1848/49 in Transilvania, about those revolutionary years

It's because only one side of the story is being told, so there is no conflict of ideas and perceptions.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on January 08, 2012 02:35 pm

Denes, I didnt told only one side's story, but you can consider like this if you like it more. Just tell me what is the "one side story" or maybe it is more apropiate to call it "half truth"? It will be my pleasure to answer you. A lot about what I said is from 1st hand hungarian sources . Some of them are even unknown by romanian oficial researchers or historians, as they personally told me when I spoke with them. There are letters and memories (of Bem, Czecz, Csutak and many others) published facsimiled by hungarian historians and I readed them personally.

Andreas: it is even today debated if Kossuth used both Dragoş and Hatvani, none of them or only one of them. The suposition that he used Dragoş is based on a letter Kossuth gave to Dragoş and this letter seems to be dated in advance. Also, it seems that he wrote to Hatvani pushing him into action, but it is not quite clear if the order was clear or just Hatvani (advocate in civilian life and much unapreciated as military man by carrier oficers as Czecz Janos) acted at his own will. On the other side, the concessions Kossuth made to romanians were so big and so many, given writed on the paper, that it would be amazing if he gave this concesions with one hand and with other hand pushing the army into action in the same days.

LE, as I readed again what Andreas asked: no one knows if Kossuth's offer to romanians was sincere. In 1850 Hatvani couldnt do a new revolution in Hungary. After hungarian revolution failed in 1849, he fled to South America. He returned in 1850 only to be caught shortly by austrians, who put him jail, where he died.

This post has been edited by 21 inf on January 08, 2012 06:25 pm

Denes,
it's surprising that you make such assessments, once the majority of the discussions we have were technical, and assessments of the actions of one or the other parts in conflict were based on Hungarian books or websites that have been mentioned! If you have a different opinion than those expressed, you are free to say it, mentioning the sources that supports it!
21 inf,
the offensive triggered by Bem in Transylvania in the second half of December 1848 comprising 11 150 men in infantry, 1 385 men in cavalry and 24 guns (according to Janos Czecz only half of them were experienced trained soldiers) has enjoyed great success in a short period of time. Comparing to the three brigades of Austrian forces as you described here: http://www.datinastrabuna.ro/blog/?m=201112 - mainly regular forces with superior artillery, the Hungarian troops success appears more then significant! Bem actually get with his troops during the war in 1849 important victories against the austrian and later russian troops! The commander Janos Czecz often praise Bem's military genius, but as he was in his army can be suspected of partiality so what can we believe from his writings about Bem's campaign? Are there other explanations (surely his troops were good, because even a genius commander without a good army can't win battles!) like big mistakes made by austrians or any other factors I don't know? For instance a deliberate retreat of the austrians in the fortified cities from the south (Deva, Alba Iulia, Sibiu, Brasov, a.o.)?

A quality which cannot be denied to Bem is that he was really stubborn. About his genius, my personal opinion is average. He had some moments when he manage to exploit well the mistakes austrians made, other times he failed as a normal man in rather similar situations like the ones when he was briliant. Also, the austrians made a lot of mistakes. In the austrian OOB I mentioned one can see that austrian forces were scatered and deloyed in depth in Transylvania. The hungarian troops were forming a large front, from Şimleu Silvaniei to Ciucea. They managed to threaten austrian right flank and did so imediately after Ciucea Pass battle from 18-20 december 1848. Bem went toward Baia Mare, then changed direction toward Bistrita, pushing austrian right flank in Moldova. He didnt went straight to Cluj, even he had the way open. Other troops were sent there. This was his good movement.

I also doubt about the quality of hungarian troops as Czecz says. One brief looking at the 11th Honved batalion and other similar units, from hungarian sources, show that they were raised from volunteer ranks and these men were not professional soldiers. They barely had 5 months of military trainings and I cant tell if this training was continuous or was only from time to time. The only professionals were the austrian regiments raised from hungarian ranks BEFORE the revolution. My guess is that Czecz wants to emphasise how good were his troops and that at Ciucea the austrians lost because austrian army was badly used on the field. (anyway, the losses at Ciucea Pass battle were about 20 hungarian dead and some 18 dead and 20 wounded on austrian side)

Austrians had no plans afaik to withdraw in fortifications. They had extremelly few troops to manage the walls: at Alba Iulia they merelly had 2.500 men instead of 10.000 to defend all the fortifications; at Deva they had 200 men. Sibiu was almost undefended.

