Finland- Romania comparison

Maybe the finns had some reasons to not launch a major offensive in the Soviet Union: they realised that their forces are inadequate for strategic offensive, feared major loses in their small army, did not want to enrage a much stronger neighbour, wanted to keep the good relations with the western Allies that were born during the Winter War, did not want to depend too much on Germany and did not want that Germany rule unoposed Northern and Eastern Europe.

Why the soviets wanted to take Finland? First, they wanted to take everything they could, second, Finland was very close to the second largest city of Russia and controled the sea lines to the largest and most important port of Russia and third it open the way to spread the world proletarian revolution to the opressed people of Norway and Sweden. Not to mention that it was a part of (tzarist) Russia and a runaway province.
Sending Santa to a reeducation camp will be an added benefit

I don't think that Finland had enough soldiers to man Stalingrad flanks, but if it was this (absurd) case the result will have been better as the finns were better trained and armed for a winter campaign.

@ Victor All armies changed fast under the pressure of war. For those who relied on imported weapons the change was for worse.

@sid guttridge Bravery was not enough, but played an important role in the outcome. No weapon is more important then the bravery and skill of those who use it. Think about the american reluctance to land in Japan.

@ Jeff S I think you are right.
Finns had three options in 1941 and all of them bad.
- stay out of war, try to recover some things and hope for the best. This did not work for Bulgaria that faced in 1944 a Soviet attack and surrendered quickly. Public opinion in Finland was fierce about the loss of Carelia and would have pushed the gvt. for war. Neutrality was hard to keep in ww2.
- go for a limited war against the soviets (we know what happened)
- try to be a deciding factor in war (like Romania tried)

Another Axis country that did not faced Allied occupation was Thailand.

Kosmo, I am not referring to inherent changes that occur during wartime in every army, I am referring to deep structural changes within the Red Army. The Winter War was a hard lesson for the Red Army and by summer of 1940 they had already drawn conclusions of it, but unfortunately for them not enough as was seen the following year.

I am not trying to take away what the Finns did during the Winter War, but I don't think simplifiyng things to the extreme is wise. You do this when talking about the Red Army in the 1939-1944 period and you do this when regarding winter warfare which is one thing in the tundra and a totally different thing in the steppe.

Btw, never say to a Finn that his country was part of the "Axis", unless you take cover immediately.

That's exactly my point. Much of their supposed "superiority" came from the fact that they were defending their homes and families, in terrain that greatly favored the defense.

An army such as the Finns would have been crushed by the Russians in the open terrain of southern Russia, IMHO.

That's a very good point. The training value was the most important result of the Winter War for the Soviets. It's interesting to speculate what would have happened in 1941 if they had not learned these lessons.

Of course, the Germans took lessons away from the Winter War too. It just fed their belief that the Russians would fight badly.

So true! My thesis advisor was a visiting professor from University of Helsinki. He corrected my misperception on this. The Finns really did see it as a "Continuation War", coincidentally at the same time as Germany was invading.

Hi Kosmo,

"Maybe......." is not actually answering the question. Are you asserting any of these things in your opening paragraph as accomplished facts?

So, why didn't the USSR occupy Finland in 1940 or 1944? The Finns were militarily defeated on both occasions and there was little to stop a complete Soviet occupation, bravery or no bravery.

The Finns were certainly better equipped and trained for a winter campaign than the bulk of the Romanian Army. However, the southern sector of the Eastern Front did not exist in a permanent state of winter, the terrain was not broken up by defensively advantageous lakes and forests and, more importantly, the Finns had exactly the same mechanisation, armour and anti-tanks deficits as the Romanians, Hungarians and Italians. If the Finns had been deployed in similarly exposed positions to them, there seems little likelihood that the outcome would have been much different. Remember, the Red Army also regularly broke through German infantry armies as well.

Actually, Bulgaria might well have gained out of WWII by not declaring war on the USSR. It kept Southern Dobrudja off Romania. By contrast, Hungary, which had declared war on the USSR, had to return Northern Transilvania to Romania.

Thailand's situation is somewhat different as, although its army occupied and annexed British territory in Malaya and Burma, it never clashed with British forces when doing so and later renounced its claims and withdrew. Thus the qualities of the Thai soldier had no influence on the outcome.

Cheers,

Sid.

Actually i think the Finns would have fared even worse than the Romanian 3rd Army at the Don Bend. Romania had at least one armoured formation that succeded in delaying the enemy advance, allowing some of the infantry units to escape. Finland had no such forces, so a bigger proportion of their infantry would have been cut off and destroyed after the inevitable Soviet breaktrough.

Aparently you know nothing about Stalingrad.

I believe Finland was not "re-incorporated" into the USSR, or did not join the Eastern Communist Bloc for strategic reasons, which have little to do with the Finns themselves. Potentially the danger was real.

