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Thomas |
Posted: June 28, 2003 08:49 pm
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Soldat Group: Members Posts: 24 Member No.: 5 Joined: June 17, 2003 |
Hello all,
I’m trying to solve something that has always caught my attention; the XLVIII. Panzer-Korps of the 3. Rümanische Armee and it’s appearance during the Russian attack of November 1942. According to the book I’m using, “Stalingrad” by Geoffrey Jukes (I have the Dutch translation), the situation is like this: According to Jukes; (p. 107, translated) “By their insufficient equipment and lack of enthusiasm, the Romanians had done nothing about the bridgeheads at SERAFIMOVITSJ and KLETSKAJA on the western bank of the Don (…)” He goes on to state that Col.-Gen. DUMITRESCU had not put his own infantry at disposal for an eventual counter attack, but instead requested for armoured units. I don’t know if this “lack of enthusiasm” is actually correct – I’m sure a more correct description can be given on this forum. But the armoured support did arrive, Hitler personally sent XLVIII. Pz.-Kps. (detached from 4. Panzer-Armee) to the 3rd Romanian Army on 10.11.1942. A brief OOB, still according to Jukes, would consist of this; 1. Romanian tank-division (108 tanks, mostly the Czech 38t) 2. 12. Panzerdivision : minus its Pz.Gren.Rgt. and the Pi.Btl. (Paulus was using it for street combat inside Stalingrad), total of 104 tanks 3. 14. Panzerdivision, only parts of it, who went to SERAFIMOVITSJ The 12.Pz.-Div. Didn’t see any action since September and the unused tanks had been stored in Russian sheds, covered with straw, somewhere behind the 7th Italian Army. The straw had attracted mice, and it seems they had bitten on the wiring inside the tanks, because 65 didn’t want to start when ordered to move. A second disadvantage was that it didn’t have appropriate tracks, so the tanks themselves could barely drive straight. How did the Romanians fare in their clash? They met with the Russian 5th Tank Army, which is supposed to have had a 10% loss but didn’t stop to engage the Pz.Korps, it just drove through for its objectives. And what is true and untrue about this Romanian supposed lack of just about everything? |
Hohenstaufen |
Posted: June 28, 2003 11:08 pm
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Soldat Group: Members Posts: 14 Member No.: 8 Joined: June 18, 2003 |
Actually, Dumitrescu had requested for a Germano-Romanian operation to destroy these two bridgeheads several times but the OKW simply refused, they thought their allies were simply panicing in the midst of victory when the Romanians told them about Soviets massing there in large numbers. There's also something weird about the OOB of the XLVIII. Pz.-Kps. given by Mr. Jukes, I always thought the corps consisted of the 22. Pz.-Div. and 1. Romanian Pz.-Div, totalling about 150 tanks of which a large number were obsolete and couldn't stand a duel with the 1183 Soviet tanks that were facing the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies (with no tanks at their disposition except Heim's panzer corps situated behind them), mainly T-34's and KV's, that started pouring in like water in a glass. And above all, Heim's XLVIII. Pz.-Kps. arrived late, about 24 hours later. But even if it arrived in time, the situation was doomed from the start in my opinion.The 3rd and 4th Romanian armies had to defend, in total, a 400 km front, the line was so stretched that in some places there were no troops available to be left in reserve. This was not a good sign, especially when facing 8 Soviet armies operating at full strength. Not to mention that the Romanian AT guns were (approximately) 90% 37mm and 47mm pieces, hardly anything to even slightly damage a T-34, much less a KV. However, the Germans gave the Romanians a few 75mm PaK 97/38 (?) but in very small quantaties which is why these 75mm pieces were placed at a 12 km interval from eachother, correct me if I'm wrong. Given these circumstances, the romanians had to engage enemy tanks mostly at "hand-to-tank" using Molotov cocktails, satchel charges, etc. While Mr. Jukes has a negative view of the Romanian troops at Stalingrad, Mr. David Irving says very much the opposite as far as enthusiasm is concerned. I can't tell you more as I'm not very familiar with this topic so I beg Victor, Dragos or any other EF buff to correct me.
