March 07, 2008 09:19 am
Anyone can say something about Focsani - Namoloasa - Galati guns, mortars & co?

Iama

Posted by: Victor March 07, 2008 11:32 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 07, 2008 02:18 am)
So one would expect Romania to be ahead of Poland because it was not devastated by war in 1940 in the degree it would have been if it would have decided to fight and not to give in. But it is not.

Maybe some parts were saved by the destruction of war but so were the enemies saved from any pain from their actions and they inexpensively got what they wanted.

I assume you are refering to today's economical situation? If so this has little to do with what happened almost 70 tears ago and it is a very simplistic view of things.

For those who do not know, Poland:
- suffered enormous destruction during the war
- was occupied for the entire duration of the war
- several million Polish citizens were exterminated (both Polish and Jewish)
- lost territories to the Soviet Union at the war's end
- received some parts of German territory in exchange and had to expell Germans living there in order to make place for refugees coming from the part that was annexed by the SU
- became Communist by force

The fact that they managed to break free from Communism earlier than Romania did and build a better future (same for Hungary and the Czech Republic), despite the terrible losses they had to make up for is laudable. Romania had a head start, but is still lagging behind. However, this is not the subject of the topic.

Posted by: Victor March 07, 2008 12:38 pm
Kosmo,

I must say you are over simplifying. It is true that the Red Army of 1944 was very different from that of 1940, but then again so was the Romanian Army of the 1944 from that of the 1940.

Despite your claim that the Red Army was not able to carry a rapid offensive in 1940, the battle of Khalin Ghol in 1939 is a good example of such an operation, where massed artillery, armor and mechanized forces achieved victory over an infantry force.

And in 1944, the Romanian units did defend the Dnestr: the 3rd Army and the Tobulkhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front launched the offensive in that very sector, acting as the left pincer in the German 6th Army's envelopment.

There is nothing easy about defense when one lacks the effective means to defend oneself. Like I said, there were almost no strategic reserves available and the mobility of the local reserves was limited (the motorized brigade was in Trasylvania, facing the Hungarians). The ARR had a lower strength in 1940, than it did in 1941 and would have to be divided between East and West, thus we can safely assume a Soviet air supremacy. The firepower was lower than in 1941, despite the superior number of soldiers.

As half-hearted as you claim Germany's effort against Britain was, it took up time and valuable ressources. Hitler did indeed want to attack the Soviet Union, but in June 1940 his army was for most of it in France. It takes time to move the neccessary men and material across Europe, to build the supply bases, the infrastructure, to plan. The Soviet Union was a big target and many preparations were needed.

Regarding the relations between Romania and Germany in that period, there is a good book on it by Rebecca Haynes. They were not that good. Better than when Tituelscu was in charge, but not good. Germany had a pact with the Soviet Union and it intended to respect it.

In my opinion (yes, also a supposition), Hitler would rather join Hungary in invading Romania, trying to reach Ploiesti before the Soviets would, than attack the SU. It made much more sense and it was achievable.

Romania suffered much losses, but in my opinion it could have suffered even more in case of German-Soviet occupation (see the Polish example). Remember the German occupation of Wallachia in 1916-18. Most likely the vast majority of the Jews would have been killed and not only a part, as it happened. I am convinced that those Romanians who commited war crimes would have assisted the Germans in applying the final solution (like it happened in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc.). The entire Romanian territory would have turned into a battlefield during the war. The USAAF bombardments would not have been avoided, as the oil and refineries would still be there (France was bombed intessively before D-Day without remorse). The Soviet Union would emerge victorious and would annex whatever Stalin would please and Romania would not escape Communism.

Thus we would have more people killed durign the war, more destruction and would still be under Soviet occupation, maybe even with less territory. I really do not see any gain in this situation.

Regarding the moral issue, it would not be the first time territory was given away without a fight: Bukovina, Oltenia, Braila, Giurgiu, Bessarabia and then Southern Bessarabia come to mind.

Posted by: Imperialist March 07, 2008 12:51 pm
QUOTE (Victor @ March 07, 2008 11:32 am)
I assume you are refering to today's economical situation? If so this has little to do with what happened almost 70 tears ago and it is a very simplistic view of things.

The fact that they managed to break free from Communism earlier than Romania did and build a better future (same for Hungary and the Czech Republic), despite the terrible losses they had to make up for is laudable. Romania had a head start, but is still lagging behind. However, this is not the subject of the topic.

Why do you say it is very simplistic?

You compared war destruction, occupation, territorial and demographic losses suffered by Poland mostly on its own soil vs. the "achievement" of Romania sparing most of its soil from that fate.

One would expect to see that achievement reflected in a slightly better comparative development for Romania vs. a certain retardedness in Poland's development. But that is not the case. The war destruction, the losses were recuperated. Poland was ahead of us even under communism. Romania would have recovered from the war destruction too.

So the issue comes down to these undeniable facts:

1) it was the duty of the state to resist aggression with all available means;
2) the army "ate" funds for 22 years in view of fighting when the time came, not of giving up territories without opposition;

Maybe Romania was right in not resisting the Soviet Union, but it should have resisted Hungary. It could have done that.

Posted by: dead-cat March 07, 2008 01:51 pm
the mood in Poland was allways more defiant vs. the SU AND the communists, partially for the influence of the Catholic Church. also, Poland didn't enjoy a 20+ year domination by an illiterate cobbler who turned an entire country into his personal circus.
other than that, for some time, Poland was high up in the SU priority list (until the 80ies to be more specific when the the GDR became the most reliable ally), unlike Romania.
but by far, the largest damage was done by the "carpathian genius".

QUOTE

Maybe Romania was right in not resisting the Soviet Union, but it should have resisted Hungary. It could have done that.

it would not have been Hungary alone.

Posted by: Imperialist March 07, 2008 03:12 pm
QUOTE (dead-cat @ March 07, 2008 01:51 pm)
it would not have been Hungary alone.

So what some here are basically saying is that Romania would put up a fight against aggression only if attacked by a lone, weaker state (like never) or when it would have an army worthy of making it equal to that of the more powerful opponent (like never).

And since you mentioned the "Carpathian genius", he had the sense of introducing the people's war doctrine.

Posted by: 21 inf March 07, 2008 06:34 pm
Coming a little back to the original subject: implications for Romania in the case of rejecting the soviet ultimatum.

Memorium regarding "Horea" campaign plan for 1938

MARELE STAT MAJOR
III Section
I Bureau

Notice regarding the M.U. (Mari Unitati - Divisions) needed for set up the Campaign Plan

Hypotesis:

1. Romania engaged on 3 fronts.

a. War with Hungary: secondary actions against USSR and Bulgaria.
Oligations:
-against Hungary: 140 battalions (14 divisions)
-against USSR: 153 battalions (17 divisions)
-against Bulgaria: 75 battalions (8 divisions)
Total: 368 battalions (39 divisions)

b.War with USSR: secondary actions against Hungary and Bulgaria.
Oligations:
-against USSR: minimum 153 battalions (17 divisions)
-against Hungary: 112 battalions (12 divisions)
-against Bulgaria: 75 battalions (8 divisions)
Total: 340 battalions (37 divisions)

c.War with Bulgaria: secondary actions against USSR and Hungary.
Oligations:
-against Bulgaria: 120 battalions (12 divisions)
-against Hungary: 112 battalions (12 divisions)
-against USSR: 153 battalions (17 divisions)
Total: 385 battalions (41 divisions)

In the considered hypotesis (war on 3 fronts) the medium number of forces needed is 39 divisions.
Our present total forces is insuficient for the needs required.
2. Romania engaged on 2 fronts.

a. War with Hungary and Bulgaria.
Oligations:
-against Hungary: 140 battalions (14 divisions)
-against Bulgaria: 75 battalions (8 divisions)
Total: 215 battalions (22 divisions)

b.War with USSR and Bulgaria.
Oligations:
-against USSR: minimum 153 battalions (17 divisions)
-against Bulgaria: 75 battalions (8 divisions)
Total: 228 battalions (25 divisions)

c.War with Bulgaria and Hungary.
Oligations:
-against Bulgaria: 120 battalions (12 divisions)
-against Hungary: 112 battalions (14 divisions)
Total: 232 battalions (24 divisions)

d.War with USSR and Hungary.
Oligations:
-against USSR: 153 battalions (17 divisions)
-against Hungary: 112 battalions (12 divisions)
Total: 265 battalions (29 divisions)
...
In comparison with the total number of MU which we can raise, it remains at our disposal only 8 infantry divisions+4 brigades (3 mountain and 1 border), which is not sufficient for:
-the covering of the third front;
-general reserves
-reinforcements and replacements for the main front.

source: col. ® C. Mosincat - Politica de aparare a vestului Romaniei (1930-1940), vol. II - Documente, citing from A.M.R. fond 1948, dos 455, f. 181-195.

Bolding is made by myself, not by the author of the original document.

Posted by: dragos March 08, 2008 12:30 am
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 07, 2008 06:12 pm)
So what some here are basically saying is that Romania would put up a fight against aggression only if attacked by a lone, weaker state (like never) or when it would have an army worthy of making it equal to that of the more powerful opponent (like never).

Or having an ally at borders or allied forces on the national territory (like 1916 or 1941)

Poland rejected the German ultimatum on the belief that the Western Allies would take immediate military actions against Germany in their support. It was the so called "Western betrayal".

Posted by: Dénes March 08, 2008 08:25 am
QUOTE (dragos @ March 08, 2008 06:30 am)
Or having an ally at borders or allied forces on the national territory (like 1916 or 1941)

There is a myth usually perpetuated in Rumanian historiography, namely that before the war Rumania was surrounded by enemies and thus was isolated, or in other wording, Rumania had no allies, except the Black Sea.
In fact, out of the six neighbours Rumania had in the late 1930s, three militarily rather strong states were friendly and allies (Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) and three unfriendly, or outright hostile (USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria), of which only the USSR was a militarily strong state.
Of course, the situation changed by mid-1940, but by then war was already raging on for almost a year.

QUOTE
Poland rejected the German ultimatum on the belief that the Western Allies would take immediate military actions against Germany in their support. It was the so called "Western betrayal".


