Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940, Implications

Hi Guys,

There was no "barter" in 1940. Bartering implies some sort of exchange of similar value. No such exchange was offered to Romania in 1940.

Although I don't approve of the capitalising of the word "dictat", that was effectively what Romania faced at the hands of first the USSR backed by Germany in June 1940 and then at the hands of Germany backed by Italy in August 1940.

In the Hungarian case, although there was no barter, the Hungarians certainly felt that they had accepted a compromise on their original demands for the whole of Transilvania.

There were a lot of countries that succombed without a fight due to diplomatic isolation. Apart from Czechoslovakia and Romania, there were the Baltic Republics, Albania, the Polish Government ordered no resistance be given to the Red Army on 18 September 1939 and Denmark barely fired a shot. And what about Hungary in March 1944?

In the Danish case Churchill himself stated in February 1940 that if Denmark did not resist a German attack he could not reproach her because he could offer no assistance.

Romania was not alone in taking such a decision.

Cheers,

Sid.

Barter doesn't necessarily imply the exchange of 'things' of the same nature.
Here is the definition, as given by the Free Dictionary: "To trade goods or services without the exchange of money." Therefore, one can exchange goods for services and vice versa. In Rumania's case, there was an exchange of territory against official guarantees. It sounds bartel to me.

The two cases do not fall into the same category. While Rumania faced a clear-cut direct ultimatum in case of Bessarabia, in case of Transylvania it was an arbitration by a third party, arbitration the two respective parties officially asked for. While in the former case the entire Bessarabia (along with Northern Bukovina and the Hertza territory) was lost, in the latter case the larger half of Transylvania coudl be kept, as a result of the arbitration.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 17, 2008 04:03 pm

It may have been dressed up as a diplomatic settlement, but given the fact that Romanian officials were summoned without explanations and forced to accept the terms of arbitration in that very night under the threat of military intervention against Romania, it still is an ultimatum or diktat.

Yes, but it shouldn't be forgotten that the recent discussion started from Victor's comparison with the barter of 1878 when territory was exchanged for other territory, and he asked me should Romania have resisted then too. I went from there and stated that the comparison is wrong because there was no similar situation and no real barter in 1940. I consider the gurantees unworthy of what was ceded in exchange. A real barter (and comparable with 1878) should have consisted of territories in kind.

Anyway Carol II asked in July for German military support and in late August and early September Antonescu in cahoots with the Germans played an important role in defusing any "rogue" resistance against the Vienna decision. For the sake of the state's "survival" a righteous resistance was discouraged and the state was transformed into a nazi state. All hail the state... and don't forget to pay your taxes.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on March 17, 2008 06:36 pm

Hi Denes,

Be it goods, services, or territory, barter implies an exchange of equal value. Romania was offered nothing of the sort in 1940.

"Extortion" would be a better term than "barter". Romania was told that unless she agreed to the dictats of the Gerrmany, the USSR and Italy, she would lose even more territory and possibly even her national existence.

As for being offered a "guarantee" of the rest, Romania was already in fully recognised legal possession of all of it under international law. The "guarantee" of the rump of Romania left after the cessions of June-September 1940 was, if anything, technically weaker than the universal international recognition it had had before, because this "guarantee" involved only two countries - Germany and Italy - one of which was effectively powerless in the region.

There was definitely no "barter" in 1940. Why? Because Romania had absolutely no leverage with which to barter with Germany, the USSR and Italy at a time when they were acting in concert.

It is disingenuous to imply that both parties, Romania and Hungary, voluntarily asked for third party arbitration. Romania was forced to attend Vienna by dictat of Germany and Italy. Why would Romania voluntarily ask for arbitration when she was already in full possession of the disputed territory and had no further claims on Hungarian territory?

Cheers,

Sid.

This post has been edited by sid guttridge on March 18, 2008 03:51 pm

Hi Imp,

Romania was never a "nazi state".

It couldn't be by definition, because Nazism was reserved by Hitler for Germanic peoples.

Even if Romania had become "legionary state" it would have had a different character to Nazism. There was a mystical, Romanian Orthodox religious strand to the Legionary movement that was entirely lacking in Nazism.

However, Romania never became a "legionary state". When he had to make a decision on this subject in January 1941, Hitler sided firmly with Antonescu and the Army against Sima and the Legionaries.

Cheers,

Sid.

This post has been edited by sid guttridge on March 18, 2008 03:59 pm

I know I might sound stupid, but I'm still wondering what the major difference between nazism and fascism is. I know nazism refers to Hitler's National Socialist Party governing Germany from 1933 to 1945 and it was more focused on ethnical issues. Is there anything else?

Hi mele,

The thing to remember about all the right wing totalitarian ideologies was that they were highly nationalistic. There was no right-wing equivalent of the Communist International. All the right-wing -isms were potentially or actually mutually antagonistic. The Romanian and Hungarian Communist Parties might have found a way of co-operating together, however grudgingly, but the Romanian Iron Guard and Hungarian Arrow Cross hated each other.

Each right-wing totalitarian "-ism" had different national characteristics. The Iron Guard were influenced by a crude version of Romanian Orthodoxy. The Arrow Cross was ultra-Catholic. The Slovak and Croatian wartime leaderships were also very Catholic, but disliked the Hungarians. Fascism in Italy had little religious content, while German Nazis tried to reinvent a pseudo-Nordic religion. Italian Fascism had no ideological problem with Jews. Nazism put anti-semitism near the core of its ideology.

Cheers,

Sid.

