Seelowe

http://www.operationsealion.com/p1_problems.php

http://web.archive.org/web/20070504034219/...thist/seal1.htm

I must admit this/these changes my views - still, I wish I had access to a contemporary German study/oppinion...
Nevertheless, some aid could have come -if it were the case - from the "cousins" over the Atlantic. I doubt that Roosevelt would have just stood and watched...
My whole "beef" with the German side comes for not even seriously trying or considering it!

This post has been edited by MMM on June 25, 2012 07:07 am

Isn't that the point?

I don't see anywhere in this thread a reference to Hitler's famous "vacation" post the fall of France. What the "German side" did was what Hitler odered. (in this case, nothing).

Also, I think it's been observed that Hitler held a sort of grudging admiration for the Brits and the fortitude they so often displayed, WERE displaying in 1940!

Some have speculated that stayed der Fuhrer's hand re invasion, irrespective of all the tactical obstacles that have been hashed over here.

Hitler had a radio; presumably he could hear Churchill's famous June 18, 1940 speech: "......We shall not flag or fail....we shall defend ot our island whatever the cost may be. WE shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills. We will NEVER surrender!"

strong stuff. And he/they meant it. If you have never heard/seen a recording of that speech, please do so. (I suppose it's on Utube somewhere). This was what stopped the madman.

sorry; that speech was June 4, 1940

here's a downloadable mp3 link



http://audio.theguardian.tv/sys-audio/Guar...0/Churchill.mp3

also

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sam5omG0v0

Oh, thanks, but... no thanks! This quote/speech is also at the beginning of an Iron Maiden song, "Aces High" - of which I learned at the tender age of 15
So, I'm quite familiar with Churchill's activity, career and speeches; he's also one of the historic personalities I really like and admire, in spite of his (numerous) flaws!
What I intended to "conclude" was that I finally agreed that an invasion was never seriously considered by the German side; the Brits, on the other hand, were as prepared as they could've been - given the circumstances.
PS: as far as I know, he said "We shall never surrender"

yeah....Iron Maiden vid was the second link I posted above...was wondering if anyone would open/comment on it,

....check it out..it's really a great video, imo...dramatic shots of dogfights, etc while Winnie delivers those famous lines, cuts to vid of a spirited live performance of that famous IM anthem.

Of course the full speech (mp3 from The Guardian archives) is much longer, quite dramatic.

And not to split hairs, but maybe Germans did "seriously consider" doing it, but Hitler never acted.....for one or all the reasons we've been discussing?

cheers

Regarding the stopping of the tanks at Dunkerque:

The Blitzkrieg theory applied by Guderian supposed daring advances even when the rear was not fully secured.
The shape of the German advance in northern France in May 1940 was a kind of wedge: long and thin, with barely protected frontlines above and below the route of supply and reinforcements. It was attacked by the French from the south (under the command of De Gaulle) and by the British from the north (also known as the battle of Arras / offensive at Arras). The British attack was quite a problem, but both German frontlines survived, at north and at south.
However, these British and French attempts had a result. The German High Command and Hitler decided that the communication lines are too stretched, and they ordered to the armored divisions (ready to enter in Dunkerque and smash everything in their way) to stop for two days, to get the help of the infantry coming from behind.
After these two days, a heavy rain started, turning the ground into soft mud. Worried that the tracks of the armor may bog down, Hitler ordered two additional days of delay, until the ground will get better.
These combined 4 days of delay made a life or death difference around all Dunkerque matter.

Slightly OoT, but really ironic: the 2-nd Officer from the Titanic has helped at Dunkirk:
Lightoller's yacht
As for the "weather problem", this might be the prelude for the General Winter in 1941! I must check out my copy of Frieser's "Myth of the Blitzkrieg" book - perhaps he says something about that!
L.E.: Mr. Frieser confirms the five days of bad weather, but his "final" approach towards the STOP order is that Hitler needed to consolidate his authority over the Wehrmacht's generals, at any cost: if he said STOP, they must STOP! Well, the truth might be beyond our reach, because every hypothesis tends to have a little truth in it: Goering's pride, Runstedt's fear, Hitler's will to command etc. etc. etc.

This post has been edited by MMM on June 17, 2012 05:34 pm

I also recommend a book: "Blitzkrieg" (subtitle: From the rise of Hitler to the fall of Dunkirk)
Author: Len Deighton
My 2000 edition was published by Castle Books.

That matter with soft ground after rain fall is in other sources as well.
Years after 1940, Hitler felt the need to justify himself regarding the stop order at Dunkirk, but when historians later checked the rain story, it was correct.

Considering the "Seelowe" operation, in August-September 1940 the British attack against the Italian fleet at Taranto was yet to happen, same about the attack at Pearl Harbor, or the sinking of the Prince of Wales. I am saying that the German military leadership was not yet sure that airplanes are able to sink battleships, questioning the ability of the Luftwaffe to stop the Royal Navy.

It is interesting that at war start the Germans and the Japanese accepted engaging a land battle only if they had the total aerial superiority, and if that superiority in the air was not total, they backed off.
I am considering the Seelowe operation, or the canceling of landings at Port Moresby after the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Later in the war, both the Germans and the Japanese had to accept carrying battles with no aerial superiority, simply because they had no choice.
My conclusion is that the Germans should dare to push ahead with the invasion, even with some Spitfires or Hurricanes still messing around.

It is bad to lose. It is also bad when you are not trying at all.

This post has been edited by Florin on June 18, 2012 04:55 pm

The effect of de Gaulle's attack is up for debate, from what I understand. While some (including de Gaulle, unsurprisingly... ) claim that his attack helped influence the Germans to pause the armored columns, there are historians who claim otherwise. For instance, Alistair Horne, in "To Lose a Battle", states that the order to halt Guderian had already gone out when de Gaulle launched his first attack. He also states that the German archives didn't contain any real notes of concern along the lines of that expressed at other trouble areas during the offensive, and that it appears that the High Command wasn't even aware of de Gaulle's attack until after they had already told Guderian to resume his advance.

According to Horne, any alarm over de Gaulle's attack got no further than the 1st Panzer Division, which was de Gaulle's target.

Junior, I agree that de Gaulle's attack almost got unnoticed by the Germans.
The British attack was a different story. The Matilda tanks were much heavier than what the Germans could show in May 1940, and they were almost impervious to the shells fired by Panzer III. Some Matilda tanks kept fighting after 20 hits from Panzer III.

From what I've heard, you're correct. If the British Matildas had been properly supported when they counterattacked into the German lines, they may have caused some serious havoc. Unfortunately, they weren't. And after the initial shock, the Germans managed to scrounge up some 88s to deal with the tanks.