A misleading concept about the Polish army of 1939, generally perpetuated by modern historiography is that, in hindsight, the Polish Army is generally considered as no match for the German army. However, back then, in the late 1930s, the European military specialists considered the Polish army as an equal opponent to the fledgling German army, in fact the best one in Central or Eastern Europe (except for the USSR, of course), fully capable to match the German army. Of course, history proved otherwise. No one, or few, would had ever envisaged the eventual outcome of the first German military action.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Kosmo March 08, 2008 01:03 pm
British military mission considered Poland's army better then the Red Army, at least Liddle Hart says they did in his History of WW2.

I doubt that poles really expected that the West will defeat the germans quickly as everybody thought in WW1 terms. They expected that themselves will do much better then they did as Denes rightly points.

Imperialist you are perfectly right, this type of thinking would mean that Romania would never fight alone the SU and her army and alliances were there to deal only with Hungary and Bulgaria. It does not make sense.

I have no ideea what would have happened if Romania fought the soviets then, but I still say that the actions that were done were extremly bad and might be viewed not as the best of a bad situation, but as an huge disaster.

The efects that we feel today include the losses of teritory in the East and the creation of another romanian speaking nation. The lag behind that the 40 years of soviet rule brought for all Central European countries it's much larger then the one that existed in 1938. The losses in poulation and property were great. Having your leader shot for war crimes it's worse then having some petty criminals accused of this.

What more could we had lost if we had fought in 1940? Our precious "soveraignity" that meant german and soviet occupation?

Posted by: sid guttridge March 08, 2008 05:40 pm
Hi Guys,

One has to look at the overall situation in June 1940.

1) Germany and the USSR were then allies and had already agreed to a Soviet land grab in Basarabia and Bucovina. Therefore the two greatest land powers were against Romania.

2) France had just been conquered and the UK driven from the continent. Therefore Romania had lost its two major traditional supporters.

3) Germany controlled the sources of almost all Romanian weaponry due to its occupations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and France and its alliance with Italy.

4) With the exception of an indifferent and similarly isolated Yugoslavia, Romania's other neighbours, Hungary and Bulgaria were hostile.

Romania was in a much weaker position than either Poland or Finland in 1939.

Anyone who advocates that Romania should have fought in June-September 1940 must explain why this would have been more advantageous for Romania than not fighting. At least by keeping the core of the state and armed forces intact Romania was able to regain Basarabia and Northern Bucovina in 1941 and Northern Transilvania in 1944. Neither could have been attempted if the state had been destroyed in 1940.

There was no glory and much indignity in the hard decisions of 1940, but they laid the groundwork for the counter-attacks under more favourable circumstances in 1941 and 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Imperialist March 08, 2008 06:34 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ March 08, 2008 05:40 pm)
Anyone who advocates that Romania should have fought in June-September 1940 must explain why this would have been more advantageous for Romania than not fighting.

Looking at the issue from an "advantage in giving up" vs. "advantage in fighting" point of view means adopting a street-corner market barter attitude.

"So, putting up resistance would cost me 80 cents, cowardly giving up people and territory would cost me 50 cents. Oh joy, I can save 30 cents. That settles it, where do I sign?".

If history really valued petty barters then it would celebrate the giving up attitude, not the "we will fight them on the beaches..." attitude.

The issue is not about advantages it is about principles. The people left behind so easily paid taxes for decades so that the politicians could sign contracts, the generals play war, all in the name of protecting them. And when push came to shove, the army bailed out to ensure its "integrity" and abandoned everyone.



Posted by: dragos March 08, 2008 06:40 pm
QUOTE
The issue is not about advantages it is about principles.


Imperialist, have you been born yesterday? Wake up! laugh.gif

Posted by: Imperialist March 08, 2008 09:19 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ March 08, 2008 06:40 pm)
Imperialist, have you been born yesterday? Wake up! laugh.gif

A man dismissing principles and defending the cession of territory and people without a fight is unfortunately not uncommon, but still worrying.


Posted by: sid guttridge March 09, 2008 04:12 am
Hi Imp,

Napoleon once said that he who defends everything defends nothing. This applies quite aptly to the Romanian situation in 1940.

What do you think the result would have been if Romania had fought in June 1940?

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Imperialist March 09, 2008 09:46 am
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ March 09, 2008 04:12 am)
Hi Imp,

Napoleon once said that he who defends everything defends nothing. This applies quite aptly to the Romanian situation in 1940.

What do you think the result would have been if Romania had fought in June 1940?

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Sid,

The question is inappropriate imo.

Though a cost/benefit analysis is appropriate when starting a war of choice, getting involved in one or sending troops in peace missions, when a war is imposed on you the only thing appropriate to do is to put up the fight in defense, not giving in and trying to comfort your conscience by adopting a mercantile/barter point of view on a cowardly and unprincipled blunder.

When Romania gave in in June, the army staff leader in his remarcable wisdom advised the Crown Council to give in so that the army would maintain its integrity in order to be better prepared to stand up to a move against Transylvania from the West. We know what happened a couple of months later. In its desire to maintain "integrity" the Army shun its duty of defending Romania and ended up losing both Bassarabia and Transylvania without resisting. That blunder meant many thousands will die waging a war of aggression on foreign soil than waging a righteous defense in their own country. The result was the same - occupation, but the behavior was despicable. Carol II called it "rusinea nationala".

Posted by: sid guttridge March 09, 2008 10:13 am
Hi Imp,

Do you think there were any circumstances under which armed resistance in June 1940 would have improved Romania's situation? If so, how?

Romania's problems were not fundamentally military, but diplomatic. The major international allies that had interwar military obligations to Romania (Czechoslovakia, Poland, France and the UK) had been knocked out of the picture for the foreseeable future by powers hostile to Romania. There was therefore no military solution to the country's predicament in June 1940. It had to rebuild its dilpomatic alliances first before it had any hope of improving its situation through military means.

Fighting is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. If that end cannot be achieved by fighting, then the raison d'etre for fighting is lacking.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Victor March 09, 2008 12:42 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 07, 2008 02:51 pm)
Why do you say it is very simplistic?

You compared war destruction, occupation, territorial and demographic losses suffered by Poland mostly on its own soil vs. the "achievement" of Romania sparing most of its soil from that fate.

One would expect to see that achievement reflected in a slightly better comparative development for Romania vs. a certain retardedness in Poland's development. But that is not the case. The war destruction, the losses were recuperated. Poland was ahead of us even under communism. Romania would have recovered from the war destruction too.

So the issue comes down to these undeniable facts:

1) it was the duty of the state to resist aggression with all available means;
2) the army "ate" funds for 22 years in view of fighting when the time came, not of giving up territories without opposition;

Maybe Romania was right in not resisting the Soviet Union, but it should have resisted Hungary. It could have done that.

Because it is a very simplistic view. There are so many factors to take into account that it is pointless to even start listing them. I would expect you to know by now that economical development is not equal among countries.

What is more important to me is that while several million Polish citizens were killed during WW2, the Romanian citizens fared much better from this point of view. Some of us may not even have been here at all to discuss this.

The fact that you consider the two facts undeniable, it is only your opinion and others may differ.

All the members in the Crown Council lived through WW1, the Buftea Peace and the fall of the Central Powers. Romania gave up in March 1918 for similar reasons (avoiding a futile fight to the death and preserving a Romanian state), but then bounced back at the end of the year. We have the benefit of hindsight today. They didn't and most likely expected history to repeat itself.

My opinion is that:
1). the duty of the state is to exist, because it is the only way it can protect at least a part of its citizens
2). the duty of the army is to fight against external foes when the political leadership orders it to fight; there were many Romanian officers and soldiers that wanted to fight both in June and in August 1940

It is true that Romania could have resisted Hungary, but it is very probable that the Soviet Union would have assisted Hungary in its attack, making resistance futile.

Since you have adopted the moral highgorund in this discusion, please answer the following questions:
1. Should Romania have continued to fight to the death at the end of 1917 against the Central Powers?
2. Should Romania have resisted militarily in 1878 against Russia's annexation of Southern Bessarabia in exchange for Dobruja?

Posted by: Victor March 09, 2008 01:17 pm
QUOTE (Kosmo @ March 08, 2008 03:03 pm)
Imperialist you are perfectly right, this type of thinking would mean that Romania would never fight alone the SU and her army and alliances were there to deal only with Hungary and Bulgaria. It does not make sense.

I have no ideea what would have happened if Romania fought the soviets then, but I still say that the actions that were done were extremly bad and might be viewed not as the best of a bad situation, but as an huge disaster.

The efects that we feel today include the losses of teritory in the East and the creation of another romanian speaking nation. The lag behind that the 40 years of soviet rule brought for all Central European countries it's much larger then the one that existed in 1938. The losses in poulation and property were great. Having your leader shot for war crimes it's worse then having some petty criminals accused of this.

What more could we had lost if we had fought in 1940? Our precious "soveraignity" that meant german and soviet occupation?

Romania could have never fought alone against the Soviet Union. It is common sense.

This is why several alliances were concocted during the inter-war era:
- Small Entente - against Hungary
- Balkan Entente - against Bulgaria
- Polish-Romanian alliance (supplemented by Western assistance) - against the SU

All crumbled in a matter of a couple of years.

Maybe I do not understand the rest of your post correctly, but are you implying that had Romania resisted in 1940, it would not have lost Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Herta at the peace conference or that we would not have had to endure Communism all these years?

Like I already mentioned in the earlier post, the losses in population suffered by Poland during WW2 are several million citizens. Romania lost much less. Pick up Constantin Chiritescu's work on the Romanian participation in WW1 and read a little about the German occupation in 1916-1918 to get a glimpse what was the best-case scenario in case of Nazi occupation. Include here the certain extermination of all Romanian Jews, Gypsies and entire villages that would support partisans. And after the Red Army would "liberate" Romania, blasting everything the Germans would not have destroyed in their retreat westwards, a Communist state would be set-up starting from 1944 (or earlier), a Communist state that would renounce Bessarabia and Bukovina "annexed by the Romanian boyars in their hunger for territory". Who knows, maybe that new Communist state would also renounce the rest of Moldavia, the Danube Delta or whatever Stalin would want to take*.

* For those who do not know how close we came to loosing a part of Maramures to the Ukrainian SSR, I recommend the several articles published in Magazin Istoric in 2007.