About romanian reserves (mans, ammonitions, aircrafts, food, etc.) can anyone say something?
ROmania, at that moment, was prepared to sustain a war? Even for those 50 days, to the momment when ... when what? Bulgaria and Hungary occupyed, and after that we just resist forever on the east front?

Let's say just - one squadron with PZL 24 or 11 will sustain some loses. We have what to put in place of destroyed planes & killed pilots?

Thank you,

Iama

[Finally back on topic...]

Well, since the engines and airframes for both planes were produced at IAR factories, I guess there would have been no serious problem in replacing the lost PZL 11 and 24 planes with another 11/24 - even if the production had been halted by the summer of 1940. Also the IAR 80 wasn't so far of reaching the serial production stage. However a problem could have been the 7,92 FN MG's, which were imported from Belgium.

As for the downed pilots, I don't think that Romania's situation was any different then that of Poland, Belgium, Holland, France or any other country involved in WW 2.

This post has been edited by Agarici on March 23, 2008 01:38 am

Hello guys,

The point is that Romanian governement at that time didn't do anything to stop the territorial loss of 1940. Only cries, regrets and upset people (cf Gafencu etc). The above question has to be forgotten since not a single "official" shot was fired against the "occupation" of these territories.

The question is how can we deal with those historical facts in our days thatfore no more wars, violence and bitterness should devide us in nowdays and in future.

BM

Hello guys,

The point is that Romanian governement at that time didn't do anything to stop the territorial loss of 1940. Only cries, regrets and upset people (cf Gafencu etc). The above question has to be forgotten since not a single "official" shot was fired against the "occupation" of these territories.

The question is how can we deal with those historical facts in our days thatfore no more wars, violence and bitterness should devide us in nowdays and in future.

BM

Sorry, Mr. Miclescu, but, [/QUOTE]The above question has to be forgotten since not a single "official" shot was fired against the "occupation" of these territories. [QUOTE] ... it is not my interese. No offence, but i hate: my opinoin is better than yours. Generally speaking.
Anyway this topic is about a confrontation. Politics are just in start. I asked about some things... i just want some answers about Romanian power strngth or something like.

Thanks,

Iama

Sid,

Following the unsuccessful direct talks regarding the partition of Transylvania, held at Turnu-Severin, between 16-24 Aug. 1940, both the Rumanian and Hungarian Governments officially asked Berlin and Rome for arbitration on 27 Aug. The alternative to this would have been war (as Hungary had already mobilised its armed forces on 26 Aug.). BTW, this joint call by Rumania and Hungary is included in the first sentence of the official document released following the arbitration.

As for the answer to your other question, namely 'Why would Romania voluntarily ask for arbitration when she was already in full possession of the disputed territory and had no further claims on Hungarian territory?' is simle: to avoid war, which could have had a disastruous result for Bucharest, as probably it would not have been a 'simple' war between Hungary and Rumania (which could have ended with either side's victory), as Germany (and perhaps the USSR) would have probably intervened, most probably to the detriment of Rumania.

Gen. Dénes

P.S. On a personal note, I don't really get this: "It is disingenuous to imply..." Are you suggesting that I am somehow implying something untruth in an insincere way?

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 23, 2008 11:01 pm

Hi Denes,

Exactly. Romania entered into talks with Hungary "to avoid war, which could have had a disastruous result for Bucharest, as probably it would not have been 'simple' war between Hungary and Rumania (which could have ended with either side's victory), as Germany (and perhaps the USSR) would have probably intervened, most probably to the detriment of Rumania."

That was not just the reason why Romania agreed to the Vienna Arbitration, but why it entered into talks with Hungary over 16-24 August. Romania had full legal possession of all the disputed territory, had absolutely no claims on Hungarian territory and little to fear from Hungary itself at the time. (It should point out here that Germany believed that Romania was more likely to have beaten Hungary, whose forces were only part formed at the time.) Romania had absolutely no reason to enter into any sort of dialogue with Hungary on the subject except that it was pressured into it by hostile great powers.

Disingenuous was "unparliamentary" language. I apologise.

However, my point remains. If one looks at the full facts there is absolutely no doubt that Romania was forced into talks with Hungary on the subject through fear of powerful third parties.

The only other alternative is that for some reason the Romanian government had spontaneously come to the sudden realisation that its possession of some of Transilvania was unjustified and wished to make concessions to rectify this. This doesn't seem very likely to me.

I make no comment here as to which party was right or righter. However, there is absolutely no doubt that Romania was forced by outside pressures to address this issue at Turnu Severin and Vienna unwillingly. Romania was told, in effect, "Make a bilateral deal with Hungary or we will force one on you" In short, Romania faced a dictat.

Cheers,

Sid.

Sid,

It's very hard to pinpoint the actual motivation for the Rumanian Government to enter talks with Hungary. Of course, the increasing German influence in that region is undeniable. However, this might not have been enough. At that point, in mid-1940, the post-Versailles/Trianon territorial arrangements started to unravel and the so-called 'New Order' begun to take shape in Central and Eastern Europe, too. The unsettled issues started to break apart. The "full legal possession of all the disputed territory" you mentioned did not seem that strong and lasting any more (for example, Rumania renounced the ineffective British territorial guarantees on July 1 and turned to Germany instead - so no dictat fell upon her out of the blue sky). Therefore, Bucharest must have felt 'the heat', particularly after she lost Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina just weeks earlier. At that point, the Rumanian Government could have thought that it's better to keep a larger chunk of Transylvania than loosing it all. This might have been a powerful 'incentive' to enter direct talks with Hungary. But who knows?
To know more certain details, not only engage in educated guesswork, we would need some documents and hard facts in this regards.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 25, 2008 04:36 pm