Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940, Implications

The risk never disappeared. The very fact of trusting German and Italian guarantees was a risk. Nobody could have known if those were genuine guarantees or a way of making the politicians accept the first step in the weakening of the country.
I dont have the time to search now, but wasnt Czechoslovakia assured of its safety after the Sudetenlands were forfeited?

The decision to continue the ops in russian lands makes sense from a strategic point of view only because Romania was then completely in Germany's sphere of influence or domination. And the same strategic point of view was to appear when Romania was in Soviet sphere of domination and had to go beyond Transylvania.

With the guarantees of Germany and Italy, Romania had no option but to shift in the German sphere of influence, with a pro-German policy. I think you realize that Romania couldn't have remained isolated at the middle of interest of two great powers, in a moment when the fate of the European nations was being decided. It had to go with one side or another.

Yes, and like I said (I think on this thread) Carol already decided in favour of Germany, placed the bulk of the Army to face the soviets whom he considered to be the main enemy and gave up the idea of resisting in the face of the Diktat, choosing to sign the Arbitration in return of being accepted in Germany's sphere.

No, the borders were guaranteed only by France and Britain. Hitler said that he would guarantee the borders only after Czechoslovakia would have appeased the demands of Hungary and Poland, but even after the First Vienna Award, Germany did not offer any guarantee.

Wasn't that one also a 'Diktat' to you? Or only the second one?

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on September 14, 2005 12:11 pm

Wasn't that one also a 'Diktat' to you? Or only the second one?

Gen. Dénes

I do not know much of the circumstances of this event, but my guess is that it had the same character of a diktat. Am I wrong?

I think you are right. After the infamous act of appeasement of Hitler's demand of Sudetenland, the further aggressions on Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement were between the CHARGES AND PARTICULARS OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND ASSURANCES CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THE COURSE OF PLANNING, PREPARING AND INITIATING THE WARS:

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc...c-01-01-10.html

It is safe to assume that both Vienna Arbitrations or Vienna Diktats had the same character of violation of international treaties, preparing and initiating the war.

Dénes, you forgot about Schulenburg's telegram No. 1244 dispatched on 27 June at 4:40 p.m.

According to the Soviet plan 1 (authorized to be used in case Romania rejected the ultimatum), the 12th and 9th Soviet Armies, supported by 5th Army, had to strike towards Jassy, in order to destroy the bulk of the Romanian troops in the north. The 9th Army had as the main objective the ocupation of Kishinev sector, then, together with 12th and 5th Armies had to complete the encirclement of the Romanian troops in northern Bessarabia. Between 11 and 26 June the Soviet units moved in position of attack. On 19 June, at Proscurov, took place special exercises, with the participation of the military councils and corps commanders, in order to familiarize with the plan of operations, and with the designated missions. By 23 June, each of the 40 Soviet divisions knew its combat mission thoroughly. It has been studied in detail a number of issues, such as the use of air force, the operations behind the combat zone, the evacuation and care of the wounded, the handling of POWs, the recording, usage, maintenance and evacuation of the war booty, the military-administrative organization of the occupied territories etc.

According to the plan of operations, in both variants, airborne assaults had to be carried out in order to cut off the enemy and to create diversions behind the Romanian lines. On 25 June 1940, the Air Force of the Southern Front received the order of dropping paratroops near the town of Târgu-Frumos (beyond the Prut River). The airborne assault had to be preceded by massive air bombardments on Romanian military objectives. In order to achieve the success of the operation, the Soviet forces carried out reconnaissance in force, such as the forcing of the Dniester River at 0435 hours of 28 June, near Kashilovka village (south of Kamenets-Podolsk), with two platoons, that initiated fight with Romanian troops. Behind the front, Marshal Timoshenko attested the setting up of a large number of field hospitals, anti-epidemic centres, mobile detachments of surgeons and 12 hospital trains. For the wounded were also available the hospitals of Lvov, Tarnopol and Proscurov, with the capacity of 32,400 beds.

Source: RIM 4(10), 1991

Wrong. Both Vienna Arbitrations actually prevented war, not "preparing and initiating" a war, as you suggested.
But this is already off-topic.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on September 14, 2005 09:04 pm

Wrong. Both Vienna Arbitrations actually prevented war, not "preparing and initiating" a war, as you suggested.
But this is already off-topic.

Gen. Dénes

Well, I'm sorry, but it's part of the charges of Nuremberg Trial.

The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Naturally, there were also other aggressors ready to pick up the crumbs off the Hitler's table, such us Mussolini or Horthy.




This post has been edited by dragos on September 15, 2005 07:24 am

Hi Imperialist,

A point of information.

In your post of Sep 13 2005, 01:42PM you corrected my formulation, "Approaching half the population loss was of minorities, not of Romanians" by stating that "the mere numbers are 4 million Romanians lost, and 2 million minorities".

In fact, according to official Romanian figures, the total loss of population in Basarabia, Northern Bucovina, Morthern Transilvania and Southern Dobrogea was 6,161,317, of whom 3,029,928 (49%) were minorities.

Cheers,

Sid.

According to Dragos the numbers are:

I'd rather go with his numbers.

thanx

Hi Imperialist,

My source is "Spatiul Istoric si Etnic Romanesc" Volume III (Editura Militara, Bucuresti, 1993), pp.76-77. Its source is "Harta Etnografica a Romaniei dupa Rezultatele Recensamentului din 1930" by Dr. Sabin Manuila (Director al Institutului Central de Statistica al Romaniei).

It contains two sets of statistics about the lost areas of 1940. The first (p.76) are the 1930 census figures. The second (p.77) are for the "situatia probabila in 1940".

I gave you some 1930 figures last time. The 1940 estimates are as follows:

Province - Total population - Romania population - Romanian percentage

Basarabia & N. Bucovina - 3,748,198 - 1,962,613 - 52.4%
N. Transilvania - 2,603,832 - 1,305,066 - 50.1%
S. Dobrogea - 407,515 - 106,534 - 26.2%
TOTAL of Lost Territories - 6,759,098 - 3,374,329 - 49.9%

These are very close to Dragos's numbers but very different from yours.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Dragos,

Given that 1940 population figures are all estimates,I guess there are bound to be differences in detail. Where are yours from?

Cheers,

Sid.