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PaulC
Posted: May 17, 2012 08:06 am
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Just to preempt a resurgence of some very popular fairy tales regarding the Red Army ( the percent mania about its shortcomings, lack of transport and lack of communications ) I will post what Mark Solonin has to say about this. The deceit perpetrated in the official history and by "famous" experts like Glantz is breathtaking ( strangely people who consider themselves smart and informed don't want to bother themselves with disturbing some elephants on the sofa, they avoid asking the right questions )

QUOTE
Tear gas (aka the "Yaroslavna wail") was and remains one of the most important, base trick in the falsification of the history of the war beginning. What is its strength in? In the truth. The substance of this approach is in speaking up truth and only the truth about the pitfalls (shortages, unfinished work, difficulties, problems) encountered by the Red Army in the summer of 1941. Only the Red Army. Nothing about the same (and may be even more serious) problems occurred with the enemy. That is it. Works trouble-free.

"... The landscape. In the corps advance corridor are 5 serious water obstacles: rivers Radostavka, Ostruvka, Zhenka, Lovushka and Sokoluvka. All rivers are with the swampy shores and are difficultly-accessible lines for the tank actions. The entire landscape within the offensive corridor is woody-swampy; the command highs are on the side of the enemy. The conclusion: the landscape does not facilitate the offensive..."

How could one disagree with such a conclusion? Having read this, not everyone would surmise to ask: "And in what landscape did enemy advance at a tempo of 30—50 km per day?" How could Wehrmacht's  divisions of the 1-st Tank group which acted in the Ukraine get over these mighty, not shown on a single geographic map, forest rivulets (Radostavka, Ostruvka, Zhenka, Lovushka and Sokoluvka), and also the Western Bug, Styr, Goryn, Sluch and at last the full-water Dnieper? Where from the "command highs" appeared in the swampy forest and how come did they turn out in the enemy hands albeit the enemy appeared in this forest just a few days (or even hours) before the events described in the quoted report of the 15-th mechanized corps commander?

There was not and there is not a single book where the Soviet historians, with a woeful sniffle, would not report to the reader about the lack of the military experience, shortage of the command and technical cadre, terrible hurry in the formation of tank divisions and mechanized corps in the Red Army. You will get a mandatory statement that 76.453% mechanized unit commanders were in their positions for less than a year, and some tank division commanders (how terrible!) commanded cavalry units before that.

By default it is assumed the Germans had it all spiffed up. And of course, any book says about "the two-year experience of the modern war accumulated by the Wehrmacht". The hypnotic effect of this endless repetition of the "two-year experience" mantra is so great that even now many readers cannot count using their fingers: four weeks of the war in Poland + five weeks of the war on the Western front + two weeks in the Balkans (at that, all these are with a large margin; if to take in actually, it is 3+4+1). Is it really two years?

There were problems in the Soviet Union of manning the army by the personnel (first of all, the command personnel). Who would argue? In the summer of 1939 the Red Army included 100 infantry and 18 cavalry divisions, 36 tank brigades. Two years later, on the eve of the war, 198 infantry, 13 cavalry, 61 tank and 31 mechanized divisions have already been formed. Total of 303 divisions. More than doubling the number of the units (and significant increase in the level of their motorization!) caused serious problems with manning. To solve them, the compulsory universal draft was introduced in the Soviet Union. Due to this the country gradually accumulated multimillion contingents of the reservists who served three years. Yes, all these are not easy and not cheap but not even close to the Wehrmacht problems.

Germany, demilitarized under the Versailles Treaty conditions, entered the year 1935 with 10 infantry divisions. In the field drills the tanks were indicated by cardboard dummies. In the summer of 1939 the Wehrmacht already had 51 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 mechanized), by the spring of 1940 the Wehrmacht formed 156 divisions, by June1 of 1941, 208. A dazzling headcount increase forced to put "under arms" totally unschooled draftees. The Germans would be happy to form their tank and mechanized divisions on the basis of the cadre cavalry divisions (the operative tenets in the combat application of the movable groupings were quite similar). But the old Reichswehr had not even a trace of such number of the cavalry units and officers. Wehrmacht's tank divisions were formed on the base of the infantry groupings, and it was possible to man their command with no more than 50% of cadre officers. Of course, for the Wehrmacht 50% was a high index taking into account that the infantry divisions formed in the second half of the 1940's and later had no more that 35% cadre officers.

Germany began the war with 5 tank divisions, by the spring of 1940 their number grew to 10, by the end of 1940 10 more tank divisions were formed. How many "years" did the commanders commanded these divisions? What kind of the "combat experience" could have the tank divisions formed after the completion of the campaign at the Western front? Out of the 17 tank divisions deployed in June of 1941at the USSR border only three divisions (1-st tank division, 3-rd tank division, 4-th tank division) had some semblance of a "two-year war experience" (i.e., the participation in the Polish and French campaigns). Seven tank divisions (12-th tank division, 13-th tank division, 16-th tank division, 17-th tank division, 18-th tank division, 19-th tank division, 20-th tank division) did not even have the experience of the two-week long war in the Balkans, and 22 June became for them the first day of their combat actions as a tank grouping. Why is this that against such background the combat experience acquired by the Soviet tankers at Khalkhin-Gol and in Finland (i.e., in the war with the enemy which showed the fanatical tenacity in the engagements) should be treated as a tiny trifle?

I would call the "percentage method" the most malignant (and most common) modification of the "tear gas". Not a single publication by the historians from the Gareyev-Isayev scientific school gets by without using it. It is a particularly significant "brain-having" technique so we devote the entire next chapter to it.


This post has been edited by PaulC on May 17, 2012 08:07 am
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PaulC
Posted: May 17, 2012 08:08 am
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Continuation
QUOTE
Chapter 8    THE PERCENT-MANIA

The jist of the percentage method of "brain-having" is best illustrated by a demonstrative example from a domain well familiar to any Soviet person: "the housing problem".

Let us assume that some citizen V. Pupkin with his family of three resides in a comfortable 4-room apartment with the area of 80 m2 (807 ft2). How can the living conditions of Comrade Pupkin be interpreted? The answer is simple and understandable. We have to compare. With what? With how the others are living. The comparison result is obvious: Vasily Pupkin is well settled, his numerous compatriots are still living in the "Khrushchebas" with a kitchen of 6 m2 per five people. And now let us imagine that we have a task to prove that Pupkin is suffering because of absolutely unbearable living conditions. Can we do it? Easily.

To do this it is necessary to make Vasily a present of additional real estate. Namely: a house in a village (70 m2) with wood-burning heating stove, with "facilities" in the yard, a big barn next to the house (50 m2), hayloft (60 m2), pigsty (40 m2) and a cellar for the potatoes (30 m2). One would think Comrade Pupkin did not get poorer and his life did not turn into nightmare because IN ADDITION to a wonderful city apartment he got the barn, hayloft, pigsty and a cellar. But it only appears this way. Until a deafening howling sound: "Only 24% of the premises belonging to the Pupkins match the current sanitary standards, 55% of the premises do not have heating or lighting... How is it possible to live in such inhuman conditions?" That is exactly how our military history is written.

Four tank groups were formed in the Wehrmacht for the attack on the Soviet Union. The weakest, 4th tank group (army group "North") was armed with 602 tanks. The largest, 2nd tank group (army group "Center") had 994 tanks. Total number of tanks in the four tank groups as of 22 June, 1941 was 3,266 (if to call whippets Pz-I and Pz-Il "tanks"), i.e., on average 817 tanks per group.

The Red Army included six mechanized corps equipped with 800 and more tanks each (1st mechanized corps, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th mechanized corps). This list should be complemented by two quite battle-worthy mechanized corps: the 3rd (672 tanks including 128 KV and Т-34) and 15th mechanized corps (749 tanks including 136 KV and Т-34). Total is eight powerful mechanized units almost totally manned and supplied with the artillery, tanks exceeding enemy in the technical parameters, supplied even prior to the open mobilization by two to four thousand automobiles and two to three hundred tow tractors each. Did the Red Army become weaker when IN ADDITION to these eight "armored battering rams" it could bring into action in the first days of war 12 more mechanized corps at various degrees of battle readiness and manning? Did the incompletely manned 13th mechanized corps (282 light tanks, 18,000 troops) hampered in any way combat activities of the most powerful 6th mechanized corps? Who did they intend to fight, percents or the enemy?

