Tidal Wave Footage Photos, 15th AAF and Luftwaffe, 'Black Sunday', 1 August 1943

[alexkdl]

I normally do not have much to add to the TW discussions, but I have been enjoying the recent activity and this is one thing about which I think I might be able to contribute.

In my former life (before I retired to take care of my wife), I often had to assess the risk of hazardous chemical processes. One of the "tools" we used in the evaluations was "the probabilities of human error." During WW2 such assessments relied in intuition. Now one can use actual statistics. One could have used this tool when formulating the plan for TW if it had been in use prior to the days of nuclear energy.

The statistics we used were compiled by safety engineers to evaluate the safety of operating nuclear reactors. Designers of chemical processes are able to use these tables in assessing the adequacy of designs and operating procedures.

Statistically, according to the tables, the probability of people making errors (mistakes) in situations of normal stress is usually in the range of once every 100 to 1000 times one does the task. The probabilities of error increase with the amount of stress involved when conducting the task. In tasks conducted under High Stress the probability of error rises to one in ten times the task is conducted.

In Very High Stress,that is, in rescue operations or in military type operations, where one's life is at risk, the probability of making an error approaches one in one! Almost a sure thing that a mistake will be made! I often was involved in incident investigations and I found it interesting the compare the errors made with the statistical probabilities. They always fit within the predictions based on the statistics. I have determined that the same holds true for the "wrong turns" in TW.

There are many opportunities for mistakes, by everyone involved, even the leader. Training/ experience can reduce the probability of error. For TW the Command tried to improve the probabilities of success by, what Ken McFarland (93rd BG) said was, "Ploesti was the best planned, best trained, most poorly executed" mission he was ever part of. The training applied to the pilots and crews and tried to address the navigational problems anticipated while flying at high speed and low level; if my recollection is correct by special training for the navigators in a separate meeting.

It appears to me it was a last minute decision on who would lead the mission. Col. Smart went on at least two combat missions prior to TW; one with Ken McFarland and one with Bob Sternfelds. On McFarland's mission, Col. Smart administered morphine to a dying man and was thus probably mentally prepared for the realities of leading a mission with the importance of TW. But Col. Smart did not lead the TW mission. I suspect Ent and Compton were last minute choices to lead the mission and thus would not be fully prepared mentally. What I mean is, their stress levels were probably higher than if they had known from the beginning that they would lead.

Compton was pilot in the lead plane for this very important mission. Success or failure and the lives of many men depended on the leader doing the right things Therefore, his stress level, and the probability of his making an error, was most likely extremely high. It does not surprise me that errors were made; it is predictable. In the Iraq "Desert Storm" you may recall the helicopter shot down by "friendly fire" with the loss of many lives. A friend of my daughter lost a fiancée on that helicopter. The error made then was one of calling out the wrong coordinates of the helicopter, twice. Anyone who has listened to news reports should be able to recognize frequent similar errors. Those verbal errors are made under low stress levels.

I am sure the "political" and "propaganda" pressures just after TW would not allow the admission that a plane carrying an American general compromised the mission when the plane turned too early, a simple mistake. It does not surprise me that a "cover-up" occurred.

I have to believe Sternfels that Compton accepted full responsibility for the error, but I do wonder what role General Ent played. It is hard for me to believe he went along just for the fun of it, and isn't the highest ranking officer in charge? Also, why didn't Compton trust his navigator? I know from statements by Ken McFarland that he did not trust his "new" navigator on the return from Ploesti and only used him to trim the plane. But this was after he had been given conflicting headings and the navigator admittedly was unsure. McFarland also got his ass chewed when his navigator brought him down over a city in England through cloud cover resulting in "friendly fire" flak at them. It was made clear to him that as pilot he was in charge, not the navigator! But you would think that for a mission as important as TW, one in which navigators were given special training, they would have a trusted navigator on the lead plane and would be in constant communication with him.

The measure of a man is not if he makes mistakes. Everyone does, even commanders. The measure of a man is whether or not he will admit to making a mistake. It appears to me, based on Bob Sternfels' statements, that Compton fessed up to his mistake, admittedly many years after it might have had any propaganda value to the Nazis.

