Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940, Implications

By abandoning another part of its citizens without a fight the state has made a mockery of its protective role.

Like I said somewhere earlier in the thread, the example of Czechoslovakia was fresh. A state that gave up territories in the idea of "surviving" was eventually occupied. Giving up in both cases in 1940 made the state weaker.

Nobody would blame the state for not being able to stop a territorial rapture when faced with overwhelming odds, but everybody should blame it for not even trying.
It would be like the police (another state institution dealing with protection) not intervening if it perceives it could be costly and giving the felons everything they ask for. In the name of peace, general well being (except for the citizens directly affected) and cost/benefit analysis. It could even sound rational from those points of view, but it isn't.

Making a "what if" scenario it's pointless, but seeing the results of the policy that was carried it's obvious that that policy failed. Romania lost everything it had to lose in the war including her honor.
Would this losses been larger if we fought like Victor says? Well, this is a "what if" again that can not be truly answered, but occupied countries often had smaller losses then combatant ones. And fighting does not necessary means losing.

Giving up land meant giving up dignity and hope. Maybe a miracle would have been possible. SU tried to annex Finland, but gave up because was risking isolation. Here was different, but something might have happened. Defending the Namaloasa line, or a german intervention or the soviets giving up after taking Basarabia, or maybe even a victorious defence.

What was the point of annexing Bassarabia in the first place if we were never willing to fight the russians for her?

No answer to my questions, I see.

Hi Kosmo,

Romania lost neither everything it had to lose during the war either materially or in terms of honour.

For a start it could have lost Northern Transilvania, but didn't. It could have lost all of Bucovina, but didn't. It could have lost its national existence altogether, but didn't.

Fighting in June 1940 almost certainly meant losing, and losing more than had already been lost through negotiation (if the Soviet ultimatum can be called "diplomacy").

Giving up land certainly does nothing to improve one's dignity, but it does not mean giving up hope, as the Romanian Army proved in 1941 by recapturing the territory lost to the USSR in 1940. It simply required an intervening improvement in dilpomatic circumstances to make fighting a viable proposition. In 1940 the USSR and Germany had agreed to Soviet annexations from Romania. In 1941 Germany had become Romania's ally.

Finland's situation was very different from Romania's. It had geography and climate as its allies. Defending an open area like Basarabia in high summer against a more highly mechanised opponent is a vastly different proposition to defending a narrow peninsula and a forested area with few roads in an arctic winter.

Germany could not come to Romania's aid. Its entire field army was in France in mid June 1940. It could not have sent any significant military assistance to Romania, even if it had not already given its approval to the Soviet seizure of Basarabia and Northerm Bucovina.

The Romanian Army had little hope of any prolonged successful defence. For a start, half of it had to be left to watch the Hungarians and Bulgarians. The remainder would have been hopelessly outnumbered, out-gunned and outmechanised. It also had no recent military campaign experience, whereas the Red Army had a lot.

Romania WAS willing to fight for Basarabia. What happened in July 1941 and May-August 1944, if not Romania fighting for Basarabia? Indeed, Romania's entire campaign from 1941-44 was designed primarily to ensure the retention of Basarabia.

To fight is not an end in itself. If one wants to fight successfully, one has to pick a favourable moment. June 1940 was about as unfavourable a moment as one could get for Romania to have fought.

Cheers,

Sid.

This post has been edited by sid guttridge on March 10, 2008 04:26 pm

I posted the evaluations of Romanian Supreme HQ (Marele Stat Major), but no one seems to bother about their perspective.
MStM apreciated that the number of romanian troops was insuficient to the posible atack scenarios.

In few days I'll post a more clear conclusions from the part of MStM, as being a military documented opinion.
Probably it will solve the "mistery" of "what if" scenarios, giving the fact that MStM made his plans acording to exactly this kind of "what if" game.

Just citing from memory: "prolonged defense is realistic and posible in Apuseni mountains"; "parts of Oltenia and Dobrogea has to be abandoned"; "short delaying actions on Dniestr, a medium timed delaying actions on Prut and firm defensive on Carpati Mountains"; "ratio between soviet troops and romanian ones = 6:1, which not guarantee for soviets odds for succes".

My 2 cents...

1 - "Should have continued to fight" denotes an entirely different situation.

