Battle worth mentioning on this site., Suggestion to mention an historical even

It's ok, I do believe that open and honest debate always yields good results !
I was also thinking for some time at that paragraph in the book ; my view is that given its status of "popular literature" it had to end the episode on a triumphal note, after all.
The truth may be - as suggested by the map from this link:
http://reocities.com/motorcity/freeway/7333/Imag/C7szoln.gif
that the push southwards of the German-Hungarian forces was a secondary push, aimed to encircle and finish off the bridgehead of the 4th Infantry Division and provide cover for the main push. The main push was aimed directly eastwards, towards Mezotur and Turkeve - as you also say. On the map we see that reaching Tiszafoldvar was the farthest the secondary southern push went.
Both the "Radio Donau..." book and the quoted essay only speak about the southwards advance of ennemy forces.

Guess what: I played with Google a little bit and found this:


dragos Posted: January 02, 2005 01:17 pm

luciang, indeed if we are watching the situation of the attack on the map, you're absolutely right! But, in this case, I wonder why they would claim that the German tanks attack was stopped, when in fact they have reached their objectives by penetrating deep behind the frontline held initially by the Romanians?
In the book I quoted, the area Rakoczifalva -Tiszafoldvar where the remains of the romanian 4th Infantry Division were retreating (probably where the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment was too), the german unit who advanced was the 4.SS Polizei Panzergrenadier Division or units from it! And indeed the division had in his composition a handful of Panzer IV Ausf. J tanks and StuG IV assault guns. But these armored vehicles certainly were not in number of 50-60, maybe up to 20 altogether ... and whether they were used against the Romanian or Soviet troops from the Mezőtúr area (the book says that against the Russians!).

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on March 31, 2012 07:46 pm

Related to:

I believe that if you consider only the southwards pennetration, then, the assertions are correct in both Romanian sources. If you look at this issue from a general perspective one might argue that limiting the length of a front line breaking is quite an achievment...

Related to:

I believe that here is the point where it's hard to say when the southward pennetration became less important for the germans and the forces actually pursuing the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment were no longer so powerful. Given the fact that all attacking forces had to cross the Szolnok bridge, at the very beginning it must have been quite a force presenting itself towards the 1st Regiment. After a few hours most of that force must have shifted eastwards, but since the 1st Regiment was already falling back this wasn't so obvious for them...

Indeed, from what is mentioned in the book, Hungarian infantry units ensured the flanks after the armored and mechanized German units penetrate in the depth ... so the remainings of the 4th Infantry Division and the entire 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment faced later Hungarian infantry units!

So, to wrap up things resulting so far:

- The story in the "Radio Donau..." book should be considered as written exclusively from the perspective of the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment. The general development of the larger engagement was different from what may seem to result by interpreting this story. There are also elements of "popular literature" present in the story - such as the claim of only Tiger and Panther tanks beeing present there - which should be dismissed.

- The survival claim of the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment stands, and I would say that it stands undiminished from a merit point of view. It was most likely achieved by gradually retreating in front of the advancing tanks.
There may be an additional merit here, as resulting from the 2005 quote above, that the 998th infantry battalion, part of the 4th Infantry Division managed to survive as well - probably with a certain amount of losses - and avoided being captured, thanks to the resistance opposed by the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment.

- The slow down of the ennemy advance claim appears diminished from a merit point of view. This is due to the fact that the gradual retreat of the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment was performed on a north to south axis while the main axis of the ennemy offensive was west to east.
However, I would speculate that this claim should not be dismissed entirely due to the fact that the initial aim of the attacking force which crossed the Szolnok bridge must have been to clear the area of ennemy forces before dashing eastward. So at least the initial shock which the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment sustained could have come from a significant proportion of the attacking force.
Another angle from which we may consider the maneuver of the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment is this: the north to south gradual retreat axis was probably chosen on purpose by colonel Dobriceanu because in this way the left flank remained covered by the Tisa river making it easier for the Regiment to avoid encirclement.

luciang, in terms of withdrawal of the our heavy artillery regiment forces to the south, some other explanation is also possible (maybe not the real one?): the communications (roads and highways) in the area favored a withdrawal of this kind (to the south) more advantageous on the road than in the open field... it's an assumption of mine looking at the map!
Otherwise I adhere to the other conclusions of yours from the last post!

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on April 03, 2012 08:02 pm

My understanding from the link I already presented into this topic
http://www.historynet.com/desperate-panzer...orld-war-ii.htm
is that the deep Soviet advances in Hungary in the previous weeks presented the German command with 2 options: overall withdraw, possible up to Budapest, or a counter-offensive to keep situation in check.
They tried the counter-offensive and succeeded (for that moment).
This episode presented by "luciang" was a part in the bigger picture of Axis counter-offensive in that whole area.

This post has been edited by Florin on April 05, 2012 01:53 am

The book by Norbert Szamveber, titled: Az alfoldi panceloscsata (The Tank Battle of the Hungarian Plain), 1944 October (Puedlo Publisher, 2007), describes the events on a day-by-day basis. There are many interesting details also related to the topic of this thread. Unfortunately, I don't have time to translate it.

Gen. Dénes

Indeed Denes, I also quoted from this book, which is very well documented and well balanced in assessments!

Available this summer

http://www.amazon.com/DAYS-OF-BATTLE-Armou...34757693&sr=1-3

Based on the publisher's past history, it will actually take years until this book will be published (I know, I am one of their authors). But it's a well documented book, already published in Hungary, so the waiting will be well worth.

Gen. Dénes

Incidentally I found on this site another reference about this battle:

About the radio equipement the 1'st Heavy Artillery had, the "G radio" mentioned here, perheaps it would be interesting for you to know that on the 13th of May 1944, during the operations in Moldavia, Col. Feldmann, comander of the 4'th German Artillery Corp, gave a very performant radio equipement to the 1'st Heavy Artillery Regiment, used by the 1'st Battery of the Regiment during the fights in Moldavia. I don't know if it was the same thing or not, but all the same, the Romanian Regiment had a vehicle with radio equipement of german fabrication.
About the battle of Racoczifalva, col. Dobriceanu, in his book, says it took place on the 19th October 1944, the Regiment being placed south of Racoczifalva. For more precise informations I'll have to read again the way the Colonel describes this battle. However, although it is true that the 4'th Infantry suffered a great number of losses, I don't think the same thing happened to the 1'st Heavy Artillery, since only a few days later, starting with the 23rd of October, they took an active part in forcing the Tisa River. But for more precision I'll check out again the facts at Racoczifalva. According to Col. Dobriceanu, the mission for the 1'st Heavy Artillery Regiment that day at Racoczifalva, was to prevent the german tanks for pursuing their way in menacing the positions already occupied by the Romanian 7'th Army on the Tisa.