Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940, Implications

P.S.

There is a map of Zhukov's proposed operation on:

http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/index.html

It can be entered at the bottom of the final page, where it is the fourth map down.

Cheers,

Sid.

Here it is:

No, we dont know that. Zhukov's was a battle plan, he was not empowered to take the political decision to cross the border. That was Stalin's decision to make, and considering its implications, I dont think we know he would have taken it.

I dont think so. The war was a limited one, over Bassarabia. Pursuing the war westwards was not necessary.

Sure, it could have gone as far as Berlin...
The point is that we are not interested where the Red Army would have eventually stopped, we are interested where Stalin's politics would have stopped it.

And the goal is to keep the Army with no material damage? Why does the army receive money from the budget year after year, though it is peace? To make the best it can the moment its war, not turn around to avoid material damage...
The fact that later on material damage was bareable at Stalingrad, is ironic and sad.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on September 12, 2005 12:48 pm

Hi Imperialist,

There were two variants of the Soviet military plan. Variant 1 using full force, was to be employed if Romania fought. Variant 2, using lesser forces, was to be employed if Romania conceded peacefully. Variant 2 was actually employed. Stalin had already agreed to both and which was employed was entirely dependent on Romanian reaction.

Pursuing the war westwards would not have been necessary if Romania had conceded after the fall of Iasi. On the other hand, you would presumably have Romania fight on, which would have given the Red Army little choice but to do the same.

Damage to the army would be acceptable if it was likely to bear results not achievable by diplomatic means. In June 1940 in Basarabia and Bucovina no such results were likely.

Romania had watched two of its allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland, both disappear off the map completely in the previous two years and three more countries, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, in the previous fortnight. Romania was looking at the real possibility of extinction as a nation state if it fought. There was more at stake in mid 1940 than just Basarabia, Northern Bucovina, Northern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea.

That Romania was not congenitally indisposed to fight for these provinces under any circumstances is illustrated by the successful campaigns in Basarabia in July 1941 and Northern Transilvania in September-October 1944. There the wider geo-political and military tide was with Romania, unlike in mid 1940, when it was very much against.

Fighting is not an end in itself. It is a tool to be employed at the right moment.

Cheers,

Sid.

There were many provocations on the Romanian-Soviet frontier in August 1940, during the crisis involving Northern Transylvania. Stalin was ready t otake advantage of a probable Romanian-HUngarian conflict and annex morte territory. Somehow I am not very convinced he would have settled only with one half of Moldavia. Later that year, Soviet marines occupied some islands in the Danube Delta, killing several Romanian frontier-guards in the process, without fear of complicating the relationship with Germany.

This is simply sad, because its the same foolish appeasement like in the late '30s. The falseness of the idea that there is anything to be "saved" by giving up territory was supposed to be a lesson learned from WWII.
Also, by the losses you mention, the Romanian nation state was severely hit in its demographic, economic and military potential. No one could guarantee that this was not one step in the complete piece-by-piece dismantling of the state. Given the Czechoslovak example, this was a highly likely possibility.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on September 12, 2005 02:19 pm

Hi Imperialist,

I don't think that Poland can be accused of appeasement in September 1939, yet it, too, was extinguished as a nation state.

Romania was severely hit by the losses of 1940. However, it was not as severely hit as mere numbers would imply. Approaching half the population loss was of minorities, not Romanians.

Economically Romania was also severely hit, but the vital core of the economy, the oil fields, remained in Romania hands.

Militarily I would suggest that Romania was not much weakened. The USSR apparently returned some of the weaponry lost in Basarabia. No significant weaponry was lost elsewhere. It is true that 12th, 16th and 17th Infantry Divisions were disbanded after the territorial losses, but this was because the minorities in them had deserted in significant numbers. So they were not necessarily an asset in the first place. The severest military weakening was in the geo-strategic sphere. The buffer provinces had been stripped away and the core of the country was under much more direct threat. This was, indeed, serious.

Romania's solution to securing the core of the country was to get a German guarantee of its rump in 1940. This never turned into a German occupation, so Romania managed to retain internal sovereignty and a nation state, unlike the Czechs, the Poles, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, the Estonians and later the Yugoslavs.

Romania was in a virtually impossible situation in mid 1940 and it doesn't appear that fighting then could have done anything to improve it. However, it might well have made the situation very much worse.

Cheers,

Sid.

