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WorldWar2.ro Forum > Eastern Front (1941-1944) > Stalingrad performance

Posted by: Victor December 16, 2008 10:58 am

[split from http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=3249]

QUOTE ("MMM")

RE: Victor
I did NOT intend to joke about the performances of the Romanian infantry divisions. Unfortunately, judging ONLY after the result, we didn't do much. It is also clear - from the sheer number of the victims on both sides - that the Romanians put up a good fight, but they didn't have a real chance. As it was seen, the "reservoir" of Soviet infantry was quite endless. As for the example of Romanians who knew what to do, I'm sure there is at least a counter-example of an officer who did NOT know for each one who did! Why else would the things have happened like that???
And, again, I have only respect for the many soldiers, NCO's and officers who gave their lives for Romania (at least, that was what they were told), regardless where and alongside which ally. I see no big difference between Don and Hron, in that matter.

Things happened like they did because:
1. The Romanian troops were put in a very difficult strategical situation: they were overstretched on a long barren frontline with little reserves against an enemy with superior numbers and in possesion of two extremely large bridgeheads.
2. The Romanian troops were sent to the front by marshal Antonescu in greater numbers than it was possible to properly equip and supply.
3. The Romanian troops were subordinated to a foreign chain of command, which comitted error after error during the winter of 1942/43, and which cared little if not at all about them

To think that things happened as they did because of Romanian officers "who did NOT know what to do" is simplifying beyond the borders of a serious discussion.

Posted by: MMM December 16, 2008 02:42 pm

I agree and disagree with your oppinion. The ultimate responsibility belongs to Antonescu, but as for the lack of reserves and

QUOTE

a very difficult strategical situation

, this is still a matter of debate. In the end, it is so easy to blame it all on Antonescu, isn't it? But he was not alone, he was surrounded by military; how comes that nobody's seen the possibility of a catastrophe before it actually occured? Plus; greater numbers, but lesser battalions: as far as I know, Romanian divisions were reorganised w/ six batallions instead of nine. Was it the same reasons for which Adolf re/organised his armored divisions w/ only one tank regiment instead of 2?

Posted by: Cantacuzino December 16, 2008 06:31 pm

QUOTE

2. The Romanian troops were sent to the front by marshal Antonescu in greater numbers than it was possible to properly equip and supply.

And if Antonescu would sent in lesser number troops but properly equiped with obsolete guns and tanks could stop the soviet attacks ?

On 11 february '42 a romanian delegation leaded by Antonescu was present at the meeting with Hitler and agree to continue the war for defeating the soviets only conditioned by supplying the romanian divisions with heavy artillery, AT guns, modern tanks and munitions as equivalent to german divisions.

If germans (or Hitler) didn't respect their promises it's not Antonescu fault.
Of course the soviets realized the weakest ring of the chain been the romanian divisions with obsolete AT guns (37mm Bofors, 25 mm Puteaux, etc),obsolete tanks (Skoda R2) and concentrated their counterattack with their best winter trained divisions (the siberians) sustained by hundreds of moderns tanks (T-34) against romanians.
Against german divisions was not a good option (equiped with modern AT guns and moderns Tanks P-III,P-IV).
I doubt that anyone could choose better option than soviet did.
Mayby Hitler believed that romanians could fight with empty hands or mayby the truth is that he preffered to use his limited armament supply only for german divisions.

Posted by: Victor December 16, 2008 07:20 pm

QUOTE (MMM @ December 16, 2008 04:42 pm)

I agree and disagree with your oppinion. The ultimate responsibility belongs to Antonescu, but as for the lack of reserves and

QUOTE

a very difficult strategical situation

I don't think there is much to debate, given the known facts and, it wasn't all Antonescu's fault. The German command, which was in charge of the Romanian troops on the Eastern Front, has a large part of it

Regarding Antonescu, General Iacobici lost his position as Chief of the General Staff after disagreeing with him on the number of divisions to be committed on the front during the 1942 campaign. Iacobici wanted to limit the number of division to the minimum that could be properly manned, equipped and supplied. From memory that number was around seven. He was replaced by maj. general Steflea, the former CO of the Antonescu's dear 3rd Division and a more docile character. This fact is relatively well known and documented.

It is also a well known and documented fact that the general Petre Dumitrescu, the CO of the 3rd Army, repeatedly warned the German command about Soviet forces massing up in the two bulges into his line. All his pleas for an offensive action against them and the danger they posed were ignored by the German command and dismissed as Romanian panic.

I fail to see what is the relevance of the spring 1942 reorganization to the discussion.

Posted by: Victor December 16, 2008 07:32 pm

QUOTE (Cantacuzino @ December 16, 2008 08:31 pm)

QUOTE

2. The Romanian troops were sent to the front by marshal Antonescu in greater numbers than it was possible to properly equip and supply.

Was that promise put on paper and signed by both parties? If not it's worthless.

Sending less soldiers would have created a different scenario altogether, which is almost impossible to predict. One thing we can be sure of: it would have meant less Romanian lives pointlessly lost.

Another common misconception is the fact that the Soviets chose to attack as they did because that is where Romanian troops were stationed. In reality, the plan for the offensive was finished and approved before the Romanian 3rd Army took up positions on the Don.

Yet another myth is the fact that the Operation Uranus was a sure victory, when in fact it could have gone very wrong or at least failed to meet all its objectives, if the German command would have had a good strategic view of the situation and would have been less cocky.

And this is where we get back to the initial topic. Armored and motorized reserves (there were enough Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions fighting bleeding dry uselessly inside Stalingrad) carefully stationed behind the Romanian infantry armies in order to counter a Soviet tank breakthrough would have most likely changed things a lot.

Posted by: Florin December 17, 2008 06:41 am

As the years are passing by, historians are realizing that the German army was much weaker in equipment and personnel fit for combat than people thought back in the war years.
What really made the German army to shine as superpower were the revolutionary tactics and strategy, which quite often opened new paths for military thinking: conquering for the first time in history a country mostly with paratroopers (Norway), and later a whole big island (Crete). Also, the revolutionary Blitzkrieg tactics, and the coordination of aviation and ground units in real time etc.

Unfortunately for Germany, and for the Axis, the Soviets and the Americans learned quickly all the "lessons", and they started to use them back against the Axis.
I think the biggest problem of Germany and Japan was their military production.
While people know that the United States was the industrial giant of the war, Soviet Union alone was producing much bigger quantities of tanks and cannons than all European Axis combined.
As far as I know (and I think it was discussed right under this topic), the problem with the Romanians at Stalingrad was not only the overstretch of the German resources, but also some hostile atitude (or, at best, reluctant) of German high ranks in regard with the supply of the Romanian troops.
Actually, the German leadership played the "dumb" role in understanding the need to supply their allies. Only in 1944 things started to move into more consistent aid - for Romania, Finland and Hungary altogether.
According to my understanding, even though the resources of Germany were quite "thin" and overstretched at the end of 1942, it was still not that bad to don't help the Romanians with some additional equipment, if the Germans would really had the will to do it. And I would say it was not a fair atitude, because in spite of the World War I and the Treaty of Vienna of 1940, the Romanians were loyal allies in the first years of World War II.

Posted by: Dénes December 17, 2008 08:06 am

QUOTE (Florin @ December 17, 2008 12:41 pm)

... it was still not that bad to don't help the Romanians with some additional equipment, if the Germans would really had the will to do it. And I would say it was not a fair atitude...

