Soviets preparing their own invasion of Europe, Myth or reality?

That's a myth.

The communists already had prepared an european invasion, that ended at the gates of Warsaw in 1920. The Comintern wasn't just a world-wide organisation, it was a fifth-column tool that was hopefully going to attract supporters for a future all-communist block. I genuinly think that Stalin would have attacked, at some point Central Europe, if it weren't for the Nazis that beat them to the prize. Now, the level of preparedness could be argued, but the Communists' ambition not.

Based on what I've learned in the past years, I agree with Alexandru.

The Soviets were preparing to "liberate" the working class in the Central and Western European Capitalist countries. Stalin just waited for the proper moment in the 1940s, when both camps, at war with each other, would be weak enough militarily. To Stalin's dismay, he was beaten to the punch by Hitler.

Mind you, the German attack in June 1941 was not a 'pre-emptive' one, as some authors say. It was planned long before. It just happened that Hitler was quicker than Stalin.

Gen. Dénes

Following that trail of thought we can say the West prepared the invasion of Russia since 1918.

If Suvorov's main argument is that a lot of Russian forces were concentrating on the border before June 1941, so they were obviously preparing an attack, I'm afraid its all baloney. The main defensive doctrine at the time was to concentrate the forces on defensive positions on the border so as to act as a covering force for interior movements and as a delaying force against the enemy's armoured and mechanised assault.
What did Suvorov expect, the Soviets to keep their forces around Moscow?
The fact that Germany attacked first remains. The Soviets may have had plans (who doesnt?) but that doesnt justify the German move.

p.s. maybe this is offtopic, but an interesting discussion. maybe its better to be moved where we could talk at length about this?

Suvorov brings other interesting arguments.

1. See the Japanese defeat at Khalkhin-Gol in Mongolia, which was the result of a decision taken shortly after the second purge of the generals. This is a clue about Stalin's intention: the desire to have reliable commanders, to stop a possible conflict in the East and to be able to devote most of the military resources in the West. Check the famous two-year mobilization program from 1939 to 1941, which meant nothing more than the final preparations for a war.

2. Between 1939 and 1941, the military forces of USSR literally doubled. I don't remember the exact figures, but from not a single tank division, Stalin ended up with more than 50-60. That's a staggering number, indeed...

3. The Red Army ordered in the Spring of 1941 massive artillery and ammunition pieces, but did not create special storage houses for them, they simply laid there on the ground, at the mercy of the autumn rains. But what if they were supposed to be used before fall? Stalin's order makes more sense!

4. After the attack, when opening the envelopes with the plans, the russian commanders found only attack orders, which maintained the state of dementia among the russian armies for several days.

Now, I don't think Hitler knew very much about the russian preparation, he thought Stalin would prepare for war, and he acted accordingly to his "strike first" credo. While it wasn't an innocent preemtive attack (the war against USSR had nothing to do with the last two years of russian mobilization), it can be considered, from the point of view of the nazist war machine, such an act....

Read your basic documents about the Russian-Polish war of 1919-1920. The Russian elite (Lenin, Trotki, Zinoviev, who was the head of Comintern) expected Poland to be the trambuline towards Hungary, Germany, Austria, Romania, and the grand red european revolution. May I recommend Richard Pipes' "Short History of the Russian Revolution"?

The West tried for two years to supress the revolution, then it left never to return. USSR kept going...

A state of War in Europe existed in 1939. Mobilisation was a normal thing to do.

@ No.3 - pure speculation. The situation of them lying in the autumn rains did not occurr. Ofcourse, you can say Stalin preempted the german attack in the production lines, but that doesnt mean anything.

@ No.4 - does he give any details what kind of attacks were there on the orders? I mean were there strategical lines of attack for entire russian army groups towards Europe, or mere tactical attacks against the german thrust? (flank attacks maybe?)

The Soviets tried to spread the Revolution in 1920 in Poland, but they were stopped. They left never to return (?). The West kept going (1941)....
my point -- no use in engaging into statements like that (soviets plan to invade Europe were obvious, they tried to do it in 1920; the West's intention to invade Russia were obvious, they tried to do it in 1918); both sides have their arguments and can play with them. It doesnt mean much. Besides acknowledging obvious dislike between the 2 sides.

This cracks me up! Sounds like an Orwellian Answer!

Edit: May I ask you something? What is with you and the USSR? Defending it is one thing, but sentences like the one above makes me question the existence of a line between reason and imagination...

This post has been edited by Alexandru H. on May 16, 2005 04:37 pm

This cracks me up! Sounds like an Orwellian Answer!