Posted by: Imperialist March 09, 2008 06:13 pm
QUOTE (Victor @ March 09, 2008 12:42 pm)
My opinion is that:

1). the duty of the state is to exist, because it is the only way it can protect at least a part of its citizens

By abandoning another part of its citizens without a fight the state has made a mockery of its protective role.

Like I said somewhere earlier in the thread, the example of Czechoslovakia was fresh. A state that gave up territories in the idea of "surviving" was eventually occupied. Giving up in both cases in 1940 made the state weaker.

Nobody would blame the state for not being able to stop a territorial rapture when faced with overwhelming odds, but everybody should blame it for not even trying.
It would be like the police (another state institution dealing with protection) not intervening if it perceives it could be costly and giving the felons everything they ask for. In the name of peace, general well being (except for the citizens directly affected) and cost/benefit analysis. It could even sound rational from those points of view, but it isn't.




Posted by: Kosmo March 10, 2008 11:30 am
Making a "what if" scenario it's pointless, but seeing the results of the policy that was carried it's obvious that that policy failed. Romania lost everything it had to lose in the war including her honor.
Would this losses been larger if we fought like Victor says? Well, this is a "what if" again that can not be truly answered, but occupied countries often had smaller losses then combatant ones. And fighting does not necessary means losing.

Giving up land meant giving up dignity and hope. Maybe a miracle would have been possible. SU tried to annex Finland, but gave up because was risking isolation. Here was different, but something might have happened. Defending the Namaloasa line, or a german intervention or the soviets giving up after taking Basarabia, or maybe even a victorious defence.

What was the point of annexing Bassarabia in the first place if we were never willing to fight the russians for her?

Posted by: Victor March 10, 2008 11:41 am
No answer to my questions, I see.

Posted by: sid guttridge March 10, 2008 04:05 pm
Hi Kosmo,

Romania lost neither everything it had to lose during the war either materially or in terms of honour.

For a start it could have lost Northern Transilvania, but didn't. It could have lost all of Bucovina, but didn't. It could have lost its national existence altogether, but didn't.

Fighting in June 1940 almost certainly meant losing, and losing more than had already been lost through negotiation (if the Soviet ultimatum can be called "diplomacy").

Giving up land certainly does nothing to improve one's dignity, but it does not mean giving up hope, as the Romanian Army proved in 1941 by recapturing the territory lost to the USSR in 1940. It simply required an intervening improvement in dilpomatic circumstances to make fighting a viable proposition. In 1940 the USSR and Germany had agreed to Soviet annexations from Romania. In 1941 Germany had become Romania's ally.

Finland's situation was very different from Romania's. It had geography and climate as its allies. Defending an open area like Basarabia in high summer against a more highly mechanised opponent is a vastly different proposition to defending a narrow peninsula and a forested area with few roads in an arctic winter.

Germany could not come to Romania's aid. Its entire field army was in France in mid June 1940. It could not have sent any significant military assistance to Romania, even if it had not already given its approval to the Soviet seizure of Basarabia and Northerm Bucovina.

The Romanian Army had little hope of any prolonged successful defence. For a start, half of it had to be left to watch the Hungarians and Bulgarians. The remainder would have been hopelessly outnumbered, out-gunned and outmechanised. It also had no recent military campaign experience, whereas the Red Army had a lot.

Romania WAS willing to fight for Basarabia. What happened in July 1941 and May-August 1944, if not Romania fighting for Basarabia? Indeed, Romania's entire campaign from 1941-44 was designed primarily to ensure the retention of Basarabia.

To fight is not an end in itself. If one wants to fight successfully, one has to pick a favourable moment. June 1940 was about as unfavourable a moment as one could get for Romania to have fought.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: 21 inf March 10, 2008 05:15 pm
I posted the evaluations of Romanian Supreme HQ (Marele Stat Major), but no one seems to bother about their perspective.
MStM apreciated that the number of romanian troops was insuficient to the posible atack scenarios.

In few days I'll post a more clear conclusions from the part of MStM, as being a military documented opinion.
Probably it will solve the "mistery" of "what if" scenarios, giving the fact that MStM made his plans acording to exactly this kind of "what if" game.

Just citing from memory: "prolonged defense is realistic and posible in Apuseni mountains"; "parts of Oltenia and Dobrogea has to be abandoned"; "short delaying actions on Dniestr, a medium timed delaying actions on Prut and firm defensive on Carpati Mountains"; "ratio between soviet troops and romanian ones = 6:1, which not guarantee for soviets odds for succes".

My 2 cents...

Posted by: Imperialist March 10, 2008 06:37 pm
QUOTE (Victor @ March 09, 2008 12:42 pm)
Since you have adopted the moral highgorund in this discusion, please answer the following questions:

1. Should Romania have continued to fight to the death at the end of 1917 against the Central Powers?
2. Should Romania have resisted militarily in 1878 against Russia's annexation of Southern Bessarabia in exchange for Dobruja?

1 - "Should have continued to fight" denotes an entirely different situation.

Like I said, nobody would complain if Romania would have fought for its own but would have been unable to win in the field of battle. But Romania did not.

While in the case of the USSR complaining that the opponent was stronger and resistance was futile is valid (though not an excuse entirely), the same cannot be said in the case of Hungary.

2 - "In exchange for" denotes an entirely different situation. Unless the USSR and Hungary offered something in return for what they took.


Posted by: Dénes March 10, 2008 08:00 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ March 10, 2008 10:05 pm)
In 1940 the USSR and Germany had agreed to Soviet annexations from Romania.

Just a minor point to Sid's otherwise sound explanation.

In 1940, Germany did not explicitely agree to the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia*, but rather expressed its non-interest in that geographical area.

Gen. Dénes

*I would like to note that the English form of the territory the Rumanians call 'Basarabia' is Bessarabia (similarly 'Bucovina' is actually Bukovina). Therefore that's the form I prefer to use in English historical text.

Posted by: Imperialist March 10, 2008 09:07 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ March 10, 2008 04:05 pm)
To fight is not an end in itself. If one wants to fight successfully, one has to pick a favourable moment.
June 1940 was about as unfavourable a moment as one could get for Romania to have fought.

But that is true when you pick the time and place of fighting.
When the fight is imposed on you, you defend yourself.
You might very well lose but that is war.

Posted by: Victor March 11, 2008 07:16 am
QUOTE (21 inf @ March 10, 2008 07:15 pm)
I posted the evaluations of Romanian Supreme HQ (Marele Stat Major), but no one seems to bother about their perspective.

I find them more than useful and it is one of the few posts in this topic that has more substance than personal opinions. Thank you.

Imperialist,
I see you are unable to give a straigth answer.
The supposed differences of the 1917 and 1940 situations are false. In both cases, Romania was isolated against a militarily superior foe. In both cases it stood to lose territory if it settled. There is an armistice, Romania receives the Cemtral Powers' terms which mean losing Dobruja and the Carpathians and turning Wallachia into a German colony. Should Romania accept the terms or should it restart fighting preferring to disappear than give up territory? Simple question IMO.

In the 1878 situation, Romania had an ally (Austria-Hungary), so it was in a more favorable situation. Yet it chose to barter Southern Bessarabia for Dobruja. Is that not against the principles you defend? Were not those people also Romanian citizens?

Posted by: Imperialist March 11, 2008 08:08 am
QUOTE (Victor @ March 11, 2008 07:16 am)
Imperialist,
I see you are unable to give a straigth answer.

The supposed differences of the 1917 and 1940 situations are false. In both cases, Romania was isolated against a militarily superior foe. In both cases it stood to lose territory if it settled.

In the 1878 situation, Romania had an ally (Austria-Hungary), so it was in a more favorable situation. Yet it chose to barter Southern Bessarabia for Dobruja. Is that not against the principles you defend? Were not those people also Romanian citizens?

I gave you a straight answer. The differences are not false because Romania actually fought before 1917. The politicians did not cede territories without a fight in order to "survive" in Basarabia, they allowed the army to defend.

Regarding 1878. In the Treaty of Berlin the great powers offered Romania the Danube Delta, Dobrogea, Snake Island and independence. Romania had to choose between those substantial compensations and fighting for 3 counties in Southern Basarabia.

What did Romania have to choose between in 1940? Giving up people and territory or defending them. There was no gain, no compensation. That is why it boiled down to a matter of basic principles.

Posted by: Kosmo March 11, 2008 10:47 am
QUOTE (Victor @ March 09, 2008 12:42 pm)
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 07, 2008 02:51 pm)
Why do you say it is very simplistic?

You compared war destruction, occupation, territorial and demographic losses suffered by Poland mostly on its own soil vs. the "achievement" of Romania sparing most of its soil from that fate.

One would expect to see that achievement reflected in a slightly better comparative development for Romania vs. a certain retardedness in Poland's development. But that is not the case. The war destruction, the losses were recuperated. Poland was ahead of us even under communism. Romania would have recovered from the war destruction too.

So the issue comes down to these undeniable facts:

1) it was the duty of the state to resist aggression with all available means;
2) the army "ate" funds for 22 years in view of fighting when the time came, not of giving up territories without opposition;

Maybe Romania was right in not resisting the Soviet Union, but it should have resisted Hungary. It could have done that.

Because it is a very simplistic view. There are so many factors to take into account that it is pointless to even start listing them. I would expect you to know by now that economical development is not equal among countries.

What is more important to me is that while several million Polish citizens were killed during WW2, the Romanian citizens fared much better from this point of view. Some of us may not even have been here at all to discuss this.

The fact that you consider the two facts undeniable, it is only your opinion and others may differ.

All the members in the Crown Council lived through WW1, the Buftea Peace and the fall of the Central Powers. Romania gave up in March 1918 for similar reasons (avoiding a futile fight to the death and preserving a Romanian state), but then bounced back at the end of the year. We have the benefit of hindsight today. They didn't and most likely expected history to repeat itself.

My opinion is that:
1). the duty of the state is to exist, because it is the only way it can protect at least a part of its citizens
2). the duty of the army is to fight against external foes when the political leadership orders it to fight; there were many Romanian officers and soldiers that wanted to fight both in June and in August 1940

It is true that Romania could have resisted Hungary, but it is very probable that the Soviet Union would have assisted Hungary in its attack, making resistance futile.

