Rejecting the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940, Implications

Carol II tried to obtain German guarantees several times before 1940. Talks with Göring often resulted in the impression for the Romanian diplomats that the Germans would give such guarantees and efforts were made to try make them happy.

See this older thread: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1568

Carol II tried to obtain German guarantees several times before 1940. Talks with Göring often resulted in the impression for the Romanian diplomats that the Germans would give such guarantees and efforts were made to try make them happy.

See this older thread: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1568

I was merely referring to Carol II's message of 2 July 1940. In it there is no direct mentioning of guarantees, only "help and protect", apparently in a general sense.

Reading through the diplomatic correspondence from the time of the Romanian-Russian crisis of June 1940, I have found an interesting paragraph according to which England recognised the Balkans as a Russian sphere of influence as early as 1940.

Telegram no. 2 (743) of 27 June 1940 sent by the German Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop) to the Legation in Romania:

Do you have more information about this? Is there any official British document confirming this situation? Not necessarily a full agreement, but a telegram, report or memorandum specifying the recommended line of action for the British diplomats? This happened well before the October 1944 meeting between Churchill and Stalin when the south-eastern Europe was carved up into British and Soviet spheres of influence.

Even King Carol II suggested that England had agreed on the partition of Romania in June 1940.

Killinger's report of 30 June 1940 on Romania, with reference to the Russian crisis conversations with General Moruzov, Minister Urdăreanu and King Carol:

Do you have more details on the episode involving the British employees at Astra Română?

Hi Carol I,

The two references to British (not English) attitudes are pretty thin evidence of anything - a fourth-hand account transmitted by the Moscow diplomats of countries hostile to the UK and an ambiguous remark attributed to an anonymous drunken British engineer of no apparent official authority whatsoever! I think you are right to ask for more corroboration.

Cheers,

Sid.

I know there could be many explanations for the two quotes mentioned above (e.g., the former could have been a way to discourage the Romanians, while the latter was an attempt to raise some sympathy from the Germans). Nevertheless, as they are from official documents, I think they are worth pursuing somewhat further.

Hi guys,

were you aware of the existence of a November 2nd 1939 letter from the Rmanian embassy in Moscow which informs MAE about a discussion with the american ambassador in which he said that the russians and some circles in France expect Bassarabia to be ceded without a fight the moment the demand for it is issued by USSR?

First of all I don't see the benefits of preserving the state and the army if they fail to defend the nation. As results of 1940 and 1944 Romania lost large parts of it's teritory and her independence for 50 years seriously compromising her future.
I'm not saying that fighting would have brought better results but the policy that was carried was an obvious failure. Fighting would have not brought an worse result.
Second, the military threat was not as great as it seems. The Red Army was huge but not very good and her offensive capabilities limited. They had lost most superior officers in the Great Purge, the soldiers were poorly trained and led and they had not sufficent trucks to mount rapid offensives. Nistru was a serious obstacle while Bukovina it's good defensive land with mountains and forests.
The hungarians were obviously in worse condition then romanians after a long period of disarmament. The number of units with good fighting capabilities was small.
The romanian army would have fought defensive battles, an easier task then it had to carry latter in Basarabia or Odessa. For a poorly equiped and led army defence it's much easier then attack while the equally strong enemies would have greater problems attacking.
Germany would have been forced to take a position on this war and to stop the soviets conquering or coming to close to the oil fields. The first things that they could do would be to stop the hungarians from attacking Romania and the second to wage war on the soviets. This is a "what if" but it's obvious that with the fall of the West Hitler was spoiling for a fight with the commies. A romanian-soviet prolonged war would have created the conditions for a change in german attitude towards Romania and USSR.
Even if Romania would have fell then she would have received better treatment at the end of the war from the Allies. After all we were defeated in WW1 but still Romania doubled in size at the peace negotations.

The situation was totally different from WW1 and the comparison is without value. I for one fail to see how you came to this conclusion.

See for reference Poland's case, which ended up with less territory and rampaged by war, even though it was the first enemy of Germany and its soldiers never set foot in Russia (except as POWs following Stalin's short military cooperation with Hitler). At least many parts of Romania were saved from the destruction and brutalities of war. That alone was an accomplishment.