Something I learned during the military service - not from chatter with the comrades, but from a colonel during a lecture with the whole unit:

When the freshly born Soviet Union was in a desperate situation at the end of 1918...beginning of 1919, Lenin offered to Finland and Romania to sign documents in which he would recognize the situation already real in the ground: the independent Finland, and Bessarabia belonging to Romania. In exchange for his signature he asked to the 2 countries to guarantee that they will not attack the newly born Soviet power, who in that moment had enough troubles to cope with.
Well, in that moment prime minister of Romania was Take Ionescu, who called London and Paris and asked them for advice/permission. The guys leading France and Great Britain told to Take Ionescu to do not sign any document with Lenin.
The Finns followed what was in their own interest: they signed the treaty with Lenin, in which Lenin guaranteed an independent Finland.
Meanwhile, Romania behaved as the treaty would request, and she did not attack/invade territories beyond the Nister river. But Romania did not obtained the signed document from Lenin to recognize the border at Nister river...
And later the Finns used their document as a huge card in their hands, to preserve their independence.

I think it's inappropriate to compare Finland's situation in the wake of the Soviet ultimatum with that of Romania. Consider this, if Romania had fought, that meant that not only did she have to face the Soviet Union, but also Hungary and possibly Bulgaria whom had territorial ambitions or grudges if you wish.

In 1940 the leadership of the Romanian Army prepared plans to withdraw on the Carpathian Mountains "circle" (see the map of Romania) and to defend against everybody in the same time.
They calculated they can resist on the Carpathian Mountains "circle" for 6 months. But there was a big problem: as the resistance could be hold for only 6 months, what will happen after 6 months?
As it was obvious that 6 months was not enough for any political gain, all this idea and the plans remained just as papers - today in the archives of the Romanian Army.

The "motley equipment" was not quite similar.
Both (Finns and Romanians) had the ubiquitous Messerschmitt Bf 109.

The Romanians also had the IAR-80/81, Hurricane Mk. I, He-112B, P.24E.
The Finns also had the Brewster B-239, Curtiss 75A, Morane MS 406, Fiat G.50.
The Brewster B-239 and the Curtiss 75A were faster than the IAR-80/81, Hurricane Mk. I, He-112B.
The Morane MS 406 and the Fiat G.50 were better than the P.24E.

The Romanians had to fight also against the Americans, and against the Germans, the latter defending areas much more important than the Lapon plateau of the north of Finland, and for 9 months. After the 15000 (or less) Germans from Finland withdrew toward Norway in September 1944, the German-Finnish hostilities were over.
The Finns always include in their statistics regarding V.V.S. their victories of the Winter War, when I-16 was the standard in the Soviet air force.

If you compare the 2 air forces with the ratio between their own losses, versus enemy losses, I simply think it is not fair.

This post has been edited by Florin on December 25, 2005 06:57 am

I think the most important result was to "cool down" the enthusiasm generated by the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, in August 1939, and by the slain of the already defeated Polish Army in September.

However, the war with Finland did not stop U.S.S.R. to invade Romania in the night of June 26, 1940. It seems the Soviet intelligence services perceived Romania as weak, and they proved to be right.
I would not be surprised to learn that the border situation of Romania with 2 other neighbors, Hungary and Bulgaria, made Stalin, Beria and Molotov even more confident in their action against Romania.

Anyway, the Russians proved they learned something when they invaded Romania.
They started the war against Finland with a force much smaller than it became later in the Winter War. But while the Soviets added to their forces, the Finns were already mobilized and fully aware of the hostile situation.
The Soviet invasion of Romania was from the very beginning with a very massive mechanized and armored force, during night, against an unsuspecting neighbor.

This post has been edited by Florin on December 25, 2005 07:36 am

The size of the attacking force that the russians used against Finland in the Winter War was based on wrong intelligence about the moral of the finns and poor apreciation of both soviet and finnish forces. A superiority of 2 to 1 in infantry from the start, 1400 tanks against almost none, a huge airforce, a strong artillery and good military recon was more that enough to wipe the finns in a short time.
Soviets had little reasons to believe that their force will have problems with the finns as the Red Army was quite active and efficient in the second half of the 30's (Spain, China, Manchuria, Poland)
I think that the weather and ground conditions are overestimated as not only the soviets managed to launch winter offensives, but also the germans in Norway made a blitzkrieg in Scandinavia during April with small forces in a mountainous region. Very cold weather made lakes, rivers and swamps easy to cross. Soviet forces launched massive offensives over the sea landing division size units behind the finns in Viipuri Bay and on the Finnic Golf islands.
The soviets had problems to resuplly the forces north of Lake Ladoga, but the main force in Karelian Isthmus was close to a major base and started from a contact position with the finns. The main weaknesses of the soviets were training and leadership.
Finns made tactical attacks against superior soviet forces and this is a good indication of the fact that ground conditions did not make attack impossible.

Was that a blitzkrieg in Norway?
See this thread: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=1761

You have a good point. Blitzkrieg is not the right term for the norvegian campaign, but it was a vary fast one carried with a small number of troops with a strong air support including paras.
My point was that germans achieved surprise and made the offensive with high speed in the melting snow of deep mountain valleys.