Red Army in Romania - August 1944

[Victor]

QUOTE

YES. Antonescu was wayting for a \"clearer\" response from the Soviet part. I actually see as naive the attitude of both Antonescu & opposition, to hope obtaining Anglo-American \"gurantees\", when it was obvious that the Soviets had the initiative.

Well, they did not know about the talks between Churchill and Stalin and the percentages. Would a true Anglophile like Antonescu think that such a thing was possible?

QUOTE

His conclusion was sincere, correct and realistic...

Yes, but unfortunately for us it was inevitable, no matter what we would have done in the 1940-44 period.

[tempesta]

About resisting on the AFNB line after 23 August 1944:
By the summer of '44 the war was lost. Capitulation was inevitable.
But i think that, if instead of waiting for a soviet ofensive, either marshal Antonescu or the king should have accepted soviet conditions while the front was still stable (like in early August). By that time the germans sufered catastrophic defeats in Normandy and Bielorussia and they were in no better position to take measures against Romania than they were in late August, and the soviets were not yet ready to move against Bucharest. By accepting the armistice in early August and by falling back in order behind the AFNB line, may be the russians would not have taken in captivity 150+ thousands men; and may be the occupation of the whole country didn't happened.
After the soviet offensive started, it was a bad thing to simply stop fighting and wait for the mercy of the enemy. By holding the russians on the AFNB line a few weeks, it was posibil to sign an armistice agreement (read surrender) avoinding some of the human losses. But the king had only one chance to depose af the stubborn Antonescu, and he had to use it.
If one think af a better alternative to the real history, that would be not resisting longer, but surrendering a bit earlier.
About the way Red Army acted in Romania:
Romania was under soviet ocuppation. They acted like in a conquered land. All the things about alliance and liberation were just propaganda. The situation cannot be compared with that of Wermarcht in Romania: germans were in a allied country and they had to behave acordingly.

[inahurry]

I agree, tempesta.

One comment: capitulation makes sense only before an ennemy you hope will abide to certain unwritten rules, should not be the offering of a lamb to the wolf hoping the wolf suffers of indigestion, wolves are always hungry.

[tempesta]

The soviets ofered to Romania a conditional surrender, even if I doubt they would have respected the initial conditions. The most important of these was that a part of Romania would remain under romanian administration. Is logical to presunme this part to be southern Romania, with the russians ocupping Moldavia and then advancing aganist Hungary thru the Carpathians.
So an armistice agreed before the colapse of the front was not unconditional capitulation, the wolf promised to not swallow the lamb in one bite . With their offensive developing well is obvious that the soviets were in no mood to accept anything but total surrender.

[Geto-Dacul]

tempesta wrote :

QUOTE

The soviets ofered to Romania a conditional surrender, even if I doubt they would have respected the initial conditions. The most important of these was that a part of Romania would remain under romanian administration.

What's interesting to realize is that all the official conditions were mainly negotiated with Antonescu, and not with king Mihai and his camarila. So when the king arrested Antonescu, all conditions became obsolete. King Mihai facilitated the Soviets in Romania, without complicating with Antonescu...
That's why Michael received the highest Soviet award, "Pobeda"...

[inahurry]

The front didn't collapse.

In a few days the Russian offensive would have ended and before a new one could start a few weeks of partial acalmy would have sufficed.

The Focsani-Namoloasa line was placed such way that prevented an important bridgehead over the Siret. Tanks action would have been reduced considerably. It wasn't that frail as some stubbornly suggest. There were bunkers which after aviation bombs were detonated inside only cracked. For sure it could held a few weeks.

Would be interesting to know who advised Mihai (and what exactly said him), from a military point of view, before August 23. Not that it matters too much, Mihai is a simpleton so obviously someone else decided what he was to do.

[Victor]

QUOTE

What's interesting to realize is that all the official conditions were mainly negotiated with Antonescu, and not with king Mihai and his camarila. So when the king arrested Antonescu, all conditions became obsolete. King Mihai facilitated the Soviets in Romania, without complicating with Antonescu...   That's why Michael received the highest Soviet award, \"Pobeda\"...

Actually for the Soviets it would have been much better to have Antonescu in power when Romania switched sides, so that all the "complications" in the 1945-47 period would have been avoided. After the war ended Antonescu could have much more easily been replaced with a Communist government and all that circus with the "elections" would not have been necessary.

QUOTE

In a few days the Russian offensive would have ended and before a new one could start a few weeks of partial acalmy would have sufficed

The Soviets had hundreds of thousands of Axis troops encircled or retreating and had to eliminate them. But a mechanized spearhead could try to get through the line.

QUOTE

The Focsani-Namoloasa line was placed such way that prevented an important bridgehead over the Siret. Tanks action would have been reduced considerably. It wasn't that frail as some stubbornly suggest. There were bunkers which after aviation bombs were detonated inside only cracked. For sure it could held a few weeks

Nobody said it was frail. I believe I already posted its strength in another topic. But any defensive line is practically useless if the mobile reserves lack. The Soviets only needed to breach it in several points and launch their tanks in deep penetration maneuvers. After that all would be lost. Of course we must also take into consideration the fact that since 18 August the 15th Air Force could bomb almost unopposed any target in Romania and could seriously obstruct the communications behind the front lines. But these are only unimportant details, which only some stubborn people see. :roll:

[Geto-Dacul]

Victor wrote :

QUOTE

Actually for the Soviets it would have been much better to have Antonescu in power when Romania switched sides, so that all the \"complications\" in the 1945-47 period would have been avoided. After the war ended Antonescu could have much more easily been replaced with a Communist government and all that circus with the \"elections\" would not have been necessary.

