Suvorov books, ww-2

Do you really not see the clear link between the two? There is no way one could happen without the other. Had the Soviets attacked only Romania in July 1941, they would also run into the German Heer and Luftwaffe in Romania itself. Or do you have another scenario in mind? Please, by all means, enlighten me.

Do you really not see the clear link between the two? There is no way one could happen without the other. Had the Soviets attacked only Romania in July 1941, they would also run into the German Heer and Luftwaffe in Romania itself. Or do you have another scenario in mind? Please, by all means, enlighten me.

Yes but in Romania itself the germans had only a handfull of division with no tanks.

From their homes I presume.

Mostly were mobilized reserves, but some also resulted from the elimination of the corps from the Army structure, from the reduction of the size of the standard rifle division etc. However I am not familiar with any figures regarding the fact that the new rifle divisions had all the necessary officers and NCOs. Are you?

Inside the soviet army . V Rezun

This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on March 17, 2010 08:31 am

I see nothing actually related to WW2, just Rezun's allegations regarding the Cold-war era organization of the Red Army (although the number of 150 divisions is not supported by anything than Rezun's claims). There is no actual proof that the Soviet state had managed to create a large pool of well trained and capable officers after the war.

But even admitting such an improbable fact, is there any actual evidence that all the new rifle divisions in 1941 were commanded by skilled and experienced officers? I do not see it. Or are we suppose to take the word of a fiction writer for granted? (I will not go as far as to consider Rezun a historian).

The memoirs of P. Grigorenko, former Red Army general, who did some time in the Gulag for some calls for reform in the 60s, show a distinct picture:

According to Stumbling Colossus, 53% of army, corps and division commanders were in that position for less than six months and over 75% for less than a year (there is a numerical breakdown, I calculated the percentages). Where were those skilled undercover officers?

We lose a point in this debate.
All over their history, Russian main tactic was overnumbering the enemy. After the artilery apears, their tactic improve a little: massive artilery barage, and after that, mass attack, to overnumber the enemy.
For them, the main bulk of their army was disponsable, because they can recruit anytime a huge number of soldiers. Every conquest they made, it was for land and men who became soldiers under their comand.
Their skilled soldiers and NCO apeared after first stages of battle, from who survived.
Red Army was made of skilled soldiers later phases of ww2, their skills obtained on the battle field. In first stages, they need just massive numbers, to mount overnumbering attacks. This was Commisaires point of wiew, every soldier, every citize, must be ready to die for SU.

Wow, you just reduced 1000+ years of military history into one conclusion. Any evidence to back up this very simplistic view of a very complicated matter? You just managed to sink the discussion, because really there is no point is debating when these are the type of arguments being used. I am simply wasting my time.

perhaps you should direct your attention towards the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, particularily the battle of Borodino?
because there you'll find some (but hardy all) examples,where the russians accepted and fought battles in numerical inferiority.

They had seven infantry divisions plus supporting units (that's about half of the Romanian infantry force on the Soviet frontier). Hardly a "handfull". All were equipped to deal with tanks and some even had experience at it.

In my opinion it is mistaken to believe that only tanks could fight tanks in 1941. Many of the Soviet ranks were destroyed in 1941 while attacking German infantry divisions. All the AT guns that equipped them, as well as the Romanian divisions (in lesser numbers) were good enough to destroy any T-26 or BT. For example, in the Battle North of the Azov Sea, the Soviet tanks that broke through the infantry line alone (the infantry had been mowed down by the Romanian mountain troops) were eventually destroyed by German tank hunters.

Besides this sizeable force the Luftwaffe had an entire Fliegerkorps in Romania and was very effective in supporting ground operations during 1941 (see for example C. Bergstrom Black Cross/Red Star vol. 1) and even wining them through the severing of Soviet communications.

Couple all off these with the total lack of effectiveness of the Soviet mechanized operations in 1941 and you start to see that the chances for defeating the 3 Axis armies in Romania were not that high, quite the contrary.

Victor,
even if I do not contradict the essence of what you say, which, after my opinion, is correct, a serious concentration of forces, which I did not read anywhere that has done too often by the Soviets in summer 1941, could change the situation radically. As an exemple the June 1941 Battle of Brody (Ukraine) proved that even inexperienced but coherent led the soviet forces could organize a serious offensive operation, against an opponent without pair in Europe (even if it proves that without supporting aircraft the tanks are threatened). What I mean is that if S.U. could concentrate such large scale forces against Romania, the Romanian and German troops in Romania had been defeated. Because I do not want to speak theoretically, I'll say that a concentration of forces of the size realized in July 1940 by S.U. near Romania could make the difference...

I don't want to sink the discussion, and I don't want to waste anybody's time. I think it is a history fact, not a simply statement.
But, please, tell me, everyone on this forum, in your opinion, who was the greatest Soviet general in ww2?
And, who was the greatest Russian/Soviet general in other wars, except ww2?
After that, we can conclude about my statement. (maybe can be the subject of another topic).

you may think that, but no, it's not a fact.

for example Kutusov. or Barclay de Tolly. or perhaps czar Peter I. depends on the criterion you apply for "greatest".
ww2 is a quite recent event, which is why it's present in public consciousness. it was tha same however, with ww1, or the crimeean war, the Napoleonic wars, the cabinet wars of the XVII-XVIII centuries. it's quite obvious by reading beletristics from that time.

This info appeared in the March issue of Magazin Istoric:

On March 5, 1941, Moscow received from Richard Sorge microfilms that contained documents from Germany's Foreign Ministry, documents that revealed Hitler's plan to attack the SU in mid-June.

Yes, Imperialist, but for various reasons Stalin chose not to believe Mr. Sorge. I haven't read the article you mention, but I've read some things about Sorge, other than Suvorov's oppinions.
1. He wasn't trusted anymore by Moscow; in fact, he was to be "recalled for maintenance", probably at the famous Lubyanka garage
2. Sometimes, if you hear something that doesn't fit your plans, you just ignore it (as it's the case with some of our fellow forumists in here )
3. Many spies had transmitted many things, not all necessarily worth much.
4. Maybe he DID believe him and that's why he (and Stavka) started to concentrate the Red Army to the western (new) fronteers.

The romanian soviet border had ~ 600 km in 1941, that makes a average sector of 20 km per division or brigade.
The standard german division had 72 AT guns.
The density of AT guns is 3.6 per km , not enough to deal with anything larger than a tank company.
If 50 or 100 tanks launch a concentrated attack on a one km front the antitank line would be overrun.

Rokossovsky.