Of course, these are foolish questions. I may say, idiotic questions. But why don't you, dear comrades throw away into the garbage basket the next salvo of scribbles which in the thousandth time derive "the average body temperature for the hospital", i.e., adding together and dividing the armament of all 30 corps (including those barely started to form in the Central Asian and Orel districts), begin their blood-curdling wailing: "the Red Army mechanized corps were supplied by the trucks only ...%, movable repair shops, ...%, tanker trucks, ...%, automobile tires, ..." Why are you sadly shaking your heads reading that "the new type tanks were only 7.8% of the total tank park"? Just 7.8 percent. Terrible, flagrant unpreparedness to a war.

The traditional Soviet historiography maintained that with such percentages the USSR could not be ready for the war before the summer of 1942, and until that time it was necessary to procrastinate, to procrastinate and to procrastinate... But this is an outdated view. Two comrades (A. Anatolyev and S. Nikolayev) published in two issues of the "Independent military review" a huge article entitled "A natural defeat". After having listed all possible percentages they came to a dumbfounding conclusion: the Red Army could have become really battle-worthy only by the end of the 1940's". Could have become. In the mid-1940's, or to be more precise, in May of 1945, Berlin has obviously taken by some un-battleworthy army. But the authors are implacable, or rather the implacable math indisputably proves that only "by the end of the 1940's" the army could have been 100% armed with the "new types of tanks". And the magazine pretending to be considered as a solid publication did not find an editor who could have explained to the Comrades that the new types of tanks (as well as of cellular phones, ladies' shoes, best surgeons and fresh jokes) never and nowhere can constitute 100% of the entire depot, and only the defeated army can "complete the re-armament".

There is the specific, exact date of the "complete rearmament", 8 May, 1945. This was the day when the rearmament of the Wehrmacht was finally and irreversibly completed. The Red Army, to our luck, was unable to reach such summit. As of 9 May, 1945 the "new type tanks" (Т-34 and KV), which were so assiduously multiplied and divided by Anatolyev with Nikolayev, were hopelessly outdated and were everywhere removed from the combat units. The main "workhorse" of the Red Army tank force became Т-34-85 with new armament (super mighty 85-mm cannon), new three-man turret and new fire control devices. But this tank also did not have the right to be called "advanced" because in January, 1945 a serial production began of the tank Т-44, conceptually new in design. Contrary to the expectations tank Т-44 turned out to be a flop, and in April, 1945 were manufactured two experimental prototypes of the new tank, which was in a year made operational with the name Т-54. By the 9th of May were manufactured no more than two hundred Т-44's (about 0.8% of the total tank park), the prototype Т-54 was only beginning its test runs, so in May of 1945 was observed a total "unpreparedness to the war"...

The "percentage method" is working nicely also in a situation when the notorious "preparedness" is counted in percents of some arbitrary selected parameter which does not say too much about anything. An example. All Soviet pamphlets , with a woeful sobbing, informed a credulous reader that on the eve of the war "only 8% of the Soviet fighter aircraft had cannon armament". This is working. On the intuitive level everybody "understands" that cannon are whoopee, not something like a trashy miserable machine-gun... To complete the picture it would be nice to quote the "cannonness" percentage for the aircraft of the other countries - enemies of Hitler's Germany, but that was traditionally passed over in silence by the Soviet historians. We'll fix this deplorable omission.

A first serious, strategic in scale Hitler's defeat was the collapse in the fall of 1940 of his plans of invading the British Isles. Germany suffered this defeat not on the ground, not in the water but in the air, in the course of the multi-months "battle of Britain". The Royal Airforce fighters held the air supremacy over La Manche and incurred huge losses on the German aviation. Do you know how many English fighters had at that time cannon armament? 80 percent? 18? 8? A correct answer is: zero digits, cock decimals. England's fliers won the air battle in the skies over London with "Hurricanes" and "Spitfires". Both fighters were armed exclusively and only with machine guns. Let us go further. In the latest months of the World War II American-made long-range fighters covered the armadas of allies' bombers. What percentage of these aircraft had the notorious "cannon armament"? I do not know the exact number, and there is no sense looking for it. The absolute majority of the fighter squadrons by 1944-45 were rearmed with "Mustangs" and "Thunderbolts". And both were armed only with the machine guns. Not a single cannon aboard. And the American fighters with the cannon armament ("Lightning", "Kittyhawk") by that time moved into the rank of outdated and were either absent in the skies over Western Europe or very modest numbers of them were used as light attack aircraft ("Kittyhawk") or spy planes ("Lightning").

The shortest explanation of this strange, from the first sight, transition from the "outdated cannon" to the "advanced machine gun" fighters took 13 pages of text in my book "On peacefully sleeping airdromes". In this super-brief rendition it only remains to be said that the cannons vary, and multi-ton guns which children climb in a recreation and entertainment park were not installed on World War II era aircraft. The difference in the destructive effect of a 20-mm shell and a 13-mm bullet is of course real but it is not as significant as it may seem from the first sight. Besides, designing of the aircraft and everything attached and screwed-on to it is rigidly limited by the restrictions on the weight and dimensions. Thus, the issue is phrased something like this: what is better: to arm the fighter with two cannons with the shell store for 10 seconds of firing or with six machine guns with bullet store worth 50 seconds of firing? The answer to this question is very complex or rather there is no singular answer in principle. In any case there are no grounds to treat as "hopelessly outdated" the 1941-vintage fighter only because it did not have cannon armament.

22 July, 1941, exactly one month since the beginning of the war, began (and ended at midnight) the sederunt of the USSR Supreme Court's Military board. The Western front Commander D.Pavlov, front's headquarters chief V.E.Klimovskikh, the front's communications chief А.Т.Grigoryev, the Western front 4th army commander А.А.Korobkov spent in the dock the last hours of their lives. Among the numerous questions asked from the former head of the Red Army Main automobile-tank directorate, hero of the defense of Madrid, Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Pavlov was also this one:

"...You testified at the preliminary investigation that: "In order to deceive the party and Government, I know exactly that the General Headquarters overstated the ordering plan for the war time for the tanks, automobiles and tractors by about the factor of 10. The General Headquarters justified this overstatement by the available capacities whereas the actual capacities which the industry could provide were much lower. With this plan Meretskov intended for the war time to confuse all estimates for tank, tractor and automobile procurement to the army <...>. — Do you confirm this testimony?"

Before reading the response it is important to note one important circumstance: the response was given not in a torture chamber but in the court session where Pavlov denied some testimonies which the "interrogators" beat out of him.

Defendant Pavlov:

— Mostly, yes. There was such a plan. It contained such nonsense (emphasis added — M.S.). Based on that I came to a conclusion that the order plan for the war time was put together for a purpose to deceive the party and government..."

Army General К.А.Meretskov (chief of the Red Army General Headquarters from August, 1940 through January, 1941) certainly had the most direct connection with the development of the Mobilization plan of 1941 (MP-41) but still, the document was signed not by him but by Timoshenko and Zhukov. Pavlov was shot. Meretskov was arrested in the end of June, 1941 but was miraculously released in August into a tentative "freedom". The "Pavlov's case" materials were declassified and published only in 1992. But that time nobody from the aforementioned was with us. Timoshenko did not write memoirs. Meretskov's memoirs do not say a word about MP-41. G.K.Zhukov turned out to be more talkative:

"...Remembering how and what we, the military, demanded from the industry in the last months of peace I see that sometimes we did not fully considered the real economic possibilities of the country. Although from our so-to-speak institutional point of view we were right ".

