1848/49 in Transilvania, about those revolutionary years

[ANDREAS]

Thanks 21inf, I knew the site and appreciate it very much!
About the information posted there, I can only say that I don't contradict them, but the data posted above are taken from the minutes of the sentences given by the Military Courts led by Major Gal, translated in romanian in the book! Obviously I have extract from them only few military informations...

[ANDREAS]

Of course I noticed the difference in equipment (infantry muskets) described in "Enciclopedia Romaniei" site, for the Hungarian troops, compared to to that evidenced in the book... I have no comments to make...
Regarding the hungarian military units participating in the operation I mention that there were indeed only two honved companies taking part, one from Arad (from the 29 Battalion) and one from Oradea (from the 27 Battalion)!
I do not know if the Hungarian success was due to the superior firepower, surprise or poor instruction of Romanian forces but it was unprecedented and with large consequences in the future, as mentioned above!

[21 inf]

Well, the article in ER might have some mistakes regarding equipment, as I wrote with the sources available to me at that time. New info or corections might surface as I continue to study.

About the hungarian victories, there might be some reasons: romanian forces were hastily raised and my suposition is that romanian Landsturm from Gura Văii, Hălmagiu and Poienari were with no military training as other legions had; overwhelming hungarian firepower; more experienced hungarian fighters than romanians; poor romanian leadership. In further battles romanian trained Landsturm and better armed successfully oposed great numbers of honveds. Consequences on long term might be minor for romanians after Gal's expedition, as we can see the same area Gal crossed in romanian hands in February, March, May 1849 and a high decree of unsecurity for Kemeny's 4.000-6.000 troops in early June 1849.

[ANDREAS]

21inf, when I was talking about big and long-term consequences of the military -punitive action led by Major Gal I had in mind the fact that further military actions of the hungarian troops led by Major Beke Ioszef (second half of January 1849), and later Major Csutak Kalman (second half of February 1849 and again in mid-March 1849) managed to take, after fighting something less intense (than those from november 1848), the area Halmagiu -Baia de Cris -Brad. The Romanian troops led by Buteanu obviously have not risked an open resistance like those that brought them the defeats in November 1848, which was a good decision, but also failed to transform the area Halmagiu -Baia de Cris -Brad into a safe supply and recovery zone for the romanian troops. That notion "safe supply and recovery zone", in strictly military terms, express a need for a long term armed resistance to have such areas where troops can hide, recover and rest! But even so the armed resistance in the Apuseni Mountains was successful, so that loss of control of this area did not affect the resistance battle! I think you understand what I meant talking so much about this fight!

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on April 08, 2012 08:00 pm

[21 inf]

Strategically speaking, in early november 1848 when Gal entered Zarand, the iniative in Transylvania was in austrian hand. On 6 november started the operations against Cluj from Alba Iulia-Blaj area with massive romanian participation. In that area were concentrated most of romanian legions: Legion of Zarand, Legion Auraria Gemina, Legion Prima Blasiana, part of Legion of Hunedoara, part of Legion of Sibiu and part of Legion of Sebes, part of Legion of Campie. If the austrian plan of conquering Ciucea Pass in december 1848, the route of invasion of Hungary would be opened and the area of eastern Zarand became of secondary importance. In tactical terms, the expedition of Gal was a success, but zero in terms of strategic importance.

[ANDREAS]

