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| WorldWar2.ro Forum > Eastern Front (1941-1944) > How did the Romanians deal with Soviet Armour? |
| Posted by: saudadesdefrancesinhas May 16, 2006 01:48 pm |
| I was wondering, given the lack of modern Anti Tank artillery among the Romanian troops on the Eastern Front, how did they manage to cope when attacked by Soviet heavy and medium armour? I can imagine the Bohler 47mm being ok against T60s and T70s, or against T26s, but against T34s and KVs? Also, what tactics did Romanian tank units use to counter Soviet armour? If anyone has any ideas. |
| Posted by: Imperialist May 16, 2006 01:57 pm | ||
They ran. |
| Posted by: Agarici May 16, 2006 04:19 pm | ||||
Not necessarily, and not all the time. They also raised the airplanes’ tails from the ground and used them to aim the tanks with the 20 mm airguns (while the pilots were in the cockpits, ready to fire), or used the 75 mm AA cannons for direct AT firing, or even tried to smash the tank armor with a hammer. By the way, these were real occurrences (around the time of the Don's Bend Soviet offensive), and in all cases, in the first instance, the Soviet tanks withdrew... The tanks were also engaged with improvised weapons, such as Molotov cocktails or, as mentioned by Gen. Mociulski in his memoirs, tent sheets, packs of hay and bottles of gasoline. |
| Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu May 16, 2006 05:27 pm |
| Imperialist I recommend to you "Romanii la Stalingrad", that will contradict your theory. |
| Posted by: Victor May 16, 2006 08:15 pm |
| Imperialist, this was a serious question. If you are unable to provide a serious answer, better refrain from doing it. saudadesdefrancesinhas, you brought up a pretty complex, but interesting question. Usually, when heavy AT guns were not in available, tank hunting teams were used. Their equipment evolved in time from simple, but effective Molotov cocktails and grenade bundles to Panzerfausts in 1944. Maybe you read the http://www.worldwar2.ro/memorii/?article=106. He describes the effectivness of the Molotov cocktails, but also the risks the tank hunters took. I have seen a tank hunting recommendations manual, but the notes I took are at home. Ideally, the Soviet infantry had to be pinned down and separated from the tanks in order for them to be destroyed. When this happened, the Soviet tanks roamed for a while through the Romanian infantry line, before they were forced to retreat or were destroyed. In the Kuban, because of the close cooperation between Romanian and German troops, German tank hunting teams usually intervened from behind the Romanian line and knocked out several tanks. After Panzerfausts began to be used in the Romanian Army as well, things became much easier for the tank hunters. |
| Posted by: Imperialist May 16, 2006 09:36 pm | ||||
Victor, Saudadesdefrancesinhas asked 2 questions. First, how did the romanians cope under the russian medium/heay tank assaults, without modern anti-tank artillery. And the second one, what tactics did they use against the soviet armor. I answered the first one. They couldnt repell a major armored assault since they lacked the necessary equipment.
http://www.historynet.com/wwii/bl-stalingrad-wwII/ Your answer on the other hand clearly referrs to the tactical "tank hunter"/"search and destroy"/"behind enemy lines" type of action. I hope you're not implying that the romanian troops successfully substituted the anti-tank weapons with molotov cocktails and grenades in the face of a soviet blitz! |
| Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu May 17, 2006 05:38 am | ||
And again I say you should read "Romanii la Stalingrad"  you will see how they coped with heavy tanks without AT weapons and not running away. It is tragic, but it happened. |
| Posted by: Victor May 17, 2006 07:02 am |
| The article you quoted has little or no value regarding the topic at hand. First of all it is not dedicated to the Romanian troops during Operation Uranus and only treats the problem in a couple of sentences, without getting into details, because the author didn't know much about it either. Secondly, I find it strange that you would hold the recolletions of a German veteran as ultimate proof to back up the nonsense you posted initially. The recollections are from 1985, a lot of time from actual events and there is absolutely no way for a one German soldier to know what has happened on the front hundreds of km from his position. Not to mention the fact that the Italian 8th Army was attacked a month later, during Operation Little Saturn, but such historical details would spoil the pretty picture painted by the author and hearsay from one German veteran. If you really want to know more on what happened at the Don's Bend, then follow Mytzu's advice and a read a well documented book. For your information, on 19 November in the north and on 20 in the South, the first line infantry died were it stood. It repulsed the first Soviet infantry assaults, even though it had been seriously shattered by the artillery barrage and stubbornly stuck to its line. The line was pierced by the tank and mechanized corps (and the 8th Cavalry Corps) by driving through it en