Since you have adopted the moral highgorund in this discusion, please answer the following questions:
1. Should Romania have continued to fight to the death at the end of 1917 against the Central Powers?
2. Should Romania have resisted militarily in 1878 against Russia's annexation of Southern Bessarabia in exchange for Dobruja?

1. Should Romania have continued to fight to the death at the end of 1917 against the Central Powers?

As Imperialist pointed out Romania had already fought and lost. There is a difference beetwen accepting defeat in battle and giving up without a fight. And after all it's was the Entente victory that brought romanian final victory not the continued existence of the romanian state and army. A full german ocupation would have not changed much the final outcome. See Serbia's example.

2. Should Romania have resisted militarily in 1878 against Russia's annexation of Southern Bessarabia in exchange for Dobruja?

Giving up the desolate regions of the Bugeac for Dobrogea was not a bad deal. Romania should have negotiated better and win more. We gained direct sea acces and 2 good ports while Bugeac, a former turkish raya, had little romanian population and little economic activity. Bugeac has been part of a modern romanian state only beetwen the Paris Congress and the Berlin Congress.

Romania did not fought the SU in 1940, but it did later. Did that resulted in worse conditions than in 1940? If Stalin wanted to annex the entire Moldova or whatever what would have stoped him in 1944? He took regions from Poland and Cehoslovakia, he annexed the baltic states and he could have done it to Romania if that pleased him with the same ease that he could do that in 1940 if we fought and lost.
Still I can bet that he would have not attempted to conquer the entire country with a powerfull Germany looking at him from across the border thru Poland. Maybe a romanian defeat would have given him what he wanted, mainly the former tzarist regions. Presuming that he would have attacked Bucharest it's simple supposition.

Stalin was shrewed, cautios and smart and he fullfilled his desires with little risk taking, but helped by the weak heart of his enemy.

Maybe Romania would have lost Basarabia even if she fought, but it's a difference beetwen losing with the enemy attacking Iasi or the Namaloasa line and losing withou even trying your skill and luck. Fighting against a SU agression would have changed how we were looked on by others and how comunism was perceived in Romania.

The romanian army lost even the respect of later generations, as it's obvious from the attitude of most posters that here give her no chance against the enemy. I believe that in a just, defensive war romanian soldiers and officers would have shown better qualities that they displayed in a war of agression.

Posted by: sid guttridge March 11, 2008 06:39 pm
Hi Kosmo,

There isn't any reasonable doubt that Romania would have lost in June 1940.

At the end of 1917 Romania had not yet lost. Indeed at Marasti, Marasesti and Oituz it had successfully stood up to the Central Powers on the battlefield. Romania gave up because Russia collapsed. In other words, it was reduced to a situation where continued resistance without possibility of assistance from any allies was futile in much the same way that resistance in June 1940 would have been futile.

I don't understand why you advocate resistance at Namaloasa. Surely that would be to surrender a far larger area to the USSR than was actually demanded by the USSR in its ultimatum of June 1940?

Had Romania fought in June 1940 Stalin would have had the perfect excuse to over run the whole of Romania, especially as the entire German Army was in France at the time.

What does the opinion of others matter? It is the interests of Romania that is important.

You should have a close look at the condition of the Romanian Army in mid 1940. Its nearest equivalent was the Yugoslav Army in 1940. It had the same sort of obsolescent equipment and the same French-inspired military doctrine. It was similarly massively over expanded byond the capacity to sustain it in the field. It also suffered problems with the minorities in its ranks. (Look at the problems with 12th, 16th and 17th Divisions in September and June 1940). The Romanian Army was very weak qualitatively in 1940.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: dragos March 11, 2008 08:57 pm
QUOTE (Kosmo @ March 11, 2008 01:47 pm)
The romanian army lost even the respect of later generations, as it's obvious from the attitude of most posters that here give her no chance against the enemy. I believe that in a just, defensive war romanian soldiers and officers would have shown better qualities that they displayed in a war of agression.

Kosmo, the respect and patriotism have nothing to do with realism and a clear judgment of the situation. The fact that a fight is just or defending one's principle does not mean a different outcome given the realities of the situation in the field.

You consider the situation at a personal level. I cannot say anything against your opinion, anyone is entitled with one, I may have wanted to fight too, but once you are a decision factor and you have in responsibility millions of civilian lives, you cannot judge the things so simple, reducing everything to your dignity or your ego.

QUOTE (Imperialist)
While in the case of the USSR complaining that the opponent was stronger and resistance was futile is valid (though not an excuse entirely), the same cannot be said in the case of Hungary.


Imperialist, I would remind you some old topics, although you are here for some time to not have missed them. Should I remember you that Hitler threatened with the ceasing of existence of the Romanian state in case Romania would have refused to sign the Vienna Diktat?

Posted by: Imperialist March 11, 2008 10:13 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ March 11, 2008 08:57 pm)
Imperialist, I would remind you some old topics, although you are here for some time to not have missed them. Should I remember you that Hitler threatened with the ceasing of existence of the Romanian state in case Romania would have refused to sign the Vienna Diktat?

Once you give in and cede a large chunk of territory without a fight then you're in no better position. On the contrary - you register demographic, economic and geostrategic losses while the one doing the threats can continue doing that until he has you completely in his grasp.

If that is accepted then a decision has been consciously or unconsciously taken to become subservient to the one making the threats. Which amounts to a de facto ceasing of the state's independence, which is its main role. That became obvious when Romania came under the German fold, offering it military basing rights that it used against Yugoslavia, taking part in its racial policies and in a war of aggression.

And as an anecdote, if the interwar 20+ divisions were not enough to at least make a stand, I'd hate to imagine what today's 70,000-men army would do in a major crisis situation. smile.gif

Posted by: dragos March 11, 2008 10:30 pm
I presume the fact that signing the Vienna Diktat brought about that Germany was guaranteeing the Romanian state and that was a starting point from where she would take back the territories lost to the Soviets means nothing to you.

QUOTE
That became obvious when Romania came under the German fold, offering it military basing rights that it used against Yugoslavia, taking part in its racial policies and in a war of aggression.


Unfortunately Romania was not in a position to preserve its own integrity since almost a year before, with the defeat of the Western Allies in Europe, let alone opposing military actions against our neighbors .

Posted by: Agarici March 11, 2008 11:09 pm
Hello everyone! I’ve followed this topic with a vivid interest, and although the aspects which have been outlined are complex and intricate, I thing there are enough things to be added.
In the beginning, two short introductory considerations: first, I guess that advancing personal opinions (Victor has mentioned that, somewhat critical, in one of his previous posts) on the matter is unavoidable since we’re talking about a hypothetical situation; moreover, I think there’s nothing wrong in presenting (and sustaining with arguments) one’s view about that particular context.
Second, I consider that the question suggested by the topic title is legitimate, since before May-early June 1940 the official version of the Romanian defense doctrine was synthesized by king Carol’s slogan „nici o brazdă de pământ” - aprox. translation (“we shall not give up) not even a square foot of land”. Also the question of accepting or rejecting the ultimatum was actually voted in the Crown Council, so a ”NO” to the Soviet demands wasn’t at all a purely fantastic scenario.

More focused on the subject now, it’s not clear to me if the General Staff’s report presented by 21 inf is dated 1938 or 1940; however, in my oppinon its relevance is far from absolute, since there were lots of similat reports and scenarios elaborated by the Romanian military which envisaged the armed resistance. Also I want to strongly emphasise what Denes have said - there was no certitude about a war on two fronts. The germans were ”desinterested” about Bessarabia, but were irritated by the Soviets claims to Bukovina and by the fact that they were not consulted about that. „Istoria României dupa Marea Unire” (approx. translation “The Greater Romania History”), a volume of about 1600 pages, includes various original documents about the June 1940 crisis; to the measure to which my program will allow me to do that, I will try to reproduce some of them here. For example, in a un/semi official discussion with Neubacher, delegate to Bucharest to make pressure for concluding a new economic German-Romanian treaty, king Carol said “just tell Hitler that I have only one personal claim to him - to assure me that he will make the Hungarians maintain the peace in the West, and we’ll hold the Russians in the East and deliver the oil as we have agreed”. Although Neubacher advised the king that the ultimatum should be accepted (no wonder since that was the natzis’ official line) he agreed to act as the king messenger, but by the he time arrived in Vienna (since no plane was available, Carol put at his disposal the royal train) he heard from the radio that Romania have accepted the Soviets’ terms, so there was no point in delivering the message to Hitler.

Posted by: sid guttridge March 12, 2008 11:55 am
Hi Agarici,

From memory, I think the Crown Council voted twice on whether to resist. Have you the figures for voting on these two occasions? If I remember rightly, on the second occasion the decision to concede to the Soviet ultimatum was overwhelming. I guess that by then Romania's isolation was apparent.

Also , if I remember rightly, the interwar-defence plans were predicated upon Poland being an active ally against the USSR. At that stage fighting forward in Basarabia was the favoured option. However, after the fall of Poland in September 1939, which outflanked the Romanian position in Basarabia from the north, it was recommended on military gropunds to only maintain a cavalry screen in Basarabia and to make the Prut the main line of defence. However, due to political considerations (i.e. Basarabian confidence in the Romanian state being at risk and the USSR being encouraged by Romanian weakness in the province) it was decided to keep a full army forward in Basarabia. This was against purely military advice and was a political decision.

It failed, because as soon as the Finnish War was over the USSR started creating border incidents in Basarabia. As long as France (and Britain) were still in the field Romania kept a large army in Basarabia and the USSR restrained itself from making a claim. However, the moment France agreed an armistice with Germany circumstances changed drastically. The USSR delivered its ultimatum to Romania and Romania, without an effective ally left, was going to lose Basarabia and Northern Bucovina one way or the other. The only choice was whether the loss of Basarabia and Northern Bucovina would involve massive Romanian military casualties or not.

The Crown Council decided to swallow its pride and took the pragmatic and humane option. It kept its ammunition dry for a more favourable occasion. That more favourable occasion came the following year.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: 21 inf March 12, 2008 04:14 pm
To Agarici: yes, the report is from 1938, not from 1940.

Posted by: 21 inf March 12, 2008 04:18 pm
It is not what I promised to post, but I consider it also interesting.

