General Gheorghe Avramescu

An interesting paragraph about the possible defection of G.ral Avramescu I've found: "M.D.: - Da, asa i s'a promis, numai cã pe zi ce trecea, frontul se deteriora. Cãnd Horia Sima a vãzut cã Transilvania a fost pierdutã pentru frontul german, atunci el a trecut la realizarea unui plan, care dacã ar fi reusit, ar fi schimbat situatia în România. Astfel, el i-a trimis în tarã, clandestin, peste liniile din Cehoslovacia si Ungaria, pe Stoicãnescu, Schmidt si Petrascu. Stoicãnescu trebuia sã contacteze cadrele superioare ale armatei (printre care generalii Avramescu, Dragalina si Coroamã) pentru a face o defectiune majorã, antiruseascã, in timp ce Schmidt si Petrascu trebuiau sã ridice masele. Nicolae Petrascu a si rãmas în continuare în tarã. Ideea lui Horia Sima era, cã dacã armata românã s'ar fi rãsculat împotriva rusilor (acestia fiind slãbiti prin întãrirea frontului lor pe Oder) le-ar fi fãcut acestora dificultãti atât de mari, încât rusii, ori ar fi chemat în ajutor pe Aliati (care se aflau în Grecia si care dacã ar fi rãmas ulterior în tarã, ar fi împiedicat comunizarea României), ori ar fi încheiat un armistitiu cu România, asemãnãtor celui încheiat cu Finlanda. Misiunea emisarilor a fost încununatã de succes, ora X a fost stabilitã, iar Stoicãnescu si Andreas Schmidt au plecat spre Germania (la Viena) pentru a comunica data si ora actiunii si de a coordona actiunea româneascã cu un redus sprijin aerian german. Dar, din nou a functionat trãdarea, telegrafistul lui Schmidt, NicolaeTãranu, a comunicat totul rusilor, avionul a fost doborît lângã Seghedin de aviatia de vânãtoare româneascã (alertatã de rusi si obligatã sã se ridice în aer). Astfel

pagina 42 actiunea a esuat... Trebuie subliniat faptul cã doctorul Tãranu nu a fost legionar, el a fost pe vremuri seful organizatiei cuziste din judetul Timis-Torontal si fusese racolat si instruit ca telegrafist de serviciile secrete germane si îi servea personal lui Andreas Schmidt, seful Grupului Etnic German din România. Nu stim de când a devenit d-rul Tãranu omul rusilor, în mod sigur a fost constrâns sã lucreze pentru ei... În urma acestei trãdãri, generalii români implicati în complot au fost arestati...

L.V.: - Cum a reactionat Horia Sima fatã de acest esec ? "
The quote is from http://www.fgmanu.net/istorie/interv_main.htm

Like I already said, I personally am very skeptic regarding this theory, especially given its sources. Unfortunately such consipacy theories thrive because they lit up the imagination of some or offer the opportunity to others to peek their head out of history's garbage can.

I nstead of searching for obscure "sources" of inmformation, we would better concentrate the effort in logic and facts. Hearsay it's definately not worth taking into consideration.

Facts are:

1. General Avramescu was a very experienced senior officer, with a continous service during WW2, something few Romanian generals did. He would be in a very good position to evaluate the imposiblity of carrying out such an operation. We are talking about 7 divisions, corps and army artillery, supply units etc., not several hundred men. All these forces need to be supplied with ammo, food and other materials. This implies an good orgazinational structure behind the lines.

More importantly, it was crystal clear that Germany was KO and it was just a matter of time before the counting reached 10.

2. General Avramescu also knew the strength of the troops facing him, which were around 3 divisions (German 3rd Gebirgsjaeger and 101st Jaeger Divisions and Hungarian 24th Infantry Division). Not exactly a force that could carry out an offensive operation that could destabilize the front. In fact, the Wehrmacht had already depleted its last offensive potential at Balaton.

3. The Romanian forces were interlocked with Soviet units in the Zvolen Banska-Bystrica Operation. Some of the Romanian divisions were subordinated directly to Soviet corps and vice-versa.

4. The terrain was extremely difficult in Slovakia and it made offensive operations extremely costly. The Germans were able to hold the frontline with fewer men, the same could have been done by the Soviets in an initial phase.

5. The soldiers were tired of war and wanted it to be over so that they could go back home.

IMO, logic tells us that Avramescu would not try such a stupid maneuver. For my part, the legionnaire propaganda can say whatever it wants, but in the end it's just words without a real basis.

BG7M,

Thanks for posting the interesting excerpt, but Victor's reply is logical and accurate.

I would only add the following items:

It is true that Stoicanescu and the Andreas Schmidt group wanted Gen. Avramescu to join their side.

However, to claim that they succeeded in doing so would be clearly false. There is no evidence to support that they were even able to communicate with him, let alone convince him of doing such a foolish and impossible thing.

As further proof, years later Mihail Sturdza admitted to his son, Ilie Sturdza, that their claim that they were successful was false and used merely as propaganda.

