Finland- Romania comparison

If you had the chance to see documentaries, the Finns used skis as a common item. There were whole units attacking on skis.
Quite often, the same conditions excellent for the usage of skis make any other form of combat units sitting ducks.

This post has been edited by Florin on December 29, 2005 06:40 am

Hi Kosmo,

Actually the Germans did not make great speed in Norwegian mountain valleys. They seized the ports and the lower hinterland of Oslo with speed aided by the fact that Norway had no warning. However, as soon as they entered more severe mountain terrain north of Oslo they began to run into greater problems despite very weak opponents. The Allies finally abandoned Norway because of their defeat in France, not because they had yet been definitively beaten there. It was as a consequence of this that the Germans made their fastest progress.

The Finns usually fought bravely and often fought well, but favourable geography was a great force multiplier for them that was not available on the main Eastern Front. In southern Russia and Ukraine they would have been vulnerable in much the same ways that the Romanians, Hungarians and Italians were. Indeed, even German infantry armies were vulnerable there.

I am quite happy to recognise that the Finns were probably Germany's best independent allies in the East. However, their achievements must be seen within the context of the unique conditions they fought under - conditions that comparitively favoured them in 1939-40 and even in 1944, but on neither occasion enough to stave off military defeat.

Finland's comparitive good fortune was that it had no natural resources vital to the Axis to make it a strategic target in its own right and it was not en route to anywhere else of importance either. As a result the Red Army had no operational reason to operate in most of Finland after the armistice. Romania was not so fortunate.

Cheers,

Sid.

I would say the nickel ore from Finland was quite an important asset in WWII.
Also, their shares in the nickel mines made groups from the United States and Great Britain to pressure Soviet Union to reach an agreement with Finland in 1940.
Needless to add, the influence of United States in Soviet Union was not neglectable, after all those technical assistance programs of the 1930's.

This post has been edited by Florin on December 29, 2005 04:04 pm

Hi Florin,

I am rather dubious about the supposed influence of US companies on the course of geo-political events in Europe, especially on totalitarian powers like Germany and the USSR. I also do not credit reports that they influenced US bombing policy to avoid targetting US subsidiaries in Germany. This all smacks of conspiracy theory.

Finland's nickel was certainly important, but it was nothing like the vital resource that Romanian oil was to Germany.

Cheers,

Sid.

Sorry, but I don't think so. The finns were [and are today] really good, maybe the best soldiers in Europe, but the they had a 'home-field-advantage' if you know what I mean. A typical finnish soldier knew how to figth in large pine-tree foretst, full of little lakes and hills (korpi, as we finns call it). For example, the famous 'Raatteen tie' or the 'Raatte Road'- battle in winter 1939: the finns only had skis, winter camoflage and skilful snipers (and they were outnumbered 10:1) , but they sure knew how to figth in a forest road in-middle-of-nowhere (and of course, the temperature was almost -40 degrees, and there were over half meters of snow)

But when the finns fougth near Murmansk, in tundra (or in jänkä:-) or there somewhere, they weren't really effective.

I'm sorry to say, but I think that we would have been as uneffective as the Romanians, Italians and the Austrians...

-the FINN

A little OT: Hauptmann are you a finn ?

Actually NONE. Our armored forces were about 10 out-of-date vickers-tankettes, but they didn't see any action......

-the FINN

Well, Mytzu, he did saw "we finns", so I bet he is. In that case it is great he posted in this thread.

take care

edit -- sorry, I just saw that he replied to you kind of, by signing "the Finn". My browser gives me some headaches on this forum. I have to refresh in order to see new posts, and in this case I forgot to do it and only saw your post. My post now looks pretty awkward, if the mods want to delete it, they should do it.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on January 05, 2006 10:39 pm

I don't think the answer to the original questions is related too much to the military aspect (inventory, combat experience and readiness...) as it is to diplomatic efforts and consistency.

Finland never considered itself as a Germany ally. The Finland’s diplomatic term for the relationship with Germany was “waffenbruderschaft” equivalent to “brotherhood of arms”. For Finland its side of brotherhood was consistently related to the continuation of the Winter War. Even before Stalingrad the then PM of Finland, clearly stated that Finland does not take part in the World War and doesn’t want to be involved in its battles. Finland also, did not sign any diplomatic document concerning a formal association with Germany, despite Germany’s repeated invitations.