masse. Since there were no means to stop such a large force only with a couple of 75 mm AT guns and mines, they passed and drove on according to the Soviet deep battle doctrine of disrupting the enemy's rear echelons, while the rifle divisions dealt with the remains of the first line. Those who ran were in their vast majority the rear echelon troops of the Romanian divisions, who had little training, equipment and nerve to oppose the Soviet armored assault. If regular infantry was present in a village, they would oppose the attackers, but kitchen and supply depo staff, paper pushers etc. wouldn't. saudadesdefrancesinhas' question clearly referred to tactics used by the Romanians to deal with Soviet heavy and medium armor. Hence my answer regarding the tactics and weapons used. Your answer however was given without explanations or details, chat-room style. When we discuss history on the forum, it would be preferable to write longer posts with more explanations. saudadesdefrancesinhas, I forgot to mention that the pioneers also used Romanian built AT mines to disable Soviet tanks and on one occasion they were quite successfull on 19 November. |
| Posted by: Imperialist May 17, 2006 07:53 am |
| Right, OK, they didnt run, they died on the spot. Whatever.... |
| Posted by: saudadesdefrancesinhas May 17, 2006 01:54 pm |
| The tank hunters must have been brave men! During the Spanish Civil War the Nationalist infantry used similar methods to engage the Republican T26 tanks. As far as that quote goes, I think it was quite common among Germans to lay the blame for Stalingrad and other defeats on their allies. Hitler himself even seemed to start doing it days or weeks after the Soviet offensives actually began, and it became a standard idea. A while ago I read an interesting book about the Russian soldier in WWII. The author, a British Academic called Catherine Merridale, pointed out that Soviet infantry never fought as well as they could because they were often not trained properly, and their commanders actively discouraged initiative, developing trust and bonds between members of the unit, team work etc. because of political paranoia. I was wondering, does anyone have any ideas about the quality of the Romanian infantry's training, what the Romanians thought about the Soviet troops? The info. on anti tank tactics was really interesting, the title about Stalingrad is another book I will have to look for when I come to Romania... |
| Posted by: Jeff_S May 17, 2006 03:27 pm | ||
Why the snarky attitude Imperialist? You're not making much sense here. Victor's answer certainly does not refer to any "behind enemy lines" situation. Unsupported infantry without AT weapons seldom looks for trouble by attacking armored units. But there are things they can do on defense if there is no alternative. It's more than just running away or dieing in place. Clearing away the supporting infantry is key, as Victor noted. Of course if the tanks attack without supporting infantry (such as the Soviets in some of the early attacks in the Winter War) that makes the defenders job easier. While you're doing that, you fire small arms at the tank to force them to button up. The commander's MG is a bigger threat to infantry than a coaxial MG because he can see more and traverse it faster. Some armies used concealment to get their teams close enough. In the Pacific Island fighting, the Japanese would dig deep, covered foxholes to let their tank-killer teams get close enough to attack the US Marine's tanks with satchel charges on poles. Obstacles can help too: mines, AT ditches, cribs of logs with rocks in the middle, a tram tipped over on its side if you're in a city. Whatever the terrain and your engineers can provide. It's always best if they are covered by fire, even small arms fire. Then you send in some guys who are either very brave or suicidal and hope for the best: satchel charges... grenades in the vision ports... limpet mines.... molotov cocktails on the engine compartment... pistol fire in the vision ports... even logs jammed into the running gear can make the tank throw a track. Sometimes it succeeds. |
| Posted by: D13-th_Toppy May 17, 2006 04:33 pm | ||
That remark is simply nonsense... between "running away" and "dieing on the spot" is a huge difference, especialy for those that went trough situations like that. Not someting to be treated with a "whatever" remark, especially since (and if you would have read about the nov 19th fights, you would have known this) "after the infrantry was mopped away from them, the tanks, after a short "walk" trough the enemy positions, will either have to retreat, or risk being kille by the tank hunters". As much as my memory helps me, this is a quote from "Romanii la Stalingrad", written as a conclusion, after some engagements witht the soviet tanks and tanks-mounted infantry in that battle. Read the book, it's definitely worth it. |
| Posted by: Imperialist May 17, 2006 05:20 pm |
| OK, I see you're all upset about the "they ran" remark. One options would have been to treat it as humor, but since you're all so damn serious, I'll take it back, OK? You can continue your discussion with something else. And I wont read any Stalingrad book, I dont give a sh*t what they did out there, they had no reason to be there. It was a pointless fight and they didnt even win it. Sorry for putting it bluntly. cheers |