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Hohenstaufen |
Posted: June 28, 2003 11:26 pm
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Soldat Group: Members Posts: 14 Member No.: 8 Joined: June 18, 2003 |
Edit: Hello btw,
Here's what David Irving tells us about romanian troops at Stalingrad in his book, "Hitler's War". A rather more positive view I think. "The first word of trouble that reached Hitler was merely of two infantry assaults on the Romanian Third Army’s sector; the Romanians were confident, even when a gradual artillery barrage did begin. No use was made of the panzer corps stationed in reserve behind them and commanded by General Ferdinand Heim. At five a.m. on November 19, however, a colossal Russian artillery barrage suddenly began, and at seven a.m. wave upon wave of tanks assailed the Romanians. They fought heroically – three of the four Romanian generals were killed in enemy bayonet charges, and every Romanian company commander fell in the ensuing battle." p. 539 |
Thomas |
Posted: June 29, 2003 09:54 am
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Soldat Group: Members Posts: 24 Member No.: 5 Joined: June 17, 2003 |
Hello Hohenstauffen,
Thank you for your insightful contributions! Indeed it does seem to be the 1st Romanian tank division, it’s number of effective tanks placed at 108 by Jukes. I’ve already consulted Matthew Cooper’s work, but he’s very quiet about the actual details in this month. Actually it’s quite unpleasant to see that Jukes seems to be somewhere off the mark, as I’ve always considered a very decent (and highly detailed at times) source. Heim’s Pz.Korps probably did start but had difficulties with slippery tracks and mice-eaten cables. The 24 hour delay probably means the time to get as many of the non-operative tanks started, and perhaps to change to more suitable tracks. 3. Rüm. Armee did hold out for 5 days more in a small pocket somewhere in the centre of their front, but as you said, the front was stretched ridiculously long to be held by such thin amounts of material. Paulus decided to draw his resources into Stalingrad (even 4. Pz.-Armee!), which seemed to be one of the biggest blunders. I am however wondering what happened to Heim’s Korps, my first guess would be that some Ardennes-scenario developed, they found themselves bypassed by a mass of Russian tanks, so they might have left their tanks and tried to get back to their own lines on foot. Jukes at least seems to hint this by saying the Russian tanks only wanted to secure their objectives. Unfortunately, my sources run dry here. |
Victor |
Posted: June 29, 2003 01:15 pm
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Admin Group: Admin Posts: 4350 Member No.: 3 Joined: February 11, 2003 |
Actually the 1st Armored Division had 133 tanks, out of which 11 were T-3s (Pz III J and M), 11 were T-4s (Pz IV G), 109 were R-2s (Pz 35 t or more correctly Skoda LT VZ 35) and two were of Soviet origin. It also had 10 Sdkfz 222 and 8 SPW 251.
On 20 November 1942, the 48th Panzer Corps was thrown into battle in the hope that it would pluck in the holes in the 3rd Army. Unfortunately the two divisions got separated and could not act coordinated. The 1st Armored Division was surrounded on 21. It then began a desperate struggle to brake out. Fuel was flown in by the Ju-52s of the 105th Transport Squadron. On 24 November it finally made it back to friendly lines. The CO, maj. Gen. Radu Gherghe received the Mihai Viteazu Order 3rd class, as did 13 other officers. |
Hohenstaufen |
Posted: June 29, 2003 01:28 pm
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Soldat Group: Members Posts: 14 Member No.: 8 Joined: June 18, 2003 |
Here's what I found at Dragos' old site:
"In response to the situation developed south of Kletskaya, the 48th Armoured Corps (the German 22nd and the Romanian 1st Armoured Divisions) was ordered to move towards the Soviet main thrust direction. Shortly afterwards, the 22nd German Armoured Division was redirected to northwest, towards Bolsoi. Reaching Petshani, the German division engaged Soviet armour. By evening, the 1st Romanian Armoured Division reached Zirkovski, making preparations to attack towards Bolsoi the next day. [...] The 22nd German Armoured Division, overwhelmed at Petshani by the large number of Soviet tanks, withdrew north of Bol. Donscinka. The 1st Romanian Armoured Division, without radio contact (the radio station had been destroyed by enemy during night), tried to advance to Petshani in order to make the junction with the 22nd German Armoured Division, but was forced to stop a few kilometres west of Korotovski by the Soviet stiff resistance and numerous counterattacks. The Soviet tanks, flowing between the German 22nd and the Romanian 1st Armoured Divisions, occupied the Varlamovski and Perelazovski villages and made the junction with forces come from Gromki, thus encircling the 5th Army Corps troops. [...] On November 21, the 22nd German Armoured Division tried to advance towards Perelazovski in order to make the junction with the 1st Romanian Armoured Division and to relieve the General Lascar Group, but lacking effective failed and stopped on November 22 between Bol. Donscinka and Perelazovski, waiting for the Romanian armoured division to join. The 1st Romanian Armoured Division was advancing slowly towards Bol. Donscinka, where it was hoping to find the German division, but the village was controlled by the enemy. Lacking ammunition and food, the Romanian unit headed south and after grim fighting against a Soviet cavalry division backed by tanks, crossed the Cir River on November 25. [...] The few troops of General Sion that reached Bol. Donscinka linked with the 22nd German Armoured Division and, subordinating to this unit, were ordered to defend the village. On November 24, at 5 a.m. Soviet tanks stormed the locality. The Romanian sub-units, lacking artillery and anti-tank weapons and without the help of the German tanks that had been withdrawn over the night, suffered heavy losses, including General Sion. The detachment remnants withdrew to the 22nd German Armoured Division and together further withdrew to the Cir river." http://www.armata.home.ro/battles/don.htm CORRECTION: The heavy ATG's were actually placed at a 3.1 km interval and NOT 12 km. My mistake :oops: |