It's very "trendy" nowadays to blame the Germans for everything, including own failures (I see this approach not only in Rumanian historiography, but also in the Hungarian one, and probably in the other small Axis forces as well). Ironically, some German commanders and historians do exactly the same thing, but in the opposite direction, namely blaming the small Axis allies for their own failures.

For an uninitiated reader it would transpire from this thread (and others) that the bad Germans had tons of equipment available in reserve, but they purposely did not give them to their own allies, just to let them bleed unnecessarily*. Well, this wasn't the case. The Germans did not give the equipment promised because they did not have them themselves. The meagre resources still available, close to the front lines, were understandably used to equip the German units, and only a small percentage was handed over to their allies. Small wonder they succumbed to the well organized and well equipped Soviet units placing the Schwerpunkt where the frontline was the weakest. Obviously, I am not talking here of some of the German commanders' attitude and decisions, which indeed was faulty. But the military personnel from the small Axis side wasn't always faultless either.

In short, neither simplicist approach is covering the truth, which actually lies somewhere in between.

Gen. Dénes

Note: * that was the case rather with the Soviet ally in late 1944 and early 1945.

Posted by: dead-cat December 17, 2008 09:08 am

QUOTE (Florin @ December 17, 2008 07:41 am)

Unfortunately for Germany, and for the Axis, the Soviets and the Americans learned quickly all the "lessons", and they started to use them back against the Axis.
I think the biggest problem of Germany and Japan was their military production.
While people know that the United States was the industrial giant of the war, Soviet Union alone was producing much bigger quantities of tanks and cannons than all European Axis combined.

The SU produced large amounts of tanks and artillery, because they produced little else themselves. they did not mass produce APCs. motorization was supplied by the allies, as were more complex products in the chain, without which the red army would've fared far worse. also the SU did not (have to) divert resources to naval matters. Also the russians very much needed the huge amounts of tanks, as most were destroyed (numberwise). discarding the 13000L&L tanks, they finished the war, again numberwise, on approximately the same level as in 1940.

one of the reasons for the equipment shortage of axis forces during the war is the late switch to war footing of the german industry. the production numbers of 1944 are very much competitive in all branches.

Posted by: feic7346 December 17, 2008 02:43 pm

In 1941 the casualty rate of Germans as against Russians was on the order of 20-1 including prisoners of course. After Stalingrad, the Russians still lost heavily but I think the casualty rate was closer to maybe 5-1. This was because of better Russian equipment tactics and attitude.
There was no way the axis could have won at the 5-1 rate. If the rates of 1941 were maintained, the axis could have won. Comments?

Posted by: dead-cat December 17, 2008 03:10 pm

definetly not.
the red army casualties for 1941 were around 4.47 million.
20:1 would mean, that the german army lost no more than 230.000 during 1941.
the german army lost around 302.000 men irrecoverable losses alone on the EF during 1941. Zetterling gives an estimation of total losses on the EF, which i would have to look up for a more exact figure, but iirc, the german army hit the million somewhere during the 1st half of 1942.
so the exchange ratio was more towards 5:1 in favour of the german army in 1941 and declining during the war.
also to do the numbers game, the soviet union, to win at a sustained 5:1 ratio, would have to mobilize 5 times the number of german soldiers deploeyed on the EF. at no time, during ww2 did the soviets enjoy an overall 5:1 advantage on the EF. also, during ww2, the german army mobilized around 17 million men. to balance this at the 5:1 ratio proposed by you, the soviets would have to mobilize at least 85 million men, which was well beyond their capability.
according to Krivosheev, the red army mobilized throughout the war around 35 million men and they began to scrap the bottom during 1945 themselves.

Posted by: Florin December 17, 2008 05:36 pm

A big problem of Germany was the fight with Soviet Union AND The United States AND Great Britain AND... etc. in the same time. Well, the responsibility of this situation is mostly on the shoulders of the German politic leadership of that moment - and it all started at Dunkirk, France, in June 1940.
Many people argue that Germany could manage quite well the Western Allies, or Soviet Union, each of them considered separately.

Posted by: Dénes December 17, 2008 06:44 pm

The Soviet Union would have attacked anyhow, regardless of German's war effort against the Western Allies. It was only a matter of time...

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: dead-cat December 17, 2008 08:07 pm

so, i checked. according to Zetterling&Frankson the Ostheer took 831.050 casualties between 22 june and 31 december 1941.
one year later it would be 1.912.000 and on 31 december 1943 the figure would reach 3.409.271 men.
since there is a breakdown of soviet casualties from Krivosheev at http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=5956, you can do the math on the casualties yourself.
however it definetly doesn't go anywhere near 20:1. i've heared the 20:1 or even 50:1 ratio, be it casualties or numbers deployed, many times myself in my youth, told by all sort of people. it doesn't make it true however.

Posted by: feic7346 December 17, 2008 08:42 pm

Red army casualties of 4.47 million in 1941? Are you counting prisoners?
570k at Kiev; 650k at Vyazma; Minsk 250k alone
Obviously alot of Byelorussian and Ukrainains did not fight for the Soviet Union in 1941 thinking that the Germans might be better than the Communists.
Soviet losses in killed wounded or missing were close to 8-9 million in 1941. After 1941-2 there were no masses of prisoners captured by the Germans so most of the casulaties were killed and wounded after that.

Posted by: dead-cat December 17, 2008 08:51 pm

yes the 4.47 million includes the prisoners.
and no there were no 8-9 million soviet casualties in 1941. however i'd like to see that statement sourced.

Posted by: Imperialist December 17, 2008 11:39 pm

QUOTE (Dénes @ December 17, 2008 06:44 pm)

The Soviet Union would have attacked anyhow, regardless of German's war effort against the Western Allies. It was only a matter of time...

Gen. Dénes

The two powers would have moved towards conflictual relations. But we don't know how quickly and what type of conflict.

The SU would have had the advantage of being able to enter an alliance with the Western allies. However the SU would have feared the same backstabbing from Germany. So their moves would be cautious.

Even if the SU would no longer be cautious and would start dealing with the Western powers, with the US busy in the Pacific the bickering would have started (you attack first, no you first), probably ending with an agreement to mount a joint offensive when Japan was finished. That would win precious time for Germany. If the Germans would have caught wind of these negotiations, suspected them or kept them in mind as a possibility then their total war economy would have started earlier on. The SU wouldn't have cut its oil supplies to Germany fearing not to provoke it too early.

The US detonation of the nuclear bombs would change the SU's perception of threats. Suddenly waging a war against the German Wehrmacht while the capitalist US arms itself with nukes wouldn't look so appealing. If Germany would have some luck with its nuclear program then the 3 powers and regimes would have entered the Cold War intact.

Posted by: petru32 December 17, 2008 11:55 pm

Great job everybody.
But in my opinion there are quite a few other factors that led to the defeat of Romanian forces in Stalingrad operations.
1. The new structure of the Romanian infantry divisions 6 infantry battalions iso 9 and 2 artillery battalions iso of 3.
2. The low quantity of ammunition received by Romanian units (artillery and infantry ammo) as most of the ammo trains were sent to German 6 Army for the final assault of Stalingrad
3. weather (fog) which canceled the axis air supremacy advantage for the critical stages of the battle.
4. Pervitin a drug based on Benzedrine used by OKW and OKH staff officers to stay awake (including Adolph Hitler) for which the long term use induced a high grade of optimism and a loss of contact to the reality which made impossible the taking of correct and realistic decisions.