Largely I agree on what you said, 21inf, but the situation in this area concerned, according to the book "Der Winter-Feldzug des Revolutionskrieges in Siebenbürgen in den Jahren 1848 und 1849" (The Winter Campaign of the Revolutionwar in Transylvania in the years 1848 and 1849) published in Leipzig in 1861, the Austrian High Command in Sibiu.
There is mentioned on some level of detail the military situation in the White Cris and Mures valleys, especially from the area Halmagiu -Baia de Cris -Brad and also Zam from end october to mid-december 1848. The Austrian Command concern came following the increased Hungarian rebels military activity in the area where the austrian forces were very weak (around the area, in early November 1848, there were only one Battalion of Romanian border guards and half a squadron of Romanian Hussars concentrated in the Deva region). Later after Brad was occupied by Hungarian troops, the Austrian Command mobilized all available forces (one company and half a squadron of Romanian border guards, one national guard detachment from Orastie and one company from the 51. Carl Ferdinand Regiment) to drive out the Hungarians from the area. Luckily, it's written in the book, the Hungarians retreated (from Brad) without a fight, back in their land. Just as worrying was the situation in the Zam area, where the Hungarian troops pushed back the Romanian border guards company and burned the castle of the Baron Vasile Nopcea. Only the intervention of troops sent from Timisoara restored, for a time, the situation. Another action of the Hungarian rebels in early December 1848 led to the withdrawal of the two companies from Zam (Romanian border guards company and a company from the 51. Carl Ferdinand Regiment) back to Deva. Its written that the attacking Hungarian detachment was very well armed and good led and the austrian forces couldn't resist them! The importance given on those fights by the Austrian command is a result of the link between the theater of operations from Transylvania whith that from Banat, threatened by the Hungarian actions in this area!

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on April 09, 2012 09:45 pm

[ANDREAS]

I found an interesting information about the Hungarian detachment who pushed back from Zam to Deva the Major Riebl detachment (two companies of the Austrian army, including one of Romanian border guards) -it was the Torontal volunteer national guard battalion (volunteer unit) from Arad (which becomes, at the beginning of 1849, the 72. Honved Battalion) led by captain Asztalos Sandor. Maybe not the entire unit but the bulk of this battalion (700 from about 1100 men) advanced from Arad on the direction Soimos -Odvos -Conop -Savarsin -Zam where they repelled the austrian troops. The surprise consists in the fact that, traditionally (even in the memoirs of General Gőrgey!) the national guard troops (and later even the honveds) were viewed with skepticism, as not very reliable units, fleeing from the battlefield when the fighting became too intense... in this action at least they did well against the Austrian army, although, we must say that the austrians (including the romanian grenzers) probably did not oppose a too bitter resistance.

[21 inf]

In that period (early 1849), the austrian army in Transylvania was redeploying it's forces due to the defeat in Ciucea Pass. As far as I know, major Riebel was sent in that area from Alba Iulia Festung and had sometimes orders to come back to the Festung, were he received orders to re-redeploy in other parts. It was not only his case, captain Cernovich was in the same situation coming and going from Zarand and Deva Festung to Alba Iulia as long as March 1849.

It would be interesting to find what were the orders of major Riebel, maybe that's why he didnt fight back torontal volunteers. Or, maybe simply, he was outnumbered...

[ANDREAS]

As I've read in the book mentioned above, your assumption related to the reasons for the withdrawal of major Riebel detachment is credible, as long as his detachment together with other units (1 Battalion from the Baron Bianchi Line Infantry Regiment, 1 Light Cavalry Squadron, half-Squadron Romanian Border Hussars, 1 3pdr gun battery with 6 cannons and 1200 men Romanian Landsturm) will soon attack (3 days after the "defeat" in Zam!). The attack will take place on another direction (then the one of the Mures valley from where the Hungarian attack took place few days before!) Deva -Dobra -Faget -Costeiu -Hodos -Alios -Arad (in Banat, south of Mures valley and Lipova hills) in order to support the besieged garrison in Arad fortress. The 2100 men strong group led by Lieutenant major Berger (including the Major Riebel detachment) managed to break the blockade of the fortress Arad, encircled by the hungarian division led by Colonel Mariassy Janos (8.000 men strong and 20 cannons).
I found some interesting details about the Hungarian troops involved in the battles, from Mariassy led-division: 29, 30, 58 Honved Battalions (the first battalion was fully equipped with firearms -"french flintlock muskets", the second only half equipped with firearms, the third almost entirely equipped with war scythes!), Polish Volunteer Battalion or Wysocki Battalion -mostly equipped with firearms, Torontali Volunteer National Guard Battalion -fully equipped with firearms, 1st Sekler Border Guard Battalion -entirely equipped with firearms (new-type infantry muskets), 2 National Guard Companies from Debrecen and 2 National Guard Companies from Bekes -poorly equipped with firearms. I mentioned their firearms equipment to have a picture of the endowment level at which the Hungarians were in mid-December 1848.
A necessary specification: all battles metioned above took place in December 1848 not later!