| Posted by: Cantacuzino May 17, 2006 06:24 pm | ||
But what was the reason for russians to be in Berlin  |
| Posted by: dragos May 17, 2006 07:53 pm |
| Imperialist, the topic was about about the tactics used against Soviet armour, not about the whereabouts of the Romanian soldiers. For this discussion, there is a number of topics, including this one: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=36 |
| Posted by: D13-th_Toppy May 17, 2006 07:55 pm | ||
Interesting... us mortals that don't have so higher standards are forced to actually read before stating our opinions on anything else than preconception. The said book has a pretty good explanation in the begining for the reason "they had to be there", btw |
| Posted by: Imperialist May 17, 2006 08:10 pm | ||||
If I've read one book that tried to excuse the presence there, I think I've read them all. But let's leave this for the thread Dragos mentioned. Like I've said, I withdraw the "they ran" statement. I'm out of this thread. p.s. I'm not a mortal.  cheers |
| Posted by: Iamandi May 18, 2006 06:24 am |
| What is the conclusion, from discutions above: romanian soldiers did'nt run. At least they did'nt run in front of the russian tanks. All of them where very brave soldiers, and they fight without fear and without proper help from heavy a.t. guns... Sometimes, they make Camerone-like (forerign legion) fights, etc. I have doubts. No, i'm sure they run sometimes. Do you, guys, believe in the fact that they where all braves? Some of them had childrens and wifes, and parents at home and they don wanted to die. And enemy tanks are scary "things" like all of the enemy weapons. A russian tank atack, when you have no heavy pak, is a good reason to ask yourself if it worts to die there, or at least if it is not a good solution to run, to survive for the momment, and to fight again in a much better oporunity. I meet some veterans in my life and some of them told me about fear. Most of the simple soldiers speak about that. Of course, i have heard the stories of the officers who told me: "and the tank hunters attacked the russian tanks with grenades, incendiary devices, at mines". But i did not meet, to the present day, a single officer who make a hunt of a russian tank. Maybe they exist, but most of that kind of missions where for the soldiers and inferior ranks who receive orders... and they execute them, with fear, with memories from home in mind. They were braves. I'm not sure about myself if, in a war, i will succeed to attack one tank with a hand device. Maybe ill be one of the mans who choose to run and hide, and wait for a better momment. Maybe i will be more lucky and i will cover the tank hunters with automatic fire from my weapon, thanking God i was not selected to kill tanks when some of my comrades will die from MGs of the tanks or under theyr rolling.... The end: some will run, in any war. Iama |
| Posted by: Victor May 18, 2006 07:31 am |
| I see the discussion deviated from the initial line drawn up by saudadesdefrancesinhas. Iamandi, nobody is saying that Romanians were all Rambos, but describing a very complex situation with just a couple of words is IMO incorrect and, why not, childish. You can't put everyone in the same pot, because people are different in terms of character and mental strength. Some ran, some didn't. Like I already said, for the infantry in the first line, which had a prepared defensive position, even as badly fortified as it was, running away through the fields covered in snow, under heavy artillery fire and pursued by tanks wasn't such a great idea and many didn't do it. For the men in the rear echelon, who were not under a direct threat, it was easier to run away only at the news of Soviet armor advancing on the village and many did so indeed. A clear indication of this fact is that among the survivors of each infantry division that escaped the hell of the Soviet winter offensive, the number of combat troops was lower than that of the administrative staff. Getting back to the original topic, indeed, most of the tank hunters were lower ranks and so were the AT gun commanders. Unfortunately, even though they carried the burden of the war, the officers are those that usually get most of the credit. |
| Posted by: Iamandi May 18, 2006 09:25 am |
| As you say... our soldiers were put in a dilema - to stay in theyr fox holes and die, or to run/loose control and die. Some of them used another alternative - to action, to risk theyr lifes who will have no mach value if they stay or run, and theyr attacked enemy tanks with incendiary devices, with pack of grenades (this is the often story i heard), etc. And this were the heroes, in desperate momments, mans who acted against the iminent deadh. Of coures, they were crazy, insane, fools in some eyes, but in this way are made the heroic actions. And fear produce a lot of heroes! Eight years ago i heard some storyes from an artilery veteran. They were trained to use theyr 100 m.m. howitzers (Skoda, he sayd) to shoot at the T-34 in case of the enemy tanks charge in vecinity of theyr battery. At that time i did not asked the old man what kind of projectiles were used for that. He told me about direct fire against wood tanks and about a demonstrative shoot of one of the officers against one captured russian tank. He show me with the hands how impressive was the explosion of the targeted tank. Also, he reminded about the presence of the Maresal Ion Antonescu at this demonstrative shooting. Anyone knows more about the projectile used form 100 m.m. howitzers against armoured targets? Iama |
