Austro Hungarian forces in Transylvania 1916

[split from http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showtopic=939]

That's because the Rumanian Kingdom and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were actually allies up to August 1916 surprise declaration of war.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Victor on November 03, 2006 08:30 am

I wouldn't call that declaration of war "a surprise". A-H was expecting it since 1914.

Instead, the defensive alliance of Romania with Germany and A-H was a surprise for almost all of the Romanian leaders, since only king Carol I and some of the former prime ministers knew about it and didn't reveal its existence until the 1914 crown council.

I would dispute that. The A.-H. M. did not expect an attack from Rumania in August 1916, let alone 1914, as you claim. That's one of the reasons why the Rumanian troops were initially successful in quickly penetrating into Transylvania, namely because there were no A.-H. troops stationed there, at a border with a de jure ally.

Gen. Dénes

I expected you to know more about this subject, it seems that i was wrong.

The Central Powers had actually planned to attack Romania since the spring of 1915, to open a route to Turkey (see the memoirs of Falkenhayn). The idea came from the German high command but was refused by AH, not because it considered Romania to be an ally, but because its armies were hard pressed in Galitia. The plan was postponed. After the Russian defeats in the summer of 1915, the plan is considered again and rejected, this time by the Germans.

In May 1915, 3 German divisions are transported to the Banat, to serve as a reserve in case of a Romanian attack.

In October 1915, AH commander Conrad von Hotzendorf asks for a major offensive on the Southern Front, which included an attack on Romania. The plan is rejected by Falkenhayn.

In December 1915 the Germans send 7 divisions as a reserve in Southern Hungary and one division in Nothern Bulgaria. The 3rd Bulgarian army is also concentrated on the Romanian border. In early 1916 the Bulgarians ask for an attack on Romania from all sides, which is rejected by the Germans.

During the spring of 1916, the fact that Romania would join the Entente became obvious for the Central Powers. As a result, they start to send forces to Transilvania. The AH brings to the area various units, most of them severely worn out after the battles with the Russians. The lines of the rivers Mures and Tarnava Mica start to be fortified. On July 25, the 1st AH Army is created in Transilvania and Gen. Arz von Straussenburg takes command. Five days later, an order of the AH high command said that "a Romanian offensive is only a matter of time."

In August, the AH forces in Transilvania are almost doubled. Fortification works start on various other backup positions. AH wanted to bring even more units in Transilvania but the plan is ruined by the Italian attack on the Isonzo. The Germans prepare to send major forces to help the AH after the start of the Romanian offensive.

When Romania declared war, AH had in Transilvania 3 divisions, 3 brigades and various other units, while major German and AH forces were under transport to the area.

The Romanian offensive was no surprise for AH. And your statement that "there were no A.-H. troops stationed in Transilvania" must be a joke. The AH units in the area were indeed heavily outmumbered, but their purpose was only to fight some delaying actions until the arrival of major reinforcements.

If this sounds funny to you, so be it.

The very fact that the Rumanian troops could advance with such a speed in South-Eastern Transylvania is by itself an indirect proof that there were no significant [my omission] regular A.-H. troops in the area, except for the usual border guards and local militia.

I cannot reply to you with precise details and numbers, as all my belongings are in boxes, so I have to reply on my memory for now.
I will be able to refute your claims only in a couple of months. So, please be patient.

Gen. Dénes

We won't have to wait that long. When Romania declared war, AH had the following forces in Transilvania:
- 145th Inf. Brigade - in the Orsova area
- 144th Inf. Brigade - Hateg sector
- 143rd inf. Brigade - around Sibiu
- 71st Austrian Division - Brasov area
- 61st Austrian Division - in the Eastern Carpathians (this was an oversized unit, with 17 battalions)
- 51st Honved Division - in reserve in Alba Iulia
- various other units (border guards, etc.)

I would say that the AH had more than just "usual border guards and local militia."

Four days after the start of the Romanian offensive, additional German and AH forces start to arrive in Transilvania. Nine days after the declaration of war, the following units had arrived:
- 187th German Div.
- 39th Honved Div.
- 1st Austrian Cav. Div.
- 3rd German Cav. Div.
- 1st Landsturm Hussar Brigade
plus additional reinforcements for the existing units

After 2 weeks since the start of the war more units arrive:
- 89th German Div.
- 72nd Austrian Div.
- Alpine Corps
- 37th Austrian Div.