I understand that there is a tendency in many Romanians to imagine what if scenarios that would have miraculously changed history and made the Communist nightmare go away. It is, in my opinion, pointless, as things could not have possibly been better unless both Nazism and Communism would have been destroyed, something which wasn't possible and does not constitute the purpose of this topic.

You made a lot of assumptions that can easily be countered with solid arguments.

1. The Red Army was not going to face the Wehrmacht, but a poorly equipped and organized Romanian Army (compared with 1941). Furthermore it only faced half of the Romanian armed strength. The following forces were concentrated in the Southern Front:
- 32 rifle divisions
- 2 motorized rifle divisions
- 11 tank brigades
- 6 cavalry divisions
- 3 airborne brigades
- 30 independent artillery regiments and various other units
These forces could have easily be multiplied or replaced in case of losses, as the Red Army was big enough. The Red Army was also superior in terms of tanks, airplanes and artillery. I can give you examples of successful (to a point) Soviet offensive actions in 1941, without any LL trucks. Only this time there was no German mobile reserve to save the day.

2. The Dnestr was a weak barrier without an appropriate in depth defense, which was impossible with so little forces and practically almost no reserves, something which was seen both in 1941 and in 1944. Romania had 20 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions and 1 mountain brigade facing the Soviet Union. Facing Hungary were 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 mountain brigades and one motorized brigade, while on the Bulgarian frontier were 4 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 1 frontier-guard brigade and one cavalry brigade. No real reserves existed. 9 of these "infantry divisions" were reserve units with little military potential. Resistance would have been short lived in the East under these circumstances.

3. With most of the Wehrmacht in the West, the battle of Britain just beginning, it is impossible to think that Hitler would take on the Soviet Union with his pants down. It is also debatable and would require some more information the influence Hitler could exert on Hungary once the Rubicon has been crossed and with the Soviets backing Hungary's claim on Transylvania.

4. Stalin was out to get as much as he could. If he was given the chance, tehre would have been a Romanian SSR after the war. not just the Moldovan SSR. A good example is the fact that initially Stalin wanted to annex the entire Bukovina and only the German opposition to the idea made him settle for the Northern part. During the August 1940 crisis, the Soviets created several provocations along the Prut and were probably ready to enter the rest of Moldavia, had a war with Hungary had started. In the autumn of 1940 Soviet marines occupied several islands in the Danube Delta, killing Romanian frontier-guards (the islands are now part of the Ukraine).

So one would expect Romania to be ahead of Poland because it was not devastated by war in 1940 in the degree it would have been if it would have decided to fight and not to give in. But it is not.

Maybe some parts were saved by the destruction of war but so were the enemies saved from any pain from their actions and they inexpensively got what they wanted.

1-2.
The soviets had not the ability to carry a rapid offensive so even if they pushed the romanian army back the front would have been shortened due to geographic position. In 1944 the romanian army did not defend the Dniestr so no comparison could be made. The Red Army in 1940 was very different then that in 1944.
Even with less organizations and weapons in 1940 the task of defence was easier then attack.

3. Hitler's effort against Britain was half harted so he would, maybe, welcome a distraction as an escuse to abandon the risky attack on Britain. Hitler's influence on Hungary was big enough to stop their actions against Slovakia in 1939. The risk of Germany fighting against the soviets would have made the hungarians more carefull in joining a soviet attack. Romanian relations were much better in 1940 then during the times of Titulescu.

4. Stalin wanted to get what he could, but he was extremely cautios about the risks he would face. He was actually the best politician of his age and would not make such error like anexing Romania. After all he did not anexed Finland despite his military victory and the fact that he wanted to restore tzarist borders.

Romania did not fight then but had to fight 4 years for her masters with enourmous losses, sufering invasion and massive bombardments only to have her army and the country thrown in slavery whith the borders amputated and the same occupant she managed to avoid before. I don't see any benefit from our policy. It was a disastrous improvisation with dire consequences that will never be completly mitigated. And moral is among those scars. We would have avoid giving up land, changing sides or making war crimes

In 1916 Little Romania attacked against overwhelming odds showing guts, lost the war, won the peace and large teritories toghether with respect.