Posted by: Florin December 18, 2008 03:37 am

QUOTE (petru32 @ December 17, 2008 06:55 pm)

4. Pervitin a drug based on Benzedrine used by OKW and OKH staff officers to stay awake (including Adolph Hitler) for which the long term use induced a high grade of optimism and a loss of contact to the reality which made impossible the taking of correct and realistic decisions.

I did not know that the officers used it too.
But regarding Hitler, I saw a documentary with a title so funny: "High Hitler"
(instead of "Heil Hitler").
For who does not know, in the United States the expression "to be high" or "he is high" is defining somebody under the effects of drugs, like marijuana, cocaine etc.

Posted by: Florin December 18, 2008 03:55 am

QUOTE (Dénes @ December 17, 2008 03:06 am)

QUOTE (Florin @ December 17, 2008 12:41 pm)

... it was still not that bad to don't help the Romanians with some additional equipment, if the Germans would really had the will to do it. And I would say it was not a fair atitude...

It's very "trendy" nowadays to blame the Germans for everything, including own failures .........For an uninitiated reader it would transpire from this thread (and others) that the bad Germans had tons of equipment available in reserve, but they purposely did not give them to their own allies, just to let them bleed unnecessarily........

Some real Romanian veterans of the Eastern Front blamed the Italians on everything at Stalingrad. They were so convincing, that for few years as child and teenager I believed it. I discovered later, to my surprise, that the Romanian troops shared the "honor" as well.
(And no, it was not my grandfather. He just kept saying something about betrayal and treason, but not targeting the Italians. I forgot why my grandfather was very upset against von Manstein - who, on his turn, blamed the Romanians in his memories for things who were not only their fault.)

As you wrote: everybody else to be blamed... on each side.
PS: I learned quite recently that a whole Hungarian army was decimated near Stalingrad in about two weeks. Do I remember correctly?

Posted by: Dénes December 18, 2008 06:36 am

QUOTE (Florin @ December 18, 2008 09:55 am)

I learned quite recently that a whole Hungarian army was decimated near Stalingrad in about two weeks. Do I remember correctly?

Yes, you do. It was the Hungarian 2nd Army, at the Don Bend. Same scenario, but different timing.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: feic7346 December 19, 2008 06:50 pm

Manstein never attacked the Romanian army. He felt that the Romanians had always fought as well as they could under the circumstances. If the German high command expected anything more than that was its own fault. He felt Antonescu was a sincere friend of Germany who understood the strategic situation better than Hitler did.

Posted by: MMM February 16, 2009 08:11 am

IMHO: if Antonescu and/or Hitler would have learnt anything from the performances of the Romanian Army at Odessa, the catastrophe at Stalingrad could have been avoided by NOT using Romanian troops...

Posted by: Victor February 16, 2009 08:40 am

If you would have read the topic or any serious work on this subject you wouldn't have been to hasty to cast judgements.

Those could have been starship troopers instead of Romanian troops, for the outcome would have been the same. The main problem was the overstretching of available ressources and lack of adequate mobile reserves. Without mobile mechanized reserves to counter the Soviet tank and mechanized corps that had broken through the lines and had bypassed the resistance points, German infantry would have suffered the same fate.

Btw, when working on a PhD supposedly you arrive at the conclusion at the end, after reviewing all available information. You seem to have arrived at the conclusion before actually starting the work.

Posted by: MMM February 16, 2009 11:51 am

Now who casts judgements? You didn't understand what I said: there would have been no Stalingrad, as in Stalingrad attack, with huge flanks!
As for my PhD thesis, anyone in their right mind could see the Romanian army was unprepared; this is NOT my thesis, but rather the state of Romanian arma, the relations with the German army, the situation of 1940-1941 etc.

starship troopers

Why not Darth Vader instead of von Paulus? loooool

Posted by: dead-cat February 16, 2009 01:29 pm

for "no stalingrad" to happen, you'd need someone at the head of the OKW who was driven by military logic. you don't get there by displaying logic, unless you're happen to be a monarch and inherit that post.
a person who made sense wouldn't have started ww2.

hitler was the one who insisted to hold stalingrad insted pulling back, for prestige reasons. he's not the only one who was driven by prestige rather than military logic, but in his case, the action proved to be extremly costly.

Mannstein showed in feb-march '43 how mobile defence is supposed to be done, but this by taking the risk of ignoring hitlers orders.
as the post-capture bahaviour of von paulus showd, he was not the man to ignore hitler.

during his "sejour" in a soviet camp near Zaporoshe ('45-'49) my father met a soldier who claimed to have been von paulus' cook. he didn't display the "marshall" in very favourable colours; while he and his entourage were feasting on the best, the army was starving.

Posted by: MMM February 16, 2009 01:58 pm

Dead-cat, I read about some of those things. I just wanted to underline the fact that Hitler, Antonescu, OKW etc. should have been aware of the - let's say - limited potential of the Romanian, Italian and Hungarian troops. They were NOT to be put in the front line such as they were in '41 or '42. Not alot of common sense was needed - and for being the ones who allegedly started the war, they should have done more to win it!

Posted by: dead-cat February 16, 2009 02:05 pm

the criticism directed against romanian troops I read of, was more directed against their equipment (or lack thereof) as against of the troops per se.
since the widespread adoption of the machinegun, wars were not won anymore by elan.

Posted by: MMM February 16, 2009 04:30 pm

Definitely. I did not imply anything else, as I'm not Ciano or some other egotistic former leader who just wants to blame someone. I was saying that if they learnt from Odessa, they shouldn't have sent Romanians to Stalingrad.
They = Hitler, Antonescu, OKW, MStM, whatever.
Is there a thread about Odessa?

Posted by: dead-cat February 16, 2009 04:56 pm

http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=3310&hl=odessa one for example.

Posted by: MMM February 16, 2009 05:42 pm

I forgot...
I'm old and tired. Would there be another one?

Posted by: dead-cat February 16, 2009 05:58 pm

you are hererby vigorously encouraged, to make an extensive use of the "search" function.

Posted by: Victor February 16, 2009 06:12 pm

QUOTE (MMM @ February 16, 2009 01:51 pm)

starship troopers

Why not Darth Vader instead of von Paulus? loooool

Just to remind you, you wrote:

QUOTE

IMHO: if Antonescu and/or Hitler would have learnt anything from the performances of the Romanian Army at Odessa, the catastrophe at Stalingrad could have been avoided by NOT using Romanian troops...

No matter how many times one reads this phrase, the logical conclusion is that you state that the reason for the defeat at Stalingrad was that Romanians were manning the defense. It is as simple as that. Mind reading is not a very frequent capability around here, so be more explicit when expressing yourself before complaining that others don't understand you.

For your information, the plan for the Uranus Operation (the Soviet offensive on the flanks at Stalingrad) was drafted and approved before Romanian troops took up positions at the Don's Bend. So I fail to see how if Romanians weren't present on the flanks at Stalingrad, "there would have been no Stalingrad, as in Stalingrad attack, with huge flanks!" as you state.

PS: Darth Vader commanded storm troopers. Starship troopers are from a different film. The one with the big bugs.

Posted by: MMM February 16, 2009 07:59 pm

Yep, so it is... As a matter of fact, I've first read the book "Starship troopers", By Robert Henlein - and it was more like a parable against war, unlike the sci-fi action movie they made from it!
I also agree I was thinking at one and writing another - at least translating something else.
But do you think that the Stalingrad catastrophe couldn't have been avoided/countered with some (inexistent at the time) panzer divisions?