More forces continue to be transported to the Romanian front by the end of the year.

if all the brigades and divisions were at full stregth, that'd be 60-70 000 men. (w/o border presonell)
according to this document they were not and numbered 34 000 men. that's 3 divisions and 3 brigades at about 50% nominal stregth, recuperating. hardly a mighty buildup.

given that the development right up to the declaration of war wasn't all that surprising, it's quite normal as reinforcements were expected , in form of the 4divisions&1brigade mentioned, which would be about 65-70 000 more men in the 1st and 70-80.000 more within week2 (if at full stregth).

so that would boost the size of the central powers armies in transsylvania to about 150-200 000 men by mid sept.

Except for the 61st Division, which was oversized because it covered a large area, all of the other units were understrength. Moreover, all units were of low quality, a mix of older recruits and remains of units badly mauled on other fronts. In total, when Romania declared war, the AH forces in Transilvania had a total of 50 battalions, 9 cavalry squadrons and 25 artillery batteries. The Romanian units that started the offensive on the first day of the war (before the mobilisation/ concentration was fully completed) had a total of 119 battalions and 77 batteries.

Nobody said that it was a "mighty buildup". However, Denes claimed that the Romanian offensive was a surprise and that there were no significant forces in Transilvania except for border guards/militia. This is not true. It is obvious that the attack was expected and AH tried to improvise a covering force from whatever units were available, which had the mission to delay the Romanian advance until significant reinforcements could arrive.

oversized as number of batallions? well if the batallions are undestregth it's not much of an overstregth division.

"surprise" should be defined: from reading austrian newspapers from aug. 1916 it's clear that war was expected at least 1 week before the declaration of war.

I think the battalions were all up to strength, just that almost all of the units had less battalions than normal. For example, while a regular division had 12 battalions, the 71st had 9 and the 51st had just 7. The 145th Brigade only had 4, etc.

As for the surprise, it's clear that AH was almost sure that Romania would attack since early spring 1916. If in January 1916 they had only one battalion in Transilvania, the number was increased to 50 by August.

Hi Guys,

However one looks at it, it is clear that Austria-Hungary was badly under prepared in Transilvania. Given the tremendous hammering its army had just taken in the Brusilov offensive it could hardly have been otherwise!

What saved them was the almost total inexperience of the Romanian Army and the strategic brilliance of von Mackensen. It was Romania's misfortune to be the victim of arguably the finest strategic combination achieved by any general during WWI.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Sid,

Mackensen is not really the one that should take the credit for the initial Bulgarian-German victories on the Southern front. Mackensen made a wrong estimation of the Romanian forces in the area and ordered a simultaneous attack on Turtucaia and Silistra, with one division each, while staying on the defensive in Dobrogea. If his orders would have been followed, probably the Romanian army would have repulsed both attacks and would have attacked in Dobrogea after the arrival of the Russian reinforcements. As a result, the whole battle would have been different and it possible that, instead of Romania having to withdraw troops from Transilvania to defend in the South, it could have been the other way around.

It was Bulgarian General Stefan Tosev, the commander of the Bulgarian 3rd Army, that pressed Mackensen and convinced him to change the plan. He showed him that the two Romanian Danube fortresses were well-defended and modern, the only way to capture them quickly was an attack with overwhelming forces, concentrating all available units against one of them. He also convinced Mackensen to attack in Dobrogea while there was only one Romanian division there, before the arrival of the Russians.

According to Florin Constantiniu, "the Romania's war declaration, even if expected, have produced a surprise, because it was expected during autumn, after... harvesting the crops".

This post has been edited by johnny_bi on November 05, 2006 04:25 am

Hi Dragos,

I accept that. But I would suggest that it is the indication of a good commander that he can accept good advice from a foreign subordinate, so some credit remains to Mackensen, who resisted the temptation to micromanage the campaign.

Cheers,

Sid.

I agree with that. Accepting a good advice from a foreign general was something rare, especially for a German Field Marshall.