I am not sure that the present-day reader will be able to understand without a translator what exactly Comrade Zhukov said. The words "institutional", "institutional approach to the matter" were common euphemisms (words-substitutes) of the Soviet "newspeach". The word combination "institutional approach" replaced the other, much less harmonious expression: "cover one's ass". Inputting into the mobilization plan exorbitant, unsubstantiated and consciously undoable requests to the material-technical supplies of the army the military agency leaders were preparing for themselves a "legitimate excuse" in the case of a future defeat. It is doubtful they were also thinking about the convenience for the future Soviet historians but nevertheless it was a wonderful gift. Because the percents, those very percents which cover as fly traces the opuses of the Soviet historians, are computed relative to the numbers in the mobilization plan MP-41. That very plan which the Supreme Court Military board tried to present as "wreckage" but the defendant Army General was prepared only to admit that the plan contained "nonsense".

We will now try to figure out the numbers and percents in the MP-41 from a few specific examples.

The tow-tractors. One example of the Red Army "flagrant unpreparedness" for war most favored by the falsifiers are (and still remain) the artillery tow-tractors. Or rather their scarcity. The scarcity is always expressed as percentage of nobody knows what, maybe of the mobplan, maybe of the organization register. In any case, the percentages are always modest: 30, 40, 50%. That is exactly why, associate professors and PhD's explain, everything went so askew. It was impossible to bring the guns onto the fire positions or even to haul them into the rear in the retreat. That is why the loss of artillery guns in the first weeks of the war was astounding.

We will not be arguing. We just will take a calculator and simply count the number of tow-tractors and the number of tow objects.

By the beginning of June, 1941 the Red Army had among the artillery systems of the most numerous, division link (122-mm and 152-mm howitzers, 107-mm cannons) 12,800 units (the "three-inchers"  and mortars were transported in the trucks or by horse, so in this case we will not consider them). Added to this list may be 7,200 heavy 76-mm and 85-mm flak cannons (although most of these artillery systems were in the anti-aircraft system of large stationary facilities, and there was no need to haul them in the field). Thus, maximum number of the tow objects was exactly 20,000 units. As of 15 June, 1941 (here and thereafter the numbers are taken from the report of the head, RKKA's Main automobile and tank directorate) 33,700 tractors (not counting the specialized artillery tow-tractors S-2, "Comintern", "Voroshilovets" intended for towing the heavy guns of the corps artillery regiments and RGK artillery regiments) were already in the forces. It would appear that there were no causes for a catastrophe: there were one and a half times more tow-tractors then guns. However, the number in the MP-41 is 55,200. That is why it is possible to say without a twinge of conscience that the guns were abandoned due to the all-round shortage of mechanical towing vehicles". For the sake of truth the "historians" should be reminded that in the course of the open mobilization already by the 1 July, 1941 additional 31,500 tractors were transferred from the economy to the Red Army, so in this category the mob plan was fulfilled.

"That is not how the count is done", any specialist may say, and he will be absolutely correct. The artillery units were the major but not the only "consumer" of tractors and tow-tractors. Caterpillar tow-tractors were needed for the evacuation of damaged tanks from the battlefield, for the mobile repair shops and nonintegrated sapper-bridge battalions... So we will count it differently, the right way, i.e., based on the nominal norms of the level of equipment and planned number of personnel in the force units.

According to the organization chart of April, 1941 the anti-tank battalion  of a regular infantry division was supposed to have 21 armored caterpillar tow-tractor "Komsomolets" per 18 anti-tank cannons (we'll note in parentheses that the Wehrmacht's infantry did not even dream of such a luxury). So, for the total level of equipment under the nominal requirements of all infantry divisions (and all mechanized divisions which according to the nominal level of equipment were supposed to have 27 "Komsomolets") were needed 4,596 tow-tractors of this type. As of 15 June, 1941 the Red Army already had 6,672 "Komsomolets". Not bad at all. But MP-41 has the number 7,802. The flagrant "unpreparedness" indeed.

Every one of the 179 infantry (excluding the mountain-infantry) divisions nominally had to have 78 tow-tractors (excluding the "Komsomolets"). At that the nominal numbers were exceptionally generous. For instance, a howitzer regiment in a regular — not to confuse with the mechanized — infantry division for 36 howitzers, according to the list of equipment, has 72 tractors. The total for the entire infantry - 13,962 tractors. The complete equipment level for all 30 mechanized corps (which, incidentally, was not required under the mobplan by June, 1941) was to be 9,330 tractors and specialized tow-tractors (excluding the "Komsomolets"). Another first-priority receiver of the mechanical towing equipment — the RGK anti-tank artillery brigades. By 1 July, 1941 it was planned to deploy 10 such brigades, each one with 120 powerful (76-, 85- and 107-mm) cannons for whose transportation the nominal level was 165 tow-tractors. Correspondingly, for all anti-tank artillery brigades 1,650 more units of mechanical towing were needed. The artillery regiments of the corps and the RGK artillery regiments had different equipment levels and organization. Assuming (with a certain overshot) the average equipment level of 36 guns and taking into account the double reserve unthinkable in any army of the world we come up with about 12,100 tow-tractors needed for providing for the complete equipment level in all (94 corps and 74 regiments of the RGK) nonintegrated artillery regiments.

Altogether, all combat units and groupings of the entire Red Army (including the Urals, Siberian and central Asian military districts removed by thousands of kilometers from the western border) needed, under the "super-generous" roster normative, about 37,000 tow-tractors. Actually the forces had by 15 June, 1941 36,300 tractors and tow-tractors (plus 6,700 "Komsomolets"). The MP-41 compilers demanded 83,045. And we were force-fed within over half a century with the percentages of this absolutely unbridled "requirement" by the Soviet and later post-Soviet historians. But the Wehrmacht in their writings was always "ready for war". Hundred percent.

Without opening a single reference book you can boldly maintain: 22 June, 1941 the German tank divisions were fully equipped with heavy and medium tanks with anti-shell armor. And with the armored automobiles armed with the adequate 45-mm tank gun the Wehrmacht was provided in exact, absolute compliance with the organization chart and mobilization plan.

And with the division cannons breaking through the front armor of the heaviest enemy's tanks. And with multiple launch rocket systems... Zero available, zero in the plan, equipping percentage — 100. This is exactly the glorious German orderliness and scrupulousness. The Red Army tank divisions in the beginning of the war had over 1,500 KV and Т-34 tanks. Thanks to wisely composed MP-41 this may be with a clean conscience described as "miserable 9% of the organization chart". The division howitzers in the Wehrmacht are pulled by six horses. Our historians call it "fully mobilized army for which were working the industries of the entire Europe". Well, it did not get into Halder's and Jodl's heads to put together the mobilization plan "in a smart way", to include in the organization chart of their forces nonexistent hardware, to demand from Hitler 4 tow-tractors per gun... That is exactly why the Soviet historians do not call them other than "beaten Hitler's Generals".

Another favorite of the historical "brain-having" is radio-communications. There were no communications in the Red Army. Same as there was no sex in the USSR. Everybody knows it. Strictly speaking, the "dogma of the absent communications" is outside the framework of the "percentage method" as the falsifiers in most cases do not bother with specific numbers. What for? The reader knows without any numbers that at the sunrise of 22 June, 1941 the German saboteurs cut all telephone wires, and radio stations were not even dreamt of in the Red Army. And only a few most serious books include the information that the "forces of the Western SMD were provided by the regiment radio stations, 41%, by the battalion stations, 58%, by the company stations, 70%...". Indeed, how is it possible to fight under such conditions? In the early 1940's, the provision of the COMPANY RADIOSTATIONS - just 70%. It is... about the same as the cellar without a Jacuzzi or the hayloft without a dishwasher!

There really were large problems with the communications in the Red Army. During the first hours, days and weeks of the war any information exchange between the headquarters of all levels was almost completely paralyzed. This is a fact. This fact has a simple, understandable explanation which is totally unacceptable for the Soviet (as well as for the present-day imperial) historical mythology, namely: subjects of the information network were missing or did not want to communicate. Simply speaking, a division commander who abandoned his forces and fled into the rear areas could not and did not want to report about the course of his "combat operations" to the Army Commander who fled a day earlier and 100 km farther. Even the satellite phones would not change anything in this situation. Exactly as the cellular phone does not help the parents to find their rapidly grown-up teenager who went to a birthday party and does not want to return home on time. It is a case when "the battery gone dead" or he pushed "a wrong button"...

