Red Army in Romania - August 1944

[Victor]

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It's normal that he could not accept an immediat cession of them in the armistice. Antonescu refused the first offer because he considered it as a capitulation

Well this is what it was. A capitulation, because we had already lost the war.

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. And he could not get out of the war when he were still fighting in Ukraine and Crimea

Actually at the time the Stockholm talks were on the point of being finalized there were no Romanian troops in the Ukraine or Crimea. :wink:

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. Antonescu knew very well that the Soviets did not want any negotiations, because they were in a better position. The idea was to bring the Red Army in a difficult situation, and the FNB line was suited for this...

How could the Soviets be brought in a difficult position in August 1944,when they had superiority in everything from tanks to airplanes? The AFNB could only slow them down, but would not really put them in a difficult situation.

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. General Friessner, in a letter sent to his superiors on 23 August, considered that on this position he could resist until the Spring of 1945, if he received reinforcements

Note the sentence I underlined. There were no mobile reinforcements available, especially since most were up north plugging in the hole left by Operation Bagration. But spring 1945 is still very optimistic. Once the infrastructure would be completely destroyed by the 15th Air Force in maximum one month, resistance would be futile.

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. The eventuality that the Romanians could have resisted on the Focsani Line, and would have retarded the progress of the Red Army towards Berlin, could have made Stalin to accept an armistice with the modifications proposed by the Romanian government. The ambassador of USSR at Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontay, had communicated to the Romanian ambassador Frederic Nanu, that decision. The telegram sent from Stockholm to Bucharest, who should have been transmited to Marshal Ion Antonescu, who was the chief statesman, was handed by Niculescu-Buzesti, who was working at the foreign minister, to King Michael.

I seriously doubt the statements mr. Dragan makes, since I see no evidence to back them up.
The first mistake he makes is that he thinks the advance to Berlin was through Romania. He should pick up a geography book.
The second is that he assumes that Stalin would have accepted to leave Bessarabia and Northen Bukovina to Romania, which is pure fantasy IMO.
The third is that he first says that Stalin could have accepted the Romanian pretensions and then he says that he did (through Mrs. Kollontay). What actually happened was that on 4 June Frederic Nano communicated to Bucharest that points 1, 2 and 4 of the minimal conditions are not negotiable. Moscow agreed to reduce the quantum of the reparations to some degree and to give 15 days to the Wehrmacht to retreat from Romania, even though it did not believe that the Germans would do such a thing willingly. They also agreed to leave a district of Romanian territory under Romanian control.
The fourth mistake is the fact that the telegram never reached the marshal, but was stopped by the king who apparently had some power ambitions. Besides the fact that it accuses the king, without actually bringing any evidence, it is wrong. The reply from Bucharest came on 11 June and it said that we were not willing to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and that the speeding up of the negations at Stockholm could hamper other efforts. The telegram was signed by Gheorghe Davidescu and Camil Demetrescu. The author was Ica Antonescu.

Please use a more serious source

Probably someone would have had to believe col. Masterson (the chief of the British Intelligence Service in Cairo) when he said on 29 April: If you do not accept now these conditions, later they will be much worse.

[Victor]

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However, there is a valid theory to say that maybe we wouldn't have lost so much:

Oh, but we could have lost much more. The country could suffer even more destruction because of the prolonged military operations and American raids. What makes you think the Soviets would have kept their end of the bargain. They could have started arresting many officers and soldiers (maybe not 130,000) for reason of simply fighting against the SU. You have the perfect example in your family. The Soviets had on their list the destruction of the Royal Army, one way or the other. And then there would be a much stronger German army inside Romania, which would have to be driven out and it would be much, much more difficult than it actually was. And the list could go on.

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Behind a fortified line, we would have had less casualties, the troops and officers' morale would have been higher, and if May '45 would have caught us in this stalemate defense, maybe the Soviets, having already finished the German war, would have agreed to more acceptable terms - after all, we were not threatening them and they were tired of fighting too.

May 45? You must be joking. The line would not have held for long, not without serious mobile reserves and with the American bombers destroying the infrastructure behind the front, without encountering any real opposition. It is that simple.

