Suvorov books, ww-2

The statistic is done on:
- 20 armies
- 95 corps
- 198 rifle divisions
- 61 tank divisions
- 31 motorized divisions

The "experience" refers to the time those men had commanded a unit of that level, not the exact unit they commanded on 22 June 1941.

Regarding your question, if you would have bothered to read my post quoting Grigorenko, you would have understood how it was possible to raise the cannon fodder rifle divisions. One can always put junior officers in charge of higher commands and move up higher ranking officers. FOr the rest of the positions one can use reservists with no real experience or even training. The result is a unit the Red Army could sacrifice to slow down the German advance. It is not a unit one could use in case of a mega offensive against the Axis.

And to try to close up this thread of the discussion, the idea is that had the Soviets been preparing and attack, it makes sense for them to use a force that would actually have a chance of achieving something. Calling the reserves to fill in the blanks in 2 weeks some of the regular units is not how one does this, because the reserves would be totally inferior to the regulars and cohesion would lack. In fact, as I already mentioned, there was an order issued in early 1941 to bring up to strength around 100 rifle divisions. Only a small portion of these were up to strength on 22 June. The Soviets were still working on it, slowly, but steadily.

The battle of Dubno was anything but coherent and the best results were obtained by Rokossovsky's 9th MC when he decided to remain on the defensive. Most of the Soviet tank attacks ran either into German infantry in prepared AT positions or into German tanks that outmaneuvered them. Infantry support was also lacking as the "motorized" rifle divisions lacked trucks and were mostly moving on foot.

Regarding the "concentration" issue, there is little the Soviets could have done in two weeks in terms of concentrating more troops against Romania and preparing the offensive. First of all, more troops against Romania means less troops against the bulk of the German forces and a quicker successful German counteroffensive, which would also imply cutting off the Soviet forces against Romania. Second, and more important, concentrating forces means having the means to supply them, which given the low stocks the existing troops already had, is doubtful it could be achieved in 2 weeks time. It also means having the necessary infrastructure to use the extra troops properly and the infrastructure wasn't that great in Bukovina.

That's a militaria magazine. You buy it for the technical details of the airplanes/tanks, the nice pictures and drawings, the battle accounts and that's about it. It is not a historical work dealing with a complex subject. From all I could find the mentioned author is a journalist ?!

Glantz describes the Soviet Deployment Planning in some detail. On 18 September 1940, Vasilevsky presented to Timoshenko and Meretskovthe document "Considerations of the Principal Bases of Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in 1940 and 1941". It was the revision of the defensive plan Sharshopnikov had made in July 1940. The plan envisioned an attack by Both Germany and its European allies and Japan and called for the deployment of 80% of the ground forces in Europe, with the bulk of the forces South of Brest in order to be able to carry a counteroffensive that would drive the Germans back across the border and then advance toward Lublin, Krakow and Breslau.

On 5 October, Timoshenko and Meretskov presented Vasilevsky's work to Stalin and the rest of the political leadership. Stalin rejected the views and arguments that Hitler would concentrate on the shortest route to Moscow and gave them 10 days to shift the balance to the South, because he thought Hitler will be interested in the Ukrainian grain and minerals.

On 14 October Timoshenko presented the new plan to Stalin. The Southwestern front had been strengthened, becoming the main grouping in the European part of the Soviet Union. The priority 1 Axis strike was expected from Southern Poland towards Kiev. Priority 2 was from Romania towards Kiev and Priority 3 was against the Western and Northwestern fronts.

Zhukov's 15 May plan was just a proposal, not a sure thing. First of all it was beyond the Soviet military potential at the time. Second there is no evidence that Stalin has seen it, let alone approved it. It is the job of the General Staff to evaluate different scenarios and create contingency plans. The main directive finished in early May by Stavka was the "1941 Plan for Defending the State and Borders". i think the title speaks for itself regarding what it was about. The military districts submitted their detailed plans between 10 and 20 June 1941.

Thank you, Victor!
Some clarifications are really new, others I already read in the pages of that magazine (I mentioned only few ideas about the subject, being described on 6 pages - pictures included). It seemed to me also little suspicious, because the Soviet attack plans described there were very detailed, even though Rezun (who theoretically knew more about that) spoke about the lack of official Soviet documents in this area, so ... About the fact that Zhukov's plan was beyond the Soviet military potential at the time, it looks indeed credible -the weak motorisation of the infantry units from the armored and mechanised divisions, the logistics services, the poor technical condition of a part of Armour, a.o. And about the main directive finished in early May by Stavka, the army have failed to adapt to the requirements of this (if it was defensive)!

A question that may be off topic, but is interesting...
The extraordinary growth of the Soviet army from 1939 to 1941 had a beneficial effect in the context of the 1941 campaign, or contrary -dilute the soviet units combat potential? If the Germans had met in battle the soviet forces organized and of the size of 1939 (but better equipped) should they be able to crush the USSR in 1941 or the contrary, would they have been stopped sooner by the soviets?