Of course, this simple truth did no suit the Soviet "historians" so, with the dexterity which a seasoned card-sharper would envy substituted, they substituted the real fact of missing communications between the commanding echelons with the wittingly false fabrication of the "absence" in the Red Army of TECHNICAL MEANS of communications. For a stronger effect they also imposed on the light-minded superficial public the idea of the missing radio-communications ostensibly being the only technical means of communications. Surprisingly, the public swallowed even this hook without bait. For some reason nobody remembered that Napoleon, Suvorov and Kutuzov commanded huge armies not only without radio-communications but even without a simple wire connected telephone. For some reason everybody forgot that a signal camp-fire, a signal rocket, motor-bike, automobile, light airplane can be excellent communications means...

Under the field book the infantry division defense corridor is 10-12 km (it is much narrower on the offensive). If we assume for the simplicity's sake that the division headquarters are located in the center of the battle order then the courier can reach either flank running in half an hour. On foot. With the motor-bike during this time, even on a very rugged landscape, he can make 30—40 km, i.e., to get to the corps headquarters. In the overwhelming majority of cases the division commander's orders and reports are issued at a much slower tempo than two times an hour, so there is no need here for a great speed of transmitting the information. Who would be running and what means can be used for driving? According to the organization chart of April, 1941 the nonintegrated infantry communications battalion had:

— 278 people;

— 6 saddle-horses;

— 3 motor-bikes;

— 3 armored automobiles;

— 1 car and 11 trucks.

This is according to the organization chart. And what was in reality? We will not be counting horses but as of 15 June, 1941 the Red Army had 16,918 motor-bikes. As we see there were no particular problems with supplying each communications battalion in each of 179 infantry divisions with three motor-bikes. And with armored automobiles everything was in order. Only light armored automobiles BA-20, very good for a ride with a top important document under the enemy fire, were 1,899 before the war. On the average, six per each of the Red Army's 303 infantry, mechanized and tank divisions. Under the organization chart a mechanized corps included the corps squadron of U-2 and R-5 airplanes, the total of 15 (fifteen). The uniquely simple, reliable and cheap "puddle jumper" U-2 (Po-2), as is known, could take off and land on any forest glade and with all its low speed was still moving in space two-three times faster than the motor-bike.

Of course, in a number of cases the information must be transferred under the "real time regime", without even a minute of delay. For instance, the communications between the firing position of the artillery battery, the observation and command posts in the artillery regiment must be continuous — no curriers with packages are appropriate. For this reason the telephone with wires became the main communications medium in the XX-th century armies. Both wires and telephones were abundant in the Red Army. Specifically: 343,241 km of the telephone and 28,147 km of the telegraph cable. It was enough to circle the Earth on the equator 9 times. There were also 252,376 telephone apparatuses. On the average, more than 800 pieces per one division. A simple and cheap wire, beside all the other things, provides for incomparably better secrecy and noise protection than a radio-channel. The wire communications are very difficult (and with the technical means of the 1940's, practically impossible) to suppress with noise. And in order to eavesdrop on negotiations or use the wire communications for planting false information it would be necessary to send beyond the front line an intelligence-sabotage group, which is difficult, expensive and risky. After all, for this purpose (to monitor the status of wire communications channels, rapidly eliminate the breaks, install reserve lines therewith providing for continuous telephone communications) 278 communications personnel are serving in a division (i.e., on the front no greater than 10— 15 km).

That said, the future belonged to radio-communications, and the Red Army began creating this "future" on an overwhelming scale. Under the organization chart, a regular infantry division (not a tank or mechanized rushing into the operative depth but a regular infantry, which must advance in the best case at a tempo of 10 km/day) had 153 radio-stations. One hundred and fifty three. In other words, even "miserable, pitiful" 10% of the full strength means in the absolute values 15 radio-stations per a division!

Radio-stations are different. Some are on an armored train, some others in an automobile and others yet, in a horse-load or in a backpack. In April, 1941 a Red Army infantry division (for which the notorious "all Europe" had not yet begun working) was proposed to be equipped as follows. Three powerful automobile-chassis-mounted radio-stations in the nonintegrated communications battalions — they provide communications for the division's commander and headquarters. Three automobile radio-stations in the nonintegrated intelligence battalion, four — in the artillery (howitzer) regiment and division's artillery headquarters. Altogether ten reasonably powerful radio-stations; on the eve of the war the 5-АК stations were mostly used. This radio-station had radius of 25 km for the telephone communications and 50 km, for the telegraph communications, thus liberally covering battle orders of the division and its neighbors. As of 1 January, 1941 the USSR's armed forces had 5,909 radio-stations 5-АК — on average 20 per a division.

Beside the powerful automobile-mounted radio-stations there were portable transmitters (RB, RBK, RBS, RBM) with capacity of 1 —3 w and radius of 10—15 km. As of 1 January, 1941 there were 35,617 such radio-stations. More than 100 radio-stations per one division. Under the organization chart, the howitzer regiment of an infantry division had to have 37 radio-stations per 36 howitzers. One portable radio-station per gun is clearly the "extremism" because the howitzers do not shoot one at a time. The minimum "molecule" of the artillery units and detachments was the battery (usually four guns). That was exactly the battery commander who received from the command and observation positions the information for conducting fire. A howitzer regiment included nine batteries, so that even the "miserable" 24% of the organization chart number mean in effect the radio-communications availability for the artillery regiment commander with each battery commander.

The infantry regiment had to have 18 radio-stations including — 15 in the battalions. Complaints that the "Western SMD forces were only 58% provided with the battalion radio-stations" mean that each battalion (and this is 778 people and about 2 km of the defense corridor) actually had 8 portable radio-stations! The mechanized division according to the organization chart got 115 portable radio-stations (this number of course does not include the tank radio-stations), i.e., even fewer in total than the infantry division. But it got a much greater number of powerful truck-mounted 5-АК radio-stations — 36 units per a division!

Of course, having planned (and provided to a significant extent) a completely phenomenal, for early 1940's, radio installation level at the division level the Red Army Command have not forgotten the operative link groupings (corps, army). To provide for the communications in this management echelon were developed the 11-АК, RSB, RAF radio-stations. An RSB radio-station was installed on the truck chassis, had the radiation capacity of up to 50 w and provided for the telephone communications at 300 km, i.e., actually in the activity corridor of an army or even front. The RAF's were a much more powerful (400—500 w) set of equipment transported by two ZIS-5 trucks. As of 1 January, 1941 the USSR armed forces have already have 1,613 units of RSB and RAF, i.e. on average 18 units per each (infantry or mechanized) corps. The memo on the mobilization plan MP-41 for some reason does not include the data about the predecessor of the RAF, — a powerful (500 w) radio-stationи 11-АК although they were quite numerous in the forces. For instance, the Kiev SMD had as of 10 May, 1941 6 RAF's, 97 RSB's and 126 11 - АК radio-stations.

The RAT complex could be considered real technological miracle in 1941. Hugely powerful (1.2 kW), it provided for the telephone communications at a distance 600 km, and telegraph, up to 2,000 km. The transmitter could operate in 381 fixed communication frequencies with the automatic frequency tuning. The entire RAT equipment was transported on three ZIS-5 trucks; it was serviced by 17 people. There were 40 such complexes as of 1 January, 1941. In particular, the Kiev SMD had before the war 5 RAT complexes. This, of course, is very-very little. Why? Because under the mobilization plan MP-41 the Red Army was supposed to have 117 (one hundred and seventeen) RAT complexes. It is interesting, on how many fronts and on what continents did the MP-41 developers intend using them? The Red Army actually reached Berlin without ever having more than fifty RAT at one time...

In total, without portable battalion and company link radio-stations, without tank radio-stations, Red Army had 7,566 radio-stations of all types. And that was as of 1 January, 1941. The life, however, did not stop on the first of January; the factories continued their "peaceful creative labor". The production plan for 1941 included the manufacturing of 33 radio-stations RAT, 940 RSB and RAF, 1,000 5-АК. I do not think anybody is capable of memorizing these numbers. But I would strongly advise to develop a useful habit o throwing into the garbage any article/book which begins the story of 22 June, 1941 with the wailing about "German saboteurs who cut all wires".
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Posted: May 17, 2012 08:17 am
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What about tanks ? Don't we all know soviet tanks had no radios, masses of uncontrolled tanks ?