ROMANIAN SUPREME HQ
OPERATIONS SECTION
ANNEX No. 1 to "Horea" campaign plan for 1938
Bureau 1


NOTE regarding the number of divisions, needed on Eastern Front, deducted by operational needs

The factors which determin the number of divisions needed on Eastern Front, deducted only by operational needs are:
- the relations with the neighbour state;
- the value of probable enemies;
- the lenght and nature of the border;
- the nature of operational theatre;
- the deployment and concentration posibilities.

The relations with USSR.
Even if the relations are good now, USSR remains, for the well known reasons, the enemy for whom we have to have a strong army.

The value of probable enemies.
Taking in count the total number of divisions they can raise, deploy and the posibilities for concentration USSR can intervene when they made their effort against Romania with:
- 35 infantry divisions
- 6-7 cavalry divisions
- 2-3 mechanised brigades
- 7-8 aviation brigades
This forces can be concentrated as:
- in the case of an sudden atack: 6 I.D. and 3 C.D. until Day4.
- the rest of the forces probably until D34, but the bulk will not engage on D34 but sooner and in succesion, to exploit the results of the sudden atack.

The lenght and nature of the border
Aproximatelly 500 km, not counting the bends of Dniestr and the shore of Black Sea.
As obstacle, Dniestr:
- crossable in fords all the way towards Moghilev;
- hard to cross south of Botna.
In general, it is an important obstacle, especially in his low course, dar which is crossable, rather easy.

The nature of operational theatre
Excepting Cornesti mountain, which is less accesible, the operational theatre of Bessarabia is not directing the operations on forced directions like in the West. It is, generaly, suited for manouvering, which means a great number of divions for defence.

The deployment and concentration posibilities
Giving the fact that in today's situation, our concentration posibilities are less than one division per day, means that an important number of divisions are required from the begining to face the operational needs.

How many divions are needed in East?
Case 1. The bulk of our forces in East.
To be able to defeat the russians, we need to deploy at least as much divisions as the russians can, our superiority having to be obtained by leadership.
Counting that the polish troops will be forced to act south of Pripet with 8 I.D., and in the case that the bulk of russian forces will atack Romania, it is expected that they (the polish) will increase the number of divisions with 25% or more (12-15 divisions), that means that we have to have at least 20 I.D.
The covering:
In comparison with:
- the lenght of covered front (500 km).
- important directions of enemy invasion:
a. Hotin-Cernauti
b. Calus-Lipcani
c. Moghilev-Stefanesti
d.Soroca-Balti
e.Dubosari-Chisinau-Husi
f. Tighina-Falciu
Results that at least 6 I.D. are required to cover the first line, which means an average of 80 km for each division, extreme limits being between 60-120 km.
Guided by the principles of defensive, for the 6 I.D. from the first line additional 3 I.D. are needed, which means that the covering requires a total of 9 I.D.
If we llok to the total numebr of the divisions from the front (20 I.D.), the covering have a greater ratio than normal. This is needed by the lenght of the front, the covering helping to the same initial manouver of the bulk - the delay of the enemy, by this making more easier the mission of the bulk, which compensate the great number of divisions for allocated for covering.
This is a posible solution for strategic defensive but not for strategic offensive.

Case 2. The bulk of our forces in another front.
In this situation, for eastern front the mission is to secure the freedom of action, which is to be obtained by:
- a delaying manouver;
- stoping the enemy on a bottom line;
- offensive reaction with forces brought from the front where we have the decision (west).
The first two aims are conected with a minimum number of divisions and giving up the land until a line from where vital regions of the teritory are not affected.
Giving the fact that:
- the time-frame for delaying and stoping operations must be aprox. 50 days, in which time a decision is to be expected in west;
- the depth to which land can be given up in East should be the line:
a. Lower Siret - Dealu Mare mountain (south Pascani-Iasi) - Cornesti mountain - Botna-Dniestr, exceptionaly the front.
b. Moldova river-Siret-Bacau-Barlad-Cahul-Bolgrad, which means 150 km, exceptionally 220 km.
Counting that an enemy advance has a medium of 10 km per day, and at 3 operative days a day for resting, in 4 days results a total of 30 km.
This means that in 50 days (time necesary for having a decision in west and bringing the troops in east), the enemy can advance more than 200 km.
For this reason, it is necesary that the forces calculated for covering to be increased to at least 12 I.D., which represents a minimum of divisions which have to be permanently to be stationed on eastern front.

source: idem as from above article, page 145-147.

Posted by: sid guttridge March 13, 2008 03:38 pm
Hi 21 Inf.

Thanks.

Your document confirms what I said above - Romanian defensive plans for Basarabia were predicated on having Poland as an ally. However, by June 1940 this was no longer the case.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Kosmo March 14, 2008 09:12 am
Great info 21 inf, thank you!

Posted by: Alexei2102 March 14, 2008 11:17 am
Fascinting information, thanks for sharing.

Al

Posted by: Victor March 15, 2008 12:15 pm
On 8 March Imperialist wrote:
QUOTE
Looking at the issue from an "advantage in giving up" vs. "advantage in fighting" point of view means adopting a street-corner market barter attitude.

"So, putting up resistance would cost me 80 cents, cowardly giving up people and territory would cost me 50 cents. Oh joy, I can save 30 cents. That settles it, where do I sign?".

If history really valued petty barters then it would celebrate the giving up attitude, not the "we will fight them on the beaches..." attitude.

The issue is not about advantages it is about principles. The people left behind so easily paid taxes for decades so that the politicians could sign contracts, the generals play war, all in the name of protecting them. And when push came to shove, the army bailed out to ensure its "integrity" and abandoned everyone.


But in less then a week things seem to have changed:

QUOTE
Regarding 1878. In the Treaty of Berlin the great powers offered Romania the Danube Delta, Dobrogea, Snake Island and independence. Romania had to choose between those substantial compensations and fighting for 3 counties in Southern Basarabia.


So bartering was OK in 1878 and not OK in 1940. Interesting.

Since you and Kosmo seem to assume the moral high ground in this discussion I would have assumed you will show the same kind of principles when it came to similar situations. At least this is why they call them principles. Instead I see both of you came up with excuses and arguments that situations were different, etc etc.

Posted by: Victor March 15, 2008 12:35 pm
QUOTE (Kosmo @ March 11, 2008 12:47 pm)
1. Should Romania have continued to fight to the death at the end of 1917 against the Central Powers?

As Imperialist pointed out Romania had already fought and lost. There is a difference beetwen accepting defeat in battle and giving up without a fight. And after all it's was the Entente victory that brought romanian final victory not the continued existence of the romanian state and army. A full german ocupation would have not changed much the final outcome. See Serbia's example.

2. Should Romania have resisted militarily in 1878 against Russia's annexation of Southern Bessarabia in exchange for Dobruja?

Giving up the desolate regions of the Bugeac for Dobrogea was not a bad deal. Romania should have negotiated better and win more. We gained direct sea acces and 2 good ports while Bugeac, a former turkish raya, had little romanian population and little economic activity. Bugeac has been part of a modern romanian state only beetwen the Paris Congress and the Berlin Congress.

Romania did not fought the SU in 1940, but it did later. Did that resulted in worse conditions than in 1940? If Stalin wanted to annex the entire Moldova or whatever what would have stoped him in 1944? He took regions from Poland and Cehoslovakia, he annexed the baltic states and he could have done it to Romania if that pleased him with the same ease that he could do that in 1940 if we fought and lost.
Still I can bet that he would have not attempted to conquer the entire country with a powerfull Germany looking at him from across the border thru Poland. Maybe a romanian defeat would have given him what he wanted, mainly the former tzarist regions. Presuming that he would have attacked Bucharest it's simple supposition.

Stalin was shrewed, cautios and smart and he fullfilled his desires with little risk taking, but helped by the weak heart of his enemy.

Maybe Romania would have lost Basarabia even if she fought, but it's a difference beetwen losing with the enemy attacking Iasi or the Namaloasa line and losing withou even trying your skill and luck. Fighting against a SU agression would have changed how we were looked on by others and how comunism was perceived in Romania.

The romanian army lost even the respect of later generations, as it's obvious from the attitude of most posters that here give her no chance against the enemy. I believe that in a just, defensive war romanian soldiers and officers would have shown better qualities that they displayed in a war of agression.

1. No, Romania had not lost. It was an armistice forced by the dismembering of the Russian Army, but the Romanian Army was still intact and with good fighting spirit. The Russian collapse cut off Romania's supply chain and thus made a longer resistance unsustainable after the ammo runs out. So the situation was basically similar to 1940: isolated against a numerically and technically superior foe. I would say that militarily we were stronger than in 1940.

And, unlike in 1944, in early 1918 Germany wasn't defeated.

2. The "desolate regions" meant control of the Chilia branch of the Danube and good access to the sea (main ports were on the Danube). Back then Constanta and Mangalia were not what they were today and Dobruja was aslo a former Turkish domain and at least as desolate as Southern Bessarabia was. Furthermore between 1856 and 1878 are 22 years. Between 1918 and 1940 are also 22 years.

Men from Southern Bessarabia fought in the Independence War (one squadron of the 5th Calarasi was recruited from there), they paid taxes, yet they were abandoned under Russian pressure. Btw, one of the 3 Romanian marshals, Alexandru Averescu, was born there.

Like I already said in my previous post. If you want to assume the moral high ground, then do it all the way.

Posted by: Imperialist March 15, 2008 01:22 pm
QUOTE (Victor @ March 15, 2008 12:15 pm)
On 8 March Imperialist wrote:
QUOTE
Looking at the issue from an "advantage in giving up" vs. "advantage in fighting" point of view means adopting a street-corner market barter attitude.

"So, putting up resistance would cost me 80 cents, cowardly giving up people and territory would cost me 50 cents. Oh joy, I can save 30 cents. That settles it, where do I sign?".

If history really valued petty barters then it would celebrate the giving up attitude, not the "we will fight them on the beaches..." attitude.

The issue is not about advantages it is about principles. The people left behind so easily paid taxes for decades so that the politicians could sign contracts, the generals play war, all in the name of protecting them. And when push came to shove, the army bailed out to ensure its "integrity" and abandoned everyone.