Once the Finns reached the old borderline in Karelia (“their Nistru”) at the end of 1941 they stopped further significant operations and even more, while the whole world was at war, Finland initiated a partial demobilization. In 1942 and 1943, Finland declined new German invitations to get involved on the Northern Front. In 1942, Hitler requested Finland participation to capture Leningrad, which Mannerheim (“their Antonescu”) declined. In October 1943, a joint German-Finnish offensive to cut the Red Army’s supply line represented by the Murmansk railroad, failed to happen. Such offensive would have relieved the pressure on German’s Army Group North. In that sector and at that moment the German and Finns would have had a 2:1 superiority in men and material against the Red Army. Finland again refused to participate, as it understood that such an action would have trigger a declaration of war by the USA to Finland.

By that time, most likely, Finland may have had other thoughts. There are mentions of a Finnish Government meeting as early as in the beginning of 1943, were the consensus was that Germany will loose the war and that Finland should extricate itself from the conflict in the shortest time. Eventually Finland managed to navigate the rough seas of war and diplomacy and to sign in September 1944 an armistice with USSR. US and Great Britain pleaded to Stalin for an independent Finish state.

One side note that may tell something about the way the Germans have seen the Finns. Recognizing Finns’ experience in carrying-out combat actions in frigid battlefield conditions, the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres – OKH) requested and the request was honored by the Finnish High Command, to train German personnel in winter warfare. This was supplemented during the summer months by specific instruction for actions in heavily forested areas. Hungarian personnel attended the same training which was highly regarded by all involved. As far as I know, there is no other instance when German military personnel have been instructed by a foreign organization. I added this paragraph as an attempt to prove Finland had core competencies which not only that no other Axis’ partner did not posses, but even Germany lacked.

To get back and try to conclude about the comparison with Romania, Finland played its card much better. Finland never got into the (Axis’) crowd but kept a distinct position. To me it seems Romania would have been in a better situation in the post-war era, provided it did not do two mistakes. The first one is it went beyond what was its national territory; as one of Ro generals said “pina aici este al nostru” - “our lands ends here” when he confronted the Ro State Leader on his decision to proceed deeper to the East. The second one was to give in Germany’s request and declare war to US. The proof that Romania could have had a better support from the Allies’ Anglo-American side is Finland.

Sorin

Poland, just to give an example, was a staunch enemy of Germany right from day one of WW2. Didn't do them much good after the war. The main reason for Finland's success in the given circumstances can be easily observed by simply looking at a map of Europe.

Victor,

From your comment I think you didn't understand my message. I did not suggest in any way that Ro should have confronted Germany at the moment of the war onset in the idea that this would have brought a better outcome. I did not refer to (considered it known, but I'll mention now), that when the whole system of strategic and "little" alliances that Ro build in the interwar years crushed leaving Ro with no guaranties of its territorial integrity, Germany was the only option at the known price.

What I brought in discussion were two mistakes Ro did in the context of being an Axis partner. First, I refered to Finalnd as an Axis partner which systematically avoided to upset the Western part of the Allies' camp. Romania didn't. Second, when you claim your national territory you have to know where it ends. Up to that point you can (may be) convince someone else that your military actions were legitimate. Carrying-out military actions beyond your national borders represents an aggression (unless such actions are mandated by a supranational body, but this was not the case, and this regardless, would be another discussion). Finland understood and adhered to this logic and as a consequence of not commiting the first mistake, got US and UK support for its cause. Ro, again didn't.

You mention in your comment that "the main reason about Finalnd's success...." Well, I can not say I know what was "the main reason" (and I think who invokes it is only speculating), but I know that to any degree of reason for success in this matter, not commiting the two mentioned mistakes was a must pre-requisite.

Otherwise, regarding the map looking I agree with you, adding a suggestion to look not only to the North but to the South as well. Then you'll find Poland right in the center, on the shortest and most accessible way from Russia to Berlin.

If Ro would not have been involved beyond the Nistru, Ro would have been more clear minded to get into an armistice ahead the time the Soviets set foot on Ro national territory. If this was to happen, the Soviets would have saved the troops engaged on the Southern front to boost their blow on the main direction of action through Poland to Berlin. The idea should have been to keep the Red troops as far from Ro as possible, since we all know from other moments of our (and others) history that once hugged by the bear...

As far as I know, the Reds proposed armistice to Ro at different moments, which were not even considered by the Ro authorities.