QUOTE
Despite many-millioned copies of rumors, radio transmitter was installed both in armed train and in tanks. As early as in 1933 a special tank radio station 71-TK-1 went into series production. This short-wave receive/transmit simplex radio station provided range of telephone communication on the way up to 15 km, at stops – up to 30 km and in telegraph mode – up to 50 km. These radio stations were installed also on armed vehicles BA-10/20. At least, one radio transmitter was installed on tank of platoon’s commander (i.e. on every third tank). Practically, by the beginning of the war 35-40% of tanks were equipped with receive/transmit radio stations. For instance, not the best equipped 19th tank division (163 tanks, i.e. half from standard number, without any T-34 or KV tanks) by July 10, 1941 had:
- 2 powerful radio stations RSBs
- 4 regimental radio stations 5AKs
- 16 battalion RBs
- 85 tank 71-TK-1s
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Posted: May 17, 2012 08:26 am
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QUOTE (Imperialist @ May 17, 2012 08:04 am)
QUOTE (PaulC @ May 16, 2012 10:25 pm)
What I'm trying to say is, the mediocre display after June 22, isn't a sign of Red Army unpreparedness to conduct offensive operations, but is actually the direct consequence of an army that prepared and deployed only for offensive operations. All the things they did which were logical if you want to attack ( deploy the units as forward as possible, move the sappers in front of the units, bring forwards fuel, ammunition, supplies, spares, ). But the war didn't start as planned. And all the massive preparation backfired. Everything that was done for attack, turned into a disaster in defense.

Deploying units forward, bringing sappers, fuel, ammunition, supplies and spares is something normal if you want to conduct defensive operations too.

This nonsense worked out so well in the first weeks of the war, did it ?

Arm chair nonsense 0 - Reality 1.

This is so stupid, I don't know why I'm even bothering to explain it : in attack operations, ammunitions, supplies, spares, fuel, unit rearguards, sappers are deployed as forward as possible. The idea is to support the attacking units with minimal disruption and follow in their wake as soon as the border was crossed. The supply chain has to be as short as possible.

In defensive operations, you keep the main units at a safe distance from the border ( one of the main causes of defeat, mentioned even by Glantz was the forward deployment of the troops and supplies ). The whole concept is to avoid falling under the enemy's first blow and allowing enough time and space to correctly identify the main thrusts. I suggest you read about Mainstein's battles in late 1943-early 1944 and what mobile conduct of defensive operations means. Also Seelowe heights in 1945 is a good example of how to conduct defensive operations against modern forces.
Sappers are kept in the back in defensive operations because they are preparing the next fall back lines, they are preparing for demolitions the main communication features. As soon as the fighting forces retreated, the bridge is blown up.
Fuel and supplies are kept safely in the back and are sent to the front on a per need basis .

The Red Army did the exact opposite : they put fuel ( Germans used around 3000t of fuel per day in June and July from captured Russian stocks, stocks that they did not know about and which supposedly were blown up by the retreating Red Army ); ammunition ( 500,000 t lost ) , supplies, spares, even PARACHUTES ( which they had to recover under enemy fire from the border forests ). All the unit support forces were lost and so the Red Army units were left without fuel, without supplies, without repairs, without spares. In a defensive war the fighting units from a division face the enemy and the support units are in the back. On june 22, the fighting units were fleeing east ( thus facing the enemy with their back ) and their support units were being obliterated as they were trying to save the fuel, ammunition, supplies.


This post has been edited by PaulC on May 17, 2012 08:47 am
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Posted: May 17, 2012 09:02 am
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QUOTE (PaulC @ May 17, 2012 08:26 am)
QUOTE (Imperialist @ May 17, 2012 08:04 am)
QUOTE (PaulC @ May 16, 2012 10:25 pm)
What I'm trying to say is, the mediocre display after June 22, isn't a sign of Red Army unpreparedness to conduct offensive operations, but is actually the direct consequence of an army that prepared and deployed only for offensive operations. All the things they did which were logical if you want to attack ( deploy the units as forward as possible, move the sappers in front of the units, bring forwards fuel, ammunition, supplies, spares, ). But the war didn't start as planned. And all the massive preparation backfired. Everything that was done for attack, turned into a disaster in defense.

Deploying units forward, bringing sappers, fuel, ammunition, supplies and spares is something normal if you want to conduct defensive operations too.


This nonsense worked out so well in the first weeks of the war, did it ?

Arm chair nonsense 0 - Reality 1.

Why do you think it is nonsense? And no, the fact that it didn't work out well after the Germans attacked is not an argument.


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Posted: May 17, 2012 09:29 am
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QUOTE (Imperialist @ May 17, 2012 09:02 am)

Why do you think it is nonsense? And no, the fact that it didn't work out well after the Germans attacked is not an argument.

I already explained in detail why it was nonsense. And that it didn't work out AT ALL and was the main CAUSE of DEFEAT is the absolute argument.

I suggest you spend a few hours on youtube and search videos like : Wehrmacht preparing for attack, crossing the Meuse, etc.

You're talking nonsense and no amount of political correctness can cover that.

Let me help you understand what preparing for attack means :

-US 1991

user posted image

-Allies Italy 1943

user posted image

-Allies, Patton 1944
user posted image

-France May 1940

user posted image

That's attack.
Fuel, ammunition, spares, mobile repair shops, tractors, everything is concentrated at the very front together with the spearheads. For attack it is perfect. For defense it's a disaster of unimaginable proportions. Imagine a single enemy fighter dropping A SINGLE BOMB on the fuel and ammunition trucks. Can you do that ?

This post has been edited by PaulC on May 17, 2012 09:30 am
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Posted: May 17, 2012 09:30 am
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Drop the insults.

QUOTE
In defensive operations, you keep the main units at a safe distance from the border ( one of the main causes of defeat, mentioned even by Glantz was the forward deployment of the troops and supplies ).


In defensive operations you need a strong covering force. And you have been shown how the Soviet divisions were deployed, on three echelons that had depth. In an offensive operation you don't put your attacking forces on three echelons of that depth.

QUOTE
The whole concept is to avoid falling under the enemy's first blow and allowing enough time and space to correctly identify the main thrusts.


Sure, but allowing time and space is done by fighting. And fighting calls for supplies and fuel. Which should be in reach, not to be brought from 300 kilometers away where it is "safe".

QUOTE
Sappers are kept   in the back in defensive operations because they are preparing the  next fall back lines, they are preparing for demolitions the main communication features.


Yes, so if sappers were deployed to the first echelon (I think it was the one deployed within 20-50 kilometers of the border), would that mean they were deployed "forward"?

Also, I'd have to ask you what you meant by "sappers in front of the units"?

QUOTE
Fuel and supplies are kept safely in the back and are sent to the front on a per need basis .


Sure, but define "back". A supply dump located 50 kilometers from the border is back or forward?



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Posted: May 17, 2012 10:55 am
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Drop the insults.


What insults ? Spouting nonsense and being called for is an insult ? You seem to have habit of discussing in worthless hypothesis and employing reduction ad absurdum arguments as stupid questions like
QUOTE
Sure, but define "back". A supply dump located 50 kilometers from the border is back or forward?


What do you expect me to answer for this ? How can be any answer right or wrong ? I can infer that in the June 22 scenario a supply dump 50km back was too close since German motorized columns advanced 50-70km during the first day. Only the western front had 264000t of fuel in exposed positions. Do I need to repeat the fact that 1/3 of the fuel Wehrmacht used in June-July was captured from what remained from Soviet dumps ? So let me revert back to you the nonsense : based on what happened, where the supply dumps positioned with defense in mind ?


QUOTE


In defensive operations you need a strong covering force. And you have been shown how the Soviet divisions were deployed, on three echelons that had depth. In an offensive operation you don't put your attacking forces on three echelons of that depth.


There were no 3 echelons in depth. That's pure Glantz nonsense. Soviet forces were arriving in waves not all were at their launch positions.