[dragos]

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No, let yourself in the arms of the Russian bear!  Nu'l lasa sa intre pe Ivan, ca se suie pe divan! (something like this) Maybe not days, but weeks... And even months... The Red Army was not defending her own territory, she was on foreign one. The determination was ours... Defend our country.

I can never agree with this, because I don't think we could have resisted so long. We simply were not strong enough.

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It was not the Romanian nation, who turned on 23 August against Germany, and allied itself with the Soviets. A minority of conspirators did it, and nobody knew it then.

And it was Romanian nation that wanted to carry on military operations on the territory of Soviet Union, beyond Dniester ? Our logistics at Odessa could not even provide basic rations. Our soldiers were foraging the countryside to find food!

At least the intention of the "conspirators" was to stop a bloodshed, not to make one.

[mabadesc]

Victor, I think 23 August was a fiasco, but I accuse both Antonescu AND the King/Sanatescu/Communist circle.

Mihai and his circle admittedly were in a desperate situation but they shouldn't have allowed the situation to get to that point. Also, I don't agree with them capitulating.

Antonescu was responsible for being so stubborn and listening to Hitler by advocating the illogical don't-give-up-a-single-yard resistance on the Moldavian front. Once again, he should have listened to his Field Commanders (Romanian and German) well before 23 August. Who knows what would have happened?

About the "how much worse could it have been" question, it's pure speculation. I can't say what would have happened. You're right, maybe it would have been worse, although it's hard to imagine how. But you have to admit that maybe, maybe it could have been a little better. By "better" I mean less dead people, fewer war reparations...

[C-2]

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Victor, I think 23 August was a fiasco, but I accuse both Antonescu AND the King/Sanatescu/Communist circle. Mihai and his circle admittedly were in a desperate situation but they shouldn't have allowed the situation to get to that point.  Also, I don't agree with them capitulating. Antonescu was responsible for being so stubborn and listening to Hitler by advocating the illogical don't-give-up-a-single-yard resistance on the Moldavian front.  Once again, he should have listened to his Field Commanders (Romanian and German) well before 23 August.  Who knows what would have happened? About the \"how much worse could it have been\" question, it's pure speculation.  I can't say what would have happened.  You're right, maybe it would have been worse, although it's hard to imagine how.  But you have to admit that maybe, maybe it could have been a little better.  By \"better\" I mean less dead people, fewer war reparations...

From what I heard from veterans ,the days before 23 August ,were days of shortage,fear and total chaos.
Dezertion was hight and there was alot of mistrust on the leaderschip.
Cannot imagin myself a better situation than the one that occured.
At least our cities were not distroyed by bombing and house to house fighting.
The political arangments were already made at Yalta,(betwen the sick old man,the drunk,and the psiho).
I just can't imagine myself that people belive that the Romanian army could stand the Russians almost without tanks and anti tanks weapons!
A lot of army units were equiped with ww1 Russian equipment.....

[Geto-Dacul]

C-2 wrote :

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I just can't imagine myself that people belive that the Romanian army could stand the Russians almost without tanks and anti tanks weapons!   A lot of army units were equiped with ww1 Russian equipment.....

Do not forget that the new refielded Romanian Army of 1944 was best in equipment and tactics. And one of the most important things acquired by the Romanians was experience. It's for sure that the Russians had some six times more tanks (maybe even more), but despite the violent breaktrough, Romanian and German armies (maybe less for the German 6th Army) were still capable of a general and gradual retreat behind the FNB line on 23 August. Axis forces were lightly superior in men to the Soviet forces.

Getu'

[Geto-Dacul]

dragos wrote :

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And it was Romanian nation that wanted to carry on military operations on the territory of Soviet Union, beyond Dniester ? Our logistics at Odessa could not even provide basic rations. Our soldiers were foraging the countryside to find food!   At least the intention of the \"conspirators\" was to stop a bloodshed, not to make one.