For the start I want to say, to be correct with what Czecz say in his memoires, that he hasn't overrated his troops : so, for instance, he mentioned that half of his army were national guard troops who in their majority (except those from Debrecen and those from Transylvania who had muskets) had only lances (spears) as main weapons, and were untrained men, that the artillery crews consist mainly from recruits without much experience, that the Szekler units, even if were formed from former Imperial Army Border Regiments were undisciplined and always dissatisfied with conditions from the army camps in winter 1848-49, a.o. He thus stressed the merit of the commanders who managed to obtain important victories against first hand imperial troops with second class units, untrained and not so well armed! And the spirit that animated the Transylvanian army fighters who transformed them in 3-4 months in a strong, disciplined and well coordinated army! Czecz sayings...
Because we spoke about Bem's strengths and weaknesses as a man and also as a military commander, I was surprized (somehow) to read that one of the assigned duties was the destruction of Romanian rebellion from the Apuseni Mountains, after defeating the imperial army and the conquest of Transylvania. Why surprized? Because in some Hungarian books I met a neglect of the importance of the "rebellion led by Avram Iancu" that would be only "a small Vendee" who was completely insignificant for the freedom war against the austrians and later russians. From this new perspective I say that the importance of the moti battles increased and can't be overlooked by anyone who wants to be in accord with to historical truth! How important is in the economy of war the resistance of the moti in the Apuseni Mountains? Have you read or see some relevant documents in this matter?

I will present these days the hungarian documents who show what important was the resistence of romanians and especially the motzi. The documents will be from: the minister of war, general Bem, general Czecz, major Csutak, Kossuth. There are also russian generals talking about it. Until then, I' ll just mention that motzes kept ocupied and unavailable for other operations about 1/3 of 6th Hungarian Army Corp, who was the enemy army operating in Transylvania. This means about 10.000 men unavailable for hungarians.

21 inf,
in Chapter 12 of his book dedicated to the campaign of General Bem in Transylvania, Janos Czecz is trying to promote the idea that the oppression and persecution policy (he mentioned here the seizure of all assets of those who opposed the union with Hungary and also trial for treason of the country of those who had supported the Austrians!) against the former enemies, Romanians and Saxons, was a result of Kossuth policy trough the government commissioner Csany Laszlo, which overturned the amnesty decreed by Bem, and stirred up even more the opposition of the Romanians (Wallachen). Czecz says that himself and Bem found this policy as "harmful and nonpolitical". He also says that the time was particularly bad for this, because the Romanians were far from being pacified, and were still militarily significant!
What do you know about this, from the documents that you have studied? Is this real or an attempt of defending himself and also Bem from the atrocities committed (by the Courts of blood) against romanian population?

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on January 11, 2012 10:31 pm

At least for a period it was like Czecz said: Kossuth issued threats toward romanians in october 1848, when the civil war didnt erupted yet. Also, he asked austrian troop to join hungarian side. In late october tribunalele de sange were already working, even if bloody incidents between romanians and hungarians were insignificant. Everybody who was just suspected to have the slightest oposition toward Pest government was put to death by military courts, with no posibility to legal defence or appeal. When Bem came in Transylvania he issued an amnesty to all, but was not taken into account due to terror unleashed by hungarian government. In 23 may 1849 Bem issued a battle order to Kemeny Farkas which is odd for Bem, because it was like an extermination order. He was desperate that the motzes were still fighting, even if austrian and russian armies were out of Transylvania. In the rest, I studied Czecz only partially.

I apologize, I forgot to mention the period Czecz referred to - he said in March 1849! So far I read it, when I knew more I write! Only in Chapter 14 he describes at large the battles in the Apuseni Mountains with the Moti, I am now reading Chapter 12!

Andreas, what I said above was valid in March 1849.

Ok 21inf,
I suspected you understood the period of time I referred, but I needed to be more precise! Even if it is a bit off-topic I found this interesting link : http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s15/s15-deak.pdf - especially page 11-13 where I found some answers to the questions I put earlier (what motivated so many foreigners (non-hungarians) to join the hungarian revolution and actually fight for it!). What do you think about what is written there?

Andreas, I am not a specialist in history now, but my personal opinion is that austrian empire was cracking from all it's joints in 1848 due to it's multinational structure. It was a prelude to 1918 when it colapsed by the sheer number of so-called "nationalities" from the empire: serbs, slovacs, czechs, romanians, italians, ukrainians and so on. From the romanian point of view, my guess is that transylvanian romanians, if the moldavian and wallachian revolutions wouldnt failed, Europe might see even from 1848 a Romanian stat on the map (at least made and declared so by romanians, not necesarilly agreed by the great powers - some guys will tell that there was no romanian national spirit developed enough in 1848 - I will point the work of dr Arpad Kosztin, a hungarian propagandist writing in mid 2000's> he says that at least the motzes had a very strong national spirit even from 1707!!! hypothesis> if the motzes, iliterate and relativelly isolated mountain romanian poor serfes were so aware of their nationality in 1707, how were the rest of romanians?!; another foreign source from 1770 - romanians from Banat were calling Muntenia with the name "Ţara Mare" ). In 1848 in eastern Europe (including Transylvania) was too much prevailing the feudal mentality (nobles and serfs and so on), so the national issue was mixed with social issues. In other parts of the Europe, France for example, the 1848 revolution was only social.

