Blitzkrieg tactics

I was talking about air attacks (there were no landing efforts at all, so I was not talking about a 2 month delay there).

(emphasis added)

Sid,

I think what others were asking (and if they were not, I will ask), is why Britain would have been compelled to invade continental Europe in that situation. Would they have been under such public pressure to mount an almost certainly suicidal operation? Operations such as the Dieppe raid and the invasion of Sicily would seem to be more attractive than an all-out "we're here to stay" invasion of the European mainland.

Jeff

In 1942 the Iraki oil fields produced only 3,25 million tons of oil. Thats almost half the Romanian oil production of 1940. Even if you consider the unlikely possibility that the germans entered Iran too, then the whole exploit would likely produce another "Romania" in terms of oil (though I dont have any data now on the Iranian oil prod. in that period). Add to that the likely British sabotages and subsequent loss of production capacity. All in all, I dont think it was worth it, especially since Hitler saw his own forces at their peak strength and any time wasted as adding to Soviet strength.

take care

Hi Jeff S.,

I wasn't actually arguing that there would have been any extra compulsion to make an earlier invasion. I was just making the point that, whenever it came, the invasion would be more difficult and risky than was actually the case because there would be almost no Western Allied soldiers available with campaign experience of any sort, let alone of victory over Germans, if the British had conquered Libya in the winter of 1940-41.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Imperialist,

Any conquest of the Middle East in late 1940 would only have required a relatively small proportion of the German Army. Furthermore, if it were successful, this small proportion of the German Army would still have been available for use against the USSR in the Caucasus and further east.

Middle Eastern oil supported the entire British war effort in the Indian Ocean. Its loss would have had far reaching strategic consequences, quite apart from making the USSR's Caucasus oil fields vulnerable from the very start of Barbarossa.

Cheers,

Sid.

If the British empire could not be defeated by invasion or choked to death by a blocade some miles off Europe, the Germans were supposed to try and go for its Middle East oil fields? And even so, the result only affecting Britain's Indian Ocean war effort.
As for threatening Russia's Caucasus oil fields, Russia would have deployed accordingly to the threat in the region, and the terrain is harder when coming up from the south. So how many forces would the germans need, and how long and vulnerable their supply lines?

And yet their thoughts turned out to be quite close to reality.

I don't think so....
Exept of beating up small or unorganized/nemilitaristic nations,when they came upon a stong one (UK) they couldn't do anymore.
The Blitzkrieg was good againd peace loving nations or Latin ?Balcanic ones.
When they had to fight against Anglo Saxons it turn to be diferent.

France and Britain (combined) had as many tanks as Germany, in May 1940. France alone had as many airplanes as Germany in May 1940.
The French tank Somua was regarded as the best tank in May 1940 on the Western Front (all things considered), and a British tank Matilda could withstand as much as 21 direct hits from the German tanks, while being able to destroy a German tank with one shot (see the British counterattack at Arras).
Next year, in the summer of 1941, the German Army performed the greatest successes ever, against an enemy tank force more than 5 times bigger (having occasionaly better tanks, like KV-1 and T-34). The enemy aerial force was bigger in numbers in Russia, even in 1941.

Maybe France and Britain were peace lovers (in Europe ), but Stalin's Soviet Union was almost as aggressive as its attacker.

Regarding the Battle of Britain, the British were on the verge of collapse, when happened that episode with the few German bombers dropping bombs by mistake over the camouflaged London, followed by the British retaliation against Berlin.
After the British raid with 80 bombers against Berlin, Hitler and Goering were talking a whole night about what they should do next: to continue with the efficient knock-out of the British airports, radar stations and airplane factories, or to switch attention toward bombing the British cities? The decision was taken in the morning, and as it is well known, I do not insist about it.

Your post tried to portrait the Germany of early 1940 as a kind of superpower. If it was, this was mostly due to the command and organizatoric skills of some German officers of the Wehrmacht, and also due to the better trained military personnel with smarter chosen equipment, and not due to sheer numbers in equipment and personnel. Smarter tactics, and not sheer number, won the battles in 1940...1941, in France and Russia. And regarding the Battle of Britain, at its start 900 Me-109's faced 700 Hurricanes and Spitfires. I would not call this a spectacular numeric advantage.

The Blitzkrieg tactics were a revolution in military thinking in 1940...1941. The Russians and the Western Allies copied them successfully in the following years, enjoying advantage in sheer numbers .

This post has been edited by Florin on May 06, 2006 05:15 am

And yet their thoughts turned out to be quite close to reality.