| Posted by: saudadesdefrancesinhas May 18, 2006 02:14 pm |
| Officers often suffer much more casualties than other ranks, because they have to stand up and watch what is happening when everyone else is lying down, go at the front in attacks etc. This was certainly the case with the British Army in the First and Second World Wars, (Officers were twice or three times as likely to die as the men they led) and the Bolivian Army in the Chaco War, I don't have other examples off the top of my head, but I am sure there are more. Perhaps they feel less fear because they have too much to think about to distract them, because they have got to look after the men in their unit. It also depends on the quality of the officers, during the World Wars people were often made officers just because of their education or social class, and they would often be less effective than professional soldiers. I think a lot of Generals would have prefered to be out hunting tanks with grenades, quite a few end up dying doing things like that, or started their career doing that, that is how they got to be Generals. Didn't lots of Romanian Generals die at Stalingrad leading charges against the Russians? I am sure I read that somewhere. |
| Posted by: mabadesc May 18, 2006 02:44 pm | ||
Excellent point. Indeed, percentage-wise, I am almost certain Romanian officers had a higher casualty rate than the lower ranks, for the reasons you described. Also, officers were specifically targeted by enemy snipers, which greatly contributed to their casualty rate. I believe your quote applies to most WWII countries, including Germany, USSR, and Romania. If someone has specific numbers (percentages), I would like to see them. Getting back to the issue at hand, most armies had to deal to a certain extent with the element of "tank fright", or "panzer panic". The presence of this panic (and reducing it) had nothing to do with the "courage" of an army's soldiers, but rather with the level of training the troops received. Of course, having adequate anti-tank weapons only helped to further reduce the instinctive fear. Nonetheless, Romanian Combat troops - I emphasize "combat" because only about half of a division's soldiers were actually involved in combat regularly - had a reasonable amount of anti-tank training which helped them deal with some enemy tanks even with primitive means. On the other hand, well-equipped Romanian tank hunters were just as efficient as any other foreign troops. One example is given by Allerberger, the second-highest ranked German sniper, who tells of his unit being confronted by Soviet tanks, upon which a Romanian detachment of Pak's was dispatched to help them. Upon arrival, this detachment, in coordination with some Romanian ground attack planes, quickly disposed of 27 T-34's, impressing even an experienced combat veteran like Allerberger with their efficiency. |
| Posted by: sid guttridge May 18, 2006 03:22 pm |
| Hi Guys, The Red Army employed its armour in two main ways - infantry support and exploitation. It is clear from Soviet reports of the beginning of their attacks on 3rd Army on 19 November that these were less successful than hoped. As a result the main exploitation force of tanks had to be launched into the attack before a breakthrough by the infantry and their support tanks had been achieved. From this it seems likely that Romanian infantry could, at least for a while, deal with Soviet tanks in the infantry support role. The problems really arose once masses of Soviet tanks had achieved a breakthrough. That said, for a number of reasons, the Romanian infantry was not good at handling armoured attacks at any stage of the war, be they improvised NI tanks at Odessa in 1941 or JSIIs at Iasi-Chisinau in 1944. The most obvious success seems to have been that of the Paulis Detachment against the Hungarians in 1944, but Hungarian tanks were not particularly numerous or powerful. (A knocked-out, obsolescent Toldi light tank is usually shown in Romanian photos of the action. Are there other photos of the Paulis action?). Cheers, Sid. |
| Posted by: dragos May 18, 2006 07:33 pm | ||||
2nd Lieutenant Ioan Bogdan, battery commander (100-mm howitzers) in 16th Artillery Regiment, on 19 November 1942:
While the T-34 tank was crushing under the tracks the guns of the 2nd Battery, with the infantry disembarked, the other 4 smaller tanks were keeping in the rear, protected by the dead angles of the terrain. I ordered the gunner to aim at the base of the turret, and when the tank moved some 150 meters away from the 2nd Battery, I ordered fire. Looking through glasses at the effect of the fire, I noticed that the shell hit the turret near the cannon embrasure and ricocheted exploding in air (with delay), but I noticed the shake of the tank at the moment of the impact, because of the big weight of the shell (17 kg). The effect of this hit was that the tank crew could no longer use the cannon. As I was not satisfied with the effect, I aimed the howitzer myself at the second shot. The shell hit the turret in the center, right at the base, and it no longer skipped, but crushed on the armor, and the explosive content spread on the surface of the tank, so as when the delay fuse ignited, it caught fire, igniting also the ammunition crates on the tank. All the soldiers nearby started to cry “hurrah”. The tank crew, frightened by the fire, immediately took a left turn, trying to get out of the range of the howitzer. We did not let them to get too far, as the third shell was projected on the cogwheel of the right track, destroying it. The tank made one more turn in place, then it was abandoned by the crew, which, together with the other tanks, fell back towards north using the dead angles of the terrain. |
| Posted by: SiG May 19, 2006 04:51 pm | ||
Off Topic: I've read them. Couriously, there seem to be an unusal number of Soviet soldiers speaking Romanian in that story. Maybe Sgt. Zamfir's unit stumbled upon an entire unit of Romanian conscripts from Bessarabia? That would be really sad, Romanians killing Romanians, fighting for foreign interests.  |
| Posted by: hauptmann May 19, 2006 08:04 pm | ||
I don't want to be rude but I remember that in Antony Beevors book Stalingrad he says something like "Romanian troops were left alone, no-one had seen their officers nor NCOs in front line; on the contrary, they were safe behind the own lines, enoying theirselves with wine and women..." I agree that a common romanian soldier was brave, but according to mr. Beevor I think that their officers were mostly bad. Sorry to say. -the FINN |
| Posted by: dragos03 May 19, 2006 08:46 pm |
| There is no such passage in Beevor's "Stalingrad". At one point he claims, based on "Russian recon sources" that the Romanian officers kept some of the supplies for themselves. Most of the officers fought and died with their troops. Many of the junior officers also respected the tradition to lead the attacks in front of their men, which led to high casualties among them. |
| Posted by: Alexei2102 May 22, 2006 05:18 am |
| To be back ontopic, sort of speaking, has anyone seen "Manner Gegen Panzer" ? It is a small movie (propaganda one, of course), where they are showing all the means used by the German Infantryman to destroy a tank single handed. Perhaps this will answer some questions about the Man-againts-Tank issues presented here. |
| Posted by: sid guttridge May 22, 2006 02:20 pm |
| Hi Hauptmann, I don't know about Stalingrad, but according to the detailed breakdown of Romanian losses at Odessa, prepared by the German military mission the previous year, Romanian officer losses were slightly higher than those of other ranks. The German criticism at Stalingrad was that the few engineering resources made available to the Romanians were used firstly to build command bunkers, not front line positions. This undoubtedly aided the comfort of senior officers. However, it may just have been mistaken priorities. In any event, there were never enough engineering supplies to fortify more than a very small section of front, so this seems unlikely to have been a decisive factor. Cheers, Sid. |
| Posted by: Florin May 29, 2006 03:02 am |
| In a previous mesage for another topic (I do not have time to search for it) it was mentioned that before the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad, the Romanians had available 1 piece of 75 mm AT at every 3.7 kilometers (1 per 4000 yards) of frontline. No canon "lower" than a 75 mm could stop a T-34. And sometimes the Russians attacked with 30...50 T-34's per kilometer. Somebody who was not Romanian mentioned in the same topic that the German generals responsible with furnishing supplies and equipment for both the German and the Romanian armies denied with intention the desperately requested 75 mm AT's for the Romanians. If I remember right, the equipment was available, but it seems those generals had some accounts to close toward Hitler, and they intended a kind of sabotage. (The guy who posted the information called them "traitors".) Somebody who died many years ago told me how he climbed on a Russian tank, opened the lid from above and dropped a grenade in the turret. Well, this is another way the Romanians dealed with the Russian tanks - but I am sure it occured in very rare situations. Ironically, that guy, after becoming prisoner, ended with signing for "Tudor Vladimirescu". He told me how during the so called "rest time" between 2 slices of Russian style instruction, they had to pick up wild flowers, and then to create with them letters for propagandistic Communist slogans. |
| Posted by: Florin May 29, 2006 03:23 am | ||||