For the moment, you are only right with the Odesa thing ; Antonescu was in part guilty of that horrible campaign, but we cannot accuse only him for the bad situation in which was the army and logistics. (in 1940, she was even weaker). The 1941 war was inevitable, and the destruction of potential bases on the Nistru and beyond was capital. Of what I remember, Antonescu organised some national polls on the subject after crossing the Nistru, in which his action received more than 85% approbation... Of course you could say that it was not a free and "democratic" poll, as was the régime too. King Michael and Sanatescu never consulted the nation for the crossing of the 1938 boundary between Romania and Hungary... So who's better?! :wink:

Conspirators stopping a bloodshed!? :shock:
Hoy they could stop a bloodshed when they lied an entire country at the radio, on 23 August, with the joke that "we accepted the armistice"??? What armistice? A Soviet dictate was signed at Moscow, on 12th September 1944! But no armistice... In these conditions, it was normal that the Soviets captured 150.000 Romanian soldiers... You know what did the conspirators? They largely opened the doors to the Red Army, without any guarantee! They betrayed the honor of a people by giving it's leader (Antonescu) in Russian hands, unconditionally... Not only they did not stop a bloodshed, but they had given the country to Stalin. As Nicolae Baciu said : Sell out to Stalin!

[Geto-Dacul]

Victor wrote :

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Well this is what it was. A capitulation, because we had already lost the war.

When could we sign the armistice? When the Luftwaffe was bombing Moscow, in December 1941? :shock:

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Actually at the time the Stockholm talks were on the point of being finalized there were no Romanian troops in the Ukraine or Crimea.

Stockholm talks began when Romanian troops were still evacuating from Crimea... (is it true?)

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How could the Soviets be brought in a difficult position in August 1944,when they had superiority in everything from tanks to airplanes? The AFNB could only slow them down, but would not really put them in a difficult situation.

The plan was to stop the offensive for some weeks on the FNB line. A too great extension of the Ukrainian Fronts could not have let them to assault so fast the FNB line. How much airplaines did had the Soviet 15th Airforce on the front? And the Germans? The Romanians had roughly some 600... From which a number were fighters.

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Once the infrastructure would be completely destroyed by the 15th Air Force in maximum one month, resistance would be futile.

Concrete bunkers? And with flak batteries?

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The first mistake he makes is that he thinks the advance to Berlin was through Romania. He should pick up a geography book.

One of the Ukrainian Fronts that "liberated" Romania, participated in the battle for Berlin.

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The second is that he assumes that Stalin would have accepted to leave Bessarabia and Northen Bukovina to Romania, which is pure fantasy IMO.

It was more a moral boost, in the kind of : "See, we did not totally abandon Basarabia"... After the war at the peace negotiations : "Ok. We lost Basarabia, but we did not lost our independence"... This is a naive point of view, taking in account that Romanian politicians "did not know" of the Teheran, Casablanca and Yalta arrangements. I'm sure that Antonescu had suspicions. After all, that point was discusses it its last interview with the fuhrer :
After Hitler had warned Antonescu that the Soviets would never allow a British landing in the Balkans, the meeting broke up in mutual exhaustion.

Mark Axworthy's THIRD AXIS, FOURTH ALLY page 161.

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The fourth mistake is the fact that the telegram never reached the marshal, but was stopped by the king who apparently had some power ambitions. Besides the fact that it accuses the king, without actually bringing any evidence, it is wrong. The reply from Bucharest came on 11 June and it said that we were not willing to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and that the speeding up of the negations at Stockholm could hamper other efforts. The telegram was signed by Gheorghe Davidescu and Camil Demetrescu. The author was Ica Antonescu.

Dragan talks about a Soviet reply from Alexandra Kollontay on 23 August, that never reached the Marshal. For sure that Dragan has NO source for it, but he must have taken it from somewhere. The citation was from a "brief" Romanian history book... I'll study his other book about the subject (more serious) : Antonescu, maresalul Romaniei si rasboaiele de reintregire, Nagard, Switzerland.