Posted by: petru32 February 17, 2009 02:56 pm

Pervitin was issued for air crew (mostly for bomber crew as they were use intensively), tank drivers, assault infantry, HQ officers.
The Romanian 3 Army positions were held initially by Italian and German forces which left the positions before the replacement could arrive in some cases the positions were occupied by soviet forces forcing Romanian infantry to go to attack just arriving from long marches in order regain them, causing a lot of casualties.
The logistic for the Romanian forces was a nightmare as the supplies for 4th 6th German armies Army group A in Caucasus 3rd and 4th Romanian army and the Italian army were strangled around a single bridge over river Niper, adding to the fact that 6th German Army had priority in supplies in order to ensure the swift capture of Stalingrad.
Another problem was the poor communication between Romanian 3rd Army and German 6th Army (direct contact between the two was not aloud by OKW) however there were a some unofficial liason German officers but usually the information sent through till 19thNovember them by the Romanian side was ignored. And after the initial report of the attack signal by soviet trumpets (used due to the fog) the 6th Army received the information of the magnitude of the attack only couple of days after its start
6th German Army was totally committed in Stalingrad and due to the need for infantry they were starting to use tank and gun crew as infantrymen which limited very much their mobility and reaction time

Posted by: MMM February 17, 2009 03:39 pm

QUOTE

they were starting to use tank and gun crew as infantrymen

Well, they actually didn't have enough tanks and guns for all the crews surviving.
Pervitin, on the other hand, was used by so many german troops one can hardly state for sure which one hasn't used it... but it is not to be blamed alnoe for the optimism of OKW and others!

QUOTE

the plan for the Uranus Operation

I thought I made myself clear: if the real combat value of the allied troops would have been seen as such (i.e. low), OKW/Hitler/whoever shouldn't have planned an operation with huge flanks!

Posted by: Victor February 17, 2009 08:33 pm

The Germans ended up using what was available, since they underestimated the Soviet strength and overestimated their own capacity to inflict defeats to the Red Army similar to those of 1941. The Germans knew very well what their allies were capable of. They just didn't know what their enemy was capable of.

Returning to your earlier question, for example, the 5th Tank Army lost 198 tanks out of the initial 380 between 19 November and 2 December. Other Soviet units suffered relatively similar attrition rates owed not only to enemy action, but also to mechanical failures.

In the steppe, the success of the offensive laid in the successful capture of the several existing villages behind the frontline and creating viable supply routes behind the enemy lines, while in the same time cutting the enemy from its supply sources. When the 26th Tank Corps ran into the 1st Armored Division on 20-21 November, it simply went around when it encountered organized resistance and pushed on toward its objectives. Had more mobile reserves existed, they could have been used to deny the Soviet mechanized spearheads the alternative routes and would have limited the breakthrough.

The Red Army was at the beginning of its deep operations and was far from being the fine tuned machine of Jassy-Kishinev Operation in August 1944. The offensive would have run out of steam, before it reached teh objective of encircling the 6th Army. Of course many Romanians would still have died, but that is due to them being in a place they weren't supposed to be in the first place.

You said that there weren't any forces available for such operations, yet the Germans managed to create a mechanized force that attempted to breakthrough to the 6th Army immediately after the disaster (Operation Wintergewitter). Furthermore, the 6th Army had several divisions, which although depleted in the senseless fighting inside Stalingrad, still had enough forces to mount an adequate defense and were highly mobile (14th, 16th, 24th Panzer Divisions and 3rd, 29th and 60th Motorized Infantry Divisions).

Posted by: Imperialist February 18, 2009 08:46 am

QUOTE (MMM @ February 17, 2009 03:39 pm)

I thought I made myself clear: if the real combat value of the allied troops would have been seen as such (i.e. low), OKW/Hitler/whoever shouldn't have planned an operation with huge flanks!

Given the extent of the battlefield in the East, when planning an offensive the presence of huge and vulnerable flanks was a given.

Posted by: MMM February 18, 2009 09:31 am

Re: Victor - it is true what you say, but the counter-offensive (Counterstrike

) mounted by the Germans was made with remains of forces; initially, there were much more armored divisions allocated, which never reached their starting point because the soviet offensive was still on in other sectors, as well. Example - Operation Saturn...
As for the

QUOTE

fine tuned machine of Jassy-Kishinev Operation in August 1944

, the German Army was crippled in 1944, even f it had some wild animals (Tigers, Panthers etc.), so not only were the Soviets more powerful and more experienced, but the Germans were also approaching the failure, fighting on three fronts and so on.
Re: Imperialist - to some extent, it is true, but Manstein, for example, had other ideas: let the enemy attack, create huge vulnerable flanks and exploit them. Exactly what Jukov did at Stalingrad!
But political reasons made Hitler go on offensive, although the Germans remained with him til the bitter end.

Posted by: Matasso May 11, 2009 08:33 pm

Didn't come for a long time on the forum but to add some real info on Romanian performance at Stalingrad.

First, and often overlooked, Romanian Infantry Divisions present numbered only 7 Battalions instead of the usual 9, and even in this case 1 being a Light Infantry Battalion, very low on heavy weapons.
Second, Romanians sent several intelligence reports on the upcoming soviet attack and were totally ignored, the last one presented on the 16th October (Report 36312). Even more, the Soviets were left with 2 bridgeheads on the western bank of the Don which were never reduced. The Romanian 3rd Army command proposed 2 different plans to ensure the bridgeheads were destroyed. Most, even the German 6th Army was supposed to have attacked those bridgeheads with Italian support on the 22nd September but it was refused by the OKH.
Third, Romanian Divisions had an immense front to defend. Several times, romanian units were forced to take over areas that were not supposed to be defended by them to help the sending of German Forces to Stalingrad. The Romanian 3rd Army was supposed to receive back both the 1st Cavalry and the 20th Infantry Divisions to use them as reserves and instead they stayed at Stalingrad under 6th Army command till the end.

On the eve of the attack, 18th November 1942, the Romania 3rd Army had an overall front of 156 km, with 7 Infantry and 1 Cavalry Division, about 52 battalions overall, which means something like over 3 km per Battalion ar full strengh or 4,5 km with the usual 1/3 in reserve. This means a Company for 2 km of front, nowhere near a regular defensive position, just some outposts and blocking areas at best. By the 14th November the 3rd Army had only 72% of ammunition for heavy infantry weapons, 89% for field artiillery and just 56% for heavy artillery. As an example, 4th Corps had only when the sovient offensive gegan, 20% of needed ammo for 60mm and 81 mm mortars, 40% for 120mm mortars, 55% for artillery. Only AT and infantry ammo had full reserves.

As another example, the Romanian 13th Infantry Division was attacked and repulsed every one of them, 32 times between September and November 1942 losing 4000 men in the process.

On the 8th November, the report sent by General Dumitrescu stating once again the imminent soviet onslaught, syas as a conclusion that given the situation; 3rd Army is in no condition to repel an overwhelming assault heavily reinforced with tanks.

The same day, on the 4th Romanian Army Front, the total line of defense was of 330 km!!!!!!! As an example 4th Romanian Infantry Division had a front of 40 km to defend with 7 battalions!!! Romanian 4th Army was forced to take over an unexpected area of over 30 km to the north that were supposed to be 6th German Army's task. So before the offensive, each Romanian unit of 4th Army was as follows:
6th Cavalry Division - 100 km
5th Cavalry and 1st, 4th and 18th Infantry Divisions - between 27 and 41 km each.
2nd Infantry Division - 18 km
20th Infantry Division - 20 km.

