Should our troops have stopped at Carei?, Why fight past Transylvania in 1944?

The participation of Romanian troops on the Eastern Front past the Dniestr River has been debated since the summer of 1941.
Conversely, however, historians have been relatively silent in debating the validity of Romanian military participation in Hungary and Slovakia on the Western Front, during the fall of 1944 through the end of World War II.

According to the Armistice signed on September 14, 1944, between the government representatives of Romania and the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States, Romania "will wage war on the side of the Allied Powers against Germany and Hungary for the purpose of restoring Rumanian independence and sovereignty, for which purpose she provides not less than twelve infantry divisions with corps troops".

According to the clause mentioned above, Romanian military action was to be undertaken with the final purpose of restoring independence, i.e., eliminating German and Hungarian forces from its territory and recovering the portion of Transylvania up to its pre-1940 Vienna Agreement border.

Some historians have rightly hypothesized that Romanian troops crossed over the Hungarian and Slovakian frontiers in order to gain co-belligerent status at the Peace Talks that were to follow after the fighting ended, or, at the very least, to gain the graces of the UN Allies and be viewed in a more favorable light. To this end, the General Staff increased the number of fighting divisions by 50% by sending up to 18 divisions to the front instead of the minimum of 12 required by the Armistice Agreement.

Nevertheless, it became evident as early as September 1944, that the Allied Control Commision exhibited a hostile attitude not only toward our government but especially towards our troops. Romanian divisions were forced into inefficient frontal attacks (as was the case with Oarba de Mures) resulting in excessively high casualties; the liberated portion of Transylvania was placed under Soviet administrative control; war materiel captured by Romanian troops was confiscated by the Soviet Army on a regular basis; entire regions of the country outside of fighting areas, such as Moldova and Eastern Vallachia were pillaged and fell victim to excesses from passing Soviet units. The list could go on and on.

Most importantly, perhaps, once the fighting Romanian divisions crossed into foreign territory, their supply lines were virtually cut. Military rail traffic was exclusively under the authority of the Soviet-led Allied Control Commision, which proceeded to eliminate, or in the best case, severly delay the shipment of supplies intended to our troops. To exacerbate the already desperate situation, the Romanian Armies operating in Hungary and Slovakia were not allowed to either purchase or requisition supplies from the theater of war in which they were fighting.

Given the hostile attitude Romania was receiving from the Soviets both from a political as well as from a military perspective, making it obvious that the granting of co-belligerent status was out of the question, and given the fact that the country had fulfilled and exceeded its military expectations with its participation in the Transylvanian Offensive as required by the Armistice Agreement, one may debate whether further military operations past the restored national borders represented a necessary decision.

Why exactly did we push on past our restored borders? Romania had met all its Armistice requirements once it reached the pre-war Western border. In return, the Soviet (Allied) side had not done the same, bringing the country to near-chaos and forcing their views in all cases. Moreover, it was fairly obvious that were neither gaining the good graces of Soviet authorities, nor about to obtain co-belligerent status.

I am not advocating a point of view, but rather would like to debate this issue and hear any arguments that I am not aware of.

What do you think? Should we have stopped at our borders, on October 25, 1944, and swallow the consequences and hostilities which we were receiving in any case, or was it necessary to push on, with more divisions that agreed upon, until the end of the war?

I'd very much like to hear your points of view on this matter.

Well,I asked the same question some vets....
I never understand how come they could ever thoght that the Soviet Union is beatable.
The unswer was that such quick and easy vict. were made,that it seemed very close.
They also expected the local population to rize agains the cominists.
The Russians were the "Traditional Enemy" of the Romanians and many wanted him "killed".

As far as i know, one of the conditions of turning against the axis was to help the allied troops defeat the germans.

Would it not be more fair to say that the Allies had very little say over what was required with regards Romania, from a military campaign and logistical point of view, this area of opperations was going to fall to the Soviets and they were going to decide what way the area would be managed.

I doubt if there were any real plans to put US / British / Allied troops into Romania, their main priority being Western Europe, the Medetaranian and the Middle East.

The next main aerea of opperations being the Far East, it would have been impractical if not impossible for them to put troops on the ground everywhere.

Kevin in Deva.

actually the soviet union *was* beatable. especially without the allied help.
actually, until 1943 inclusive, they were losing the attrition war, despite stalingrad.

When german army was going to beat the SU on foot?
Without trucks ,cars and so on?
Without transport planes,long range bombers?

Are you talking about war material captured in Romania or beyond?
According to the Armistice, Romanian troops had to relinquish all enemy war materials captured on our territory.

The Armistice did not have the final word on the status of Transylvania. Though annulling the Vienna 1940 decision, the issue of how much of Northern Transylvania would have remained ours was reserved for later discussion during the Peace Conference. So in my view Romanian leaders saw fit to do everything possible to have a better position in that Conference.

Also if I'm not mistaking the Armistice noted Romania's entry into the war. And the war was not over unless Germany unconditionally surrendered. So, don't think there were territorial benchmarks for Romania's participation (reach those borders and you've done it, you can exit the war).

take care

Both in Romania during Aug. 23 - Oct. 25, 1944, and in Hungary and Slovakia.
The armistice refers to german war materiel present in Romania as of August 23, 1944.
I don't think it could refer to war booty captured by Romanian troops fighting alongside Soviet troops.

True, but the Armistice refers exclusively to war against German and Hungarian troops. It never mentions Slovakia. Additionally, the entire Armistice is based on a fundamental clause: restoring the sovereignty of Romania and its borders.