Getu'

[dragos]

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Conspirators stopping a bloodshed!? :shock:   Hoy they could stop a bloodshed when they lied an entire country at the radio, on 23 August, with the joke that \"we accepted the armistice\"??? What armistice? A Soviet dictate was signed at Moscow, on 12th September 1944! But no armistice... In these conditions, it was normal that the Soviets captured 150.000 Romanian soldiers... You know what did the conspirators? They largely opened the doors to the Red Army, without any guarantee! They betrayed the honor of a people by giving it's leader (Antonescu) in Russian hands, unconditionally... Not only they did not stop a bloodshed, but they had given the country to Stalin. As Nicolae Baciu said : Sell out to Stalin!

I did not said they stopped the bloodshed, but this was the intention.
The capture of Romanian soldiers was probably inevitable in any situation. They were still in contact with the enemy, and even if all Soviet units received new orders immediately (although I doubt), many probably found the oportunity to take revenge against their enemy. During the previous of war, much anger and hate has accumulated.
The difference is not the way the armistice was made, but wether to make an armistice, or turn Romanian land into a real battleground, as Victor said, and I strongly believe that the price in the latter case was much higher.

[Victor]

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When could we sign the armistice? When the Luftwaffe was bombing Moscow, in December 1941?

I fail to understand your joke. Do you not think that in 1944 the war was already lost?
Btw, the Luftwaffe's systematic air raids over Moscow ended in August 1941. Until April 1942,they carried out sporadic missions over the Soviet capital, but with 3 to 10 bombers. I would not really call that bombing Moscow. More like disturbing the peace.

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Stockholm talks began when Romanian troops were still evacuating from Crimea... (is it true?)

What is the relevance of when they began? The reply from the Soviet side I mentioned on 4 June was after the Romanian troops came back from Crimea.

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How much airplaines did had the Soviet 15th Airforce on the front? And the Germans? The Romanians had roughly some 600... From which a number were fighters.

The15th Air Force was American not Soviet. J:)
The Soviets employed the 5th and 17th Air Armies in the Iasi-Chisinau Operation. That is 1952 aircraft.

And from where, might I ask did the Romanians had "roughly some 600... From which a number were fighters"?
On the Moldavian Front were only 9th Fighter Group, which was like a squadron strong after the fights with the Americans, and the IAR-81C equipped 2nd and 4th Fighter Groups.

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Concrete bunkers? And with flak batteries?.

Infrastructure means railroad, bridges etc. Can you put these in bunkers? Please do not make comments just for the sake of it.

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One of the Ukrainian Fronts that \"liberated\" Romania, participated in the battle for Berlin.

Really? Which one?

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It was more a moral boost, in the kind of : \"See, we did not totally abandon Basarabia\"....

Morale boost? When your house is destroyed and you can barely find any food, do you really think you would be more happy because you did not totally abandon Bessarabia? The same Bessarabia which was the Cinderella of the inter-war Romania?
But even if we look at things this way, I would still not consider that we abandoned Bessarabia. We fought, we lost many men and we were defeated. There was nothing more we could do.

[Geto-Dacul]

dragos wrote :

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I did not said they stopped the bloodshed, but this was the intention.

If the intention was to stop a bloodshed, than they should have worked differently... And never gave the country's leader like a dog or criminal to the invading power. All this just proves that they had only one intention : take power.

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The capture of Romanian soldiers was probably inevitable in any situation.

It was not inevitable if the gradual and defensive retreat would have been executed under Antonescu's lead. The Soviets promised that "the Romanian Army wouldn't be disarmed" only to Antonescu's government. The coup d'état of 23 August rendered obsolete every Soviet promise, because USSR did not negotiate anything with King Michael or Moscony, but with Antonescu and his emissaries.

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The difference is not the way the armistice was made, but wether to make an armistice, or turn Romanian land into a real battleground, as Victor said, and I strongly believe that the price in the latter case was much higher.

Marshal Antonescu knew very well the danger of turning the country into a battle ground between USSR and Germany. On 23 August, Antonescu was ready to conclude an armistice, according to Mircea Ioanitiu, in his personal "Memoirs", at page 24 : "In the morning of 23 August I was awakened by Mihai Antonescu's phone, who asked an audience for him and the marshal to the king, that day."