It is a tribute to those who participated in the mission that after 60 years there is still so much interest in this mission. I think if Compton had not made the error that the American losses would still have been high because the Germans and Romanians were well prepared for an attack. But I also think if the mission had been carried out as planned the results would have been far more impressive than they were.

There are many examples of navigational mistakes and bombing unintended targets in WW2. An eight plane formation of the 466th had the dubious distinction of bombing the rail-yard in Basel, Switzerland.

Errors can be anticipated and for critical things measures taken to minimize the impacts of errors. In the case of TW, even with radio silence there were ways of communicating between planes as a way of double checking and confirming the correct IP. It did not HAVE to depend on a decision of one man. A simple discussion of "What do we do if we miss the IP and turn too soon, or too late may have been all that was needed. The leaders of the 389th made a similar error but quickly recognized it and corrected their headings. (Again it is interesting that the pilot apparently made the turn without input from the (specially trained?) navigator. It just shows how much stress they were under flying at low level with landmarks zipping past and the need for split-second decisions when guessing about where they were.) One skilled in "risk assessments" would recognize this as a frequent error made by pilots flying at low level and high speed under the high stress battle during WW2. With the use of GPS and computers such an error should no longer happen, but there was no GPS in WW2.

Anyway, getting back to my original point, it appears to me there were three opportunities to make the "wrong turn" error. (I am counting the 376th and 93rd as one opportunity with the consideration that the 93rd was trapped into following the 376th either by position of planes or the Military Protocol of following the commander. I count the 98th and 44th as another opportunity and the 389th as the third opportunity.) Of these, on two out of three opportunities the leaders turned too early. This falls right where one would predict for extremely high stress situations.

The reason for making the assessments is to determine what needs the be done to avoid the error. In TW it was done. The navigators got extra emphasis. The mistake I recognize (If I am to believe what I read.) is that two of the three leaders took matters in their own hands and did not even consult with their navigators before making a turn. In this case, the statistics say that two out of two opportunities resulted in the predictable error! A sure thing. I wonder if they would have done the same if they were aware of the statistics?

I hope you find that interesting. From the perspective of one experienced in making risk assessments, I did.
That is my two cents on this subject.

By the way, does anyone know how Wally Forman is doing?
Dale Melin

[alexkdl]

On August 1,1943, the oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania, were attacked
in a low-level raid by 163 Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers of the IX
Bomber Command. Fifty four of the American bombers were lost, either over the
target or in returning to their bases in North Africa.

The results of the raid were disappointing. The refineries temporarily
lost 42 percent of their throughput capacity and 42 percent of their cracking
capacity. Some 10,000 slave laborers were sent to Ploesti to help
repair the damage. As a result, the refineries were back in operation within a few
weeks. Although Ploesti was bombed many times over the next year by both
American and British aircraft, oil production was never fully stopped.

Little has been written about Brig. Gen. Uzal C. Ent, the mission
commander for the August 1 raid on Ploesti, and some of what has been published
abouthim has been erroneous. Ent was my uncle, and I hope to set the record
straight by explaining the details of the Ploesti raid.

A 1924 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Ent became
a pilot in 1936. He was promoted to full colonel on March 1, 1942, and that
October was named chief of staff, U.S. Air Forces in the Middle East. In
February 1943 Ent assumed command of the IX Bomber Command, Ninth Air Force, in North Africa. The unit consisted of two heavy bombardment groups--the 98th "Pyramiders" under Colonel John Riley "Killer" Kane, and the 376th
"Liberandos," commanded by Colonel Keith K. Compton, who would serve as
the mission leader on the August 1 raid.

In January 1943, during an Allied summit meeting in Casablanca, some
attendees claimed that an air raid on Ploesti would destroy a third of Adolf
Hitler's oil production and could shorten the war by six months. But they made
it clear that the raid had to be conducted between the end of the African
campaign and the beginning of the planned invasion of Sicily, so that the bombers
could be used in those operations as well.