Completely agree! My post was only an intention to show a different point of wiew, not my oppinion.

BG7M, you did the right thing by posting the interview fragment.
In my opinion, it's important to be aware of all points of view or statements with respect to our world war II commanders, regardless of whether they are accurate or false.

Thanks for your post, and please keep posting if you find any other excerpts or comments.

Let me contribute to this discussion by adding another blatant false statement (this time made by a Romanian author) which was unfortunately used as a reference in Klaus Schonherr's book, "Luptele Wehrmacht-ului in Romania".

In footnote #260 (to be found on page 180 of Schonherr's work), the author cites Gh. Buzatu's book, "Romania - Razboiul Mondial" as stating:

"General Avramescu resigned due to the fact that he could not accept the idea of retreating troops from the Iasi-Chisinau region and ceding the territory to the Soviets without any fight"

This is a false statement and is in fact opposite to the truth. General Avramescu asked to be relieved of his command of the 4th Army because the German command structure of the South Ukraine Army Group refused to allow retreating the front to the FNG fortified line inspite of the crushing superiority of Soviet forces (especially in armored units) and of the obvious futility in attempting to resist on the existing line. Furthermore, German command structures (to which the 4th Army was subordinated) continued to interfere with the retreat even after it was aproved and ordered by Antonescu.

The statement made above can be massively corroborated by the Operations Journal of the 4th Army, Aug. 20 - 23, 1944.

In fact, General Avramescu was well aware of the imbalance of strength between Soviet and German-Romanian armored forces on the Moldavian front and vehemently protested the German removal of several armored units from the Moldavian front during the summer of 1944.

To illustrate his protest, here is one of his reports made to the Romanian General Headquarters (Marele Stat Major) on August 6, 1944 (sorry, Romanian language only):

"Raportam ca Divizia 14-a blindata Germana a primit ordine de plecare pe frontul central. Si de aceasta data luarea Diviziei s-a facut fara vreun aviz prealabil care ar fi dat Comandamentului putinta de a aviza la masurile de luat.
Aceasta este ultima unitate blindata germana din frontul Armatei 4-a, care ramine astfel complet lipsita de rezerva de blindate la Est de Siret, pe rocada Tg. Frumos-Iasi.
Frontul de la Nord de aceasta rocada si-a avut ratiunea si puterea in reactiunea mobila a blindatelor care insumau initial intre Siret si Prut 5 (cinci) divizii blindate germane.
Acest ultim fapt intareste propunerile Armatei din raportul Nr. 300422 si impune o reexaminare a situatiei.

Comandantul Armatei 4-a
General de C.A. (ss) Gh. Avramescu"

Nascut 26 I 84
Elev 1 IX 06
Subloc. 1 VII 08
Locot. 1 X 11
Captain 1 IV 16
Major 1 IX 17
Lt. Col. 23 V 23
Colonel 31 III 29

Source : Anuarul Ofiterilor Activi Ai Armata Romane Pe Anul 1936

http://www.edituramilitara.ro/shopping/pro...ails.php?id=173

Does the mentioned book add any new info regarding Gen. Avramescu's purposed defection plans in early 1945?

Thanks,

Gen. Dénes

I have not read it. We found a publisher's site.

http://www.edituramilitara.ro/shopping/mem...rmatii-173.html

I read it, and is very interesting. I strongly recomand it, you can find many things about Stalingrad, Soviet offensive in august 1944, and General Avramescu's case. It is written by a man who was in centre of the events, at higher ranks in Romanian military staff.

Does it confirm the defection plans of G-ral Avramescu and his army in early 1945?

Gen. Dénes

No, it does not! This book (Ion Grosu's memories) has very "bad" things to say about Avramescu (not defection, but about aiding and abetting ex-legionnaires and many things about his character and leading manner), about Antonescu and many other Romanian generals. I wonder why...
I didn't even have the necessary patience to read it from beginning to end, as i read only a couple of chapters of immediate interest and found the book resentful up to the point of being venomous!

It doesn't confirm on infirm that. There are memories of one Staff officer, about what he had seen there, many documents and personal impresions about many German, Soviet and Romanian generals, that ones with whom he personally worked during the war.
He exposed the facts he had seen, and doesn't make any hazardous conclusion.

Well, actually, he (the author, Ion Grosu doesn't conclude in this particular regard, although he was very close to the action. BTW, he ws an intelligence officer, along his staff position.

One of the "suspected" actions he saw about Avramescu, is that one:
Two important Iron Guard members were captured when they tryed to cross the front line. They were taked in custody by Avramescu himself, that it was very unusually. Avramescu signed himself that he take in custody the two ones.
Few days later, the two ones speak at Donau radio, telling that many Romanian units were ready to change parts in war, and two important generals the same. How the two Iron Guard members were fred, Grosu don't know. After that event, Avramescu was called to Bucarest for explanations. He come back, and later was arrested by Soviets.