These Divisions had fought since September 1941 without a stop or pause and were very low on manpower. 40% for the 1st Infantry to 65% to 20th Infantry. This means battalions with under 400 men to defend areas of 4 km each. 4th Army had only 34 75mm AT guns for the entire front, and even these were not PAK 40. Ammo was also low with 53 to 57% of what was needed for mortars or 50 to 60% for AT weapons.

These as an example to say that to rate romanian performance at Stalingrad is futile. The German High Command asked much and never gave the means to enable romanian units to perform their mission. In this Antonescu can also be blamed as he repeatedly forced romanian commanders to accept german requests in the name of an alliance that benefited only one of the parts. German High command was to obnubilated by its "Stalingrad dream" that it only saw what it wanted to see, despite repeated warnings. In war, to underestimate an ennemy often gives you painful surprises.

Besides, even today in 2009 the manpower and equipment levels required to conduct a defense mean a 1st outpost line, a 2nd defensive main position and a 3rd reserve and counterattack line. With so few units the romanians were only able to ensure a 1st line and partially a weak 2nd line. That many soldiers performed admirably and fought with enourmous spirit and sacrifice can only put in doubt by a devious mind. That the battle was already lost and thousands of romanian soldiers were uselessly doomed when the first shots were fired on the morning of 19th November is also true, unfortunately!!

A good evening to all and sorry for such a long post
Mat

Posted by: feic7346 May 11, 2009 09:39 pm

How many Romanians were actually captured at Stalingrad?
How many were killed and wounded?
How many ran away? Those who escaped ran away. There was no escape otherwise.

Either one fought to the death, was wounded, was captured or ran away.

Posted by: Matasso May 11, 2009 10:41 pm

Total losses are estimated at between 135 and 165 000 men killed, wounded and lost, prisoner or presumably prisoner, just for the period between 19th November and February 1943. from a total of 77.250 for the 4th Army and 155 532, that is a total of 232 782. More or less 2/3 of the total forces engaged.

Differences between dead, wounded and prisoners are not known precisely.
As an example, Group Lascar that fought surrounded for 5 days, fought without any food in the middle of nowhere, at the 3rd day artillery had only 40 shots and the infantry had almost no ammo. And they still fought on, 1 Battalion was able to withdraw completely without losing a single weapon. Around 7000 men were able to escape the trap, the rest being either killed or prisoner. Usually troops fought well when officiers were on the front line.
But after 3 or 4 days of constant action, without any armoured support and low on food and ammo troops only wanted to escape alive as anyone else.

Besides most soldiers that escaped encirclement fought on later during Wintergewitter and every action until March 1943 so they fought long enough to be an important part of the stabilization of the line.

Cheers
Mat

Posted by: Victor May 12, 2009 06:53 am

Unfortunately there aren't any figures with breakdown on types of casualties or operations (Uranus and Little Saturn).

The 158,854 KIA, WIA and MIA often quoted (inlcuding by worldwar2.ro) was calculated by substracting 73,062 men that the 3rd and 4th Armies could account for on 7 January 1943 from the total strength of the troops as they arrived near Stalingrad. At the time there were still Romanian soldiers in different German Kampfgruppe or wondering through the steppe and, as Matasso pointed out, there had been some bloody fights prior to Uranus that had caused several thousand casualties.

What I would like to add is that the "Either one fought to the death, was wounded, was captured or ran away" view is too simplistic IMO and should be backed with arguments/sources. There were many units that carried out a fighting retreat, braking their way through the Soviet units cutting the paths. The 1st Armored Division or general Sion's column come to mind, but there were others too.

Posted by: Victor May 12, 2009 07:00 am

Matasso, just a couple errors to correct in your otherwise excellent post:

1. Most of 4th Army's Divisions were not engaged in fighting in 1941, but from early 1942. Had they been fighting continuosly from June, there wouldn't have been any unit to speak of.

2. The 1st Cavalry was subordinated to to the 3rd Army and it fell in the Stalingrad encirclement after Operation Uranus. Only then was it subordinated to the 6th Army.

3. The 20th Infantry Division was part of the 4th Army, not the 3rd, and, like the 1st Cavalry Division, it fell inside the encirclement and was subordinated to Paulus.

Posted by: Matasso May 12, 2009 09:06 am

The corrections you pointed out Victor are ok. It is the way you said for the 1st Cavalry and 20th Infantry. I must point out that if they were attached to 3rd and 4th Army respectively they had a more independent mission and were not subordinated to any corps command and had a liaison mission to 6th Army more than anything else.

As for the combat missions, you are not exactly correct for all units concerned as follows:

6th Cavalry Division - since July 1941 and had marched 800 km without rest to reach the front in October
1st Infantry Division was on the front lines since November 1941
2nd Infantry Division was in action since December 1941
4th Infantry Division was in action since May 1942
20th Infantry Division since May 1942

The 5th Cavalry and 18th Divisions I'm not sure.

Anyway; these were units that had fought and moreover had marched thousand of km by foot, let's not forget that they had reached the Don marching and with almost no vehicles and these were units that had no rest for at least 6 months and no reinforcements had reached them so they were badly depleted already.

To rate a performance in these conditions ammounts to a futile gesture.

And as Victor pointed out there were units that came out fighting as a fighting body as the 1st Battalion of tthe 15th Infantry Regiment of Major Rascanescu that came out of Group Lascar's encirclement alone and with every heavy weapon at hand.

Usually, and even romanian reports aknowledge that units where officers tended to be near their men soldiers fought bravely and units where there was a great distance and despise between officers and men tended to fight less and desintegrate rapidly which is a normal occurence in every army and every war.

For me, they didn't fight better or worse than others, they just started a battle with such huge handicaps that it was lost even before it began, and such a result would have been the same no matter what forces would have been in their place.
Romanians fought consistently well when under "normal" battle conditions which was not the case in November / December 1942

Cheers
Mat

Posted by: Victor May 12, 2009 12:27 pm

Matasso,

if you would look carefully at my post, I said most, not all.

Basically the only units engaged in combat since July 1941 had been the 5th and 8th Cavalry Divisions (not 6th as you posted), with some periods of lull on the Black Sea Coast or in Crimea.

The 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions saw serious and relatively continous action starting from January and February (respectively) 1942. I wouldn't call security duty as "frontline" action.

The 18th Infantry Division saw some action in the final days of Odessa and started serious frontline action in February/March 1942 in the Crimea.

The 20th Infantry Division began its service in April/May 1942 with the 6th Corps.

Posted by: Matasso May 12, 2009 02:50 pm

On one thing you are right, it was the 8th Cavalry Division. The 6th was in the Caucasus. On the rest, you mostly completed what I said earlier. Anyway, we are talking of 6 to 10 months of continuous action in Crimea or the Ukraine before Uranus. Those would have been tired and depleted units altogether.

Cheers
Mat

Posted by: MMM May 12, 2009 03:11 pm

I suppose I asked that some time ago, but I'll repeat it anyway:
Why did Antonescu changed the number of batallions per division from 9 to 7? To send less soldiers on the front - sending weaker divisions, thus? Isn't this the very definition of sabotage?

