Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940, Implications

Yes, obviously in 1940 Romania alone did not stand a chance against Soviet Union, surrounded by enemies and with no allies left on the continent. And yes, the country was saved (what has left of it) and remained as a sovereign nation, able to fight back another day, rather than being occupied and splitted up among the aggressors, as it happened to Poland in 1939.

Romania had to do the normal thing - resist. That action alone could have changed the political situation on the continent, so we cannot really know if we wouldnt have gained new allies.
The country was left to fight another day? What good is that if it didnt fight when it was the most needed?
As for split up, it was. Not on the level of Poland, but its territory was split up. The difference is that Poland fought, Romania didnt.

It is hard to believe it would have changed the political situation on the continent in the matter of the weeks it would have taken the Soviets to reach Bucharest. Maybe you can offer some clues on this. And also about the presumable new allies.

Again, how can you say it was most needed to fight then, when the outcome was an univocal defeat, and possibly the disbanding of the Romanian state?

The difference is that Poland ceased to exist as a state for the period of the Second World War.

This post has been edited by dragos on August 30, 2005 08:30 pm

I believe Imperialist meant that Poland fought her aggressor.The fact that outcome was an inexistent Polish state after the fights was an error suddenly repaired after 1945.They fought and they have gained respect.

The outcome was 5 years of brutal occupation, death of milions of people (including the Polish Jews), the destruction of 90% of Warsaw (after the uprising) etc.

You talk of all of these as an error suddenly repaired in 1945?

They fought believing that Great Britain and France would come to their help. They didn't. Would they have fought knowing they are alone? I'm not so sure.

This post has been edited by dragos on August 30, 2005 09:12 pm

A state exists only to facilitate the proper development of the nation's forces, and the unified exercise of leadership of the most able men of the nation. In case of war its supposed to direct the whole efforts of the nation towards a certain goal.
The state/statesmen have no right to forfeit parts of the territory and people living there only to insure its own survival. What kind of survival is that if its main cost is decreasing the nation's unified force by giving up land and people?
A state that does that only weakens the nation's morale and unified force. The state is useful only if it gathers the entire forces available and directs them were fellow nationals need them. When the romanians in Basarabia needed the military action of Greater Romania for the first time, they were left alone. When the romanians in Transylvania needed the military action of Greater Romania for the first time, they were left alone. The action might not have made a big difference, but that is not an excuse for not doing it.
Compare Romania's forfeiture of Transylvania with Hungary's refusal in WWI to heed to some hints to cede Transylvania to Romania in order to ensure the latter's participation on the side of the Central Powers. Even at the cost of losing the war, that forfeiture was rejected.

And yet its still there. Losing a state is not the end, continuing to live with a state that hinders the nation's development and put a stop to the natural reaction to resist and help fellow nationals, and that acts as the agent of imposing a detrimental treaty is far worse.

This is not the way to look at it. What you mention is not the fault of those resisting, its the fault of the attackers. Their aggressiveness lead to these destructions, the Poles did what they had to do -- they defended their own.
(I also found somewhat similar way of thinking relating to the guerilla actions in Irak. The fact that Iraki people continue to die and infrastructure is destroyed is the fault of the insurgents who continue to resist, not the fault of the occupiers who decided to go in that country).
Sorry for the digression.

Probably. But I think their main thought when fighting was about believing they are doing their most to defend their country, with or without the brits or french doing something too. And believing they kill an invader who has no right to be there.
The cavalry charge against tanks says something about their state of mind. Probably if those men were to act like romanian politicians, they would have saved their lives in order to fight another day. Maybe when stronger allies are on their side too.

What is this, some kind of definition teached at the university of political studies?

The point is the the action would have made a big difference, because it would have led to the destruction of the very state, but with no effect to the goal the action was targetted to.

Totally different situations (Austro-Hungary in 1916 and Romania in 1940).

A good point, albeit involuntary. In 1940 Romania knew about the experience of both Polish campaign and Winter War in Finland (what the aggressors did).

From what I have read, I think the Poles were basing on the intervention of the Western Allies. Maybe a Polish member can shed more light on this.

The cavalry charge against the German tanks is nothing but a myth according to the Polish sources.

What is this state you keep talking about? The state was destroyed with the parts of territory ceded. The Romanian state 1918-1940 ceased to exist.
Also, this kind of political thought sounds good. Very good. Anybody with a territorial claim and enough force to intimidate is enough to make a demand and promise the sovereignty of what will remain out of Romania and we'll roll over. Avoid "unnecessary" destruction and death. Its obvious we'd lose. I wonder what destruction is necessary in romanian eyes, if the destruction endured in defense of own territory and people is so unwanted.

Different? Maybe, maybe not. Think about it.

I dont learn definitions by heart, and I dont retype definitions here. It has something to do with political thought nevertheless.

I meant Romania as a sovereign state, and not a foreign occupation regime as in Poland. I thought it was obvious.

Different? Maybe, maybe not. Think about it.

Austro-Hungary was part of the Central Powers in 1916. Romania had no allies in 1940.

Yes, but Romania ceded Transylvania in order to gain Germany as an ally. Austria-Hungary did not cede Transylvania to ensure Romania's allegiance to the already existing alliance. If you want to look at the context, ofcourse you can find plenty of differences. But the idea is the principle of not cedeing territory. The same happened after 1871 with Alsace-Lorraine. Decades later it will be decryed as the biggest mistake the fact that Germany did not cede back Alsace-Lorraine in order to secure a friendly France. However, cedeing things that easy like Romania did is very hard to find in the policy of respectable nations, and I'm sorry to say that. Mostly because it does not ensure a favourable outcome, and it only means renouncing a favourable position and weakening the state/nation. As a matter of fact, was Romania even certain that the partitions of 1940 will not be followed by a partition a la Poland? How could it be sure? Czechoslovakia's example was pretty clear too, not only Poland's. Giving up territory did not ensure non-occupation, resisting did not ensure victory. It was a matter of principles, in my opinion.

To settle the things straight, Romania did not cede Transylvania in order to gain Germany as ally, but because she was threatened with an all-out attack if she did not give in to the demands. The fact that Germany and Italy were guaranteeing the new borders were only a consequence of the Romania's submission.

In WW1 Austro-Hungary had no reason in cedeing Transylvania, simply because there were no negociations between Romania and AH regarding this aspect. Even if AH would have been aware of the Romanian negociations with the Entente, it wouldn't have been so much worried about it, being power bound with Germany.

Other examples of less respectable nations in your opinion: Czechoslovakia, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Letvia, Lithuania.

As I have said before, after the Vienna Diktat, the new borders were guaranteed by the Axis. But after the Soviet ultimatum, no guarantees indeed. However, it is to be noted that Romania was one of the strongest military powers among the minor nations.

This post has been edited by dragos on August 30, 2005 11:48 pm

What if Romania refused to open its territory for german troops to pass through Bulgaria against Yugoslavia. What if Romania refused to open its territory for Barbarossa. What would have remained out of Romanian state's sovereignty and "guaranteed" borders?

This post has been edited by Imperialist on August 31, 2005 12:04 am

Your hypothesis is unrealistic.

After signing the Tripartite Pact it is hard to believe that something like this would have happened. At least this is what Romania has gained after the territorial losses, guarantees of the territorial integrity, German missions to train Romanian troops, German AA batteries to protect Ploesti. It is the same Antonescu said about his coming to power: the last card to play for Romania.