I don't think so....
Exept of beating up small or unorganized/nemilitaristic nations,when they came upon a stong one (UK) they couldn't do anymore.
The Blitzkrieg was good againd peace loving nations or Latin ?Balcanic ones.
When they had to fight against Anglo Saxons it turn to be diferent.

France and Britain (combined) had as many tanks as Germany, in May 1940. France alone had as many airplanes as Germany in May 1940.
The French tank Somua was regarded as the best tank in May 1940 on the Western Front (all things considered), and a British tank Matilda could withstand as much as 21 direct hits from the German tanks, while being able to destroy a German tank with one shot (see the British counterattack at Arras).
Next year, in the summer of 1941, the German Army performed the greatest successes ever, against an enemy tank force more than 5 times bigger (having occasionaly better tanks, like KV-1 and T-34). The enemy aerial force was bigger in numbers in Russia, even in 1941.

Maybe France and Britain were peace lovers (in Europe ), but Stalin's Soviet Union was almost as aggressive as its attacker.

Regarding the Battle of Britain, the British were on the verge of collapse, when happened that episode with the few German bombers dropping bombs by mistake over the camouflaged London, followed by the British retaliation against Berlin.
After the British raid with 80 bombers against Berlin, Hitler and Goering were talking a whole night about what they should do next: to continue with the efficient knock-out of the British airports, radar stations and airplane factories, or to switch attention toward bombing the British cities? The decision was taken in the morning, and as it is well known, I do not insist about it.

Your post tried to portrait the Germany of early 1940 as a kind of superpower. If it was, this was mostly due to the command and organizatoric skills of some German officers of the Wehrmacht, and also due to the better trained military personnel with smarter chosen equipment, and not due to sheer numbers in equipment and personnel. Smarter tactics, and not sheer number, won the battles in 1940...1941, in France and Russia. And regarding the Battle of Britain, at its start 900 Me-109's faced 700 Hurricanes and Spitfires. I would not call this a spectacular numeric advantage.

The Blitzkrieg tactics were a revolution in military thinking in 1940...1941. The Russians and the Western Allies copied them successfully in the following years, enjoying advantage in sheer numbers .

Well Florin, I have no choice but... to entirely agree with you.

But Jukov, against japanesse, don't used something like Blitzkrieg tactics? Swerepunkt?

Iama

The Japanese forces in Manchuria were outnumbered during the Soviet August 1945 offensive, not to mention outclasssed in terms of tactics, experience and mobility.

It is debateable if the Soviet commanders copied the German Blitzkrieg. The concept of "deep battle" has been theorized by Soviet generals before the war, but it need time and experience to start being effectively put to use with good results.

My impression is that the two differed mostly by the tactic used to break the enemy line. While Germans preferred to use an armored battering ram to make their way through, the Soviets usually employed regular infantry and saved their armor for the exploiting phase only. Hence the large casualties recorded in the first days of the offensives.

Seriously? Yes, Soviet theory from the 30s (and maybe even the 20s, I don't remember) talked about some of the same ideas as the German Blitzkrieg: massed airpower, mechanized forces, and the value of mobility. But the disastrous defeats of 1941 show that they were in no way equipped or trained to make it happen, either offensively or defensively.

Just a few examples:
- tank units that did not have enough motorized supporting forces: artillery and (especially) infantry. Look at the first offensive against Finland for an example of this -- unsupported tanks being destroyed piecemeal
- lack of radios in vehicles, limiting the ability of mobile units to reinforce success or call for help
- a maintenance concept that, while it talked about repairing damaged vehicles close to the front, in practice was completely overwhelmed and often abandoned them
- a supply system that had problems supplying units on the move (right up to the end of the war)
- poor coordination of air and ground operations, I've read more than one account of SB-2s flying in perfect formation and being massacred by Me-109s. There was no use of tactical airpower as "flying artillery".

I agree that the Soviets often led with their infantry, but I would also give credit to their artillery for shooting a hole for the infantry to pass through. That's how German units often were mauled in the opening days of the Soviet offensives, when they had to face the full weight of the Soviet artillery. When the battle became more fluid as the Soviets exploited the breach in the German line, the Germans met with much more success.

I would say that much of the Soviet "experience" with deep battle that you cite was experience at being on the receiving end of it. I think mainstream US military thinking sees post-war Soviet doctrine as an evolution of the Blitzkrieg.

The concept of deep battles was indeed created in the 30s and became official in the Red Army regulations of 1936. From there on, things did not go so well for the Red Army from different reasons.