This is hypothetical; but given the fact that in 1939 there weren't any T-34 tanks and much less KV's, my "educated guess" is that Moscow would have been reached; but only when Wehrmacht 1941 fought the Red Army of 1939 - which didn't happen!
Oh, now I've seen "better equipped"! However, given the fact that some troops (and generals) "learned" something in the Winter War, I stand to my oppinion: the Red Army of 1939 was weaker than that of 1941, thus easier to overrun.

This post has been edited by MMM on April 02, 2010 02:40 pm

It did. The operational area, renamed Southern Front, spanned towards West up to Beregomet and to North-West up to Smotrich.

As for the MiG-3, bombers were more important than fighters, as they could inflict to the enemy way more damage.

Gen. Dénes

I was refering to the 149th fighter regiment.

This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on April 09, 2010 06:13 am

That would be the same as P. Grigorenko who started the " Stalin preemptive strike theory " ?

This however does not explain the high proportion of Major generals leading the newlly mobilised divisions, when prewar division were often lead by oficers with the rank of colonel.

This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on April 09, 2010 06:23 am

@ Victor and others

I did not take Glantz figures for granted and did my own computations (only for ODESSA M.D. )

The data is correct however i wish to make one observation.

By the end off July 1941 the precentage of officers
with more than one year of experience as a division commander would rise to 56 %.
Here are the names included in my statistic:

A I PASTREVICH -95TH R.DIV.
V N MARTSINKEVICH- 176TH R.DIV.
S G GALAKTIONOV -30TH Mn.R.DIV
F YE SHEVERDIN -747TH R.DIV.
A S ZAKHARCHENKO -25TH R.DIV.
P G TSIRULNIKOV -51ST R.DIV
V K BARANOV -5TH Ca. DIV
A F BYCHOSKII-9TH Ca. DIV.
YA F YEREMENKO -116TH R.DIV
M S TKACHEV-106TH R.DIV.
P V CHERNYAEV-156TH R.DIV
I I KHORUN -150TH R.DIV
G I KUZMIN -11TH Tk. DIV.
M I MYNDRO -16TH Tk. DIV.
N N BELOV -15TH Mot. Div.
V P KRYMOV -44TH Tk. DIV.
F N SHILOV -218TH Mot. Div.




This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on April 09, 2010 06:54 am

Why would a 25 year old rezervist , with two years of military service , be totally inferior , to a 19 to 21 y.o. conscript ?

Just out of curiosity: how many were 25 year old reservists with 2 years of military service were called up and how many fresh 19/21 years olds had just been conscripted before the war began?

I think it is common sense that a bunch of reservists called up for duty and shipped to the front in a matter of weeks (as the Soviets desperately did in the summer of 1941) will perform on average worse than regulars would. The complexity of a military force in the 20th century is immense. You cannot just make people that had some military service at some point in their lives click and act with the same cohesion and efficiency as soldiers that have been training together for at least some months. Also the physical fitness of a civilian would also be lower on average and the knowledge of the more modern equipment/tactics would be lacking. All of this gets worse when the reservists and conscripts called up have on average lower education and are used not to display too much initiative (if they know what's good for them).

Than you would not mind explaining this combat deployment to me :

Basarabia and N Bucovina -243 Mig-3
Bielorussia-201 Mig-3
Leningrad ( finish border)-164 Mig-3
Ucraine-126 Mig-3
Baltic States -101 Mig-3

Why the soviet forces in former romanian teritories got more modern fighters than anyone else ?

I don't have BC/RS at hand right now, so I cannot provide the figures, but, from memory, the Kiev and Odessa Military Districts had received by June 1941 more
"modern" aircraft than other MDs.

The MiG-3 in particular was a high-altitude interceptor, i. e. a defensive weapon. The first months of service on the Eastern Front proved it was pretty much crap in other types of missions.

I do not know if Grigorenko started the "Stalin preemptive strike theory". From what I read, Piotr Grigorenko was very critical of the situation of the Red Army's pre-Barbarossa status.

If you are referring to what Rezun had him reportedly say, then better read this old post (8 years) now on AHF: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php...2b3892db#p88729

Regarding the second issue, please first demonstrate with numbers and sources the "high proportion pf major generals leading the newly mobilized divisions". If this is indeed true, then one explanation could be that some of these officers resulted from the disbandment of the corps level which I suppose freed up many high-ranking officers. Otherwise it is difficult to say exactly where they came from. Glantz quotes a report by Shchadenko, the chief of the RKKA Cadre Directorate, which states that in 1938 the Red Army was short of 93,000 command cadre and the reserves of 300,000-350,000. During 1939-41, the schools output was increased and the purges were much reduced, but the shortage could only be decreased and not eliminated. Also the increase in output meant a decrease in quality of the new command cadre.

The Wehrmacht of 1939 was much different from that of 1941 in some many respects that this discussion is really too much of a what if.

that's not my point , this is:

This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on April 11, 2010 12:56 pm