Like I said, nobody would complain if Romania would have fought for its own but would have been unable to win in the field of battle. But Romania did not.

While in the case of the USSR complaining that the opponent was stronger and resistance was futile is valid (though not an excuse entirely), the same cannot be said in the case of Hungary.

2 - "In exchange for" denotes an entirely different situation. Unless the USSR and Hungary offered something in return for what they took.

Just a minor point to Sid's otherwise sound explanation.

In 1940, Germany did not explicitely agree to the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia*, but rather expressed its non-interest in that geographical area.

Gen. Dénes

*I would like to note that the English form of the territory the Rumanians call 'Basarabia' is Bessarabia (similarly 'Bucovina' is actually Bukovina). Therefore that's the form I prefer to use in English historical text.

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 11, 2008 07:09 pm

But that is true when you pick the time and place of fighting.
When the fight is imposed on you, you defend yourself.
You might very well lose but that is war.

I find them more than useful and it is one of the few posts in this topic that has more substance than personal opinions. Thank you.

Imperialist,
I see you are unable to give a straigth answer.
The supposed differences of the 1917 and 1940 situations are false. In both cases, Romania was isolated against a militarily superior foe. In both cases it stood to lose territory if it settled. There is an armistice, Romania receives the Cemtral Powers' terms which mean losing Dobruja and the Carpathians and turning Wallachia into a German colony. Should Romania accept the terms or should it restart fighting preferring to disappear than give up territory? Simple question IMO.

In the 1878 situation, Romania had an ally (Austria-Hungary), so it was in a more favorable situation. Yet it chose to barter Southern Bessarabia for Dobruja. Is that not against the principles you defend? Were not those people also Romanian citizens?

I gave you a straight answer. The differences are not false because Romania actually fought before 1917. The politicians did not cede territories without a fight in order to "survive" in Basarabia, they allowed the army to defend.

Regarding 1878. In the Treaty of Berlin the great powers offered Romania the Danube Delta, Dobrogea, Snake Island and independence. Romania had to choose between those substantial compensations and fighting for 3 counties in Southern Basarabia.

What did Romania have to choose between in 1940? Giving up people and territory or defending them. There was no gain, no compensation. That is why it boiled down to a matter of basic principles.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on March 11, 2008 06:36 pm

Because it is a very simplistic view. There are so many factors to take into account that it is pointless to even start listing them. I would expect you to know by now that economical development is not equal among countries.

What is more important to me is that while several million Polish citizens were killed during WW2, the Romanian citizens fared much better from this point of view. Some of us may not even have been here at all to discuss this.

The fact that you consider the two facts undeniable, it is only your opinion and others may differ.

All the members in the Crown Council lived through WW1, the Buftea Peace and the fall of the Central Powers. Romania gave up in March 1918 for similar reasons (avoiding a futile fight to the death and preserving a Romanian state), but then bounced back at the end of the year. We have the benefit of hindsight today. They didn't and most likely expected history to repeat itself.

My opinion is that:
1). the duty of the state is to exist, because it is the only way it can protect at least a part of its citizens
2). the duty of the army is to fight against external foes when the political leadership orders it to fight; there were many Romanian officers and soldiers that wanted to fight both in June and in August 1940

It is true that Romania could have resisted Hungary, but it is very probable that the Soviet Union would have assisted Hungary in its attack, making resistance futile.

Since you have adopted the moral highgorund in this discusion, please answer the following questions:
1. Should Romania have continued to fight to the death at the end of 1917 against the Central Powers?
2. Should Romania have resisted militarily in 1878 against Russia's annexation of Southern Bessarabia in exchange for Dobruja?

1. Should Romania have continued to fight to the death at the end of 1917 against the Central Powers?

As Imperialist pointed out Romania had already fought and lost. There is a difference beetwen accepting defeat in battle and giving up without a fight. And after all it's was the Entente victory that brought romanian final victory not the continued existence of the romanian state and army. A full german ocupation would have not changed much the final outcome. See Serbia's example.

2. Should Romania have resisted militarily in 1878 against Russia's annexation of Southern Bessarabia in exchange for Dobruja?

Giving up the desolate regions of the Bugeac for Dobrogea was not a bad deal. Romania should have negotiated better and win more. We gained direct sea acces and 2 good ports while Bugeac, a former turkish raya, had little romanian population and little economic activity. Bugeac has been part of a modern romanian state only beetwen the Paris Congress and the Berlin Congress.