But in less then a week things seem to have changed:

QUOTE
Regarding 1878. In the Treaty of Berlin the great powers offered Romania the Danube Delta, Dobrogea, Snake Island and independence. Romania had to choose between those substantial compensations and fighting for 3 counties in Southern Basarabia.


So bartering was OK in 1878 and not OK in 1940. Interesting.

Since you and Kosmo seem to assume the moral high ground in this discussion I would have assumed you will show the same kind of principles when it came to similar situations. At least this is why they call them principles. Instead I see both of you came up with excuses and arguments that situations were different, etc etc.

You brought in the discussion a comparison between 1878 and 1940. Looking into its validity is not a search for excuses, Victor. And neither is pointing out the inconsistencies.

Pray tell what territory did the SU offer us in exchange for Basarabia and Hungary in exchange for Transylvania? There was no real barter in 1940. And the equation is seriously different than 1878, so it would be honest to stop calling them "similar situations".

My point was not that barter is wrong (I think I only blamed petty barter and street-corner market barter attitudes), but that using a petty barter mentality to excuse shirking away from a legitimate fight is/was wrong.

1878 was true state-level barter and one from which we gained.
1940 was not even a barter but a blunder covered with petty barter approaches to the issue.

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 06:18 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 15, 2008 07:22 pm)
Pray tell what territory did the SU offer us in exchange for Basarabia and Hungary in exchange for Transylvania? There was no real barter in 1940.

Imp., using your concept, there was a barter in August 1940 (concocted by Germany and Italy). Accordingly, Northern Transylvania (the smaller part of Transylvania) went to Hungary, while Southern Transylvania (the larger part of Transylvania) stayed with Rumania.
But you already knew these facts, didn't you?

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Imperialist March 15, 2008 07:03 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 15, 2008 06:18 pm)
Imp., using your concept, there was a barter in August 1940 (concocted by Germany and Italy). Accordingly, Northern Transylvania (the smaller part of Transylvania) went to Hungary, while Southern Transylvania (the larger part of Transylvania) stayed with Rumania.
But you already knew these facts, didn't you?

Gen. Dénes

Hungary had neither Northern nor Southern Transylvania.
Romania had both.
What did Hungary give to Romania in exchange for what it received?
Taking half of an object put up for barter and telling its owner that you exchange for it his right to keep the other half is no real barter. But you already knew this basic fact, didn't you?

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 09:59 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 16, 2008 01:03 am)
Taking half of an object put up for barter and telling its owner...

Imp., you're looking at those events with hindsight, which is an error.
Back then, in 1940, Rumania and Hungary both thought they are the "owner" (your word) of Transylvania, and were ready to go to war for it. However, Germany and Italy decided to cut the proverbial 'Gordian knot' in two, parting the contested territory between the two parties. Moreover, part of the "barter" was that those days' 'superpowers' guaranteed the territorial integrity of the two parties.
But you already knew these facts, didn't you?

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos March 15, 2008 10:17 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 16, 2008 12:59 am)
Back then, in 1940, Rumania and Hungary both thought they are the "owner" (your word) of Transylvania. Germany and Italy decided to cut the proverbial 'Gordian knot' in two, parting the contested territory between the two parties. Moreover, part of the "barter deal" was that those days' 'superpowers' guaranteed the territorial integrity of the two parties.

According to the international laws, the "owner" of Transylvania was Romania. Hungary took advantage of the situation in which the international laws could no longer be enforced by its signatories and threatened with instability in the region. Germany took Hungarian side on this matter (based on facts like Romania was a friend of France, the settlement was imposed after the defeat in WW1, the diplomatic isolation of Romania and others) and forced Romania into submission, in order not to risk a Soviet involvement in the event of regional war. The fact the Hungary was not pleased with the result was also of less significance for Hitler. The result was that both parts were somewhat reconciled having gained the protection of a powerful ally, yet remaining antagonistic at each other and trying to please Hitler in order to gain more. The only winner out of this "barter" was Hitler's Germany.

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 10:25 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ March 16, 2008 04:17 am)
Germany took Hungarian side on this matter... The result was that both parts were somewhat reconciled having gained the protection of a powerful ally, yet remaining antagonistic at each other and trying to please Hitler in order to gain more. The only winner out of this "barter" was Hitler's Germany.

Dragos, I agree with most you've written. However, let me point out that Hitler (and Mussolini) did not take Hungary's (or Rumania's) side. He (they) had only his (their) own interests in sight in this 'barter'.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Imperialist March 15, 2008 10:27 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 15, 2008 09:59 pm)
Imp., you're looking at those events with hindsight, which is an error.
Back then, in 1940, Rumania and Hungary both thought they are the "owner" (your word) of Transylvania, and were ready to go to war for it. However, Germany and Italy decided to cut the proverbial 'Gordian knot' in two, parting the contested territory between the two parties. Moreover, part of the "barter" was that those days' 'superpowers' guaranteed the territorial integrity of the two parties.
But you already knew these facts, didn't you?

Gen. Dénes

Transylvania was a de facto part of Romania, it was not just a thought.

Hungary and the powers you mentioned did not do a barter because barter means exchange between items that are owned by both parties prior to the deal. And like I said, Hungary had neither Northern nor Southern Transylvania, Romania had it all. There was no barter.

Guaranteeing territorial integrity in exchange for not resisting a move against your own territorial integrity is laughable at best.

Posted by: dragos March 15, 2008 10:32 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 16, 2008 01:25 am)
QUOTE (dragos @ March 16, 2008 04:17 am)
Germany took Hungarian side on this matter... The result was that both parts were somewhat reconciled having gained the protection of a powerful ally, yet remaining antagonistic at each other and trying to please Hitler in order to gain more. The only winner out of this "barter" was Hitler's Germany.

Dragos, I agree with most you've written. However, let me point out that Hitler (and Mussolini) did not take Hungary's (or Rumania's) side. He (they) had only his (their) own interests in sight.

Gen. Dénes

I expressed my opinion that Germany took Hungary's side because it was Hungary that raised the settlement of this issue in one way or another, and Hitler could simply have forced Hungary into laying down her claims (or stay neutral and let Hungary "barter" with Soviet Union rolleyes.gif) . However, this was an opportunity to bring Romania under Germany sphere of influence, and Hitler could not find a more favorable moment.

And Mussolini could not have other opinion than Hitler on this issue cool.gif

Posted by: dragos March 15, 2008 10:40 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 16, 2008 01:27 am)
Guaranteeing territorial integrity in exchange for not resisting a move against your own territorial integrity is laughable at best.

No it's not. Especially if your territorial integrity was at stake between Soviet Union and Germany.

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 10:41 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ March 16, 2008 04:32 am)
I expressed my opinion that Germany took Hungary's side because it was Hungary that raised the settlement of this issue in one way or another...

No. It was actually both Rumania and Hungary who raised the issue of an arbitration with Berlin and Rome in regards of Transylvania.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 10:46 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 16, 2008 04:27 am)
Transylvania was a de facto part of Romania, it was not just a thought.

That was about to change through the means of war. In August 1940, Rumania faced the real risk of losing Transylvania for good in an imminent war. That's why it was a 'barter', namely keep the bigger half and gain the sought-after guarantees of one of those times' 'superpowers' in exchange of letting the other half go.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos March 15, 2008 10:47 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 16, 2008 01:41 am)
QUOTE (dragos @ March 16, 2008 04:32 am)
I expressed my opinion that Germany took Hungary's side because it was Hungary that raised the settlement of this issue in one way or another...

No. It was actually both Rumania and Hungary who raised the issue of an arbitration with Berlin and Rome in regards of Transylvania.

Gen. Dénes

Yes, after failed negotiations between the two parts, and started by who?

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 10:53 pm
Initially by Hungary, of course. However, the request for arbitration, which actually settled the contentious issue (for a while), actually came from both Rumania and Hungary. This is what eventually matters.

Anyhow, this is now off-topic, and we are loosing sight of the original issue, namely the notion of the 'barter' in 1940.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos March 15, 2008 11:04 pm
Not quite off-topic, because the Soviet ultimatum is linked with the so called Vienna Diktat or Arbitration.

However, being sarcastic, it proved that appealing to Hitler was not a very inspired move from Hungary wink.gif

It is interesting to know if there was any secret meetings or negotiations between Hungary and Soviet Union prior to appealing to the arbitration from Hitler.

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 11:13 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ March 16, 2008 05:04 am)
Not quite off-topic, because the Soviet ultimatum is linked with the so called Vienna Diktat or Arbitration.

It was linked only indirectly, namely when seeing the USSR getting hold of a contested territory of Rumania, the Hungarians thought it's the proper time to enforce their claim, too. For this, they were ready to ultimately go to war, if necessary. But Hitler stopped them, and suggested both parties direct negotiations instead.

As for your sarcastic point, as I've said, it wasn't Hungary who appealed to Hitler. Eventually, Hitler was who intervened to avert war in his 'backyard', and after the failed direct negotiations it was both Rumania and Hungary who appealed to the Führer (and the Duce).

As far as I know, in 1940 there were no secret negotiations between Budapest and Moscow regarding the issue of Transylvania. Hungary was too small of a 'pie' for Stalin, and would have nothing to offer to him anyways.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos March 15, 2008 11:24 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 16, 2008 02:13 am)
As far as I know, in 1940 there were no secret negotiations between Budapest and Moscow regarding the issue of Transylvania. Hungary was too small of a 'pie' for Stalin, and would have nothing to offer to him anyways.

I asked this because I have read in a Military History magazine that Soviet Union declared that it was ready to intervene in case of a conflict between Romania and Hungary. At stake was not the Hungarian territory, of course, but the Romanian one, and it's not improbable that Red Army was eager to assist the Hungarian Army struggle in the west. It could have been a favorable moment for Stalin to pick up spoils of war and push its sphere of influence westwards.

Posted by: Imperialist March 15, 2008 11:25 pm
QUOTE (dragos @ March 15, 2008 10:40 pm)
No it's not. Especially if your territorial integrity was at stake between Soviet Union and Germany.

Trading territorial integrity in exchange for guarantee for your territorial integrity (issued by the same guy that forces you not to resist a violation of it) is pure and simple silly.