This is another case of spreading a false image starting from individual cases. I can give you similar examples occuring in the German army, but I will not generalise and I will not say that this was the case with the German army on average. Considering individual cases, and as I see you signed "the Finn", there was a funny story with a womanizer Finn captain, who admired with his binoculars the Russian girls from Leningrad, who were soldiers in an encircled Soviet battalion of women, near Leningrad (previously, Petrograd; today, Saint Petersburg). After he spotted few "better pieces" and started to dream about them, he asked a propaganda unit to ask through their loudspeakers: "Surrender and nothing will happen to you." Unfortunately for him, he was not believed, and next day the girls started a suicidal counter-attack which ended with their deaths. |
| Posted by: Florin May 29, 2006 05:03 am | ||
Mr. Antony Beevors did not fight on the Eastern Front. My grandfather did. I think that any Romanian who has/had in his family an officer or NCO active in Russia in 1941-1944 may feel the words of Mr. Antony Beevors as a personal insult. I could develop this, but what I wrote is enough. |
| Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu May 29, 2006 06:07 am |
| Does "Lascar" ring a bell ? |
| Posted by: Florin May 30, 2006 03:17 am | ||
And this means... what? |
| Posted by: D13-th_Mytzu May 30, 2006 08:58 am | ||
This was in reply to:
and it means that MANY high ranking officers fought untill the last bullet encircled at Stalingrad and were later killed or captured together with their soldiers. Gruparea Lascar is on such notorious case. |
| Posted by: hauptmann June 01, 2006 05:29 pm | ||||
1) I understand your thougths. Two of my My grand-grandfathers did figth in Winter War AND in Continuation War, the other as a sergeant and the other as a captain. If somebody said me that finnish NCOs or officers were bad, I would propably beat him. 2a) I said (or I meant) ACCORDING TO MY INFO. I have no other sources but the book Stalingrad and the Internet. I'm sorry, but both of the main-sources are mainly anti-romanian. 2b) Antony Beevor has his own sources; mainly battlereports of the german comrades, soviet pow-examinations and memoirs and diaries of romanian soldiers. 3) I did not mean that your grandfather was an bad soldier. I believe that he was a hero, if you say so. But I have no delusions; there MUST have been bad NCOs and officers in ANY ARMY that particitipated WWII. Please accept my humble apologies. Sorry. -the FINN |
| Posted by: saudadesdefrancesinhas June 02, 2006 11:09 am |
| I don't think Anthony Beevor really used any Romanian sources apart from 'Third Axis, Fourth Ally'. Likewise there are no Italian sources listed in his bibliography either. This could easily mean that most of the comments on the Romanians and the Italians will derive from German sources. The main problem with relying on what the Germans say about their allies is that they tended to blame them indiscriminately for their own mistakes, failures and misjudgements. Given the equipment available to the Romanian Army, it would have been miraculous if it could have resisted the Soviet attacks at Stalingrad. The Germans themselves played a part in this; they would not allow the Romanians to buy the number of tanks and antitank guns necessary to fight effectively, probably because they feared that doing so would allow the Romanians too much independence. Many problems with 'bad' Ncos and officers derive from the fact that lots of the smaller nations in the Second World War ended up fielding armies that were disproportionately large compared to their technical, industrial, educational etc. base. Sometimes, when fighting for things that seemed vital to the National interest, (eg. when the Romanians fought for Transylvania) these shortcomings could be overcome through moral determination alone, but the human cost was usually high. Of all the nations in World War Two the one that seems to me to have really fought badly was France. Anyone think of a nation that squandered so many of it's assets so quickly and so completely? |
| Posted by: Alexei2102 June 02, 2006 02:30 pm | ||
I second you on that. But they redeemed themselves later in the war, when they contributed decisively on the Western Front. |
| Posted by: Dénes June 02, 2006 05:57 pm | ||
I would question that. Based on what I've read, the Free French forces did not play a militarily significant role in the liberation of France. Gen. Dénes |
| Posted by: Alexei2102 June 02, 2006 06:05 pm | ||||
You are right, but you must take also into consideration the Free French Forces and The Maquis. They indeed played a major role on the Western Front. |
| Posted by: warhunter October 03, 2008 04:32 pm |