Also, it should be noted that at the time the Armistice was drafted, the pressing issues were to hold the Carpathian passes and to push back the German and Hungarian troops out of Romanian territory, including Transylvania.

One may argue that these conditions were met on October 25, 1944.

However, I can't really contradict you. You have stated things correctly.

But I can't help but think that perhaps there existed the possibility of stopping at Carei. You can be at war with a country, namely Germany, without sending troops past your restored borders.

What I would like to know is whether the Soviets insisted on our troops participation into Hungary or Slovakia, or whether it was something that we more or less voluntarily did in order to claim co-belligerent status.

By the way, thanks to everyone for all your arguments.

This post has been edited by mabadesc on July 03, 2007 04:06 pm

Hallo mabadesc

As the Soviets effectively were taking control of all the areas they were fighting through including the countries they were passing throug, do you think it would have been easy for Romanian military commanders to say to the Soviets:
"Thats it we have done our bit and we are stopping here and not going one step further"?
I think this would have been seen as an excuse for the Soviets to start lining people up against walls and executing them.
As it was it seems that Russian commanders prefered their new found Romanian Allies to be at the spearhead of any advance being made towards the West.

Kevin in Deva

This post has been edited by New Connaught Ranger on July 03, 2007 06:55 pm

it's not like the red army was a very much fully motorized force, despite the 375.000 trucks recived through L&L (which is more than the entire german war production of about 315.000). russian production figures for trucks range from about 290.000 to 650.000, of which about 110.000 were captured by the germans.
given the relative front strengths, the german army was actually higher motorized (truckwise), even accepting the higher figures for the soviet production, albeit by not a great margin.

now without L&L, which qualifies as "allied help" together with the air raids and "Husky" and also does by no means conclude the allied material assistance to the SU, the latter would have, to sustain the same level of motorization (if even possible capacitywise) reduce war material production in other key ares (aircraft, tanks, artillery) to satisfy the requirements of the army.

also, there wern't all that many raids by the VVS on german main industrial production areas during 1943, were they?

while hindsight is a blessing, i wouldn't share the view, that the outlook for the regular axis soldier would have to be as grim as portrayed, at that point, since you were wondering about the vets you asked.

It's not quite like that. Once again, the Armistice text as a whole implicitly revolves around breaking the alliance with Germany and waging war against German and Hungarian troops with the purpose of eliminating them from Romanian territory, including all of Transylvania.

Negotiations regarding a variety of military, economical, and political factors continued between Romania and the Allied Control Commission through the fall of 1944 (and probably beyond). I am saying that perhaps the possibility of stopping at our restored Transylvanian borders existed.

To reinforce this point, on October 26, 1944, one day after the liberation of Transylvania, the Soviets wanted to further dissolve a large part of the Romanian Army, reducing it to 12 divisions. At the insistence of the Romanian government and GHQ, this was not done. Instead, a new agreement was reached, allowing for the Romanian Army to retain a larger size, provided that at least 12 divisions were sent to the front.
Clearly, then, the Romanian government was a proponent of sending more troops to the front than the Soviets were requesting.

The Romanian Army was at the time the only institution remotely capable of resisting the Sovietization of the country. For this reason, the Soviets could deal with this threat by either dissolving it (or reducing it drastically) or by sending the bulk of it to the front, away from its territory.

Given the arguments presented above, and given the lack of morale of the troops, along with their severly strained supply lines, one may argue that an agreement could be reached which provided for an even more drastic reduction of the Romanian Army in exchange for not sending any expeditionary troops into Hungary and Slovakia.

Whether it would have been a better solution, I do not know. I am not taking the side of either option, I am simply posing a question and proposing a theory.

This post has been edited by mabadesc on July 04, 2007 02:43 am

Hi mabadesc

I fully understand where you are "coming from" as the Americans say, but, seeing as the German with their Allies could not hold off the Soviet Military Forces on there march west, is it concievable that the Romanian Military Forces could have held back or slowed the Soviets for any considerable period of time??

Even if there was a collaboration between the Russians and Romanians to move against the Hungarians and Germans, I believe, the Russians would have been highly suscpicious of their new comrades during this period of time, seeing that only shortly before the Romanians were actively engaged in killing Soviets troops.

Despite what has been agreed in an Armistice text, I believe it would have been the situation on the ground that would dictate how matters were being controlled, as you yourself said:

Might it not have been the intention of the Soviets all along, to use the ploy of saying they wished to disolve a large part of the Romanian Military Forces, to get the Romanian Government and Romanian GHQ, to propse sending more troops to the front, this way avoiding any claims later that the Soviets forced the Romanians to send troops into the front lines??
The use of the Soviets in sending Romanian troops in as a spearhead and incuring high casualties would also help reduce the amount of people who could be used to forment trouble or organise a resistance movment in Romania post WW2.

Kevin in Deva.

Mabadesc, also consider the image considerations. In 1941 Romania did not stop at the borders of the contested territory but moved on citing military considerations and the need to fight the enemy you are at war with before he submits or is defeated.

Now how would it have looked like for Romania to say it would not go beyond the borders of Transylvania, while Germany was not yet defeated or surrendering? Not good. And it would have probably angered the Allies. And if with all the efforts we made they still didn't recognise our co-belligerance, what would their treatment have been at the Peace Conference if we would have prevaricated? Probably even harsher.

On July 14th Patriarch Teoctist will set the foundation stone for a Church dedicated to the Romanian soldiers who lost their lives in the WWII campaign in Czechoslovakia:

http://www.crestinortodox.ro/Patriarhul_Te...-105-17360.html