Suvorov books, ww-2

The counterattack at Brody was a anything but coherent , the tank losses were so high that the 16th mechanized corps was scrambled toward Berdichev to check Von Kleist advance.

How many army's and division even existed one year or six months before ?
Not being in the same position for more than six months does not mean that a division commander never commanded a division before (if he was reassigned ) or that he is less familiar with his division than anyone else ( if he was promoted or given command of command of a new raised unit ).
Given the number of new army's / corps/ divisions raised in 1940 and early 1941 and the subsequent reassignment of command positions, the percentages are reasonable.

Is it even posible to raise 80 new rifle divisions in june- july 1941 and another 90 during aug-sep-oct without officers and NCO ?.

This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on March 24, 2010 10:30 am

The romanian soviet border had ~ 600 km in 1941, that makes a average sector of 20 km per division or brigade.
The standard german division had 72 AT guns.
The density of AT guns is 3.6 per km , not enough to deal with anything larger than a tank company.
If 50 or 100 tanks launch a concentrated attack on a one km front the antitank line would be overrun.

The average thinking is a plain mistake! And where from did you get the idea that 3.6 ATG/km could deal with just a company of tanks? Presuming that a tnak attack would've managed to pass through the lines (which, BTW, were mostly formed by the Prut River), they would've been severely diminished (and easier to deal with - as it was the case many times during the conflict); given also the fact that we would have fought on our own territory, unlike at Stalingrad, this was an advantage from the supplying point.

About the battle of Borodino:

About a third of Napoleon's soldiers were killed or wounded; Russian losses, while heavier, could be replaced due to Russia's large population, since Napoleon's campaign took place on Russian soil.

The battle itself ended with the disorganized Russian Army out of position and ripe for complete defeat. The state of the French forces and the lack of recognition of the state of the Russian Army led Napoleon to remain on the battlefield with his army instead of the forced pursuit that had marked other campaigns that he had conducted in the past. The battle at Borodino was a pivotal point in the campaign, as it was the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia. By withdrawing, the Russian army preserved its combat strength, eventually allowing them to force Napoleon out of the country.


What is the conclusion of it? The Russians don't win the battle, but the French lost it, because they has no forces to pursuit the enemy. It was not a victory for Russians, but it was a defeat for French.
"The winner is this one who resist five minutes more than the enemy".

Anyhow, the examples of Russians victories when they were in inferiority are the exceptions, not the rule.

osutacincizecisidoi,
the purpose for which I recalled the battle of Brody from July 1941, was that of a joint action on a large scale of the soviet army, not necessarily successful, but able to carry large number of armored units in a organized manner. About the battle itself, read
http://www.battlefield.ru/en/articles/168-...-offensive.html

Let's try to keep the perspectives. The border was not an open field. The Danube and the Prut formed a natural barrier that needed to be crossed first, thus it is less likely that the situation where the Soviets realize a large concentration of armor against a lone AT gun on 3.6 km is purely theoretical.

I will quote an older post you made in this topic.

The "open field" was limited to the Siret Valley, which isn't that wide (around 7-8 km) and has two roads going down on each side from village to village. It isn't very difficult for a skilled force to block the advance of an enemy that didn't know to well how to conduct mechanized offensives in the summer of 1941, especially when the defender's air force is superior to the attacker's in skill, experience and equipment.

A soviet light tank company had 17 tanks at the start of the war.
Do the math.

Thanks for the link but i have read it before .
There a couple of problems with Ryabishev story.
The claim of destroying 200 of Von Kleist tanks and another 200 by the 34th tank division alone is science fiction material Imho .
That being said the 8th mechanised corps commander by his own account is no stranger of the corps debacle:
-failure to keep contact an colaborate with the neighbor 15th M.C.
-spliting his command during combat which lead to the destruction of his 34th tank division
-not willing to acnowlege defeat even after his attack has cleary failed.


The after action report of Rokossovski 9th M.C. is more in the realm of reality regarding the batle of Brody.

That says it all...
Also, IIRC, Kirponos got killed in battle later (in september 1941), so his memories and testimony will never be read!

Than you would not mind explaining this combat deployment to me :

Basarabia and N Bucovina -243 Mig-3
Bielorussia-201 Mig-3
Leningrad ( finish border)-164 Mig-3
Ucraine-126 Mig-3
Baltic States -101 Mig-3

Why the soviet forces in former romanian teritories got more modern fighters than anyone else ?

No. of MiG-3s of the VVS units attached to OdVO in mid-June 1941:
55 IAP: 62/0, 4 IAP: 60/7, 69 IAP: 5/0, 131 IAP: 5/0, 146 IAP: 57/2.
Total: 189/9 (total/unserviceable a/c).

I am wondering why did you pick the MiG-3?

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 30, 2010 05:34 am

Odessa military district does not include N Bucovina.

Because there were to few yak -1, I-153 is a biplane and probably the I-16 flyes better than it looks ...

Interesting discovery ... at least for me!
I had the chance to read two magazines of the polish Wydawnictwo Militaria, describing operation Barbarossa (text partly translated into English). The author Tomasz Lisiecki begins his first volume of the magazine not with the description of events from 22 june 1941 (read page 62-67) but with the description of the soviet plans for an attack on forces of the IIIrd Reich and its allies. The first plan - Marshal S.K.Timoshenko and gen. K.A.Mierieckov, presented Stalin on 18 september 1940, but, modified later and presented to Stalin on october 14, 1940. This plan was the reason of the convening in Moscow of the command of the Red Army 23-31 december 1940 (276 marshals, generals and admirals participated), where mainly the attack plans were discussed, defense only part of a general attack plan. War games (3 scenarios) were held on 2-11 january 1941, the goal of which was the selection of the best attack plan. The second plan - Timoshenko -Zhukov presented to Stalin on march 11, 1941. The last version of this plan was was approved on May 15, 1941.

WOW! Are those magazines only in Polish?
Anyway, if the final decision was made on may 15, 1941, would there have been enough time to start the attack on july 6-th?

It did. The operational area, renamed Southern Front, spanned towards West up to Beregomet and to North-West up to Smotrich.

As for the MiG-3, bombers were more important than fighters, as they could inflict to the enemy way more damage.

Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on March 30, 2010 06:52 pm