Posted by: Matasso May 12, 2009 09:17 pm

No matter his faults, Antonescu wanted to recover the lost territories and his idea was to ensure there were enough troops inland to be ready for Transylvania whenever the occasion would present itself. Besides the 1941 campaign losses had been heavy and it was necessary to keep manpower as much as possible, even more in a political situation where there was much opposition to the continuation of the war against the Soviet Union. Maniu among others publicly wrote a lot against this action.
Antonescu was trying to please everyone. Changing the name of mountain and Cavalry from Brigade to Division was also the same idea, to show by numbers that Romania was participating more than others, notably Hungary. Besides Romanian Cavalry and Mountain were as large as their equivalent in the soviet, Hungarian or German armies so the move was logical, I think!

Cheers
Mat

Posted by: dragos May 12, 2009 10:01 pm

QUOTE (MMM @ May 12, 2009 06:11 pm)

As at the time of Romania entering the war the infantry division was a large and rigid organization, based on WW1 doctrine, the reasons of reorganization were to decrease the manpower but to increase the mobility and firepower.

In 1940, a full strength Romanian infantry division had about 22,000 men while a German division had 17,500 men, but in equipment, the German unit was surpassing the Romanian one in almost every aspect (780 vs 83 trucks, 270 vs 42 motorcycles, 387 vs 303 light machine-guns, 133 vs 158 heavy machine guns, 84 vs 18 mortars)

After the reorganization of 1941/1942, the manpower of the infantry division was reduced to 13,500 men, but the firepower increased considerably. For example, each infantry squad had a light machine-gun and a light mortar.

The cavalry divisions were strengthened not only in firepower but in manpower also. Here are the numbers for 1941 and 1942 respectively (1941 values in parenthesis): 8,137 men (6,842), 46 machine-guns (35), 32 anti-tank guns (20), 44 mortars (6), 24 field guns (16) etc.

Posted by: Victor May 13, 2009 06:24 am

QUOTE (Matasso @ May 12, 2009 04:50 pm)

On the rest, you mostly completed what I said earlier. Anyway, we are talking of 6 to 10 months of continuous action in Crimea or the Ukraine before Uranus. Those would have been tired and depleted units altogether.

Cheers
Mat

I only supported my earlier post in which I said that most of the units they had been fighting since 1942, not 1941, because otherwise there wouldn't have been any divisions to talk about at all.

The 1st Infantry Division, which entered action at the end of January/beginning of February 1942 was down to around 25% in combat strength in November. The 2nd, 4th and 20th Infantry Divisions were also below 50%. Only the 18th Infantry Division, which had served in Crimea, was in better shape.

Posted by: MMM May 13, 2009 10:41 am

QUOTE

whenever the occasion would present itself

This is a sample of wrong thinking - both from Antonescu and those who supported it back then, and from those who nowadays keep repeating it!
How could that occasion come otherwise than by Germany and Italy being defeated? Oh, wait, we fought along them! Not even in 1944, after Margarethe I, Hitler wouldn't give back the territories - when we already lost again northern Bessarabia! It's much more plausible the reorganising thing; however, in these times, one could see how many km's had a division to cover! Why didn't he send more divisions (now we know it would have been to their certain destruction, but then it wasn't even clear whether the Soviets would counter-attack, even less the future catastrophe from Stalingrad).
The fact remains that the German blamed us for the thin front at Stalingrad - and that wasn't entirely false!

Posted by: MMM May 15, 2009 03:05 pm

QUOTE

The 1st Infantry Division, which entered action at the end of January/beginning of February 1942 was down to around 25% in combat strength in November. The 2nd, 4th and 20th Infantry Divisions were also below 50%. Only the 18th Infantry Division, which had served in Crimea, was in better shape.

I'm not sure if I understand it correctly: these divisions were reorganised, but no reinforcements or completions have been sent? Why?

Posted by: Victor May 15, 2009 03:19 pm

QUOTE (MMM @ May 15, 2009 05:05 pm)

QUOTE

I'm not sure if I understand it correctly: these divisions were reorganised, but no reinforcements or completions have been sent? Why?

These divisions were not reorganized.

Posted by: MMM May 16, 2009 07:27 am

Were they neither reinforced? I'll check in "Istoria militară a poporului român" - later, that is

Posted by: Victor May 16, 2009 11:02 am

No, they weren't.

Posted by: MMM May 16, 2009 11:21 am

Indeed (I checked) - and no explanation is given except the subtitle "Preserving the fighting potential of the Romanian people". I'm getting back to the idea that Antonescu didn't do too much to strengthen the line troops...

Posted by: Victor May 16, 2009 04:19 pm

The plan was to reorganize and overhaul these divisions during the winter of 1942/43 somewhere near Rostov.

Posted by: MMM May 17, 2009 11:42 am

Yet there were information regarding an attack weeks before november 21st. The Romanians later complained that OKW didn't listen their warnings. But why didn't the Romanians do anything, then? This is my question!

Posted by: feic7346 May 19, 2009 06:03 pm

So what did you want? The Germans to divert forces from their key OBJECTIVE (Stalingrad) to help the "in awe" Romanians (the Romanians were always in awe of "the Russians") who in theri minds were probably overestimating the Russian threats?

Do you know many times in the 6/1941 thru 11/42 time frame had the Romanians overestimated or rather exaggerated the Russian forces on their front? The Romanians had repeatedly done this at Odessa!

Posted by: Victor May 19, 2009 06:56 pm

QUOTE (feic7346 @ May 19, 2009 08:03 pm)

Do you know many times in the 6/1941 thru 11/42 time frame had the Romanians overestimated or rather exaggerated the Russian forces on their front? The Romanians had repeatedly done this at Odessa!

No, I for one do not know. How many times exactly? I expect a sourced answer.

The events have showed that the Romanian intelligence on the strength and intentions of the Soviets were correct and not a figment of someone's imagination. The fact that the German command lacked the necessary strategic thinking and resources to successfully conduct the operation is hardly the fault of the Romanian command.

In order to reach the rather pointless objective of capturing Stalingrad, the Army Group had to defeat the Soviet forces opposing it on the whole front, not just those inside Stalingrad. And for this to happen, the strengthening of the two overextended flanks was a sine qua non condition. It wasn't a favor for the Romanians, it was common sense. Unfortunately, common sense lacked in the OKW.

Posted by: MMM May 19, 2009 07:46 pm

The "in awe" Romanians were there at German request! What about Odessa? That was Antonescu's ambition to conquer an objective without German help!

Posted by: dragos May 19, 2009 10:26 pm

QUOTE (feic7346 @ May 19, 2009 09:03 pm)

Like Germany's Luftwaffe diverting the forces from bombing London, back to their initial objectives during Battle of Britain, because Hitler wanted retaliation? Or divert their strategy back to Manstein's elastic defence of Harkov during 1943 instead of following Hitler's orders not to give any ground from 1943 onwards?

Yes, Hitler should have diverted his forces, but unfortunately for him, he was not in"awe"

Posted by: dragos May 19, 2009 10:38 pm

QUOTE (MMM @ May 19, 2009 10:46 pm)

The "in awe" Romanians were there at German request! What about Odessa? That was Antonescu's ambition to conquer an objective without German help!

Romanians did conquer Odessa without German help, and they were able to do that, costly. What Antonescu discovered was that Romanian Army was not what he was expecting, but it was a result of an inefficient training system and a result of a corruption that spanned a century long till our present times.

Posted by: Dénes May 20, 2009 05:15 am

QUOTE (dragos @ May 20, 2009 04:38 am)

Romanians did conquer Odessa without German help...

