Romanian contribution to the shortening of the war

I disagree with that nuke assessment.
Lets remember that the main reason/justification for nuking Japan was the high cost of landing on the islands.
By August 23rd 1944, the Allied main military effort was already 2 and 1/2 months after a successful landing on Festung Europe.
Besides, I;ve started to think that the number of days Romania would have been able to resist is overstated anyways.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on May 10, 2005 08:13 pm

AFAIK, this evaluation has been made after the capitulation of Germany. While I have found only reliable references on the assessments of using the A-bomb against Japan, there is none I know about not using it against Germany.

AFAIK, this evaluation has been made after the capitulation of Germany. While I have found only reliable references on the assessments of using the A-bomb against Japan, there is none I know about not using it against Germany.

Yes, but I mean the main Allied military effort was in Europe.
British, American, Russian forces were on the ground.
In comparison, the nuke was an important force replacement on the secondary theater. Plus, it saved them a landing.
I do agree that a nuke attack would have been possible against Festung Europe, but only against an intact fortress. The fortress was breached before August 23rd '44, so I dont think Romania hanging on for 100-200 days more would have had any impact on an already penetrated continent.

As for Romania hanging on, for a while I too thought about the famous FNG line, but I started to think that it could have been outflanked through Transylvania anyway.

p.s. what is AFAIK?

At the time the A-bombs were used, the Pacific theater was no longer a secondary theater.

This is only speculation in my opinion.

A totally different topic, feel free to open it.

As far as I know

In terms of importance, no.
In terms of force levels there, it retained its secondary character from the previous period. As stated on another thread by somebody else, a lot of force redeployments were required to deal with Japan, mostly from the other theater.

True, but them OTV guys saying Europe was going to be nuked if Romania held on in august '44 is speculation too.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on May 10, 2005 10:25 pm

In terms of importance, no.
In terms of force levels there, it retained its secondary character from the previous period. As stated on another thread by somebody else, a lot of force redeployments were required to deal with Japan, mostly from the other theater.

But you miss the main clause, of main theater of war still in action, unless in your opinion the A-bomb would have been used only in a secondary theater (for which cause?)

Of course, but the possibility of using the A-bomb over Germany in case of an extended war in Europe deserves attention IMO.

As Far As I Know

Just consider it my small contribution to this thread:)

No, what I'm trying to say is that because Europe was chosen the main theater, forces of all Allies were converging on the center of German power, while in the Far East Japan was an island fortress.
So I think the thought process was that if they were to test the bombs, they would do it somewhere where the effect would have been greater. Afterall, for Germany they still had the city-busting bombers...

Thanx Alex, but Dragos already answered... thank you both.

The first test of the A-bomb was on 16 July 1945. The second test was on 6 August 1945 (Hiroshima)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_project

Since the war started for U.S.S.R in June 1941, the Oriental Carpathian Mountains was the first real chain of mountains the Russians encountered during their offensive period.
In such a place their superiority in armor (tanks) and artillery would not make their effect. Remember, later in Tatra Mountains they called the Romanian mountain units any time they were not able to advance in the Czech territory.

I think the weak link in the Romanian-German defense was the part along Siret river. Also, the Soviets could pass over Danube, but it wouldn't make sense, because they would face Danube again, and if they would go ahead for Bulgaria, they could face counterattacks in the rear.

For Romania the passes were more of a reliability than an asset.
In WWI it was obvious that holding those mountain passes in the face of a superior enemy is not that easy. And secondly, the main question would be one of overstretch.
Romania could have faced a combination of the 3 Ukrainian Fronts.
Ofcourse, I'm not saying all these would have converged on Romania, but they offered plenty of assets for a two pronged assault on Romania.
I think the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts would have deployed forces in Transylvania while other forces of the 2nd and 3rd would have attacked the FNG line. Then the question would be what and where was Romania to deploy its remaining forces (about 20 divisions?).

Was real chances to obtain more than 200 days, if Romania don't switch the sides?

Iama

IMO no.
Also the question is, 200 days for whom? For the collapsing German army? To do what? The russian hammer was already advancing at great speed, the allies landed, the bombings continued, Italy, etc.