Romania and the Brusilov offensive

[Victor]

Yes, I found that the Romanian participation in WWI, just like in WWII, is little known in the West. Dead-cat and johnny should remember our discussion with a certain joel pacheco on TRF some while ago.

[johnny_bi]

Victor, I remember the discussions with many others... But, if for "ordinary people" this is just ignorance, for some other "specialised historians" it is ... well, let's say, at least unacceptable.

[Victor]

At the beginning of 1916 France and Britain bought most of the Romanian wheat in order to prevent the Central Powers from getting it. This resulted in a violent diplomatic response of Germany. However Bratianu turned to the Entente asking what support Romania might get if Germany gave an ultimatum. Talks started mainly with the Russians, who would have been directly implicated. But the views of the two general staffs were totally different. While the Russians wanted Romania to secure their flank as they attacked in Bukovina, the Romanians wanted the Russian help to defend Dobruja, while the main forces marched into Transylvania. So the talks continued and by the end of June it seemed that most of the Romanian requests will be fulfilled. It was also the moment of the Brusilov offensive and an intervention then (before the Germans transferred 50 divisions from the West) would have been a terrible blow to the Central Powers. The battle of Verdun was closing its end in the West and the other 1916 carnage, Somme, was just beginning. But Bratianu still negotiated every single detail, bringing the Entente generals and politicians to desperation and probably loosing the moment. On 17 August the Bulgarians launched an offensive on the Salonik front and took Florina. The same day Romania signed the secret alliance with the Entente. Then days later Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary. The rest you know.

[Carol I]

Thanks Victor, this is exactly what I asked for.

Carol I

[dead-cat]

QUOTE

So the talks continued and by the end of June it seemed that most of the Romanian requests will be fulfilled. It was also the moment of the Brusilov offensive and an intervention then (before the Germans transferred 50 divisions from the West) would have been a terrible blow to the Central Powers. The battle of Verdun was closing its end in the West and the other 1916 carnage, Somme, was just beginning. But Bratianu still negotiated every single detail, bringing the Entente generals and politicians to desperation and probably loosing the moment.

i disagree partially. Verdun was becomming more and more pointless after may 1916. after that german casualties began to mount. forcing the germans to end the offensive which was kept alive only to satisfy Falkenhayns ego (who was not a iota better than Haig or Nivelle) would actually do them a favour. especially since the bulk of heavy artillery was concentrated around Verdun and could be used somewhere else. and since Brussilov only made progresses in the southern area of the front, the reinforcements could have been doing something actually usefull as early as june, which gives them 1-2 months of action in the east before any reinforcement has to be shifted to reclaim lost areas on the Somme in mid-july. especially since counter-battery fire would have been much more effective than it actually was, since all the heavy artillery concentrated around Verdun would be available now.

[Florin]

[quote]I admit my lack of knowledge on this subject. What was the deciding factor (s) in pushing Rumania into WWI ? There must have been powerfull incentives........[/quote]

Many folks discussed here about the Brusilov offensive.
It is confirmed today that Rasputin was a paid agent of Germany. You know that he had influence over Romanov family. He obtained that the Brusilov offensive should start in that area were it seems a lot of bad land and swamps were ideal to bog down an offensive.

But my intervention here is because Chandernagore is surprised about why Romania was pushed to enter in war.
The German leadership, realizing that Germany has more men under arms than France, more human resources and the German industry was more powerful than the French, decided to engage the French army in a life or death catastrophic battle, considering that the expected losses will be equal, thus the French will collapse. So they decided to attack a psychological objective that France would not afford to lose: Verdun. (The history repeated in WWII with Stalingrad, but on the other front).
The idea was not bad, and almost succeeded. At least once the French high command asked their soldiers to abandon Verdun, but the local French commander refused. The French army was close to collapse. So the German idea almost succeeded. But when you read "almost", this means it did not succeed. Because:
1. The German army was usually in offensive during Verdun battle, so their losses were higher than the French entrenched in defensive.
2. There also British soldiers in France, taking a part of the burden on the Western front. Also the important British industry did her best to help France to counterbalance the formidable Germany.
3. The Germans had to support their Austro-Hungarian allies, like during the Brusilov offensive. There was also a direct front line between Germany and Russia in the East.
But I hope now, Chandernagore, you'll understand that the Western allies were looking for anything, anything, anything that may relieve the formidable German pressure on the Western front.

