El Alamein

Can you help me here. I need more information about the defeat of Rommel by Monty. So if you know anything please write. :beer:

Marius, try to find a copy of the following book:

"Fighting the Desert Fox" by John Delaney, Cassell & Co., London 1998

This provides a pretty good overview of operations in North Africa from early 1941 through the El Alamein battles of 1942. Useful maps and photos included.

If you add the following two books, you'll get a pretty good idea of the whole North African campaign:

"Operation Compass 1940" by Jon Latimer, Osprey, Oxford 2000: operations from the start of the campaign until Rommel's landing.

"An Army at Dawn" by Rick Atkinson, H.Holt & Co. 2002: U.S. operations from the Torch landings through the end in Tunisia. Some information on the 8th Army operations in the eastern part of the theater as well.

Best,
Diego

Marius
If you live in Romania at Editura Bogdana (the ex Editura Z) has a coleciton called War. There you will find a book called Batalia de la El Alamein.
:cheers:

You may post please an adress of this editure? Or a link to his home page, if he had one?
10x!

Iama

^All^ and Iama,
All books from "Z" publishing house or "Bogdana" are novels (fiction).
Anyway check the link below:
http://www.aer.ro/ro/edituri.asp?id=127&paid=0

Sorry, did't had time to read the book about El Alamein to see if it's fictios or not, but not all their books are fictios for example the book written by Andy McNab or the Desert Rats written by the commander of the 8-th Army during the Golf war.

I once stumbled on a thick second-hand book on the second battle of Alamein. Don't remember the author and I'm not home to check. I was initially not interested but it was very cheap so I told myself "for cold winter evenings".

I did not regret it. It was a very meticulous study of the offensive from a British pov. It was also usefull to get into the British mindset of the time and also got me to know a bit about Monthy. When I reached the last pages I could fit the work into the frame of more general studies. My end thoughts were something like "so that's what it takes for Monty to defeat an enemy. Wow. The guy was quite lucky he didn't have to wage war with Rommel's ressources. That would have been interesting to see".

I think it was one of the first battles for the Wehrmacht where defeating the enemy wouldn't have been a problem with the proper supplies, fuel, and reserves.

The geographical situation and the land mines left no other solution than attritional warfare. The British won because the Germans had none of the items you listed in quantities approaching the British level. If you give both sides equal ressources then the defender would have held a considerable advantage. I think that El Alamein 2 was closer to WWI than mobile desert warfare. It was not very typical.

Hi Chandernagore,

I think you can extend the WWI analogy further to most WWII battles. The actual breakthrough period, with masses of men and materiel employed on narrow frontages, often strongly ressembled WWI battles. WWII battles tended to differ from WWI battles during the exploitation phase, when extremely rapid and deep ranging movement by mechanised formations achieved penetrations impossible during WWI.

For example, Rommel's breakthrough of the British Gazala line in May-June 1942 had taken just as long as Montgomery's breakthrough at El Alamein in October-November 1942. It was from there that he exploited up to the El Alamein position.

Cheers,

Sid.

Mostly agree. Minefields were to desert warfare what trenches were to WWI. Of course there wasn't much mechanized forces to exploit any breakthrough for the major part of WWI. If you except a few operational stand -offs the desert war in north Africa was however very mobile, from O'Connors offensive right to the end in Tunisia.

Yes, was an attrition war, but was in some ways differend then World War 1. Was more mobile, because of new military technic (more advanced) - rapid tanks then in ww1, aviation had a more major role then at time of ww1, and in some aspects was more mobile then that.
I say this regarding to what means all war in Africa. And, of course there was more tactical thinking then in world war one.

And, what Sid say here:

was different in the last part of ww1 to the rest of this war in minds of briliant tacticians, and i think if Germany was not perturbed by internal revolt the war can extend over the 1919, momment were was possible to see a different type of war, different then what was the majority of first world war. Unfortunately, in practice were not so much achievements because that tanks were underpowered, non-fiable, ... , were at first stage of their life (example: gases in crew compartment); planes much adapted to tactical needs were not introduces and used in large scale, because war was over. Let's not forget some: at the time of the ww1 were developed new tactics - first thinking in blitzkrieg tactics, first steps to assault planes by Camels of british with small bombs and pilots with missions to straffe, and bomb trenches, trains, artilery and whatever looks importand, and by German part with planes tended to look more like military planes and distinct roles -> assault planes, planes armed with 20 m.m. machinecanons for tank destroyer missions. War was ended so early! But, quilty were top military commanders and theyr stoopid thinking mode. Clear thing, majority of that leaders were limited in thinking!

But, for this separate subject i will open a new topic soon in section dedicated to pre ww2 time.

Iama

Hi Iamandi,

Hitler also blamed Germany's defeat in WWII on internal revolt. However, this is to evade the truth, which was that Germany's internal disturbances were the direct result of failure in the field. Germany's internal cohesion wasn't under threat in 1914. It was by 1918.

If Germany had staggered on into 1919, we might, indeed, have seen a different kind of war, but it would have been conducted by the Allies as they swept across Germany.

Cheers,

Sid.

While the appearance of mechanized forces was certainly important, I don't think it was the only reason the war in North Africa was more mobile. Look at the troop densities. They were much lower than those you see in Western Europe.

While the appearance of mechanized forces was certainly important, I don't think it was the only reason the war in North Africa was more mobile. Look at the troop densities. They were much lower than those you see in Western Europe.

Good point. No way you could create a continuous front. Except at a few location like El Alamein