Anyone can say something about Focsani - Namoloasa - Galati guns, mortars & co?

Iama

I assume you are refering to today's economical situation? If so this has little to do with what happened almost 70 tears ago and it is a very simplistic view of things.

For those who do not know, Poland:
- suffered enormous destruction during the war
- was occupied for the entire duration of the war
- several million Polish citizens were exterminated (both Polish and Jewish)
- lost territories to the Soviet Union at the war's end
- received some parts of German territory in exchange and had to expell Germans living there in order to make place for refugees coming from the part that was annexed by the SU
- became Communist by force

The fact that they managed to break free from Communism earlier than Romania did and build a better future (same for Hungary and the Czech Republic), despite the terrible losses they had to make up for is laudable. Romania had a head start, but is still lagging behind. However, this is not the subject of the topic.

Kosmo,

I must say you are over simplifying. It is true that the Red Army of 1944 was very different from that of 1940, but then again so was the Romanian Army of the 1944 from that of the 1940.

Despite your claim that the Red Army was not able to carry a rapid offensive in 1940, the battle of Khalin Ghol in 1939 is a good example of such an operation, where massed artillery, armor and mechanized forces achieved victory over an infantry force.

And in 1944, the Romanian units did defend the Dnestr: the 3rd Army and the Tobulkhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front launched the offensive in that very sector, acting as the left pincer in the German 6th Army's envelopment.

There is nothing easy about defense when one lacks the effective means to defend oneself. Like I said, there were almost no strategic reserves available and the mobility of the local reserves was limited (the motorized brigade was in Trasylvania, facing the Hungarians). The ARR had a lower strength in 1940, than it did in 1941 and would have to be divided between East and West, thus we can safely assume a Soviet air supremacy. The firepower was lower than in 1941, despite the superior number of soldiers.

As half-hearted as you claim Germany's effort against Britain was, it took up time and valuable ressources. Hitler did indeed want to attack the Soviet Union, but in June 1940 his army was for most of it in France. It takes time to move the neccessary men and material across Europe, to build the supply bases, the infrastructure, to plan. The Soviet Union was a big target and many preparations were needed.

Regarding the relations between Romania and Germany in that period, there is a good book on it by Rebecca Haynes. They were not that good. Better than when Tituelscu was in charge, but not good. Germany had a pact with the Soviet Union and it intended to respect it.

In my opinion (yes, also a supposition), Hitler would rather join Hungary in invading Romania, trying to reach Ploiesti before the Soviets would, than attack the SU. It made much more sense and it was achievable.

Romania suffered much losses, but in my opinion it could have suffered even more in case of German-Soviet occupation (see the Polish example). Remember the German occupation of Wallachia in 1916-18. Most likely the vast majority of the Jews would have been killed and not only a part, as it happened. I am convinced that those Romanians who commited war crimes would have assisted the Germans in applying the final solution (like it happened in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc.). The entire Romanian territory would have turned into a battlefield during the war. The USAAF bombardments would not have been avoided, as the oil and refineries would still be there (France was bombed intessively before D-Day without remorse). The Soviet Union would emerge victorious and would annex whatever Stalin would please and Romania would not escape Communism.

Thus we would have more people killed durign the war, more destruction and would still be under Soviet occupation, maybe even with less territory. I really do not see any gain in this situation.

Regarding the moral issue, it would not be the first time territory was given away without a fight: Bukovina, Oltenia, Braila, Giurgiu, Bessarabia and then Southern Bessarabia come to mind.

Why do you say it is very simplistic?

You compared war destruction, occupation, territorial and demographic losses suffered by Poland mostly on its own soil vs. the "achievement" of Romania sparing most of its soil from that fate.

One would expect to see that achievement reflected in a slightly better comparative development for Romania vs. a certain retardedness in Poland's development. But that is not the case. The war destruction, the losses were recuperated. Poland was ahead of us even under communism. Romania would have recovered from the war destruction too.

So the issue comes down to these undeniable facts:

1) it was the duty of the state to resist aggression with all available means;
2) the army "ate" funds for 22 years in view of fighting when the time came, not of giving up territories without opposition;

Maybe Romania was right in not resisting the Soviet Union, but it should have resisted Hungary. It could have done that.