The Entente told to the Romanians that the Central Powers were at the end of their reserves, and if Romania will enter in war only 7 divisions will face her. Well, the Romanians entered in action, and soon 40 divisions of the Central Powers were ready to counterattack :!:
According to what do I read here, it seems it was not mentioned that the Russian troops in Romania retreated very often and left the Romanian flanks unprotected, forcing also the Romanians to retreat.

[quote].........Well they could have said "never" it's not like England was going to invade Rumania for not complying... [/quote]

Oh... The good mannered British guys could not bear in their nice souls the idea to invade Romania.:? Because they needed to invade Germany and Austro-Hungary first!
But everybody knew that Romania dearly wants Transylvania, even more than Bessarabia, so the guys from the Entente simply said something like: "If you want Transylvania, enter now. If you'll enter later, merci beaucoup, but forget about Transylvania."
By the way, the United States were neutral in that moment. Otherwise maybe the Western guys wouldn't beg us so much. And also, as far as I know, the landing in Greece (under the French general Sarrail) had the main objective to stab Bulgaria and Turkey, but also to lure Romania to enter in combat.
Shame to all who dare to laugh about the Romanian performance in 1916!
Some people seem to forget that in addition to the Transylvanian front, Romania had to defend itself alongside Danube and the southern part of Dobrogea. This second front was longer than that in Transylvania, and the length of the 2 fronts combined was double the length of the Western front! And for whoever doesn't know: the first problem of Romania in 1916 was not in Transylvania, but at Turtucaia (southern Dobrogea), were the Bulgarian army, in cooperation with some Turkish and German units, stabbed strategically from back! The Bulgarians even tried a landing over Danube, but the bridgehead was smashed.

Florin
PS: By the way... Are you still curious to read what do I think about what happened in Yugoslavia in the 90's? 8) :keep:

[Florin]

Sorry, guys, I couldn't edit my previous message.

I saw Victor and Dead-Cat also mentioned about the battle of Verdun, and Victor even referred briefly about the defense of Dobrogea.

[dead-cat]

i'll comment on a few inexactities.

germany neverd had numerical superiority on the western front. they were close to 1:1 during operation Michael in 1918.
pre-war:
Germany 761 000
France 790 000

in aug. 1914
Germany 1.6 million
France 1.7 million

add the BEF with 250 000 - 300 000 in 1914.

also the german industry was cut off from overseas raw materials since 1914. they had an edge in steel production.

Verdun was the idea to bleed the french dry. so far it's correct.
the 5th army was exceptionally strenghtened with heavy artillery (taken from other armies). until early april 1916 they never planned to take Verdun. the aim was, to have to force the french to commit a large part of their manpower to a theatre where the german army had an edge in artillery. the germans initially didn't plan to take the city and the french didn't intend to hold it at all costs. but after the german attack showed promising results in march the prestige thing kicked in.
Falkenhayn now suddenly wanted to take Verdun and the french, carefully watching the morale of the army, decided they have to hold it at all costs.
military, the loss of verdun would have been nothing more than a prestige blow. there were other fortresses south and a breakthrough couldn't be expected anyways.
so, in early april, focuses shifted and the 5th german army commited more and more men to conquer and hold some ground which was military worthless. by early june, when it showed that taking verdun would be prohibitive, it was too late allready. prestige reasons prevented Falkenhayn from calling off this allready useless offensive. eventually, the somme offensive, brussilov and the entry of romania provided falkenhayn with the face-saving reasons to finally call off the whole thing.

ironically, the original german plan worked. even being the attcker, the german army suffered less losses than the french, but only marginally (the most often quoted figures are 337 000 german and 353 000 french), while the bulk of the german casualties occured in the late stage of the offensive, when they tried to take the forts around verdun.

the german army fired 8.2 million tonnes of shells from 1500 heavy pieces during the battle. or with other words, the load of 820 000 railcars.

the french losses were eventually replaced 2 years later by the americans, but the german losses forced the german army to think of a new strategy for 1917: the siegfried line. after the battle of verdun died away, it became clear that the war couldn't be won by the central powers before 1918, that they would be on the defensive throughout 1917 and that the focus has to shift to the eastern front to knock out russia.


on another topic brussilow tried to limit his attacks on the austrian section of the front, the larger part of the german front remained silent.