That's not entirely true.
When the Rumanian troops were not able to proceed according to the (several times extended) timetable, they called in the German aviation and artillery for support.
Also, in early October, the OKW had enough of the prolonged siege (by then the front line had had overpassed Odessa with hundreds of km), and planned to divert ground forces to finish the job. At the end, this proved not to be necessary.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: MMM May 20, 2009 07:05 am

QUOTE

it was a result of an inefficient training system and a result of a corruption that spanned a century long till our present times

So true!
The German help didn't count so much - I guess the Soviet decision to evacuate was more important!

Posted by: Dénes May 20, 2009 09:41 am

QUOTE (MMM @ May 20, 2009 01:05 pm)

the Soviet decision to evacuate was more important!

Yes, indeed. That was the key to the conquer of Odessa.
However, the evacuation order was triggered by the German troops' rapid advance, so all available Soviet forces were badly needed for the defence of the Crimea.

Gen. Dénes

Posted by: MMM May 20, 2009 12:06 pm

True! I believed that if the Germans wouldn't have neither advanced, nor helped the Romanians (not that they really helped much at Odessa), the siege could have lasted much longer and who knows who would have won... (i.e. who knows how many losses would have suffered the Romanian army before calling it off

)

Posted by: ANDREAS July 21, 2009 08:53 pm

Hallo everybody and my appreciation for this interesting discussion...
Stalingrad ...I see it from different perspectives ...from books I read ...and from what some veterans (luky to speak with some) narrated...now from the interesting discussions here...
Fact and legend first ...Fact that the romanian troops had to cover much more of the frontline that any tactical manual recommand ...much more than they were able to ...much more any army (german included) could defend ...
Legend ...if our troops had better weapons they could resist ...no, I don't believe it ...even better armed the thin veil of romanian troops could not resist ...they could inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, but not stop the armored columns and huge reserves ...
Fact that the romanian troops had serious shortage in ammo and weapons and a lot of useless obsolete guns of tanks ...
Fact is that the hungarians manage to obtain in may-june 1942 german weapons to equipped completely their 1st Armored Division -with german tanks, tractors, trucks and guns -for the missions given on the Don Front, but their faith was the same as our two armies...
Legend is that if our troops had the same excellent unteroffizier class NCO better known, as the germans, they could resist the soviet thrust ...I agree it could be a big advantage in battle...but at the end I am sure ...the same faith!
Just an oppinion...

Posted by: MMM July 24, 2009 07:24 am

Indeed, but the only thing that could have been done would have been a counter-attack. It was tried, with two armored divisions (1-st.Ro, 22-nd Panzer), but failed miserably. Had it succeeded, there would have undoubtedly been another Soviet attack and so on - as it happened, in fact, all along the winter 1942/1943 and early spring 1943. The tide has turned (Churchill said it, not me

)

Posted by: ANDREAS August 02, 2009 11:05 am

Hi again...
I don't know if somebody talk before about the treason theory...
Can't say how serious it could be? I mean the theory that Paulus treason was in fact the cause of the disaster... The main argument is that he refuses to try to meet halfway the Hoth panzers in the well known Wintergewitter Operation lauched by Manstein ...and the refusal to comit suicide after the debacle of his army and the advance as Feldmarshall made by Hitler...
What you think about that?

Posted by: MMM August 04, 2009 05:48 pm

There are two possible explanations, IMO:
1. (most plausible): Paulus was too scared either to commit suicide or to disobey a direct order from Hitler and return to Germany (he did disobey the suicide order, however), so he preferred to be the highest-ranking prisoner of Moscow.
2. He realised the war was lost and just saved his skin (see above).
Any of them is in a certain amount, treason - we speak of a Prussian General, not of a spy or something "unclear"...

Posted by: dead-cat August 04, 2009 05:52 pm

disobeying suicide hardly qualifies as trason. nor does following the orders.

Posted by: MMM August 05, 2009 08:34 am

However, if Paulus would have turned back to Reich (with or without remnants of 6-th Army), that would have meant disobeying a direct order! His choices were limited and, as history tells us, he made the right choice both for him personally (see his career after surrendering) and for the retreating Caucasus troops. The bill was paid by his 6-th Army soldiers - either right there in Stalingrad, or in the prison camps

This was a lose-lose situation.

Later edit: seems that Paulus wouldn't suicide because of his religion...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Paulus#Stalingrad

Posted by: dead-cat August 05, 2009 11:54 am

Mannstein was order to hold Charkow at all costs, in Feb. '43.
he pulled out, retreated and struck back as soon he had the 2nd SS Panzerkorps at his disposal.
hitler wanted to relieve him of command, but his success made this impossible.

Posted by: MMM August 05, 2009 12:26 pm

The key word being success, right? Manstein took back Harkov then, whereas Wintergewitter was only about relieving some troops in Stalingrad, right? Hitler's idea was for 6-th Army to stay back there, the counter-offensive meaning just a corridor opening for refuel or something. I'm not really clear what were the later plans...

Posted by: ANDREAS August 05, 2009 06:19 pm

If the Manstein memories are accurate, he wrote that Hitler's plans were, at the beginning -this means mid/end november 1942 - to block the soviet intrusions and, later probably spring 1943, retake the entire lost frontline... but later -in late december 1942- just to resist the russian attack the way in winter 1941 at Demiansk the germans succeed... and to be later rescued by the new SS Panzer Korps from Harkov region... both illusions like Manstein wrote...

Posted by: MMM August 05, 2009 08:09 pm

Did you find this in Manstein's memories, as published in Romanian version (Elit Comentator, 1996 IIRC) or in some other book?

Posted by: ANDREAS August 06, 2009 09:37 pm

Yes MMM,
I selected from this book the reports which Manstein describes Hitler position reguarding Stalingrad...
Are you not familiar with those narrations?
But again...you can't find all at a specific page...but here and there in the entire book...but certainly most of it in Stalingrad chapter...
But as Manstein wrote...it was mostly Hitler delusions...

Posted by: ANDREAS September 05, 2012 09:20 pm

Because I recently found relatively detailed informations about the soviet hammers in Don bend region, I post them:

- the soviet 5th Tank Army: 90600 men, 929 field artillery, 1456 mortars, 359 tanks;
1st Tank Corps: 89th Tank Brigade, 117th Tank Brigade, 159th Tank Brigade,
44th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 10th Armd Recce Battalion
(136 tanks of which 18 KV-1, 80 T-34, 38 T-70)
26th Tank Corps: 19th Tank Brigade, 157th Tank Brigade, 216th Tank Brigade
14th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 15th Armd Recce Battalion
(161 tanks of which 22 KV-1, 95 T-34, 44 T-70)
- the soviet 21st Army: 92056 men, 803 field artillery, 1554 mortars, 40 multiple
rocket launchers, 199 tanks;
4th Tank Corps: 45th Tank Brigade, 69th Tank Brigade, 102nd Tank Brigade,
4th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 23rd Armd Recce Battalion
(143 tanks of which 22 KV-1, 58 T-34, 63 T-70)
1st, 2nd and 3rd Heavy Tank Battalions -56 KV-1