| According to the in-depth accounts of the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armatas at Stalingrad, found at www.quikmaneuvers.com, the Romanians did better than most of you think. Their defense works were professional and they had some 75mm antitank guns along with their issued lihghter ATGs and captured Soviet atgs. The 1st Romanian Panzer Division was in reserve and it did not run. It fought well. "Melting away" by Romanian troops? No, it did not happen. Many fought and died as brave soldaten are expected to. Several german military medals were won during this period by valiant Romanian troops. Romanian tank crews sought rear shots against heavier Soviet tanks, thats where they were most vulnerable. The Romanians did overlook several possibilities that would have improved their antitank defenses: - Minefields..captured Soviet mines were available but not emplaced - The formation of German type antitank hunter teams. (Go to You Tube and view the 10 part Close Combat Against Russian Tanks and the three part Men Against Tanks, produced by the German Army. -Some Romanian officers were already subverted by communism but that was not the major problem. Overall, the Romanians failed to take an aggressive antitank attitude in spite of weapons deficiencies, like the Finns. That is a problem of leadership. -Fire and smoke tactics were not employed properly. Smoke to obscure Soviet observation then the use of fire against flammable tank hulls by infantry troops. -Siting artillery weapons for both indirect fire support and direcxt fire antitank defense. This required a lot of work to fortify artillery positions. Yet the Romanians yhad the time and manpower for it. -The formation of antitank fronts. The Rumanianis should have grouped antitank guns (mixed 75mm and 45mm also anny captured Soviet 76.2mm) in fortified fronts of ten to thirty atgs with infantry machine gun support . Such positions should have been sited along Soviet armor avenues of approach. -Separate infantry from tanks. Slaughter Soviet infantry and stalk individual Soviet tanks. The Romanians needed a lot of narrow trenches for this tactiic. |
| Posted by: Hannover December 14, 2008 11:28 am |
| I think this question highlights a problem that existed for all combatants in WW2, mainly the close co-operation required between tanks and their infantry support for attacks to be successful. Insufficient training was given to most infantry (mostly none to the majority!) with the best examples of support shown when the infantry had actually trained with or conducted manouevres with the tankers and knew what was required of them. With such poor communication between Soviet tanks, due to the lack of fitted radios, it would be possible to isolate the tanks from their infantry support, leaving them more vulnerable to attack by determined infantry. It certainly took courage to allow a company of tanks to bypass or overrun your position for you to be told to concentrate your fire on the supporting infantry, particularly as you would know that in a position such as this it would make you more exposed to artillery fire from your own side. Although there are plenty of examples of infantry lying low whilst the tanks passed and then opening fire on the infantry support. 12th SS were particularly good at this tactic in the battles in Normandy. Don't forget that antitank gunners had a reasonable idea regarding their ability to damage certain tanks and knew about aiming for vulnerable areas. Camouflage was a key area here making your position difficult to spot until the range was reduced enough for you to have a reasonable chance of damaging the tank. Obviously once you fired you would almost certainly have been spotted but again it was one of the roles of supporting infantry to target AT emplacements as generally in a tank you were on the lookout for other tanks first. Also you need to take into account the view of tank crew. Having ridden in a WW2 panzer it is remarkable how little you can actually see. Smoke on the battlefield would further reduce vision hence explaining why so many tank commanders were killed by popping their head out of the turret during combat despite the repeated warnings regarding the dangers of this. You are also aware of the 'tomb-like' quality of the tank and the fear of fire in such an enclosed space is very real. This partly explains why many tank crew abandoned ship when the tank took any form of hit. First of all the noise and confusion brought about by the shell hit and also the feeling especially with Allied crews on the Western Front that one hit that may have not penetrated, would be followed very quickly by another that would penetrate, hence the overriding emotion to 'abandon ship'. Speaking to a tank driver who fought in Normandy who told me that a 75mm shell came through the front of his tank and passed between his legs without exploding! I then asked what did you do next? He said I got out of that tank as fast as I could - you cannot be that lucky twice!! Hannover |
| Posted by: Imperialist December 14, 2008 07:38 pm | ||
The decision to allow the tanks and even the infantry to breach some of your lines depends on the organisation of your front line (if you have well prepared in-depth positions lying in ambush) and its success depends on the quality of your weapons, on the size of the forces attacking you and on what happens in other parts of your front line. Even if you destroy the attack, if the enemy sends other waves to pressure the flanks of your now-discovered prepared positions or if the enemy units that penetrated other sections of your front line attack your positions from the rear then its all lost. |
| Posted by: MMM December 15, 2008 12:37 pm |