[21 inf]

The equipment of hungarian troops was normal for the period, as they took over armament from austrian army, mainly. The national guards were armed as they could, with non-firing weapons, mainly war scythes. The new system infantry muskets you say that szekler grenzers had were Augustin 1842M with "capsă" (gyutacs in hungarian), the same that armed romanian grenzer regiments and austrian line infantry.

[ANDREAS]

21inf, indeed so seems to result from the endowment of the Hungarian troops from the Arad county, the flintlock muskets (probably the types M1798, M1807, M1828) were the majority of existing firearms! The possible reason was that the Austrians gave to the Hungarians until the actually break of relations from September -October 1848 only old weapons, physically and morally obsolete. This situation probably not persist for a long time because the Hungarians began to produce (from late autumn 1848) modern models like the Augustin modified tubelock system rifles M1841, M1842 and M1844, types used by the Austrian army back then!
Do you know what was the practical difference in the firing cadence of the two types of firearms (flintock and percussion -the austrian used a variety of percussion system called tubelock system)? Which was the advantage in the battle of the shooters equipped with percussion type firearms compared to those equipped with flintlocks?

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on April 12, 2012 08:41 pm

[21 inf]

The tubelock sistem had great advantage over the flintlock not only on firing rate but also on chances to ignite the powder. The flintlock had a rate of misfiring of up to 30% in comparison with tubelock which misfired only 2-3%. Also, the flint needed to be changed at every 6-10 fires as it didnt produced sparks after that number of shootings. The tubelock didnt had this problem. I dont have yet info about diference upon rate of fire, but for sure it was a good diference between the 2 types of weapons. Anyway, the tubelock type was easier to load.

[ANDREAS]

Thanks for informations 21inf! I have also found a free e-book on Google published in Munchen in 1851, which refers to all firing systems for the infantry rifles used in European countries back than, where is described, among others, the Austrian "Zünderschlossysem Konsol-Augustin". This firing system is criticized from some points of view and appreciated from others. It says for example that after extensive testing of the rifles using this system only 69 from 40.000 shootings were misfire!

[ANDREAS]

The rifle M1838 who adopted in 1842 the Konsol-Augustin tubelock system, was criticized as being bit longer and something heavier than her contemporary British, French, Prussian and Russian counterparts (all percussion rifles), therefore more difficult to handle, without instead gaining in performance. The austrian percussion system Konsol-Augustin (actually a transitional version to percussion later adopted through the Lorenz rifle in 1855) was also criticized as being quite complicated and therefore difficult to use by inexperienced troops, demanding on ordinary soldiers a level of training higher than that required for a caplock rifle. But they say that when the Konsol-Augustin ignition system was tested (1838-40) he seemed more reliable than that used by contemporary caplock rifles and far superior in performance over the older flintlocks! Also the Konsol-Augustin ignition system was considered as being far more safer in use for ordinary soldiers than the percussion one!
Over what you wrote about rate of misfire on flintlocks, you are right but only regarding early napoleonic-era flintlocks, who had a rate of misfire from 30 to 40%, the later models like the austrian M1807 modified in M1828 flintlocks had a rate of misfire of only 7 to 10%, proved by intensive testing on a large number of weapons made in 1831-32 in Vienna!

[ANDREAS]

In this post: http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?sh...indpost&p=84301
you say that Dragoş was not a spy, he was what we would call today "a căzut de fraier" a statement which should, I think, be nuanced! I say that because, based on the study called "Ioan Buteanu, the Prefect of the Zarand in the years 1848-49" written by Silviu Dragomir, Dragos sincerely wanted to make peace between the motzes and the hungarians (possible for selfish reasons!) but was well aware of the risk at which he was subject to! He said in a letter addressed to Kossuth in 3 may 1849 in which he ask Kossuth for clarification of the general amnesty given to the Romanian fighters (in fact the phrase is doubtful about this amnesty!) he shows that he knows that there was no truce ordered to the Hungarian troops during negotiations, so that Hatvany's troops attack was not really surprising to him (even though, obviously, he didn't wanted it)! So he was dishonest to the romanian tribunes that have met at Mihaileni! Indeed he was not a traitor, but even without his will, he bring much harm to the cause of the Romanians resisting in the mountains!