So it seems that it was not Michael who convoqued Antonescu, but the contrary.

[Geto-Dacul]

Victor wrote :

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I fail to understand your joke. Do you not think that in 1944 the war was already lost?

I was not really intending to make a joke! :wink: And yes, I think that after Zitadel, the initiative was lost by the Axis powers on the Eastern Front.

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Btw, the Luftwaffe's systematic air raids over Moscow ended in August 1941. Until April 1942,they carried out sporadic missions over the Soviet capital, but with 3 to 10 bombers. I would not really call that bombing Moscow. More like disturbing the peace.

Even if sporadic, there were still victims... In 1944, I don't think that the Luftawaffe had the power anymore to bomb Moscow.

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The15th Air Force was American not Soviet. J   The Soviets employed the 5th and 17th Air Armies in the Iasi-Chisinau Operation. That is 1952 aircraft.

Thanks for the info!!!

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And from where, might I ask did the Romanians had \"roughly some 600... From which a number were fighters\"?   On the Moldavian Front were only 9th Fighter Group, which was like a squadron strong after the fights with the Americans, and the IAR-81C equipped 2nd and 4th Fighter Groups.

In Mark Axworthy THIRD AXIS FOURTH ALLY, page 297 :

On 1st February 1944, Romania had 958 serviceable aircrafts of all sorts.

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Really? Which one?

Sorry, my fault. I was confused here... It was the 1st Ukrainian and not the 2nd, at Berlin! :oops:

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The same Bessarabia which was the Cinderella of the inter-war Romania?

The inter-war politics and administration were very different of these of WW2, as the political regimes.

[inahurry]

Victor's bias against Antonescu is well known. I understand him, anyway, these days one risks jail. Long live demmmmmmm... [ hey, what's this gag - says : Ordonanta de Urgenta - dar parca le mai stie cineva numarul ]

[Victor]

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On 1st February 1944, Romania had 958 serviceable aircrafts of all sorts

Of all sorts also includes training, liaison and transport aircraft. Also February 1944 is before the US 15th Air Force bomber offensive and the horrible losses they provoked to the ARR, in both men and aircraft.

According to Denes’ Rumanian Air Force: Prime decade 1938-1947 the Luftwaffe and ARR could muster on 20 August at most 300 fighters, of which less than 200 were serviceable. The Soviets had 802figters in the two air armies and also several regiments in the VVS-ChF. Note that the majority of the Romanian fighters on the front were the obsolete IAR-81Cs of the 2nd and 4th Fighter Groups. The 2nd FG lost 8 aircraft and had 2 damaged during those 3 days. Only the skill of the pilots brought the 4 confirmed (+1 probable) kills against superior aircraft.

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On 23 August, Antonescu was ready to conclude an armistice

If that were true it would have come up in his written testimony from the evening of 23 August 1944. Instead he argues that he could have never accepted the Soviet demands.

IMO the two Antonescus were a little confusing in their actions. Mihai Antonescu told Neagu Djuvara (who was at Stockholm) in the evening of 22 August that the military situation compels us to ask for an armistice. He also told him to ask if the Soviet conditions were the same as the ones in April and with whom they want to negotiate: the government or the opposition. Whne Djuvara asked ifthere was still time to negotiate, Ica Antonescu replied that we still have the Focsani-Glati line, Muntenia, the Carpathians.
He also asked the Turkish ambassador on 23 August to transmit a message to the English and American governments in which he asked what would they prefer: to send a Romanian representative to Moscow to sign the armistice, to enter talks simultaneously with all the Allies to set the armistice conditions or to discuss the terms only with them at Cairo.
But the bottom line is that the Soviets terms would have remained the same and I doubt the marshal would have accepted them.

[Victor]

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Victor's bias against Antonescu is well known. I understand him, anyway, these days one risks jail. Long live demmmmmmm... [ hey, what's this gag - says : Ordonanta de Urgenta - dar parca le mai stie cineva numarul ]

Why am I biased? Just because I have different views than you do? I generally base my opinions on facts and try to see the things as they were: grey. Not like some who prefer myths.