November 2012 - 70 years since Operation Uranus, November 1942 - November 2012

I know that, but wasn't it part of the "Grand Plan"? The Soviet Winter Offensive...

The Stalingrad campain was part of a much larger soviet plan make by the soviets in order to give a decive blow to german army in Russia. Another important component of the plan was Operation Mars wich ended in a severe defeat for the russian army.

Although it contradicts my previous statement on Soviet planning who does not takes into account the presence of Romanian Army at the Don bend, it is possible that the source quoted below is more trustworthy then mine (from a book about Stalingrad):
http://www.flamesofwar.com/Default.aspx?ta...58&kb_cat_id=34
And a short intersting film: http://youtu.be/QruAJUjnNYk

That only reinforces the previous point : when the Germans were attacked ( Mars ) they handed the Red Army a catastrophic defeat. When German allies were attacked, they crumbled ( Stalingrad ) giving a massive victory to the Red Army.

In operation Mars the Soviets attacked a well prepared position of German field fortifications, strong-points and AT gun emplacements with proper coverage.

"During the spring and summer of 1942 the Germans strengthened the Rzhev salient and eliminated Russian forces that had gained a foothold west of the Vyazma-Rzhev rail line. The salient gradually became one of the strongest defense lines the Germans had built in Russia."
Source: http://www.allworldwars.com/Small-Unit-Act...-in-Russia.html

The deployment of Romanian troops at Stalingrad by the German command was in an opposite situation: inadequate field works, poor terrain coverage, poor supply, poor AT capability, so the blame is not to be placed on Romanian Army.

I would reword this statement: "so the blame is not to be placed entirely on Romanian Army" (and, for the sake of the balance, this is valid for the Hungarian or Italian armies, too, also deployed in the same area).

Gen. Dénes

Since the Germans were aware of the situation of the Romanian Army and they ignored all the pleas and warnings of Romanian generals (including the request to liquidate the Soviet bridgeheads over the Don when the conditions were favorable), I'd say German Command bear full responsibility.

Also because the very conception of the huge flanks operation was a German idea...

Did they ignore the warnings because of carelessness or ignorance, or they did not have the means to tackle the situation?

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on December 11, 2012 10:49 am

Did they ignore the warnings because of carelessness or ignorance, or they did not have the means to tackle the situation?

Gen. Dénes

Well, if they were warned (and they were), one cannot talk about ignorance. Either carelesness or the simple fact that "the barrel was empty" prevented a better defence in the area. Actually, the only thing that could have been succesful would have been a couple of armoured divisions, real ones, not the 22-nd Panzer or 1-st Romanian Armoured, which failed miserably... But we're talking now with the benefit of hindsight, whereas the Germans had the benefit of being led by "Grosses Feldherr Alles Zeitung"...

In September and October 1942, the Romanian High Command and the commander of the 3rd Army contacted many times the "B" Army Group and OKH by written reports and meetings with Maximillian von Weichs (commander of "B" Army Group) and Friederich Paulus, requesting the liquidation of the Soviet bridgehead south of Don (70 km wide and 25 km deep), in a joint German - Romanian operation. von Paulus agreed but OKH didn't approve the execution on the grounds of impossibility of diverting armor and aircraft in the area. Nor the promises made by the Germans to improve the situation of Romanian troops with materiel were respected, as more and more resources were being diverted inside Stalingrad and the Romanian needs were always seen as second priority.

Starting with the latter half of October 1942, Romanian air reconnaissance was made daily, along the communications lines and over the bridgeheads south and west of the Don river. The reconnaissance reports pointed several movements of troops from NE to SW, concentration of troops in intermediate areas and on the directions of the future offensive, the deployment of fresh forces into the bridgeheads. Till November 12, the Romanian aviation identified in the field the Command of the "South-Western" Front, the 51st Guard, the 5th Tank, 21st, 65th Armies and several other big units.

From OKH order of operations Nr. 420817/42 (14 October 1942): "The Russian himself is seriously weakened by the recent battles, and will not in winter 1942-43 be able to deploy as many forces as in the previous winter."

A report of 12 November stated that "an attack against Romanian 3rd Army must be expected soon" but attributed to it only the limited aim of cutting the railroad to Stalingrad.

So it appears German high command severely underestimated the Soviet capabilities and in the same time it diverted all available resources from the area into the city of Stalingrad.

Warnings ?

The Romanian army flooded the Wehrmacht with warnings that the Soviets will strike in the next 24-48h. They did so all along October and early Nov. Each and every time nothing happened. Basically, they discredited their intelligence and their reputation.
That's why the Germans started to ignore them.

When it was to be serious, nobody believed the "yet another Romanian warning after dozens of false ones". Sad but true.

This is the first time I hear they discredited their intelligence and their reputation. Not even the Germans claimed that. I wonder what other spiteful remarks do you have in store.

If there was a poor field intelligence, all evidences seems to point somewhere else. The Romanian intelligence correctly anticipated that the Soviets were concentrating for an attack. You seem to have no clue of the realities in the field back then and you are treating the subject with astonishing superficiality.

I wonder what research did you do before coming up with stupid remarks like this. Have you talked to veterans who fought at Don's Bend? Have you made any research at the archives? I mean something more than searching the internet and Suvorov books.

Next time try to present some sources if you are going to make "edgy" remarks like this. More sources, less garbage.

This is the first time I hear they discredited their intelligence and their reputation. Not even the Germans claimed that. I wonder what other spiteful remarks do you have in store.

If there was a poor field intelligence, all evidences seems to point somewhere else. The Romanian intelligence correctly anticipated that the Soviets were concentrating for an attack. You seem to have no clue of the realities in the field back then and you are treating the subject with astonishing superficiality.

I wonder what research did you do before coming up with stupid remarks like this. Have you talked to veterans who fought at Don's Bend? Have you made any research at the archives? I mean something more than searching the internet and Suvorov books.

Next time try to present some sources if you are going to make "edgy" remarks like this. More sources, less garbage.

As always, a little knowledge is dangerous thing. I suggest you check this warning thing in Anthony Beevor's book Stalingrad, page 235-240 and is also mentioned across the line in serious literature regarding the battle.

As for your other cheap insults, I'll pass. You've proven once again to serious forum members how little you know about the overall picture regarding ww2. As an advice : before jumping on others, do a fact check for yourself. Google is your friend, would help avoid embarrassing outbursts.

That's a step in the right direction. Please continue posting sources.

Now, I have the Romanian edition of the book and there is nothing about Romanian Army at those pages, but I found what you refer at pages 324-325.

There says that on 7 November, the German liaison officer reported that the 3rd Romanian Army is expecting a Soviet attack on 8 November at Kletskaya-Raspopinskaya. It says that Romanians were usually expecting an attack in the next 24 hours, and when it didn't happen especially on Revolution Day, it started to have the unwanted cry wolf effect.

Immediately after that it says that General von Richtofen took those warning seriously and in his own journal he was asking himself when the attack would occur.

Nowhere says that Romanian intelligence was discredited, and you pick out parts out of context to put the Romanian Army in a bad light.