With the case of Czechoslovakia still fresh, our massacred "territorial integrity" was not at all safe-kept in Hitler's desk. He could have massacred again if he so wanted.

And he did precisely so a week later on September 7 when we ended up ceding Cadrilater too! So much for trusting Hitler.

Am I wrong in saying that from among the former status-quo powers, Czechoslovakia and Romania were the only ones that succombed to the revisionist powers without a fight?

Posted by: Dénes March 15, 2008 11:33 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 16, 2008 05:25 am)
Am I wrong in saying that from among the former status-quo powers, Czechoslovakia and Romania were the only ones that succombed to the revisionist powers without a fight?

Austria did not resist to the 'Anschluss' either.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: Imperialist March 15, 2008 11:37 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 15, 2008 10:46 pm)
That was about to change through the means of war. In August 1940, Rumania faced the real risk of losing Transylvania for good in an imminent war. That's why it was a 'barter', namely keep the bigger half and gain the sought-after guarantees of one of those times' 'superpowers' in exchange of letting the other half go.

Gen. Dénes

Indeed, a war was set to sort the matter. But luckily the politicians wet their pants and made the decent decision of giving up. Then they probably went back for a nap and 'revista presei' in Parliament. I doubt most of them were of a different breed back then.

Guarantees from Hitler, the man well known for his "international treaties are mere pieces of paper" attitude? They weren't worth a dime.

Posted by: dragos March 15, 2008 11:45 pm
QUOTE (Imperialist @ March 16, 2008 02:25 am)
With the case of Czechoslovakia still fresh, our massacred "territorial integrity" was not at all safe-kept in Hitler's desk. He could have massacred again if he so wanted.

Romania's case was not alike Czechoslovakian one. In the case of Czechoslovakia, a bordering territory at the Reich's border, supported by signifiant internal dissociation between Slovaks and Czech, it was a free move from Hitler at the table of negociations with UK and France.

QUOTE
Am I wrong in saying that from among the former status-quo powers, Czechoslovakia and Romania were the only ones that succombed to the revisionist powers without a fight?


Yes, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland against Soviet Union (no declaration of war, Poland did not have anything to put up agains the Soviets, a likely scenario as was Romania involved in a war agains Hungary in 1940)

Posted by: Dénes March 16, 2008 08:21 am
QUOTE (dragos @ March 16, 2008 05:45 am)
Romania's case was not alike Czechoslovakian one. In the case of Czechoslovakia, a bordering territory at the Reich's border, supported by signifiant internal dissociation between Slovaks and Czech

You forgot the main objective of annexation of the Czech lands: the sizeable ethnic German population (over 3 millions) living in the so-called Sudetenland, which had become Czechoslovakian citizens virtually overnight, in 1919, without their opinion having first been asked. A situation pretty much like of the ethnic Hungarians and Germans from Transylvania.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: sid guttridge March 17, 2008 10:40 am
Hi Guys,

There was no "barter" in 1940. Bartering implies some sort of exchange of similar value. No such exchange was offered to Romania in 1940.

Although I don't approve of the capitalising of the word "dictat", that was effectively what Romania faced at the hands of first the USSR backed by Germany in June 1940 and then at the hands of Germany backed by Italy in August 1940.

In the Hungarian case, although there was no barter, the Hungarians certainly felt that they had accepted a compromise on their original demands for the whole of Transilvania.

There were a lot of countries that succombed without a fight due to diplomatic isolation. Apart from Czechoslovakia and Romania, there were the Baltic Republics, Albania, the Polish Government ordered no resistance be given to the Red Army on 18 September 1939 and Denmark barely fired a shot. And what about Hungary in March 1944?

In the Danish case Churchill himself stated in February 1940 that if Denmark did not resist a German attack he could not reproach her because he could offer no assistance.

Romania was not alone in taking such a decision.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Dénes March 17, 2008 03:53 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ March 17, 2008 04:40 pm)
There was no "barter" in 1940. Bartering implies some sort of exchange of similar value. No such exchange was offered to Romania in 1940.

Barter doesn't necessarily imply the exchange of 'things' of the same nature.
Here is the definition, as given by the Free Dictionary: "To trade goods or services without the exchange of money." Therefore, one can exchange goods for services and vice versa. In Rumania's case, there was an exchange of territory against official guarantees. It sounds bartel to me.

QUOTE
Although I don't approve of the capitalising of the word "dictat", that was effectively what Romania faced at the hands of first the USSR backed by Germany in June 1940 and then at the hands of Germany backed by Italy in August 1940.

The two cases do not fall into the same category. While Rumania faced a clear-cut direct ultimatum in case of Bessarabia, in case of Transylvania it was an arbitration by a third party, arbitration the two respective parties officially asked for. While in the former case the entire Bessarabia (along with Northern Bukovina and the Hertza territory) was lost, in the latter case the larger half of Transylvania coudl be kept, as a result of the arbitration.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dragos March 17, 2008 05:02 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 17, 2008 06:53 pm)
in case of Transylvania it was an arbitration by a third party, arbitration the two respective parties officially asked for.

It may have been dressed up as a diplomatic settlement, but given the fact that Romanian officials were summoned without explanations and forced to accept the terms of arbitration in that very night under the threat of military intervention against Romania, it still is an ultimatum or diktat.

Posted by: Imperialist March 17, 2008 06:33 pm
QUOTE (Dénes @ March 17, 2008 03:53 pm)
Barter doesn't necessarily imply the exchange of 'things' of the same nature.
Here is the definition, as given by the Free Dictionary: "To trade goods or services without the exchange of money." Therefore, one can exchange goods for services and vice versa. In Rumania's case, there was an exchange of territory against official guarantees. It sounds bartel to me.

Yes, but it shouldn't be forgotten that the recent discussion started from Victor's comparison with the barter of 1878 when territory was exchanged for other territory, and he asked me should Romania have resisted then too. I went from there and stated that the comparison is wrong because there was no similar situation and no real barter in 1940. I consider the gurantees unworthy of what was ceded in exchange. A real barter (and comparable with 1878) should have consisted of territories in kind.

Anyway Carol II asked in July for German military support and in late August and early September Antonescu in cahoots with the Germans played an important role in defusing any "rogue" resistance against the Vienna decision. For the sake of the state's "survival" a righteous resistance was discouraged and the state was transformed into a nazi state. All hail the state... and don't forget to pay your taxes. tongue.gif

Posted by: sid guttridge March 18, 2008 11:36 am
Hi Denes,

Be it goods, services, or territory, barter implies an exchange of equal value. Romania was offered nothing of the sort in 1940.

"Extortion" would be a better term than "barter". Romania was told that unless she agreed to the dictats of the Gerrmany, the USSR and Italy, she would lose even more territory and possibly even her national existence.

As for being offered a "guarantee" of the rest, Romania was already in fully recognised legal possession of all of it under international law. The "guarantee" of the rump of Romania left after the cessions of June-September 1940 was, if anything, technically weaker than the universal international recognition it had had before, because this "guarantee" involved only two countries - Germany and Italy - one of which was effectively powerless in the region.

There was definitely no "barter" in 1940. Why? Because Romania had absolutely no leverage with which to barter with Germany, the USSR and Italy at a time when they were acting in concert.

It is disingenuous to imply that both parties, Romania and Hungary, voluntarily asked for third party arbitration. Romania was forced to attend Vienna by dictat of Germany and Italy. Why would Romania voluntarily ask for arbitration when she was already in full possession of the disputed territory and had no further claims on Hungarian territory?

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: sid guttridge March 18, 2008 03:58 pm
Hi Imp,

Romania was never a "nazi state".

It couldn't be by definition, because Nazism was reserved by Hitler for Germanic peoples.

Even if Romania had become "legionary state" it would have had a different character to Nazism. There was a mystical, Romanian Orthodox religious strand to the Legionary movement that was entirely lacking in Nazism.

However, Romania never became a "legionary state". When he had to make a decision on this subject in January 1941, Hitler sided firmly with Antonescu and the Army against Sima and the Legionaries.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: mele22 March 18, 2008 08:36 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ March 18, 2008 03:58 pm)
Romania was never a "nazi state".

It couldn't be by definition, because Nazism was reserved by Hitler for Germanic peoples.

I know I might sound stupid, but I'm still wondering what the major difference between nazism and fascism is. I know nazism refers to Hitler's National Socialist Party governing Germany from 1933 to 1945 and it was more focused on ethnical issues. Is there anything else?

Posted by: sid guttridge March 20, 2008 04:41 pm
Hi mele,

The thing to remember about all the right wing totalitarian ideologies was that they were highly nationalistic. There was no right-wing equivalent of the Communist International. All the right-wing -isms were potentially or actually mutually antagonistic. The Romanian and Hungarian Communist Parties might have found a way of co-operating together, however grudgingly, but the Romanian Iron Guard and Hungarian Arrow Cross hated each other.

Each right-wing totalitarian "-ism" had different national characteristics. The Iron Guard were influenced by a crude version of Romanian Orthodoxy. The Arrow Cross was ultra-Catholic. The Slovak and Croatian wartime leaderships were also very Catholic, but disliked the Hungarians. Fascism in Italy had little religious content, while German Nazis tried to reinvent a pseudo-Nordic religion. Italian Fascism had no ideological problem with Jews. Nazism put anti-semitism near the core of its ideology.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Iamandi March 22, 2008 10:19 am
About romanian reserves (mans, ammonitions, aircrafts, food, etc.) can anyone say something?
ROmania, at that moment, was prepared to sustain a war? Even for those 50 days, to the momment when ... when what? Bulgaria and Hungary occupyed, and after that we just resist forever on the east front?

Let's say just - one squadron with PZL 24 or 11 will sustain some loses. We have what to put in place of destroyed planes & killed pilots?

Thank you,

Iama

Posted by: Agarici March 22, 2008 10:33 pm
QUOTE (Iamandi @ March 22, 2008 10:19 am)
About romanian reserves (mans, ammonitions, aircrafts, food, etc.) can anyone say something?
ROmania, at that moment, was prepared to sustain a war? Even for those 50 days, to the momment when ... when what? Bulgaria and Hungary occupyed, and after that we just resist forever on the east front?

Let's say just - one squadron with PZL 24 or 11 will sustain some loses. We have what to put in place of destroyed planes & killed pilots?