- the soviet 24th Army: 56409 men, 722 field artillery, 1123 mortars, 148 tanks;
16th Tank Corps: 107th Tank Brigade, 109th Tank Brigade, 164th Tank Brigade,
15th Motorised Infantry Brigade,
(140 tanks of which 30 KV-1, 57 T-34, 43 T-60, 10 T-70)
- the soviet 57th Army: 56026 men, 539 field artillery, 962 mortars, 225 tanks;
13th Mechanized Corps: 13th Tank Brigade, 17th Motorised Infantry Brigade,
61st Motorised Infantry Brigade, 62nd Motorised Infantry
Brigade, 35th Armd Recce Battalion
(113 tanks of which 10 KV-1, 55 T-34, 48 T-70)
90th Tank Brigade (53 tanks of which 6 KV-1, 29 T-34, 18 T-70)
235th Tank Brigade (47 tanks of which 26 KV-1, 21 T-34)
- the soviet 51st Army: 44720 men, 318 field artillery, 698 mortars, 45 multiple
rocket launchers, 207 tanks;
4th Mechanized Corps: 55th Tank Brigade, 158th Tank Brigade, 36th Motorised
Infantry Brigade, 59th Motorised Infantry Brigade, 60th
Motorised Infantry Brigade, 44th Armd Recce Battalion
(109 tanks of which 12 KV-1, 53 T-34, 44 T-70)

As I heard (read) opinions (not necessary here in this forum) expressing doubt with respect to the willingness to fight of our troops at Stalingrad, I think the numbers (for those who understand their significance!) in conjunction with the wide fronts to be defended by our infantry and cavalry divisions (without forgetting the lack of adequate ATGs!) provides a clear picture of the impossibility to resist the soviet onslaught!

Posted by: MMM September 06, 2012 11:00 am

They do, indeed! Our small, under-equipped (when it was equipped!) Romanian force could have done no more than it was supposed to do in the early talks of the German officials: defend a natural obstacle line, provided there isn't any enemy attack... Something like that was the conclusion in the spring of 1941, after the first Romanian troops "graduated" their crash-course in modern war. Unfortunately, the neeed for troops (whatever quality they were), for cannon-fodder, was met by the Romanian 3-rd and 4-th Armies.
BTW, Andreas, where did you find those numbers?

Posted by: ANDREAS September 06, 2012 04:39 pm

MMM, the numbers of tanks, the soviet units involved and maps of the operations are taken as information from the book Jacek Domanski -Stalingrad 1942-43 vol.II, Poland 2010 (of course I'm not speak polish but there are plenty of informations and details who can be understood). If I understand well there is a book in english written by David Glantz called Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942 (The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2) who is at least so good as this one. I am searching for it!

Posted by: Florin September 30, 2012 05:53 am

Until November 1942, how much of the equipment needs for the vast number of Romanian soldiers was provided by the Romanian industry ?
It would be correct to claim that until that moment, the Romanian Army relied mostly on Romanian industry ?
(I highlighted mostly because of course I am aware of German imports - the problem is their quantity.)
* * *
In another topic some time ago, it was mentioned that on the eve of Soviet attacks in November 1942, the 75 mm anti-tank able to stop a T-34 was available for Romanians at one piece / 3.7 km of frontline. I searched "Eastern Front" but I cannot find the post or the right topic.
Can anybody confirm this information ?
Thank you.

Posted by: MMM September 30, 2012 03:33 pm

It would be correct to assert that Romanian Army relied mostly on Romanian pre-war imports! The "Made in Romania" equipment was somehow in minority...

Posted by: Florin September 30, 2012 08:23 pm

QUOTE (MMM @ September 30, 2012 10:33 am)

It would be correct to assert that Romanian Army relied mostly on Romanian pre-war imports! The "Made in Romania" equipment was somehow in minority...

Thank you. Now I can figure the picture...

Posted by: dragos October 01, 2012 06:28 am

QUOTE (Florin @ September 30, 2012 07:53 am)

In another topic some time ago, it was mentioned that on the eve of Soviet attacks in November 1942, the 75 mm anti-tank able to stop a T-34 was available for Romanians at one piece / 3.7 km of frontline. I searched "Eastern Front" but I cannot find the post or the right topic.
Can anybody confirm this information ?
Thank you.

It was the situation of 4th Army, south of Stalingrad. Statistically there was one piece per 5.7 km of front:

http://www.worldwar2.ro/operatii/?language=en&article=12

Posted by: Florin October 02, 2012 02:31 am

QUOTE (dragos @ October 01, 2012 01:28 am)

QUOTE (Florin @ September 30, 2012 07:53 am)

It was the situation of 4th Army, south of Stalingrad. Statistically there was one piece per 5.7 km of front:

http://www.worldwar2.ro/operatii/?language=en&article=12

Thank you very much. I really tried to find the information in "Forum", before posting the question.

Posted by: PaulC October 02, 2012 08:17 am

Having pulled from the virtual shelf Stuka Pilot by U. Rudel, he's less than favorable to Romanian troops at Stalingrad.

According to him, once they received news of the offensive on the morning of Nov. 19, they went to attack the advancing Russian columns. Approaching the battlefield they saw masses of Romanian soldiers fleeing, having abandoned their positions. This happened not due to enemy pressure, but before the Russians reached their positions. ( probably after or during the artillery ).

Having spent all the weapons on the advancing Russians, Rudel notes with regret it amounted to nothing not having any resistance on the ground. He states that if he had left any ammo he would have machine gunned the fleeing Romanians.

Posted by: dragos October 02, 2012 09:06 am

Some older posts regarding the allegations of Rudel:
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1898&st=0

Posted by: mabadesc October 02, 2012 04:01 pm

MMM said:

QUOTE

Unfortunately, the neeed for troops (whatever quality they were), for cannon-fodder, was met by the Romanian 3-rd and 4-th Armies.

The choice of words employed - cannon fodder - is inaccurate, IMO.

Cannon fodder usually implies being forced into a situation where minimal gains, (or wearing down the enemy) are achieved at the expense of an unacceptably high rate of casualties. It also implies failure is of little consequence to the overall result of the situation.

At Stalingrad, Romanian 3rd and 4th armies were employed to defend and protect the flanks of german troops. I would say the Germans sure did care about the consequence, as it resulted in the encirclement and destruction of 6th Army and other units.

I am just saying that "cannon fodder" is probably not an accurate term in this situation. 3rd and 4th Army roles were very relevant, it was not a matter of "need for troops for cannon fodder".

This does not take anything away from all the mistakes the German command made in November '42, which have been discussed in this thread. On the contrary, it adds to the errors made by German Command at various levels.

This brings me to the following question: How on Earth could all the different German chains of command - starting from OKW/OKH all the way down to 6th Army Staff - be so indifferent and so negligent in defining and organizing the defensive lines occupied by the romanian armies? They were aware of their importance - protecting their very own 6th Army from a possible encirclement and destruction. It was in their best interest to make sure their flanks and rear were well defended.
Yet, German command somehow managed to show remarkably little interest to the overextension of romanian divisions, lack of appropriate equipment, adjusting lines over natural obstacles, etc, even when these matters were raised by romanian commanders.

Posted by: ANDREAS October 02, 2012 09:13 pm

Indeed mabadesc, a good question! One possible answer would come from the German High Command far too much confidence in his forces, combined with the impression that the Red Army is exhausted and and is unable to launch a major attack.
Another important element is, from my point of view, that the German High Command had focused his entire attention on Stalingrad battle, neglecting any other problem that would disrupt his preoccupation about this battle.

Posted by: MMM October 03, 2012 05:49 am

Perhaps they (OKW&others) regarded the Russian offensive capabilities as extremely low... in spite of the counter-offensives mounted in December 1941 and May 1942...