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> Moscow 1941
Marius
Posted: July 29, 2004 11:21 am
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What realy happened at Moscow? I know that two german divisions (from army group center) had to atack Moscow from the N-E and from the S-W. I also know that they got close to the capital, at 30 km. I have two questions:
1 Is all i just said true? (please correct me if i am wrong)
2 Why did'nt they atack???
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dragos
Posted: July 29, 2004 12:38 pm
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After the launch of operation Taifun, on 2 October 1941, and the German successes at Bryansk and Vyazma (650,000 Soviet prisoners), the German forces approached Moscow from north and south. The congested roads, the dense forests north of Moscow, as well as the rain that turned the countryside into mud, significantly slowed the German advance. The onset of cold weather caught the German troops unprepared, causing engine failures, frostbites and low morale. In the south, the Guderian's 4th Panzer Division was stopped by the General Katukov's forces at Tula. Only in the north, General Hoth's Panzer Group continued a slow advance. On 15 November, the German offensive was relaunched, and Hoth's 7th Panzer Division succeded to broke through at Klin and reached the Moscow-Volga canal line, 30 km from the city. This is the farthest the Germans could go before the Soviets launched their counter-offensive on 6 December 1941 and pushed back the Germans.
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^All^
Posted: September 19, 2004 01:44 pm
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At Discovery there are some documentaries (like Battlefield, Gladiators of the 2-nd wrold war, and others). There I have seen that when the Germans aproached Moscow because of their succes Hitler gave an order to some German units to go to the south to the Caucaz oilfields and to the north to siege Leningrad. There are many times in the German offensive when Hitler intervined and gave orders to do other tasks.
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Chandernagore
Posted: September 24, 2004 12:17 am
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QUOTE (^All^ @ Sep 19 2004, 01:44 PM)
At Discovery there are some documentaries (like Battlefield, Gladiators of the 2-nd wrold war, and others). There I have seen that when the Germans aproached Moscow because of their succes Hitler gave an order to some German units to go to the south to the Caucaz oilfields and to the north to siege Leningrad. There are many times in the German offensive when Hitler intervined and gave orders to do other tasks.

The drive to the Caucasus happened in 42, when Moscow was no longer an option or an objective.

The drive to Leningrad was part of the initial Barbarossa plan, which I think was basically flawed. I don't think many units were diverted from AGC to AGN during 41.
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Imperialist
Posted: June 16, 2006 10:36 am
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QUOTE (Chandernagore @ Sep 24 2004, 12:17 AM)
I don't think many units were diverted from AGC to AGN during 41.

5 divisions - 2 motorized (18th and 20th) and 3 tank divisions (12th, 19th, 20th). Out of these 5 divisions only one returned for Operation Typhoon, while the rest remained in the north.
Hitler's decision to divert the offensive in the north and south also had a serious impact on the fighting strength of the divisions involved.


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Benoit Douville
Posted: July 30, 2006 01:06 am
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The Soviet reinforcements arrived, these new troops were Siberian Divisions who were ready to fight during the winter, they droved the Germans back.

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vilkas
Posted: September 25, 2006 01:38 pm
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new  troops were Siberian Divisions

In fact it was not Siberian Division ( as it's usual to say) but Far East Front Divizions.

This post has been edited by vilkas on September 25, 2006 01:38 pm
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ANDREAS
Posted: April 14, 2010 09:01 pm
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Hallo,
I hope the discussion that I want to open fits into the topic Moscow 1941 open here, although the main subject is Operation Typhoon -the German strategic offensive targeting the soviet capital.

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"The primary reason that Operation Typhoon failed was serious German operational mistakes, combined with a logistic system that was not up to the task. The critical operational mistakes were:
-Hitler and the OKH's failure to weight the main effort to seize Moscow, in that they maintained simultaneous offensives in the other two army groups that deprived Army Group Centre of vital reinforcements and supplies
-Guderian failed to seal off the Brians and Trubchevsk Pockets, which allowed thousands of Soviet troops to escape to Tula
-the OKH's dilution of the main effort by directing 9th Army and part of 3rd Panzer Army to advance northward towards Kalinin and 2nd Army to advance towards Kursk.
-von Kluge's deliberate disobedience in not supporting the second phase of Typhoon
-von Bock's removal of virtually all of 3rd Panzer Army's infantry divisions in order to reinforce the operationally useless fighting around Kalinin
-Reinhardt's failure to maintain an adequate mobile reserve to safeguard his vulnerable left flank
-the diversion of Luftwaffe assets to other fronts just as Typhoon was approaching success deprived Army Group Centre of vital close air support
-von Bock's operational plan for a double envelopment ignored the shortage of fuel, distances, and terrain involved and weather conditions.
In essence, Typhoon was a flawed plan, executed poorly and only initially successful due to gross ineptitude of the Red Army. Althought the Soviets like to claim that they stopped the German offensive, the performance of the Red Army against Typhoon was generally weak. Despite the fact that the Western Front had established a fortified line reserves, Army Group Centre penetrated the Soviet front line at multiple points and encircled the bulk of the Western and Biansk Fronts in a week. Other than a few examples of small units putting up stout resistance, most Soviet units ran away or collapsed in front of the blitzkrieg. General Boldin's defense of Tula was the only major Soviet defensive success during Typhoon." ( Robert Forczyk - "Moscow 1941" p 92)


Is this point of view credible or isolated from reality that we all know : a German army almost exhausted by the war effort since June 1941, an Soviet army exhausted as well but strengthened by numerous fresh forces brought from the Far East, completely bad weather conditions, especially for the germans...
What is your opinion? What point of view have you found in the books that have touched this topic -Battle of Moskow?
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