Planners decided that a low-level mission would probably surprise the
Germans. Such a raid would provide an opportunity for precision bombing and
reduce thechance of unnecessary civilian casualties. They also believed that a
single low-level raid might be so successful that repeated high-level attacks
would not be necessary.

The 98th and the 376th were reinforced for the mission by the only
three B-24 bomber groups then in England--the 44th, nicknamed the "Eight Balls,"
under 38-year-old Colonel Leon Johnson; the 93rd "Traveling Circus,"
commanded by Lt. Col. Addison Baker; and the new, untried 389th "Sky Scorpions," under Colonel Jack Wood.

General Ent first learned of the projected raid from General Lewis H.
Brereton, the Ninth Air Force commander, on June 8. Bombers of the IX
had previously conducted a few low-level raids with some success. But Ent,
hisstaff and his group commanders were not optimistic about the attack on
Ploesti, which had been codenamed "Tidal Wave." They felt that too
little was known of the target and its anti-aircraft defenses. No aerial photos of
the area around Ploesti were available.

Ent, who planned to accompany the raiders, opposed the low-level
attack. He wrote to General Brereton: "We estimate that seventy-five aircraft will
be lost at low level. Fifty percent destruction is the best we can hope
for. You have guessed our recommendation--to attack at high level until the
target is destroyed or effectively neutralized." But it was too late. The
decision had already been made to proceed.

Detailed planning began in early July. The IX Bomber Command was taken
off operations on July 20 so the aircrews could practice bombing at low
level. Full-size mock-ups of the refineries were outlined on the desert, with
55-gallon gasoline drums stacked up to simulate smokestacks. For 10
days the bomber crews practiced dropping dummy bombs at low level on these
simulated installations.

Hours before the mission was launched, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold,
chief of U.S. Army Air Forces, forbade General Brereton and Colonels Jacob Smart
and Edward J. Timberlake, who had been involved in the planning, from
participating in the raid. General Ent, who had planned to fly with
"Killer"Kane, shifted to replace Brereton in the command plane, Teggie Ann,
flown by Compton, the 376th's commander. They were joined by a new bombardier and the group navigator, Captain Harold Wicklund.

The mission started at dawn on August 1, 1943. Almost from the
beginning,there was no hope of achieving surprise. German spotters reported large
formations of B-24s taking off from North African bases, and from that
time on the Germans tracked the raiders. Along the way, Bulgarian, Romanian and
German air units were alerted, and anti-aircraft batteries were readied. As
the armada entered Romanian air space, it was clear to the German high
command that the target was either Bucharest or Ploesti.

Allied Intelligence reports had credited the refinery area with less
than 100 antiaircraft guns, about half of them manned by Germans. In fact, there
were 237 flak guns, 80 percent of them manned by Germans, plus hundreds of
machine guns.

Well into the mission, Wongo-Wongo , the plane carrying the lead
navigator,suddenly nosed up, then down, and crashed into the sea. The pilot of
the aircraft carrying the backup navigator broke formation and flew down to
look for survivors. As a result, Brewery Wagon now became the lead plane of
Compton's group, and the inexperienced navigator aboard became mission
navigator.

A total of 11 bombers had to abort or became lost en route to the
target. The two leading bomber groups flew part of the way at a higher altitude
than the remaining three, picking up a tail wind that the planes at the lower
altitude did not have. As a result, the lead groups flew over Romania, but the
last three groups lagged so far behind that they lost visual contact with
the leaders. Since radio silence was enforced, visual contact was the only
way of communicating between the groups. Ent and Compton were worried about
the laggard groups. For a time Compton adopted a zigzag route, trying to
give some time for Kane and the others to catch up.

The lead group hit the first initial point just right. However, for
some reason, both Ent and Compton misidentified the second initial point as
the third, overriding the word of the navigator in Brewery Wagon. It was at
the third initial point that the attackers were to turn toward Ploesti. The
heading taken at the second point led to Bucharest, not Ploesti. A
number of pilots broke radio silence to point out the error, but to no avail.
Colonel Baker's group followed Compton's group on the erroneous heading.