Hohenstaufen |
Posted: June 29, 2003 01:32 pm
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Soldat Group: Members Posts: 14 Member No.: 8 Joined: June 18, 2003 |
Hello,
Victor, do you know how romanian troops (including Heim's corps) fared against Soviet tanks? You said on your site that in the sector of the 13. Inf.-Div., the romanians managed to destroy 25 enemy tanks (or at least the majority) using molotovs, satchel charges, anti-tank mines, etc. Do you have numbers for other sectors? |
Victor |
Posted: July 01, 2003 03:45 pm
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Admin Group: Admin Posts: 4350 Member No.: 3 Joined: February 11, 2003 |
No, unfortunately I do not |
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Florin |
Posted: September 26, 2003 05:45 am
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General de corp de armata Group: Members Posts: 1879 Member No.: 17 Joined: June 22, 2003 |
I don't get it... what is so funny? The fact that Hitler sent to Turkey equipment who could be better offered to us (Pz IV, Focke Wolf 190 etc), or the fact the German industry, after 3 years of war, still did not gear up for the needs, and was not able to supply not only the Axis Allies, but the Wehrmacht itself? Or maybe that " " just dropped there by mistake. Florin |
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Hohenstaufen |
Posted: September 26, 2003 01:23 pm
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Soldat Group: Members Posts: 14 Member No.: 8 Joined: June 18, 2003 |
That's my habit of laughing at desperate situations, does it bother you?
P.S. I wrote the 75mm AT guns were placed at 12 km from each other, which is way off of the mark... I have corrected that to 3.2 km but someone changed it back to 12 km ! :shock: |
inahurry |
Posted: September 26, 2003 04:37 pm
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Sergent Group: Banned Posts: 191 Member No.: 61 Joined: July 28, 2003 |
Hohenstaufen,
I just named you honorary Romanian (you need now only to persuade another 20 million or so). It is very typical here to laugh (not hysterically, mind you) when nothing can be done anymore, we say, in a more genral way, "haz de necaz" = aprox. laugh at trouble. I'm sure not only the Romanians react like this, it might be very well built in everyone as a defense mechanism. |
Dénes |
Posted: September 26, 2003 04:51 pm
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Admin Group: Admin Posts: 4368 Member No.: 4 Joined: June 17, 2003 |
In August 1944, ARR did plan to re-equip many units - particularly level- and dive-bomber groups - with the Fw 190 (see pertinent paragraph in my book, 'Rumanian Air Force. The Prime Decade', p. 60). However, the re-equipment did not take place due to the about-face of Aug. 23. As for tanks, there were 10-12 Pz. V G Panthers en-route to Rumania in late August, but were not delivered for the same reason. Interestingly, those Panthers were given instead to the Honvédség (Royal Hungarian Army), to be used in battles in Transylvania against Rumanian-Soviet forces, in Sept. 1944. Dénes |
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Florin |
Posted: September 26, 2003 05:14 pm
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General de corp de armata Group: Members Posts: 1879 Member No.: 17 Joined: June 22, 2003 |
Hi Denes,
This time is my turn to say that your answer is somehow off-topic (but still in WWII, this I agree). This sub-chapter of "Eastern Front" is "November 1942, around Stalingrad". Until that moment, the Romanian got some Me 109, few PzIV - completely insufficient, and some 75mm AA, as Hohenstaufen said. In those days Romania, the most important partner of Germany on the Eastern Front, did not get what Turkey, a neutral state, already got - in terms of quality and modernity of the equipment. You are mentioning August 1944... Almost 2 years later! Merci beaucoup! You know what the British guys say: " A friend in need is a friend indeed." Florin |
Florin |
Posted: September 26, 2003 05:23 pm
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General de corp de armata Group: Members Posts: 1879 Member No.: 17 Joined: June 22, 2003 |
Hi Hohenstaufen, Another good British saying is about trying to walk in somebody else shoes. Supposing you never passed through a desperate situation... It's not a pleasure to be into it. Florin |
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Bernard Miclescu |
Posted: October 04, 2003 10:02 am
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Plutonier major Group: Members Posts: 335 Member No.: 53 Joined: July 22, 2003 |
Dear Florin,
I think the reason why Turckey received those supplies was to persuade it to enter in the war in the Axis camp. At that time it was an important political battle between Germany and UK for the attraction of Turckey in the war. Even in 1944 Hitler still hopped that Turckey will join him. Yours, BM |
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