Its the mirror image of your argument. It cracked me up too. (your initial argument)

This post has been edited by Imperialist on May 16, 2005 04:36 pm

I merely said that

I see nothing wrong in it. All throughout the interwar years, USSR kept all possibilities opened in order to export the model of its revolution abroad. It used parties, sindicates, intelectual, cultural movements etc... In Romania, we have the known example of the 1924 Bessarabian "insurection" along with a party led by foreigners. In USSR, Stalin killed everyone even suspected of harboring relations with the West!

Imperialist, sometimes you trip on your own circle of thoughts! Seriously, I doubt anyone would be so ideologically-brainwashed into suggesting that USSR was a "good boy"...

This post has been edited by Alexandru H. on May 16, 2005 04:42 pm

Yes, those two should be connected. I can't see your problem with this. The USSR was not a normal regime, it was an ideologically-driven regime, and, as any ideology, it maintained a few key doctrines all-throughout its existence. Among these, was the theory of revolution. You can't understand 80s Africa, 70s South America or 50s Asia if you don't see the link between the different revolution exports: Russia, 1917; Bavaria, Hungary, 1919; Mongolia 1921 etc....

The Polish war is not a proof that Stalin had prepared armies to invade Europe, it's simply a proof of Stalin's intentions.

Sure, you're so not-ideologically brainwashed that you failed to notice:

My mirror-image statement was in response to your attempt to connect the 1920 Soviet-Polish war with the "obviousness" of a russian 1941 attack on Europe.
My mirror-image showed that your statement is as revealing and insightful into the 1941-imminent-soviet-attack issue as me/someone else saying the 1918 Allied anti-soviet war showed the obviousness of a 1941 Barbarossa campaign.
And using that + german build-up on the border to justify a hypothetical soveit preemptive attack. If history would have been like that, without the actual Barbarossa Plan in hand, no historian would say the germans were definitely going to attack the SU so the SU's preemption was justified. (I hope you can follow my trail of thought, associations and comparisons. If not, lets just call it a day.)

This post has been edited by Imperialist on May 16, 2005 05:16 pm

"Intention" means squat in international relations.
If wars are to be based on mere intentions then we'd have a continuous World War.

p.s. Germany too had "intention".

However, moving away from speculations, its known that the German plans for an attack againts SU started imediately after the defeat of France.
Does Suvorov present similar Soviet plans for an invasion?
And the question remains: what kind of attacks were on the soviet orders after the German attack?

Hmm... Alex?

Here is a quick research I have made on topic.

After the partition of Poland by Germany and the USSR under the terms of the Soviet-German Boundary and Friendship Treaty, Stalin acted quickly to conclude 'mutual assistance' pacts and garrison key points in all three buffer states [Baltic states], aiming to secure his flank against potential incursions of his new and uncertain ally before turning his attention to Finland.
Early in June 1940, Soviet forces occupied Estonia by force. (I)

Like its sister republics on the Baltic Sea, Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence by a secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939. In October it was obliged to sign a 'mutual assistance' pact with the USSR, granting the Red Army military bases on Latvian territory. On 16 June 1940, Latvia was invaded by Soviet forces and a puppet regime installed under August Kirchensteins. (II)

On 28 September 1939, the Soviet-German Boundary and Friendship Treaty was signed following the liquidation of the Polish state. On 30 November 1939, the Soviet government attacked Finland and, following a difficult war, it took Karelian istmus and Eastern Karelia at the peace of 12 March 1940.
Several days later, on 29 March 1940, the report of V.M.Molotov, the president of the commisars of the people and the foreign affairs commisar, presented in front of the Supreme Soviet of USSR, stated that: "Among the neighbouring countries, that were cited, it is one with which we don't have a non-aggression pact, Romania. This is explained by the existence of an existing litigious problem, those of Bessarabia, whose annexation by Romania was never consent by the Soviet Union, even if the later never considered taking back Bessarabia by military intervention. (III)

The documents show that the Soviet Union had the intention to put in practice the stipulations of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact since the autumn of 1939, but the bogging down of the Red Army in Finnland obliged her to postpone her plans for Romania. The end of the "Winter War" on 12 March 1940, offered Kremlin freedom of movement. On 29 March 1940, V. Molotov made a speech in the Supreme Soviet, bringing back the issue of Bessarabia as an unresolved problem in relations with Romania. Meantime, the Soviet supreme command started the military preparations for an action along the Dniester, mission that was assigned to the Kiev and Odessa military districts, that later formed the Southern Front commanded by Jukov. (IV)

Sources:
I, II - The Macmillan Dicitionary of the Second World War, 1997
III - RIM 5-6(45-46)/1997
IV - RIM 2(36)/1996

BTW, in 1920, the Polish attacked the Soviet Union, enlarging their eastern frontier.
Maybe this puts things into perspective Alex.
At least thats what regular history books say, written by historians post-2000...
That kind of blows your Soviet intention theory.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on May 16, 2005 06:51 pm