The lead groups flew through several rain squalls, which severely
reduced visibility. Suddenly, Baker saw the smoke of Ploesti's refineries off
to the left and turned his bombers toward the correct heading to begin their
run in on the target.

Compton's group continued on until the crews could see the church
spires of Bucharest. Ent then acknowledged the error on the group command channel and finally turned the group toward Ploesti.

In their approach to Ploesti, the bombers in Ent's group entered a
virtual firestorm of anti-aircraft fire. In addition, because they were coming
from near Bucharest, the planes were not in position to hit their assigned
targets. As a result, Ent got on the group command net and said, "This is
General Ent. We have missed our target. You are cleared to strike targets of your
choice."

With that, individual planes of Compton's group attacked a variety of
targets. Some of the refineries assigned to other groups were attacked by
Compton's men before the others arrived. Compton's and Baker's groups were finishing their attacks when the last three groups reached Ploesti.

Kane's Pyramiders, Johnson' Eight Balls and Wood's Sky Scorpions had
turned at the proper initial point, unaware that the lead groups had made any
error. The bomber crews found some of their assigned targets already on fire, and
they were greeted with blinding black smoke and deadly fire from enemy flak
and machinegun defenses.

Seeing the smoke and flames below, Ent radioed the letters "MS" to
Brereton back in North Africa--a signal that the mission had been successful.
But the cost of the raid was very high. In addition to the bombers lost to
anti-aircraft fire, many others were shot down or badly damaged by
intercepting enemy fighters.

Although oil production was reduced only in the short term, a study of
the bombing results proved that the low-level raid destroyed more of the
target area than raids made from great altitudes. Only 33 of the bombers
returned to their bases in flyable condition, but the IX Bomber Command was able to patch up most of the remainder that made it back home.

Five men received the Medal of Honor for their part in the August 1
raid,including Lieutenant Addison Baker, who was killed when he flew his
flame-engulfed bomber into a refinery. General Ent was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross.

Ent returned to the United States in September 1943 and was assigned to
the Second Air Force, Colorado Springs, Colo., which he subsequently
commanded.Among his responsibilities was training the crews that dropped the
atomicbombs on Japan. He was promoted to major general on June 2, 1944.

On October 10, 1944, while taking off in a North American B-25 near
Fort Worth, Texas, Ent was critically injured when the co-pilot
misunderstcod his signal and pulled up the nose wheel prematurely. The plane nosed into the runway, and Ent was struck by a propeller that sliced through the
cockpit, breaking his back and fracturing 10 ribs. Ent was subsequently
paralyzed from the waist down.

Uzal G. Ent died in Denver on March 5, 1948. In accordance with his
wishes, he was cremated and his ashes were strewn over the hills behind
Northumberland, Pa., where he had roved and hunted as a boy. Ironically, the aircraft bearing his ashes was a B-25--the same type of plane in which he had suffered his tragic accident.

Al

[alexkdl]

Triple it! MERCY, MERCY AND MORE MERCY!
Monday morning quarterbacking is not an American tridition, as is evident by some of the chatter on the TW site. Yet everyone is intitled to their opinion, which perhaps IS an Americian tridition, or at least that's what the constitution tells us. Remember it is this Consititution that the TW guys were fighting for. Let's not forget that.

So, for what it's worth, I'll have to add to it, although I hadn't planned on making any other speculative " What ifs", as I think enough has been said.
So here goes. Several years ago, I contacted Harold Wicklund, in regards to having him add his name to my Ploesti book. This was around 1997 or 98. I sent my book to him along with a list of questions regarding the TW mission. I still have this list of about 20 questions, all of which Harold was kind enough to answer and return to me with the addition of his signature to my book. Since I have made a big move within the last few months, I will not attempt to find the list along with other things that I packed away and havn't the slightest idea of their location.
Two things that stick in my memory. Harold said that he did his navigation by ETA, and never had any problem with it (before Aug.1, 1943). He said he missed "IT", which I presume was Floresti, by 8 minutes, which resulted in the (wrong turn).