David Glantz presents a pretty clear picture of how the Red Army was in the eve of Barbarossa in Stumbling Colosssus. Many formations were only on paper what they were supposed to be, especially the newly organized mechanized corps, and, also importnant, many of the commanders that supported the deep battle idea were eliminated during the purges. The replacements apparently did not see the deep battle as such a great idea. The notable exception is Zhukov at Khalkin Ghol against Japanese infantry.

Thus, in 1941, the Red Army was in the middle of a reorganization, which indeed wasn't done very well, and with commanders with little experience in commanding large formations. In other words it was caught with its pants down and by an brutally efficient enemy.

The mechanized corps were too big for their commanders to direct and lacked too many things to function properly. The results were indeed disastrous as was for most of the Red Army during that year, but countermeasures were taken. formations were reduce din size so that the commanders can direct them more efficiently according to their possibilities and experience (hence the practical disapperence of most of the rifle corps commands) and in 1942 the more flexible tank corps (practically equivqlent to a tank division) were created and slowly things started to move in a better direction for the Red Army from the end of that year. As commanders' experience and resources grew, so did the size and effectiveness of the operations.

True, during 1941 there were many mistakes done (you mentioned the unescorted raids of SBs and DB-3s in plain daylight which happened during the first days of Barbarossa), but this was mainly because of low level of experience and lack clear doctrine among Soviet commanders. Many of those who escaped the purges than died during the battles of 1941, leaving an even greener officer corps in command and the Red Army needed time to revert back to the deep battle doctrine and to learn how to do it. However, it should be noted that it was the official doctrine in 1936, not just the thoughts of several military strategists.

Hello Victor, Jeff,

Interesting discussion. Allow me to add my two-cents worth...

I think the difference stated above should be given a larger importance in differentiating between Soviet and Geman blitzkrieg-like tactics.

Using armor in the initial phase of the battle allowed the Germans to drive deep into enemy lines, without regard for the protection of their flanks or even supply lines. Furthermore, isolated points of resistance were also bypassed by the german armor columns to avoid wasting time, leaving them for infantry mopping-up actions.

Fast, deep penetrations by armored formations even with exposed flanks produced confusion in enemy lines and set the ground for effective pincer movements. It also distracted and produced enough panic in enemy formations so that the following infantry would have an easier job.

On the other hand, the usage of slower (by comparison) Soviet infantry for the inital penetration of the enemy lines negates many of the advantages stated above.

Your thoughts?

In 1942 the Iraki oil fields produced only 3,25 million tons of oil. Thats almost half the Romanian oil production of 1940. Even if you consider the unlikely possibility that the germans entered Iran too, then the whole exploit would likely produce another "Romania" in terms of oil (though I dont have any data now on the Iranian oil prod. in that period). Add to that the likely British sabotages and subsequent loss of production capacity. All in all, I dont think it was worth it, especially since Hitler saw his own forces at their peak strength and any time wasted as adding to Soviet strength.

take care

I agree to Sid in this.

After the German industry started to gear up under the guidance of Albert Speer, the lack of gasoline became a bigger problem than the war equipment itself.
Quite often in the later years of war, the German tanks and airplanes were available on the frontline, but there was no gasoline for them.

Little is known that the shortage of gasoline was about to become a major problem during the first famous German campaign, the invasion of Poland in 1939. The Soviet invasion of Poland from east saved the situation. The Germans were also quite lucky because that autumn in Poland was very dry (unusual) so the countryside roads were not soaked by rains, thus good for vehicles.

The Germans learned the "Polish lesson", and they stockpiled much more gasoline for the Western campaign of 1940. In addition, France had a lot of modern paved roads, with plenty of gasoline stations spread along them. These French gasoline stations were used a lot during the advance of the German army.

This post has been edited by Florin on May 15, 2006 04:29 am

Considering a chronological order, the first to present in a book the modern doctrine of the mechanized warfare was a British officer. Unfortunately, his colleagues in the British Army were not receptive to his ideas. (But Guderian read his book with deep interest - he, hee!)

Generally speaking, after World War One the Germans asked themselves: What went wrong? What do we have to change?
In France and Great Britain, the idea was: Nothing went wrong. World War Two will be a repetition of World War One, with the same static frontlines, and a naval blockade to suffocate the enemy into submission.
The German-Soviet deal of August 1939, with the emerging economic exchanges resulting from it, made the British-French naval blockade pointless, in 1939...1940.

This post has been edited by Florin on May 15, 2006 04:51 am