Since apparently you don't bother to read my posts, let me remind you what happened days before June 22 ( and why Glantz stories of 3 echelons are nonsense )

QUOTE
There’s nothing surprising in the fact that by Sunday morning of June 22, 1941, concentration of Soviet armies of the Second strategic echelon hasn’t been yet completed. Command of Red Army acted according to its normal schedule of deployment, which didn’t assume invasion of Germans. "Redeployment of forces was planned in such a way as to complete the concentration in regions, pointed out by operative plans, from June 1 till July 10, 1941".  Just for this single phrase one should have awarded the authors of collective monograph “1941 – lessons and summaries” with Conspicuous Courage Medal already in 1992!
The earliest advancement was performed by formations of 16th Army and 5 MC, situated in Transbaikalia and Mongolia. On April 26, General Staff gave preliminary order and on May 22 began the loading of echelons with first units, which were to arrive to Berdichev-Proskurov-Shepetovka (Ukraine) in the period of June 17 till July 10, taking into account enormous distance and present schedule of railroad works of peacetime.
From May 13 to 22 General Staff issued orders with regard to commencement of advancement towards Western border of two more GHQ reserves armies. 22nd Army advanced to Velikiye Luki – Vitebsk region, with deadline to finish the concentration on July 1-3, 21st Army concentrated in Chernigov – Gomel – Konotop region by July 2.  On May 29 19th Army was ordered to be formed and deployed near Cherkassy – Belaya Tserkov by July 7. No earlier than June 13 it was decided to form one more, 20th Army, based on Orel and Moscow military formation, which had to be concentrated near Smolensk by July 3-5.
Let’s repeat it again, that all this transportation was planned to be performed provided that “railroads are to be maintained in peacetime regime" and with observance of unprecedented measures of strict confidentiality. In other words, on June 12, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense by Directive № 504206 gave the following instructions to Kiev SMD chief: “Apart from you, member of Military Council and Chief of District’s Staff, nobody should know about arrival of parts of 16th Army…Telephone and telegraph open talks with regard to arrival, unloading and disposition of forces, even without naming the units, is strictly forbidden…Conditional title is to be used for every kind of correspondence, including putting it on envelopes of “strictly confidential” documents.”  (6, p. 352 )
Among great variety of events with deadline “by July 1, 1941” you can’t miss another decision, approved on June 4, 1941 at the meeting of Politburo of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union “to approve formation within Red Army one rifle division, staffed with Polish personnel, knowing Polish language”.
(48).  National formation within Red Army have been by that time eliminated for a long time already.  Moreover, decision of Politburo tells not just about people of Polish nationality, but about people, knowing Polish language (what would make a big difference, taking into account multinational Soviet Union, with big number of mixed marriages and assimilated national groups). The only similar case happened on November 11, 1939. On that day, 20 days before planned “liberation” of Finland, it was decided to form 106th rifle division, for which the personnel was collected exclusively out of people knowing Finnish or Karelian languages. (49, page 137 )
Furious subversives of V. Suvorov’s version spoilt countless amount of paper for their trashy essays, for all these “Anti-Suvorovs”, “Ledokol myths” etc, but couldn’t so far answer such an easy question: why should Stalin need division, speaking Polish language, by July 1, 1941? Can it be true, that to protect unbreakable frontiers of USSR one should urgently need Polish people?

The wave of full-scale regrouping of forces rolled from Far East through military districts of European part of USSR up to frontiers of Western districts. By mid-June it was extremely hard to hide from enemy’s intelligence such event as concentration of operative forces formation of First strategic echelon.  In the period of June 12 till June 15 command of Western frontier districts received orders to advance divisions of district (front) reserve towards state's border. Directive of People's Commissar of Defense as of June 13, 1941, communicated to Kiev SMD, instructed:
“With the purpose of increasing district forces’ combat readiness by July 1 (underlined by me – M.S.) all internal divisions with corps departments, as well as with corps parts are to be moved closer to state’s border into new camps…All movements of forces are to be strictly confidential. Marching to perform along with tactic trainings, at night time. All mobile supplies of ammunition and fuels and lubricants are to be taken out along with the forces. Families to leave behind. Execution to communicate to couriers by July 1, 1941” (6, page 359 )
Order was accepted for execution immediately. Marshal Bagramyan (at the time – Chief of operative department, Deputy Chief Staff of Kiev SMD) tells about these events in his memoirs:
    “…On June 15 we received an order to start from June 17 advancement of all five rifle corps of the Second echelon towards border. We had already everything get prepared (underlined by me - M.S.) for this: already in the beginning of May we have performed substantial work, by order from Moscow, - drafted directives to corps, did reconnaissance of routes and districts of confinement. It was now just to give order to executors…Divisions were taking everything needed for combat actions. For secrecy purpose forces were to move at night time only. The plan was elaborated in details…In order Hitlerites wouldn’t notice our movements, districts of corps concentration were chosen not by the very border, but few daily marches away to East (45, page 75 )

Directive with similar content and with the same deadline for concentration – by July 1 – was delivered to Western SMD, as well. (6, page 423 ). By June 15 more than half of all divisions, making up the second echelon and reserve of Western military districts, were caused to move. On the eve of war, 32 divisions of Western districts secretly, by night marching through forests and swamps were going (creeping) towards to border. Colonel Novychkov who in the beginning of war was chief staff of 62nd rifle division of 5th Army of Kiev SMD, remembers: “Division’s parts advanced from camp in Kyvertsi (approximately 80 km from the border – M.S.) and by completing two night marching, approached line of defense by morning of June 19, though didn’t take the defensive position, just concentrated in forests (underlined by me – M.S.) not far from it.” (46)
On June 15 Chief commander of Baltic SMD, general-colonel F.I. Kuznetsov, issued an order № 0052, where he reminded his subordinates that “just today, ever more, we have to be in full combat readiness…This should be fully understood by everybody, since at any minute we have to be ready to carry out any kind of military task”. (50, p. 8). Notwithstanding the fact, that order № 0052 didn’t contain any specific operative tasks, it received “Top secret. Particular importance” classification was brought to notice of senior officers only (from commanders of divisions and higher), and was concluded with the following instruction: “With regard to this order no other written orders and instructions are to be given to anybody”. Concern about “secrecy purposes” led to such situation, when chief of politpropaganda department of Baltic SMD, comrade Ryabtchiy, in the evening of June 21, 1941, ordered that “departments of corps and division politpropaganda are not to give directives to units; tasks of political work to raise orally through personal representatives…” ( 46 )   

It’s very strange, very. Obviously, Soviet norms of confidentiality differed a lot from universal ones, but how come that it wasn’t be possible to put on paper such tasks as “be ready to protect peaceful work of Soviets” or “we don’t want any part of foreign land”? In this respect it’s useful to notice, that on the very first day of way, June 22, 1941, Germans captured in Shakiai (Lithuania) a storehouse with leaflets in German language, appealed to soldiers of Wehrmacht. (42, page 79 )
But the most amazing thing lies in different. Until now there are some writers, who state that Stalin tried with all his might to “delay Hitler's attack” on Soviet Union. But in order to better “delay” one shouldn’t hide divisions in the forests, crawl at nights on swamps, but instead invite on one sunny day in June to Kyvertsi correspondents of all central newspapers and order them to make picture of marching columns. And place on cover newspaper page under heading “Border is locked down!” And near it – an interview with tank commander, who arrived to Shepetovka with his comrades-in-arms from hot steppes of Mongolia. And let German analysts think – what should this mean… “When dealing with dangerous enemy, one should, probably, show him your readiness for repulse. Should we show Hitler our real strength, he would probably abstain from war with USSR at that time”, - writes in his memoirs army general S.P. Ivanov, highly experienced staff officer. (47). In the very same way one should have acted, as advised military professional of such high rank; if Stalin would think about “delaying”, instead of how to NOT SCARE AWAY the enemy during the last weeks and days before Europe’s invasion.


QUOTE

Sure, but allowing time and space is done by fighting. And fighting calls for supplies and fuel. Which should be in reach, not to be brought from 300 kilometers away where it is "safe".