The second item that I thought was important in his statement was that he said that
"we were no where near Targovesti". He simply stated that it was HIS mistake.
He also said that he left Africa right after the Ploesti mission and left his charts there, so he couldn't go back and confirm some of his calculations. Interesting.
So, my point is: Harold said he never errored in his navigational skills before Ploesti, and that there were no where near Targoviste.
Now you MMQBs can chew on that one for awhile, and read into it what suits your fancies. Someday when the TW site slows down, I might unearth that list I got from Harold and revive it again.

In 1999, while attending the 60th Anniversary of the B-24 in San Diego, I talked to alot of guys, including a pilot from the 376th. I asked him if Compton was still living. He told me that Compton was very much alive as was five of his crew. I ended up making contact and talking with Compton, Thompson,Hester, and both waist gunners. After talking with all six,(including Wicklund), I got six different perspectives of the mission. Does that surprise anyone?? I personally met Hester, and Robbins, one of the waist gunners. I got some pictures from the other gunner, Ispisi, that I sent to Bob Sternfels that he used in the addendum in his book.

This pilot I talked to in San Diego, had his own ideas as to how the "wrong turn" came about. Because this pilot is no longer living, I will only say he had his own thoughts on the subject, and he only said that the turn (may or may not have been a mistake). At the Ploesti reunion, this was brought up again briefly.

So, having talked to many people over the years, I have heard many things about Compton. This doesn't mean that I know man as did some of the people that I talked to that did know him. It does mean that I talked with people who knew him . Most of you know, that Compton came from the 93rd. I did talk to Compton on two different occasions. I called him once, and he called me once.

He was pleasant to talk with, but was quite difinate in his opinions and observations. I told him that I was affiliated with the 93rd, as my uncle was a bombardier with the 93rd and flew the Ploesti mission. With that, Compton said that the 93rd was not flying on their left after the turn, but was on their right, and the 93rd couldn't have turned towards Ploesti with out flying over or through the 376th.

I wondered how he knew that. Upon the conclusion of our conversation, I thanked him and said goodbye. I immediately called Luke Bird, who was flying right seat on Bomerang and told him what Compton said. Bird said that the 93rd was indeed flying on the right side of the 376th, but the 376th was so far ahead of the 93rd that he could hardly make them out, so it was very easy to make the left turn to Ploesti. So there, for what its worth!

I have printed out every epistle that has ever appeared on the TW site,, and have 24 heavy bound volumes that I might some day do something with. Or perhaps not.

About Uzal Ent. I talked with his son, who is also called Uzal, but with a different middle initial. He told me that his dad was flying a B-25 out of Colorado, as his dad liked to practice flying. That day he didn't have his regular co-pilot, and the copilot that day raised the wheels before Uzal had become completely airborne, resulting in a crash landing, which sheared off the left propeller causing it to rotate into the cockpit, striking Ent, injuring his back, which resulted in the Generals death a short time later. This took place in 1945. Now you know the true story.

Isn't it nice to live in this great country and be able to pick up the phone and talk to people who are in the know, and have seen the game. Are they always right? Perhaps, and perhaps not. Memories have a way of playing tricks on you.
But, I do know that when I was standing up in the swing (instead of sitting down like I was supposed to), the principal caught me and gave me a few whacks on the ass. This happened 60 years ago when I was in the first grade. I will never forget this incident.

No one else was a witness to this infamous degrading of my dignity.
I was there, and am telling it how it was!!!

Kent J.

[alexkdl]

to All Tidalwave interested members...I have scanned a few photos from the book "Safely Rest " about Lt Jesse Franks who jumpped over Ploesti when Euroclydon was shot down and his chute didnt open ...8 of the crew have died and 3 managed to get out and get into Rumanian POW captivity

The photo bellow is of J.Franks last photo prior TW along with the Euroclydon crew kneeling on front raw wearing the officer cap...on his left Jack Warner (N) WIA ,POW in Rumania ....the aircraft was hit over the target, bombay seen in flame..the aircraft attempted a climb ....2 gunners and Navigator bailed out.....Jesse Franks too though parachute didnt open..aircraft seen climbing before the target and breaking apart in the air and crashing on a house...Pilot, CPL , RO,TT. 2 x extra gunners all KIA,bodies were never recovered.