| You should be aware af two things: it very seldom happened to plan in advance what to do AFTER the tanks have breached the line; and furthermore, the officers had to know what to do, which was not quite the case w/ romanians at Stalingrad. Second: the attack of the remaining forces should take place immediately, as to prevent the counter-attack from the enemy fronces which passed them by. Anyway, when numeric and material superiority is overwhelming - as it was the case back then - no tactic could prevent the defeat. Also, the romanians might have not heard of Camerone |
| Posted by: Imperialist December 15, 2008 09:06 pm | ||
We're talking about different things. I'm not talking about tanks breaching your line but about them being allowed to breach a fake section of your line, in order to draw them in an ambush. That's the only way I see the utility of Hannover's description. The in-depth units taking part in the ambush have to be prepared in advance and deployed in a manner similar to a horse-shoe. The front line section is fake, meant to draw in and then give way to the attacking force, allowing it to breach it. The attacking force thinks it has breached the main line when in fact it is heading for the horse-shoe ambush. The pocket can then be closed by other reserve units and by the remnants of the fake line while the enemy forces that entered the pocket are cut down. The success of this maneuver depends on the effectiveness of your weapons, on the number of the attacking enemy and on what happens on other sections of the extended front line. |
| Posted by: MMM December 16, 2008 05:24 am |
| Of course we DO see this clearly now; back then, I really doubt there were any Romanian generals able to devise such a maneuver - and even less troops able to carry it on What you describe is a maneuver as old as the Carthaginian army, if I remember correctly - but they were "barbarians", not generals instructed at St. Cyr! |
| Posted by: Victor December 16, 2008 07:48 am |
| It is difficult to plan ahead such an intricate ambush, because this assumes one knows beforehand where the enemy will attack, but the tactic mentioned by Hannover was essential in defeating any tank assault on infantry positions. And this happened many times on the Eastern front, not only by AT guns crews, but also, maybe even more often, by tank hunter teams, which are very mobile and could do some serious damage in close quarters against tanks without infantry support. Dealing with a massive armored breakthrough, whose aim is simply to pass through the infantry line and push on as much as possible, is a very different matter. TO do that one needs motorized/armored reserves that could effectively counter the enemy spearhead. In this case one can think of the ambush described by Imperialist, provided the defense has enough means to prepare ambushes on each major communication axis. MMM, to your surprise, the Romanian officers knew what to do and for many hours the 13th and 14th Divisions held the Soviets at bay, by separating the tanks from the supporting infantry. Eventually, lagging behind schedule, the Soviets decided to simply pass through the Romanian infantry line with the tanks and cavalry and push on the advance, while the infantry remained to struggle against the Romanians. Again, to your surprise, many fought to the last momment much like captain Danjou's men at Camerone. These men died in a frozen steppe thousands of kilometers away from home fighting a war that was not theirs. They deserve at least a candle to be lit in their memory from time to time, not cheap jokes. |
| Posted by: MMM December 16, 2008 09:28 am |
| RE: Victor I did NOT intend to joke about the performances of the Romanian infantry divisions. Unfortunately, judging ONLY after the result, we didn't do much. It is also clear - from the sheer number of the victims on both sides - that the Romanians put up a good fight, but they didn't have a real chance. As it was seen, the "reservoir" of Soviet infantry was quite endless. As for the example of Romanians who knew what to do, I'm sure there is at least a counter-example of an officer who did NOT know for each one who did! Why else would the things have happened like that??? And, again, I have only respect for the many soldiers, NCO's and officers who gave their lives for Romania (at least, that was what they were told), regardless where and alongside which ally. I see no big difference between Don and Hron, in that matter. |
| Posted by: Victor December 17, 2008 03:19 pm |
| Off topic discussion was moved to a new topic: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=4994 |
| Posted by: Victor December 26, 2008 03:27 pm |
| Getting back to the original subject, in the autumn of 1942 the following instructions were given to the 1st Armored Division, and possibly to the other units of the 3rd Army: 1. the 75mm AT guns are to be used against targets up to 700m 2. the smaller caliber AT guns are to be used against targets up to 300m 3. the AT weapons must be placed in front of the infantry. Positions on dominant heights or ridges are to be avoided. It is preferably to place them in small valleys, on slopes or irregular ground. 4. the gun must fire only if the trajectory is oblique relative to the axis of advance of the enemy tanks to counter the sloped armor of the newer Soviet models 5. the AT gun must be dug in properly The instructions were given by the German command. |