Finally, while some comparisons could be made between Ro and Finland, Poland was in a different category. Their strategic position was paramount for the Soviets and this is what set their fate.

Sorin

I perfectly understood your point as I have encountered it times before. Unfortunately it seems I wasn't clear enough while trying to be too concise.

The Polish example was meant to show that even a country that fought against Germany from day 1 with much determination fell directly in the Soviet sphere of influence, loosing territory in the process. No special treatment by the Western Allies. Under these conditions why would you think that Romania, who took part in the attack on Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, would get a better treatment if it stopped at the Dnestr?

Regarding your two points:

1. Stopping at the Dnestr was an impossible maneuver from military point of view. Unlike Finland, which was positioned in the far North, where the front stopped near Leningrad, in the South was one of the main axis of advance and was the most dynamic of all. It was impossible for Romanian troops to simply stop at the Dnestr. Soviet bombers will continue to attack targets in Romania and so would the ChF. In the same manner one can argue that Romanian troops should have stopped at Carei in 1944, which they didn't.

2. Not getting into conflict with the US and UK was inevitable, because of the Ploiesti airfields. Romania was not an occupied country de jure thus they would have to declare war before the attack, as it happened in the case of the US for example (DoW came several days before Operation Halpro). I don't suppose you expect Romania to sit idly and get bombed without firing back at the attackers.

Romania was in no position to dictate terms to the SU and the SU was far from being interested just in advancing to Berlin. Romania had an equally strategic position to Poland, if not more strategic. Controlling Romania meant getting access and control over the Balkans and Hungary, territories which fell in their agreed sphere of influence. It is wrong to think that by signing an armistice in late 1943 with the Soviets they would have simply bypassed Romania. Read the armistice terms they offered during the talks intiated by Romania in Stockholm.

Furthermore such a maneuver was infinately more complicated when the Soviets were far from the Romanian borders, because the Germans could have taken control over the country and then the Red Army would have had to blast its way through it (see Hungary for example).

I would be interested to know when the Soviets proposed armistice on their own, what were the terms and Romania refused.

In my opinion, the comparison with Finland's situation has absolutely no basis.

Actually NONE. Our armored forces were about 10 out-of-date vickers-tankettes, but they didn't see any action......

-the FINN

Not true, Hauptmann Finn. At least, your countrymen don't agree with you on this one.

See here: The Battle of Honkaniemi, the only Finnish tank attack of the Winter War

Oops, just saw the date on the post I quoted... anyway, the link is an interesting one.

This post has been edited by Jeff_S on November 06, 2007 09:46 pm

Victor,

First of all, thanks for taking the time to provide a more detailed answer where you explained your reasons.

I think I'll have to start with the end of your last message on this topic.

[QUOTE]In my opinion, the comparison with Finland's situation has absolutely no basis.[/QUOTE]

Each country had its own situation and circumstances, and I am of the opinion that one cannot put an equal sign between two different countries' situation and circumstances. However, what I read in your last statement is what I felt while reading through your whole message. You're quite absolute. Absolute in the sense of a final expression with no consideration for doubt and no implication of possible change.

I am not like that. Therefore I would say that Finland's example would have been applicable to Ro in a range extending from greater than 0 to little than 100 percent.

To me this means that even doing exactly the same things as Finland did, Ro would not have ended up exactly as Finland did. Doing the same things (or as much as possible following the same approach) Ro had a better chance to end up in a better situation than we know it did.

As individuals, each of us is different but still each can learn very well from each other’s experiences, either positive or negative. In this way one can follow a certain path to success, staying clear of troubles that some one else had to go through. Some people call this path "principles". Principles represent basic generalizations accepted as true that can be used as basis for rules of conduct and reasoning.

I think there are two main principles that apply here; one is not to covet what does not belong to you, and the second is that a wrongdoing can not be straightened by a wrongdoing.

I do not see any use to our further debate unless we agree on these principles.

Sorin

PS. Besides the position about debating this topic, which I expressed above, as an appreciation of your effort to explain your reasons, you may find below some comments to your message.

[/QUOTE]1. Stopping at the Dnestr was an impossible maneuver from military point of view. Unlike Finland, which was positioned in the far North, where the front stopped near Leningrad, in the South was one of the main axis of advance and was the most dynamic of all. It was impossible for Romanian troops to simply stop at the Dnestr. Soviet bombers will continue to attack targets in Romania and so would the ChF. In the same manner one can argue that Romanian troops should have stopped at Carei in 1944, which they didn't.
[QUOTE]

Germans would have managed to fight in the South beyond Nistru/Dnestr without Ro participations.