This post has been edited by alexkdl on March 29, 2005 10:48 am

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[alexkdl]

This Jesse D Franks in 1942 with 8th AF in UK

This post has been edited by alexkdl on March 29, 2005 10:23 am

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[alexkdl]

A 1939 of J.Franks at Ohaio with his mates

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[alexkdl]

This is 1st Lt Jessse D Franks wallet containing personal photos stollen from his body near Ploesti by a Rumanian boy which has been returned back to his family in the US after 54 years or so.

This post has been edited by alexkdl on March 31, 2005 10:14 am

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[alexkdl]

Jesse D Franks final rest place at Ardenns /Belgium

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[alexkdl]

Hi Alex,

First, 'Kent' is Kent Jaquith, nephew of Jack Roach (Martin). He was one of the organizers of the 60th Reunion and seems like a good guy. Frankly, I was surprised by his comments. If we are not going to revaluate this, then who is???? Are we supposed to accept what has been written or should we try to examine what really happened? I hope I can share all of my information soon. As I mentioned, I don't deal with 'I heard from so-and-so', I go to the source.

On the 93rd, they saw an opportunity and Baker took it. Jerstad got his CMH right away while Baker almost didn't as he broke formation, a serious mistake in the Army Air Corps. I have spoken with a staff officer of the 93rd who said that they did not want to give it to Baker but had to since Jerstad won it. As proof, the date of Baker's award is 11 March 1944. This is the last of the five awards for Tidal Wave.

Best wishes,

[alexkdl]

I'd better check again and make sure I got the names in order;I think I got
the names from Jack Warner originally but I can't remember for sure.I have
them written down on the back of the envelope that my print of the picture
was sent in.The original shows the aircraft name.The pic in the book is
trimmed a bit."Euroclydon" had no nose art,just the name "Euroclydon the
storm." I'd been meaning to send a post as I ran across _Safely Rest_ in the
library the other day.Glad to have people on the list keeping me posted on
"What's Available." Haven't read it cover to cover so I can't review it but
I've looked it over enough that I recommend it.....but not because you'll
learn much about the mission itself.It repeats the same old business about
Wongo-Wongo but that should be forgiven because the book isn't primarily
about Tidal Wave.It DOES provide a lot about Franks and family.One thing
that wasn't quite accurate is when it says that Franks and Warner each
thought the other was a "Heathen." Actually,the way I heard it from WARNER
was that each thought the other was JEWISH...because of the names,which,I
believe,were fairly common names among the Jewish population.Warner spoke
very well of Franks.One thing that I haven't seen in the book is that Franks
often loaned money to the other crew members so that they could play in
Poker games...as I understood him,without worrying much about getting
repaid.Of course,he himself neither gambled nor drank.The book paints a very
favorable picture of Franks at least partly because that's how Warner saw
Franks.I'll stop for now,but I think the book will move you to tears
as you read it.War is a tragedy and part of the tragedy is losing men like
Franks.
Chris Bryant

This post has been edited by alexkdl on March 30, 2005 09:39 am

[alexkdl]

Chris and All

Many thanks for the Euroclydon at Storm crew ID. I wasn't aware that I.Grigorescu who was interviewed by L.W.Newby was also involved into that story. According to his statements he saw Red Franks body prior or after his personal effects were stolen by a Rumanian boy and once again comes up the statement again of finding Dickinson Shakespeare book.... I am very cautious with statements originating from Rumania which were published on that book ......some of the stories are simply fabricated or totally inacurrate,there are only a very few reliable TW historians in Rumania ,rest are into materialistic issues, .......I am also very curious on what has been written on the TINTA ROSIE ( Red Target) about TW .