Romania did not fought the SU in 1940, but it did later. Did that resulted in worse conditions than in 1940? If Stalin wanted to annex the entire Moldova or whatever what would have stoped him in 1944? He took regions from Poland and Cehoslovakia, he annexed the baltic states and he could have done it to Romania if that pleased him with the same ease that he could do that in 1940 if we fought and lost.
Still I can bet that he would have not attempted to conquer the entire country with a powerfull Germany looking at him from across the border thru Poland. Maybe a romanian defeat would have given him what he wanted, mainly the former tzarist regions. Presuming that he would have attacked Bucharest it's simple supposition.

Stalin was shrewed, cautios and smart and he fullfilled his desires with little risk taking, but helped by the weak heart of his enemy.

Maybe Romania would have lost Basarabia even if she fought, but it's a difference beetwen losing with the enemy attacking Iasi or the Namaloasa line and losing withou even trying your skill and luck. Fighting against a SU agression would have changed how we were looked on by others and how comunism was perceived in Romania.

The romanian army lost even the respect of later generations, as it's obvious from the attitude of most posters that here give her no chance against the enemy. I believe that in a just, defensive war romanian soldiers and officers would have shown better qualities that they displayed in a war of agression.

Hi Kosmo,

There isn't any reasonable doubt that Romania would have lost in June 1940.

At the end of 1917 Romania had not yet lost. Indeed at Marasti, Marasesti and Oituz it had successfully stood up to the Central Powers on the battlefield. Romania gave up because Russia collapsed. In other words, it was reduced to a situation where continued resistance without possibility of assistance from any allies was futile in much the same way that resistance in June 1940 would have been futile.

I don't understand why you advocate resistance at Namaloasa. Surely that would be to surrender a far larger area to the USSR than was actually demanded by the USSR in its ultimatum of June 1940?

Had Romania fought in June 1940 Stalin would have had the perfect excuse to over run the whole of Romania, especially as the entire German Army was in France at the time.

What does the opinion of others matter? It is the interests of Romania that is important.

You should have a close look at the condition of the Romanian Army in mid 1940. Its nearest equivalent was the Yugoslav Army in 1940. It had the same sort of obsolescent equipment and the same French-inspired military doctrine. It was similarly massively over expanded byond the capacity to sustain it in the field. It also suffered problems with the minorities in its ranks. (Look at the problems with 12th, 16th and 17th Divisions in September and June 1940). The Romanian Army was very weak qualitatively in 1940.

Cheers,

Sid.

Kosmo, the respect and patriotism have nothing to do with realism and a clear judgment of the situation. The fact that a fight is just or defending one's principle does not mean a different outcome given the realities of the situation in the field.

You consider the situation at a personal level. I cannot say anything against your opinion, anyone is entitled with one, I may have wanted to fight too, but once you are a decision factor and you have in responsibility millions of civilian lives, you cannot judge the things so simple, reducing everything to your dignity or your ego.

Imperialist, I would remind you some old topics, although you are here for some time to not have missed them. Should I remember you that Hitler threatened with the ceasing of existence of the Romanian state in case Romania would have refused to sign the Vienna Diktat?

Once you give in and cede a large chunk of territory without a fight then you're in no better position. On the contrary - you register demographic, economic and geostrategic losses while the one doing the threats can continue doing that until he has you completely in his grasp.

If that is accepted then a decision has been consciously or unconsciously taken to become subservient to the one making the threats. Which amounts to a de facto ceasing of the state's independence, which is its main role. That became obvious when Romania came under the German fold, offering it military basing rights that it used against Yugoslavia, taking part in its racial policies and in a war of aggression.

And as an anecdote, if the interwar 20+ divisions were not enough to at least make a stand, I'd hate to imagine what today's 70,000-men army would do in a major crisis situation.

I presume the fact that signing the Vienna Diktat brought about that Germany was guaranteeing the Romanian state and that was a starting point from where she would take back the territories lost to the Soviets means nothing to you.

Unfortunately Romania was not in a position to preserve its own integrity since almost a year before, with the defeat of the Western Allies in Europe, let alone opposing military actions against our neighbors .