Are you sure of that? Even Bodnaras said that if Antonescu would have concluded the armistice, cu greu vom mai putea ridica capul... :wink:

There were three plans...
1. That the Soviets destroy the Romanian-German armies with the battle of the Siret, and occuoy Bucharest : In this situation, there would be no need of Antonesco or the king... The Soviets prepared at Cernauti a govermment in exile, chief of it being apointed Petru Groza.

2. That the king concluded the armistice, and in that case, the opportunity was for the communists of the "interior" (Dej, Patrascanu, Georgescu & co.)

3. That Antonescu concluded the armistice.

[inahurry]

A line of defense is frail if it's useless even if the materials used and density of fortifications are formidable.

In the most optimistic scenarion the line couldn't be held indefinitely but in the context of the armistice talks the few weeks or few months could mean everything.

Fortress buster aircraft coming from Italy ? Let's be serious. Longer range bombers, ok, but their efficiency against targets, some mobile, at thousands of kilometers, debatable. Too risky and against the Anglo-American policies.

Bodnaras was a communist but before that a SSI member. Probably an action like the August 23 managed to comfort both his, let's say, double loyalties. I doubt though he foresaw the full consequences. 14 years later he was an active force behind the Romanian success in persuading the soviets to withdraw their troops. With Antonescu in power Soviets still could have succeeded to impose their will at a later moment but at least we could have an armistice, which the August 23 coup didn't deliver.

[Victor]

QUOTE

Fortress buster aircraft coming from Italy ? Let's be serious. Longer range bombers, ok, but their efficiency against targets, some mobile, at thousands of kilometers, debatable. Too risky and against the Anglo-American policies.

I will repost what Isaid earlier. Maybe this time you will actually read it:
Of course we must also take into consideration the fact that since 18 August the 15th Air Force could bomb almost unopposed any target in Romania and could seriously obstruct the communications behind the front lines.

Where does the word "fortress" appear?

The American bombers had already destroyed many marshalling yards and railroad stations. And in the process they destroyed most of the Axis fighter force that opposed them. They could continue to do this almost undisturbed after 18 August, as seen on 19 August.

QUOTE

With Antonescu in power Soviets still could have succeeded to impose their will at a later moment but at least we could have an armistice, which the August 23 coup didn't deliver.

This would have also meant a much better prepaired German foe.

[inahurry]

Very vigilant, as always. Yes, that was a mistake from my part. Next time I should quote you in full so I have the text right under my eyes, all the time, day and night. You didn't say fortress busters. I did. This is what could have helped the Russians most.

Unopposed bombing at such distance from the airfields is theoretical. Also the frequency of such raids against rather small targets, if you exclude railway stations, is questionable.

But the main question remains. Why would Anglo-Americans do that regardless of the possible efficiency ?

[tempesta]

inahurry wrote:

QUOTE

The front didn't collapse

I think that when talking about a front with two large breeches and a army encircled (the 6th German Army was encircled by the russians) the word "collapse" is appropriate.
But I agree that the way in which Romanian Army stop fighting without any agreement with the soviets was wrong. IMO the AFNB line was strong enough to delay the soviets for a few weeks in order to perfect an armistice agreement.

[mabadesc]

I also agree with the AFNB solution, but I strongly disagree with Antonescu's decision to retreat only when the front was broken. The retreat should have been made 3 weeks or one month earlier, as even Runstedt agreed during Antonescu's last visit to Germany. Friessner himself also advocated this, as well as the Romanian CO's, but Antonescu kept his loyalty to Hitler much too strong by obeying him and refusing to retreat sooner.

In terms of Allied bombing raids, I agree that it would not have been in their interest to invest so much effort in bombing Romanian infrastructrure. At least as far as Americans were concerned, I think they would have been happy to have finished the war with Germany and "let the Russians deal with Romania".

Finally, I don't think we should underestimate the Romanian soldier. The troops panicked and became disorganized in August 20-24 because they were not in a good strategic and geographical position to stop the huge mass of Soviet Armor.

However, we should remember that just a few weeks later, these "remnants" of the defeated Romanian Army were reorganized quite effectively and fought well in the liberation of Transylvania, despite huge shortages in equipment and supplies.

[allanteo667]

Mabadesc wrote:

QUOTE

Finally, I don't think we should underestimate the Romanian soldier.

Yes, but the only problem with the romanian soldier was that he wasn't as fanatical as the german! In the east, when the situatiopn turned bad, they tended to run away (so did the italians!), like for example when the frontline was penetrated by the soviets at the Don.

At those moments the germans behaved "arrogantly" towards the romanians. I talked to a veteran who said that the germans didn't take any romanians in their vehicles while retreating from the Don. :roll:

In Russia the romanian soldier didn't believe that he fought for an important cause, so we can understand that he sometimes behaved cowardly, but we can't say the same thing about summer 1944 when he fought to protect his fatherland (and sometimes family)! :oops:[b][/b]

[Geto-Dacul]

Great to have you back, allanteo667!!! :wink:

Getu'