On the end of the book D.Colley states that Kane left a memorable eulogy to Red and the US Airmen at TW which goes like this :

To you who fly on forever,I send that part of me which can not be separated and is bound to you for all time.I send to you , those of our hopes and dreams that never quite came true,the joyous laughter and showery tears of our boyhood,the marvelous mysteries of our adolescence,the glorious strength and tragic illusions of our young manhood, all these that were and perhaps would have been,I leave in your care , out there in the blue

So you tell me guys how could a person like this be taken command away , stripped his ranks and later promoted to Sargent , work as a bar tender in America , be stamped as playboy and downgraded to an insane commander and die almost alone ?

Ultimately, I wasn't aware that Smart in due course of the war didn't continue to fly his Hdq desk and become a POW ...can anyone tell me more about this , where was he a POW sorry if the question was asked before .

Alex

[alexkdl]

Group,
I believe General Smart took over the 97th Bomb Group. Someone in our group could verify this. He was shot down over Wiener Neustadt. He was literally blown out of his B-17 and became a POW. The Germans knew immediately who they had and used him as a sounding board for what was going to happen to Germany after the war. The Germans already knew that the war was lost and they were tying to look out for themselves. The Germans were afraid of what the Russians were going to do to them.

General Smart hardly "flew a desk." He was actively flying as early as 1931. He was down in Panama with Brereton in the early 30's flying fighters. He flew a new B-17 to Casablanca for the Casablanca Conference. I believe he flew a combat mission with Bob Sternfels prior to Ploesti. I bet Bob remembers the mission. Smart was to fly to Ploesti with K.O. Dessert. He planned the mission and he wanted to fly it! Orders from Washington pulled him off the mission the night before. He suspects it was because of his knowledge of the atom bomb. He never saw any written orders as to why he was pulled off the mission. He does not know why some of the other Ploesti mission leadership team was pulled off the mission. Apparently those decisions rested with Brereton.

I can attest to the health of General Smart. He is 96 and sharp as a tack. Other than some mobility problems (partly due to injuries sustained in his bail out) he is doing great. I had the good fortune to be in his company two weeks ago. I accompanied Cal Stewart to General Smart's home. Cal wanted to interview Gen. Smart regarding some of the personalities on the Ploesti mission. The General spoke with the highest esteem for the officers and the enlisted men who flew the Ploesti mission. This included the leaderhip of the mission. His Low Country Families of WWII is a great book. It is some 1100 pages. It is a history of WWII along with biograhical sketches of all the men and women of his hometown area who served. He started it at the age of 85! I believe it is available from the Jasper County Historical Society. I can forward details for those interested in the book. It goes for $40 plus shipping.

Blaine

[alexkdl]

Group,

Here is my contribution. A few years ago, I received a phone call
from K. O. Dessert. He told me his version of the crew change on
Tupelo Lass. According to Col. Dessert, both the pilot and copilot of
that B-24 were to be replaced for TW. Smart was to be the pilot,
replacing Epting, and Dessert was to be the copilot, replacing Young.
But Gen. Brereton "came down from Cairo and told Smart, 'Jakie, you
stay on the ground' ". So as a result, Tupelo Lass was piloted by
Dessert and copiloted by Epting. Dessert did not tell me who ordered
Brereton to order Smart to stay on the ground, if that's what
happened. I have read that Smart was told not to fly because of his
knowledge of the Manhattan Project. But if that's so, why was he
allowed to run the risk of capture by the enemy later on in the war,
especially since that's apparently what happened? Maybe someone
should ask Gen. Smart to clarify this point.

Regards,
Bill Hubbard

[alexkdl]

Alex,

Personalities sure play a big part in some events. Let's take what our local professional basketball team is going through this season. The top player who was not a pal of the second guy left to join another team so the second best player assumed command. But the players liked the first guy better and our team might finish second to last this year but won the golden egg last year! Personalities play a big part of every situation, doesn't it?