The simplest military manoeuvre is to stop, and it can be done at any time as long as you’re in offensive. The Soviets' bombing missions over Ro where no major threat even before the Reds were pushed East over the Nistru.

Ro troops could not have stopped at Carei in '44 because through the Armistice signed on 12 Sep '44, Ro committed to join and support the Allied war effort until the defeat of Germany. This commitment was quite detailed in what were the human and material resources Ro had to provide. In contrast to this, Ro did not have a similar commitment with Germany.

[/QUOTE]2. Not getting into conflict with the US and UK was inevitable, because of the Ploiesti airfields. Romania was not an occupied country de jure thus they would have to declare war before the attack, as it happened in the case of the US for example (DoW came several days before Operation Halpro). I don't suppose you expect Romania to sit idly and get bombed without firing back at the attackers.
[/QUOTE]

It would have been inevitable (as it really ended up) once Ro was fighting against one of the Allies. DoW came when it came, subsequent to the one submitted by Ro the year before. If Ro stayed within its historical national borders not fighting one of the Allies on that Allied party territory, it would have made it more difficult for the Anglo-Americans to take action against the Ro oil fields.

[QUOTE]Romania was in no position to dictate terms to the SU and the SU was far from being interested just in advancing to Berlin. Romania had an equally strategic position to Poland, if not more strategic. Controlling Romania meant getting access and control over the Balkans and Hungary, territories which fell in their agreed sphere of influence. It is wrong to think that by signing an armistice in late 1943 with the Soviets they would have simply bypassed Romania. Read the armistice terms they offered during the talks intiated by Romania in Stockholm.

[/QUOTE]

I would have argued with the idea that Ro was equally strategic to Poland, but if you're even stressing "if not more strategic"... I think I'd better should not argue. From the historic perspective however, among the major rivalries in Europe, beyond the French-UK and French-German (under whatever stately forms) ones, Poland-Russia was one of the deepest and long existing one. For the Russians, Poland was a spear eternally pointed at mother-Russia's heart. I read somewhere a quotation of Stalin defining Poland as a matter of life and death for Russia. No matter how great we think Ro was, it was never a matter of life and death to Russia.

It is exactly the Stockholm negotiations that as I know included an agreement (among other clauses) on what areas (in Ro) the Red Army should not set foot.

[QUOTE]

Furthermore such a maneuver was infinately more complicated when the Soviets were far from the Romanian borders, because the Germans could have taken control over the country and then the Red Army would have had to blast its way through it (see Hungary for example).

[/QUOTE]

It is logically to consider the German military presence in Ro was much higher once the front got close to or inside Ro, as it was in Aug '44. In this condition, as we know, Ro army (and through army I mean all services, Ground troops, Air Force, Navy) managed to deal with, determine to retreat, or neutralize within days any German opposition once King Michael decided to change sides in the war camps.

I don't know about what Hungary you're talking about. The one I know had its troops loyal to the Germans ‘till the end, fighting the Russians even after they've been pushed out of their country Hungary.


[QUOTE]

I would be interested to know when the Soviets proposed armistice on their own, what were the terms and Romania refused.
[/QUOTE]

I made the statement you are referring to above, based on what I learned during the History course which as every student in Ro I had to take. I was fortunate to have a Professor that had access to various archives. It would be very nice if I could provide a link, or mention a date to such tratatives or intentions of (as most of them I understood were). But I can not since many seemed not to have been formalized in any way (it seems even Stockholm to which I'll refer again below, at the time it happened was not made known by the Reds to the Anglo-Americans). Therefore it is up to you whether you believe it or not.

They happened as the Soviets were in retreat and they happened once the Soviets were on their rising tide. The most known, that went the farthest, is usually referred as the Stockholm negotiations to which yourself made reference as well. For whatever it matters, it seems it was also Stalin (besides Hitler) that considered up to one point that only Antonescu could have provided the warranty for continued Ro military operations.

There are certain similarities between the countrys' respective commanders - both old style authoritarian generals with decent war records. Hitler was afraid of both of them too! (In one Finnish book, it says that Mannerheim never let Hitler forget that he was a corporal).