There is a thing called "mobile supply" and "fixed dumps". Mobile supply covers army/corps/division road trains, the fixed dumps are usually at railway terminals. In between the railway terminals and the troops, there are the so called supply trains. Thousands of trucks which carry what's needed to the front. Depending on road and railway density, the distance between fixed dumps and the troops can be under 50km ( France ) or around 150-200 ( Russia ) or even more ( 300-500km North Africa ).

German flow was the following :
user posted image



QUOTE


Yes, so if sappers were deployed to the first echelon (I think it was the one deployed within 20-50 kilometers of the border), would that mean they were deployed "forward"?


Coming back to the quality of questions : in 5 days , the western front went from 160 sapper battalions to 3 . With this info ( again you don't bother to read my previous posts ), what can you say about their deployment ? Was it too forward ? Forward enough ? In the back ? In Moscow region ?
QUOTE

Also, I'd have to ask you what you meant by "sappers in front of the units"? 


FYI information, sappers open the way for the armed forces. They are in front because :
-clear the minefields
-cut the barbed wire
-deploy mobile bridges
-attack fortifications with special weapons

Like I've said, there are youtube videos where you can see this live : German sappers on the river edge. A wave of infantry crosses the Bug or the Meuse in dingies. Once a bridgehead is established on the other bank, pontoon sappers quickly build temporary bridges in a few hours. As soon as that is done, the tanks and main columns roll forward.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4HptS5iQG4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipcL7WyJN14

Better than what I can say in 10 000 words.

This post has been edited by PaulC on May 17, 2012 04:12 pm
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Posted: May 17, 2012 03:39 pm
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QUOTE
What insults ? Spouting nonsense and being called for is an insult ?


I think saying other people's opinions are armchair nonsense and stupid or saying others "spout nonsense" are insults.

Even if you think someone is wrong you can say it politely and you can present your case without embelishing your posts with the insults mentioned above.

Statements you made on this thread, such as "striking an open border is useless strategy" or "there is no defense through counter-attacks", or "had they put their planes 500km from the border and the troops 300km back would have meant Barbarossa to end by late summer 1941" can easily be considered nonsense, but nobody insulted you for them.

QUOTE
There were no 3 echelons in depth. That's pure Glantz nonsense. Soviet forces were arriving in waves not all were at their launch positions.


If it doesn't suit your opinion it's nonsense.

QUOTE
QUOTE

Also, I'd have to ask you what you meant by "sappers in front of the units"? 


FYI information, sappers open the way for the armed forces. They are in front because :
-clear the minefields
-cut the barbed wire
-deploy mobile bridges
-attack fortifications with special weapons


Oh man, thanks, but I didn't need you to tell me what sappers are or do. My question was what do you mean Soviet sappers were in front of the units? How did you establish this as a fact?

QUOTE
There is a thing called "mobile supply" and "fixed dumps". Mobile supply covers army/corps/division road trains, the fixed dumps are usually at railway terminals. In between  the railway terminals and the troops, there are the so called supply trains. Thousands of trucks which carry what's needed to the front. Depending on road and railway density, the distance between fixed dumps and the troops can be under 50km ( France ) or around 150-200 ( Russia ) or even more ( 300-500km North Africa ).


According to the diagrams you yourself posted, from the army railway terminal the supply lines (trucks) go to army dumps and then to division dumps and even lower. Covering forces need to have these division (and lower) dumps already pre-positioned. That was my earlier point (deploying units forward, fuel, ammunition, supplies and spares is something normal if you want to conduct defensive operations too). Thanks for helping me making it clearer.


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Posted: May 17, 2012 04:50 pm
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QUOTE


I think saying other people's opinions are armchair nonsense and stupid or saying others "spout nonsense" are insults.


QUOTE
Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar. SIGMUND FREUD

QUOTE

Even if you think someone is wrong you can say it politely and you can present your case without embelishing your posts with the insults mentioned above.


You are wrong on multiple levels then.
QUOTE

Statements you made on this thread, such as "striking an open border is useless strategy"


That's taken out of context, call me surprised. The discussion was whether it is preferable to destroy the enemy by surprising him in frontier battles or advance through neutral ( polish ) territory and meet the intact German forces in western Poland. I sided with the first view ( not that my opinion carries any weight ) for the following reasons :
-you have the advantage of surprise while in the second case this is lost, the forces meet after several days/weeks
-the bulk of his support services, ammunition, fuel, air force are crippled by surprise air attacks, not the case in the second option
-the main thrusts are not know, in the second case they become obvious and adequate countermeasures can be developed

I can continue , but I believe the point is clear.

QUOTE

or "there is no defense through counter-attacks"


Indeed. The Soviet Union never invaded anyone. They just defended themselves :

QUOTE
On 26 November, a border incident was reported near the village of Mainila. A Soviet border guard post had been shelled by an unknown party resulting, according to Soviet reports, in the deaths of four and injuries of nine border guards. Research conducted by several Finnish and Russian historians later concluded that the shelling was carried out from the Soviet side of the border by an NKVD unit with the purpose of providing the Soviet Union with a casus belli and a pretext to withdraw from the non-aggression pact.


QUOTE

, or "had they put their planes 500km from the border and the troops 300km back would have meant Barbarossa to end by late summer 1941" can easily be considered nonsense, but nobody insulted you for them.


You're not insulting me, you're insulting Glantz.

QUOTE
Worse still,  Soviet war planners had fundamentally misjudged the situation, not only  by concentrating their forces so far forward , but also by expecting the main enemy thrust to occur south of the Pripiat' Marshes. Thus the Red Army was off-balance and concentrated in the southwest when the main German mechanized force advanced further north.


What an error, if only they had been a little further from the frontier...like on the old state frontier, 300km from the new one in the bunkers and fortifications of the Stalin line...


QUOTE

If it doesn't suit your opinion it's nonsense.


Well I will repeat one more time :

QUOTE
  In the period of June 12 till June 15 command of Western frontier districts received orders to advance divisions of district (front) reserve towards state's border. Directive of People's Commissar of Defense as of June 13, 1941, communicated to Kiev SMD, instructed:
“With the purpose of increasing district forces’ combat readiness by July 1 (underlined by me – M.S.) all internal divisions with corps departments, as well as with corps parts are to be moved closer to state’s border into new camps… All movements of forces are to be strictly confidential. Marching to perform along with tactic trainings, at night time. All mobile supplies of ammunition and fuels and lubricants are to be taken out along with the forces.   Families to leave behind. Execution to communicate to couriers by July 1, 1941” (6, page 359 )

Directive with similar content and with the same deadline for concentration – by July 1 – was delivered to Western SMD, as well. (6, page 423 ). By June 15 more than half of all divisions, making up the second echelon and reserve of Western military districts, were caused to move.  On the eve of war, 32 divisions of Western districts secretly, by night marching through forests and swamps were going (creeping) towards to border. Colonel Novychkov who in the beginning of war was chief staff of 62nd rifle division of 5th Army of Kiev SMD, remembers: “Division’s parts advanced from camp in Kyvertsi (approximately 80 km from the border – M.S.) and by completing two night marching, approached line of defense by morning of June 19, though didn’t take the defensive position, just concentrated in forests (underlined by me – M.S.) not far from it.”


Glantz 3 operational echelons morphed into 1. There were 3 at the beginning because you couldn't deploy 170 divisions ON THE STATE BORDER several weeks before the operations. Some of the divisions were deployed on the border; some were further back. On June 13, the entire 1st strategic echelon moved on the border, hiding in forests.

Is it clear now ?

QUOTE


Oh man, thanks, but I didn't need you to tell me what sappers are or do. My question was what do you mean Soviet sappers were in front of the units? How did you establish this as a fact?


Soviet sappers were preparing cross the Bug river, clear German minefields and open the way for the massive mechanized corps to strike. I've already adressed the sapper topic and their role for offensive operations in my previous post. You have also some "sapper in attack 101 " video made by the German army.

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Imperialist
Posted: May 17, 2012 08:57 pm
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You are wrong on multiple levels then.


No problem, I think the same about you.