Well, the mere numbers are 4 million romanians lost, and 2 million minorities. Those minorities were integrate in the economy, despite their nationality.

The "sovereignty" was conditioned. One could hardly talk about sovereignty. As long as Romania pomped oil and went along deep into Russia, the appearance of sovereignty was kept. Sure, there was some level of internal sovereignty, but that is not uncommon in any system of external domination, on condition the internal sovereignty does not interfere with the general lines of the relation.

Imperialist, Poland fought in 1939, yes, and gained the respect of the entire world. But after the end of the war, the Russians didn't give back the teritory occupied. It is logical to think the same would have happened with Basarabia and N. Bukovina, even if we had fought. Not fighting simply spared the lives, resources and - possibly - teritories of Romania. Who knows if Russia would have settled only for the original teritories with their armies in Bucharest?

They had their armies in Bucharest.They settled with the whole country under their domination, territorially they only wanted Bassarabia. However, that happened after the germans lost the war. I doubt the russians would have marched into Bucharest in 1940.
One certainly cannot compare the Soviet capability of marching without impunity towards the west displayed in 1944-45 with the far more balanced and politically cautionary period of 1940.

Not fighting did not spare the resources and lives and territories of Romania. It spared "some" territories, "some" lives and "some" resources. By forfeiting others. Now, this might look very realpolitik to some, but actually it is not. Appeasement cannot be confused with realpolitik.

I doubt the in case of war in 1940 the Soviets would have stopped in Moldavia. They tried to force the borderline before and after the ultimatum of June 1940. They were also ready to intervene in case of Romanian - Hungarian hostilities, under the pretext of backing Hungary's claims. Stalin's brutal interventionist policy was far from cautious.

Had Romania concluded, it is likely that Soviet Union would retain a larger territory than the previously demanded through ultimatum, as it happened to Finnland. And given the spheres of influence after the war, any territories ceded to Soviet Union would most likely have been lost forever.

Even if the troops of the Red Army wouldn't have entered Bucharest, in a country destabilized by war a puppet regime was easier to set, by either of the great powers interested in the region.

In all, the consequences resulting form an war without hopes with Soviet Union could only have been worse, not better.

The people that reject war from the start because its without hope in their mind, close the doors to any hopes that could appear, and submit completely. Other states orient themselves and their interests in relation to the war. If resistence is not put up, to what will they orient to? The war comes first, hopes follow.

Stop speaking with hindsight and put yourself in that moment. Somebody asks you to cede territory or be attacked. Will you cede or will you resist? If you do cede, where will you stop? Who will demand something next and will you be ready to cede next? Given your smaller power from the previous forfeits, how will you resist now when you finally grasp whats next?
Romania would have had Czechoslovakia's fate if it werent for other plans for it.
To think that it didnt turn into a Czechoslovakia has something to do with the correctness of the decisions taken is absurd.

The question is no longer of better or worse, but right or wrong. Was it right for the romanian soldiers to die in the russian steppes while 1 year earlier they werent good enough to die for their land in the politicians' view? Were they "saved" at the price of romanian land so that they can be
better wasted on russian soil?

take care

No, we dont know that. Zhukov's was a battle plan, he was not empowered to take the political decision to cross the border. That was Stalin's decision to make, and considering its implications, I dont think we know he would have taken it.

We do know. The Soviet Union was prepared to resort to war if her demands would not met by Bucharest:

I wasnt referring to the decision to resort to war, but to the decision to go beyond Bassarabia and Bukovina. That wasnt Zhukiv's decision to take, though he had plans ready in case Stalin decided to take it.

I don't agree with this. A favorable moment can appear, as it happened in 1941. Some even consider that Romania was virtually at war with the Soviet Union since 28 June 1940, when Soviet Union became an aggressor forcing the border with military before Romania answered the ultimatum, and the evacution of Bessarabia and Bukovina was only a strategical retreat until 22 June 1941.

I have stated my opinion regarding this specific situation. I can't answer your generic question.

The risk of turning into the Czechoslovakia's case disappeared after the Vienna diktat, as Germany and Italy guaranteed the remaining borders.

Please don't come up with such simplifications. Who said that the Romanian soldiers were not good enough to die for their land? About carrying military operations on the territory of Soviet Union, yes, it makes sense from a strategic perspective. The way these operations were employed is a different story, but this is not the point here.