The motivation non-hungarian officers had to fight on hungarian side might be as well what was written on the article you pointed: idealism, personal profit, or, in the case of many polish oficers, the dream of a free Poland (they were fighting for it at least from 1831).

About the hesitant atitude of austrians until december 1848, it is not big issue: Ferdinand I of Austria was mentally disabled since birth and completelly unfit to rule anything, not to speak about an empire. It is said that his only rational sentence as emperor was when he said "I am the emperor and I want dumplings!".

LE: my personal guess is that romanians fight on austrian sode only because they had no ohter choice. If they could, probably they would fight for geting out from the austrian empire, but not on hungarian side.

This post has been edited by 21 inf on January 15, 2012 02:22 pm

A more balanced approach on the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49 I found the book Paul Lendvai - Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat (2003) which I read now. The dispassionate and interesting perspective is very useful for everybody who wants to understand the possible causes of the "worship" the Hungarians and many West-Europeans (Germans, French, British, a.o.) have for Kossuth, even though many (even too many!) of his actions hastened the collapse of the revolution! He blamed, and most of his countrymen believed him, as responsible for the defeat on General Arthur Görgey, a man who he unjustly persecuted whenever he had the opportunity, a men that was certainly one of the best military commanders that the Hungarian revolution gave, and whose moderation make, very often, mad the passionate Kossuth! Another very interesting chapter reveals the major conflict between Kossuth and more balancing count Istvan Szechenyi, a man who, even in greater measure than Kossuth, brought Hungary in modernity! The major difference between them, although they wanted, much the same thing, was the way forward for their country's progress! Kossuth wanted revolution and independence, Szechenyi wanted modernization within the empire! And another difference, which we (as romanians) are interested, stays in the treatment of nationalities, with Kossuth who do not conceive the existence of a multinational Hungary and an equal treatment for all the nationalities (in 1848 at least) and Szechenyi who was convinced of the revolution's tragic end due to disregard of the rights of nationalities! I'll be excused for this parenthesis​​, but I found the book interesting, and also the relations of Kossuth with some of his best quality people (a brilliant reformist Szechenyi and an excellent genaral Görgey!) that he worked with temporarily!

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on January 15, 2012 10:20 pm

I didnt study the issue yet, but I wonder if Kossuth was so apreciated in other countries. Yes, he went from Turkey in USA and in England, but I wonder if his good receiving was not organised by hungarian emigration. After all, it was not only him the only revolutionary leader in Europe who fight against austrians for independence; they were also the italians. So why anglo/saxons to bother about him? In England wasnt any revolution in 1848, they were not interested in this kind of affair.

Odd situation of Kossuth: he was not even hungarian, but he didnt wanted to recognise any but hungarians in Transylvania and Hungary. Kossuth was of mixed origins, slovac and a little german. At least one of his uncles, named also Kossuth, fight ardously on the slovac side in 1848/49. A "picant" detail, less known: when Kossuth run to Turkey, the crown of St. Stephen of Hungary was buried under a tree near Orşova. It was recuperated by hungarians years later.

One of the moments that I studied these week (when time allowed me), which included the reading of documents from the era (1848-1849) in Arad County Library was the clashes that have degenerated in open battles in Arad and Zarand Country from autumn 1848 until early 1849. My interest was fueled by the series of military defeats suffered by Romanian popular detachments, led by the tribunul Alexandru Chendi (october 1848) and prefectul Ioan Buteanu against an opponent made ​​up of detachments led by Major Gal Laszlo (former officer in the imperial army, who was appointed commander of the national guards of Arad County) and major Csutak Kalman (also former officer in the imperial army, appointed as organizer of Honved Battalion nr. 27 in Bihar district in october 1848). Of course I already read the information published by you, and those from Enciclopedia Romaniei, but I was interested in what can I personally find, including Hungarian documents of the period! So my conclusion is that at least in terms of fightings waged in the Zarand country, especially in the Halmagiu -Brad area, the Hungarian opponent had a greater number of professional soldiers (not only in the head, but also in the structure of these detachments), a higher number of firearms (received in July from the arsenal of the imperial troops from Timisoara) and the support of at least one regular army unit -the 1st Battalion /1st Szekler Border Infantry Regiment nr. 14. I don't intend to analyze here the series of atrocities committed on the civilian romanian population by the Hungarian national guards (from the Zarand area), but often even ordered by the Hungarian military commanders mentioned above.
What do you know in addition to those written by me?