Thank you,

Iama


[Finally back on topic...]

Well, since the engines and airframes for both planes were produced at IAR factories, I guess there would have been no serious problem in replacing the lost PZL 11 and 24 planes with another 11/24 - even if the production had been halted by the summer of 1940. Also the IAR 80 wasn't so far of reaching the serial production stage. However a problem could have been the 7,92 FN MG's, which were imported from Belgium.

As for the downed pilots, I don't think that Romania's situation was any different then that of Poland, Belgium, Holland, France or any other country involved in WW 2.

Posted by: Bernard Miclescu March 23, 2008 08:58 pm
QUOTE (Agarici @ March 23, 2008 12:33 am)
QUOTE (Iamandi @ March 22, 2008 10:19 am)
About romanian reserves (mans, ammonitions, aircrafts, food, etc.) can anyone say something?
ROmania, at that moment, was prepared to sustain a war?




Hello guys,

The point is that Romanian governement at that time didn't do anything to stop the territorial loss of 1940. Only cries, regrets and upset people (cf Gafencu etc). The above question has to be forgotten since not a single "official" shot was fired against the "occupation" of these territories.

The question is how can we deal with those historical facts in our days thatfore no more wars, violence and bitterness should devide us in nowdays and in future.

BM

Posted by: Iamandi March 23, 2008 09:54 pm
QUOTE (Bernard Miclescu @ March 23, 2008 08:58 pm)
QUOTE (Agarici @ March 23, 2008 12:33 am)
QUOTE (Iamandi @ March 22, 2008 10:19 am)
About romanian reserves (mans, ammonitions, aircrafts, food, etc.) can anyone say something?
ROmania, at that moment, was prepared to sustain a war?




Hello guys,

The point is that Romanian governement at that time didn't do anything to stop the territorial loss of 1940. Only cries, regrets and upset people (cf Gafencu etc). The above question has to be forgotten since not a single "official" shot was fired against the "occupation" of these territories.

The question is how can we deal with those historical facts in our days thatfore no more wars, violence and bitterness should devide us in nowdays and in future.

BM

Sorry, Mr. Miclescu, but, [/QUOTE]The above question has to be forgotten since not a single "official" shot was fired against the "occupation" of these territories. [QUOTE] ... it is not my interese. No offence, but i hate: my opinoin is better than yours. Generally speaking.
Anyway this topic is about a confrontation. Politics are just in start. I asked about some things... i just want some answers about Romanian power strngth or something like.

Thanks,

Iama

Posted by: Dénes March 23, 2008 10:52 pm
QUOTE (sid guttridge @ March 18, 2008 05:36 pm)
It is disingenuous to imply that both parties, Romania and Hungary, voluntarily asked for third party arbitration. Romania was forced to attend Vienna by dictat of Germany and Italy.

Sid,

Following the unsuccessful direct talks regarding the partition of Transylvania, held at Turnu-Severin, between 16-24 Aug. 1940, both the Rumanian and Hungarian Governments officially asked Berlin and Rome for arbitration on 27 Aug. The alternative to this would have been war (as Hungary had already mobilised its armed forces on 26 Aug.). BTW, this joint call by Rumania and Hungary is included in the first sentence of the official document released following the arbitration.

As for the answer to your other question, namely 'Why would Romania voluntarily ask for arbitration when she was already in full possession of the disputed territory and had no further claims on Hungarian territory?' is simle: to avoid war, which could have had a disastruous result for Bucharest, as probably it would not have been a 'simple' war between Hungary and Rumania (which could have ended with either side's victory), as Germany (and perhaps the USSR) would have probably intervened, most probably to the detriment of Rumania.

Gen. Dénes

P.S. On a personal note, I don't really get this: "It is disingenuous to imply..." Are you suggesting that I am somehow implying something untruth in an insincere way? sad.gif

Posted by: sid guttridge March 25, 2008 10:12 am
Hi Denes,

Exactly. Romania entered into talks with Hungary "to avoid war, which could have had a disastruous result for Bucharest, as probably it would not have been 'simple' war between Hungary and Rumania (which could have ended with either side's victory), as Germany (and perhaps the USSR) would have probably intervened, most probably to the detriment of Rumania."

That was not just the reason why Romania agreed to the Vienna Arbitration, but why it entered into talks with Hungary over 16-24 August. Romania had full legal possession of all the disputed territory, had absolutely no claims on Hungarian territory and little to fear from Hungary itself at the time. (It should point out here that Germany believed that Romania was more likely to have beaten Hungary, whose forces were only part formed at the time.) Romania had absolutely no reason to enter into any sort of dialogue with Hungary on the subject except that it was pressured into it by hostile great powers.

Disingenuous was "unparliamentary" language. I apologise.

However, my point remains. If one looks at the full facts there is absolutely no doubt that Romania was forced into talks with Hungary on the subject through fear of powerful third parties.

The only other alternative is that for some reason the Romanian government had spontaneously come to the sudden realisation that its possession of some of Transilvania was unjustified and wished to make concessions to rectify this. This doesn't seem very likely to me.

I make no comment here as to which party was right or righter. However, there is absolutely no doubt that Romania was forced by outside pressures to address this issue at Turnu Severin and Vienna unwillingly. Romania was told, in effect, "Make a bilateral deal with Hungary or we will force one on you" In short, Romania faced a dictat.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Dénes March 25, 2008 04:01 pm
Sid,

It's very hard to pinpoint the actual motivation for the Rumanian Government to enter talks with Hungary. Of course, the increasing German influence in that region is undeniable. However, this might not have been enough. At that point, in mid-1940, the post-Versailles/Trianon territorial arrangements started to unravel and the so-called 'New Order' begun to take shape in Central and Eastern Europe, too. The unsettled issues started to break apart. The "full legal possession of all the disputed territory" you mentioned did not seem that strong and lasting any more (for example, Rumania renounced the ineffective British territorial guarantees on July 1 and turned to Germany instead - so no dictat fell upon her out of the blue sky). Therefore, Bucharest must have felt 'the heat', particularly after she lost Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina just weeks earlier. At that point, the Rumanian Government could have thought that it's better to keep a larger chunk of Transylvania than loosing it all. This might have been a powerful 'incentive' to enter direct talks with Hungary. But who knows?
To know more certain details, not only engage in educated guesswork, we would need some documents and hard facts in this regards.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: sid guttridge March 27, 2008 11:06 am
Hi Denes,

Whatever the "heat" was, it was not fear of Hungary or any doubts about its right to Transilvania that forced Romania to enter talks on the subject. It was outside pressure by hostile great powers a a time when the country's own great own protectors were hors de combat. Hungary faced a similar problem at the end of WWI. Hungary faced a dictat from unchallenged great powers in 1918-19 and Romania faced one in 1940.

Cheers,

Sid.

Posted by: Florin July 11, 2008 02:49 pm
Honestly, I did not read every sentence posted under this topic (11 Web pages by now).
I think the following were not mentioned previously:

In spite of the fact that Poland was from the first day of the war on the same side with the Allies, and later the Polish soldiers fought both under Soviet Union and under the Western Allies, Poland lost a huge piece of land after war, which even with that German land given on its western border, was still bigger percentage from total than Bessarabia was for Romania.

Czechoslovakia, an obvious victim of the Nazi aggression and of the coward behavior of France and Great Britain, ended WWII with less territory than it had in 1938.

On the other side, Bulgaria, a sympathizer with Nazi Germany even before the start of WWII, and a collaborator with the Axis until Romania took the risk to switch sides, kept the land received under an agreement oversaw by the Axis.
Hungary, who's army was fighting for Germany from the start of Barbarossa to March 1945, remained with exactly the same territory it had at the start of 1939.

My point here: Soviet Union and The United States decided the map of Europe as they pleased, and what each small country did or did not was not that important, eventually.

Another thing: While Finland was always praised for its courage to stand against Soviet Union, and Romania was offered as on opposite example to this, many forget that Finland had its back secure (border with Sweden), and had some support, more or less effective, from both Germany and The United States.
At the end of June 1940 Romania was literally surrounded by enemies and cut off from any traditional ally, to make short a long story.

Posted by: razu January 21, 2009 04:16 am
I wonder what my great grand father General Aristide Razu was thinking after Romania lost so many men in WW1 fighting against germany when Antonescu and nazism came to power.I think if I was him and saw what he have seen in his lifetime I would have laughed about going against .....Maybe the communism would have not come in such a force in our country.Maybe if people would read books instead of burning them,they would know that not even Napoleon could beat the russians,or the british.
Anyway first nationalization was made to our family in 1938....when romanian government said"from tomorow the underground resources belong to the state" that is the oil if I m not mistaken.And then slowly we lost everything ,land houses ....lives.Even today General Aristide Razu house in Bucharest on Varsoviei street No.5 is nationalized since 1946 and lived by the ex workers of the communist party.Not to mention that my uncle Radu Mandrea "donated" to the communist party in 1948
Mosia Balcesti Giltofani which today is Nicolae Balcescu Museum.....probably in order to not go to prisson.Because it is well known that in 1947 arrestations of land owners begun in romania.....So if we stood up and fought and would have not been so friendly with the germans before 1938 things would have not gone so wrong for us.....or at least we would have known that we have tried.....

Posted by: Victor January 30, 2009 07:38 am
razu, please take a look at the forum guidelines and try to post on topic in the future. If you cannot find a topic to incorporate the new posting, you can always create a new topic. However, keep in mind that topics without any informational value or with the possbility of creating flame wars, will be closed

Your off topic posts were deleted.

Posted by: Victor January 30, 2009 08:04 am
Off topic posts by razu were deleted.

Posted by: MMM March 06, 2009 01:20 pm
An "interesting" update: in conformity with documents presented by the SSI to the government since May 1940, the gov't was attentioned if we have to prepare for defensive OR evacuation in order. Carol and his politicians did... nothing! And then they got the nerve to pretend surprised...
One should read Gh. Buzatu's books and cut out the theories of conspiracy: at the highest levels, they knew - or at least suspected - what was coming!
PS - Florin, you're quite right, but nobody knew that back then. AND, what's more important, one shouldn't fight only the sure-odds battles... You know you're going to lose, but you get to keep your honour! It wasn't the case with us - we had no honour to keep in the first place!

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