In the case of Compton and Kane it's my feeling that each was running their own show. Kane was burning his bridges behind him with the higher ups. Some with less time were promoted over him. This I'm sure was a needle in his side. Timberlake was under Kane somewhere along the line but advanced faster than Kane. Compton was almost 6 years younger than Kane but had the ear of the higher ups.

When the TW was planned we know that last minute changes focused towards Compton as General Ent flew with Compton but had been ordered to fly with Kane. Smart was to fly the mission but the head of the Air Force stopped that. So it was almost like bypassing Kane for the important roles and this probably did not sit too well with Kane.

Now on the mission, Kane felt he knew how to lead his group but didn't make any effort to stay with Compton. I have an idea that Kane's formation of three groups were not assembled when the time came to start out towards Ploesti. So, we were behind Compton right from the start. I don't remember seeing any of the Compton's group ahead of me but on the other hand my element was positioned back towards the end of the 98th and maybe as much as 5 or 6 miles from the last of Compton's formation. We never increased speed to do anything but climb to about 11,000 feet. So Kane made no effort to stay near Compton right from the start .

You can deduct from the above that Kane was determined to exert his methods regardless but never thinking through of what his actions might mean to the Smart's plan. In a way it was fortunate that he was not actually following close to Compton as what action Kane would have taken or would he blindly follow Compton into the wrong turn. As it turned out Kane not knowing that Compton screwed up and did not make any effort to return to the correct IP, allowed the 44th, 98th and the 3899th Bomb Groups to follow the briefed attack plan that Smart laid out. ONLY the successful bombing from the Kane's groups plus that from the error made from the 93rd determined the final result. Compton's group only caused the horrible losses for the 44th and 98th.

Both Kane and Compton were good guys. Each was a strong leader and the men under these two felt confident that both guys were doing their best. So the real problem wasn't recognized by the higher ups which was what would each do when put together on such an important mission. I'll bet Kane and Compton never shared a cup of coffee at any time! Mistakes were made and will be in the future during war time but it's still hard for many of us to wonder why Compton when he realized he wasn't on course did not do a 360 degree turn to his right where the corn was growing as high as an elephant's eye!!!! This maneuver would have solved all the problems. After being so thoroughly briefed about the Ploesti plan, one would think this would be utmost in his mind!

Smart did ride with me on a mission before the Ploesti. In talking with General Smart a few years ago, he mentioned that he had just been checked out in a B24 the week before arriving in Africa. I'm positive that he never flew a B24 at high altitude or as a leader of a group. The decision to not let him fly the Ploesti was a sound move for the reasons already expressed.

Maj. Bob Sternfels

[alexkdl]

It sure would be interesting to know why Col. Smart could not participate in TW but later on could fly other missions. I was surprised to read that he had been a POW.

Alex, I checked with a new website mentioned in the March 2005 issue of 8TH AF NEWS. On page 44 of the issue it explains how to access the information, which is not easy without guidance. The website home page is www.archives.gov/aad. You probably already know about it. Anyway, I checked on Col. Smart.

The information for him gives the date of his capture, but in the section for "CAMP", that normally would say Stalag 3, where most of the Air Force officers were imprisoned, it just says "undefined code". Thus, it does not give any useful information. The 8th AF NEWS does mention there is about a 35% error rate with the data. When I checked about my father, it said he had been in Stalag 4B, which is an error. Stalag 4B was a camp for infantry. The Air Corp guys were in their own camps. The data entry should have been for Stalag Luft 4, probably compound B. Stalag Luft 4 was were non-coms were imprisoned.

There has been some interesting stuff on this site. In my post about Compton's wrong turn and how I saw the probabilities, it was not my intent to lay blame on anyone. I apologize if I gave that impression. Let me clarify.

With the extraordinary training, emphasis of the importance of the mission, the danger, the length over enemy territory, etc., most people, both now and then, would have believed there would be more focus and less chance for errors. My point is, according to statistics, the opposite is true. I also believe there was probably more stress than normal. Under high stress, everyone is more likely to make errors. There is no intent to lay blame, just add understanding as to why the errors were made. Enough

Dale Melin