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You seem to have habit of discussing in worthless hypothesis and employing reduction ad absurdum arguments as stupid questions like
QUOTE
Sure, but define "back". A supply dump located 50 kilometers from the border is back or forward?


I'm sorry to have bothered you with my questions, but you made a series of dubious statement in the thread and I had to question them. Examples of such statements you made so far in the thread and which I questioned:

- Soviet Union allied with Germany

- "main Soviet forces were right on the frontier"

- "On june 13 the entire 1st echelon comprising of 170 divisions moved right on the state border"
(strangely enough you now say that "you couldn't deploy 170 divisions ON THE STATE BORDER several weeks before the operations"; only Freud could sort this out)

- the Soviets "crammed the airfields near the border"

Then you said the Soviets placed their supplies forward, which could only mean they were for an offensive. So I had to tell you that deploying supplies forward, or relatively close to the border, is something done in view of defense too, especially if you have large covering forces.

QUOTE

What do you expect me to answer for this ? How can be any answer right or wrong ? I can infer that in the June 22 scenario a supply dump 50km back was too close since German motorized columns advanced 50-70km during the first day.


Forward dumps have to be close to the units they're supposed to serve.

QUOTE
Soviet sappers were preparing cross the Bug river, clear German minefields and open the way for the massive mechanized corps to strike. I've already adressed the sapper topic and their role for offensive operations in my previous post. You have also some "sapper in attack 101 " video made by the German army.


Yes, but what is the source of your claim that the Soviets had the "sappers in front of the units" when the Germans attacked?


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Posted: May 17, 2012 10:23 pm
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Such a strategy is absolutely useless. In modern wars the point is to destroy the enemy's forces, not to conquer large areas. It's like playing chess and your objective is to cover as much as possible from the chess board. Try doing it and see what happens. Failing to destroyed the enemy's army caused the destruction of Napoleon and also of the Wehrmacht in Russia. They both conquered land and failed to destroy the Russian army. The end result was the same. Despair was the same for both : the Russian/soviets avoided decisive battles in the critical moments. They retreated.
A Red Army attack without the German army in eastern Poland would mean a clash between an intact Wehrmacht, close to its supply and a Red Army which is moving away from its supply lines. The same happened in North Africa, both combatants conquered and gave back land.


PaulC, please carefully read the entire text I wrote and not take from it parts to serve your ideas! A massive penetration of Soviet forces does not imply only Germany, but most likely Hungary and Romania, cutting access to oil resources for the Wehrmacht! But what I wanted to emphasize is that stopping a strong opponent in full action would have been not so easy even for the mighty Wehrmacht, and taking back the lead from the soviet hands extremely problematic! The existence of a fortified line built in depth would have helped greatly but I do not know that the Germans were preoccupied to build something like this... So back to my question: why do Stalin, knowing well the concentration of German forces in the USSR borders, not order an immediate offensive if he had the attack plans prepared and his forces (or at least some) so strong as Rezun/Suvorov sugest? Why? Because the Rezun hypothesis of an attack in july 1941 is unfounded! I believe Stalin was thinking about attacking Germany in a favorable moment, but certainly not in the summer of 1941! The stupidity invented by Rezun that the red army was excellent prepared to attack but totally incapable in defense is nonsense, a trained army is able to perform all operations, either offensive or defensive! How much training could the recruits get (I found a lot of cases in which the soviet recruits had no basic knowledge of using their tanks, vehicles or artillery!) from 22 june to 6 july 1941, the alleged date of the Soviet attack?

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on May 17, 2012 10:26 pm
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PaulC
Posted: May 18, 2012 05:47 am
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I'm sorry to have bothered you with my questions, but you made a series of dubious statement in the thread and I had to question them. Examples of such statements you made so far in the thread and which I questioned:

- Soviet Union allied with Germany


We went at length through that one. It seems that no matter how strong the cooperation was ( joint invasion of a neutral country, division of Eastern Europe, economic support to crush western Europe, exchange of undesirables by security services ), you simply refuse to accept reality.
In the same tone, the Sept 28 Nazi-Soviet treaty of friendship isn't pointing to an alliance either in your view.

What can I say beyond "take it or leave it".

QUOTE


- "main Soviet forces were right on the frontier"

- "On june 13 the entire 1st echelon comprising of 170 divisions moved right on the state border"
(strangely enough you now say that "you couldn't deploy 170 divisions ON THE STATE BORDER several weeks before the operations"; only Freud could sort this out)


This is getting awkward since either you're doing it intentionally ( ignoring evidence ) or it's a matter of reading comprehension :


QUOTE
In the period of June 12 till June 15 command of Western frontier districts received orders to advance divisions of district (front) reserve towards state's border.
Directive of People's Commissar of Defense as of June 13, 1941, communicated to Kiev SMD, instructed:
“With the purpose of increasing district forces’ combat readiness by July 1  all internal divisions with corps departments, as well as with corps parts are to be moved closer to state’s border into new camps… All movements of forces are to be strictly confidential. Marching to perform along with tactic trainings, at night time. All mobile supplies of ammunition and fuels and lubricants are to be taken out along with the forces.   Families to leave behind. Execution to communicate to couriers by July 1, 1941” (6, page 359 )

Directive with similar content and with the same deadline for concentration – by July 1 – was delivered to Western SMD, as well. (6, page 423 ). By June 15 more than half of all divisions, making up the second echelon and reserve of Western military districts, were caused to move.  On the eve of war, 32 divisions of Western districts secretly, by night marching through forests and swamps were going (creeping) towards to border. Colonel Novychkov who in the beginning of war was chief staff of 62nd rifle division of 5th Army of Kiev SMD, remembers: “Division’s parts advanced from camp in Kyvertsi (approximately 80 km from the border – M.S.) and by completing two night marching, approached line of defense by morning of June 19, though didn’t take the defensive position, just concentrated in forests  not far from it.”


Let me translate this to you :

-In the middle of may the Red Army begun to transfer its forces to the soviet border. Armies from throughout the Soviet Union arrived in waves
-The 1st strategic echelon was deployed in a 300-400km belt from the border. There weren't enough camps and accommodation facilities near the border to put all the forces there.
-On June 13, the entire first echelon received orders to move to the frontier. It didn't matter they slept in the forests under the clear sky, they weren't meant to stay there for long. On the same day, the 2nd strategic echelon is ordered to the western districts and starts embarkation throughout the Soviet Union.

If you can't understand the citations I'm giving and the explanation, I can't be any more clear than that.

QUOTE


- the Soviets "crammed the airfields near the border"


It's not like there weren't between 600-700 active airfields according to various authors ( and the Luftwaffe intelligence identified 2000 , including the reserve ones since for any active airfield you have 2 in reserve ) in a 250km strip from the frontier.

The Luftwaffe destroyed around 2000 aircraft by attacking the 66 most important airfields. Of course to you, they must have did that in Flight Simulator 1941 since there were no "crammed soviet airfields near the border".

QUOTE


Then you said the Soviets placed their supplies forward, which could only mean they were for an offensive. So I had to tell you that deploying supplies forward, or relatively close to the border, is something done in view of defense too, especially if you have large covering forces.


Says who ?

So for defense, you deploy your supplies so far forward that they had to be destroyed or ended captured by the enemy ?

QUOTE


Forward dumps have to be close to the units they're supposed to serve.


Says who ?

Forward dumps are 1-3 combat loads and are on mobile trucks so they keep pace with unit movements. Only around Bielstock the soviets had 260000t of fuel in fixed fuel dumps . About 15 combat loads for all the tanks in Western Soviet Union or around 70 combat loads for the tanks of the Western district. Enough fuel for those 4000 tanks to travel 14,000km. Enough to conquer Europe and take a bath at Gibraltar.

And Bielostock force was not even the main attack force ! The main was around Lvov.

The soviets couldn't save the fuel, the ammunition and supplies. What they put there exceed by 2-3x what the entire Wehrmacht had for Barbarossa.The set fire to the dumps ( sometimes not even that ) and they ran. The Germans used 1/3 of the fuel needed for the drive in June and July from captured soviet stocks.

If you can't grasp the disconnect between what the soviets actually deployed and your theoretical nonsense, I'm truly wasting my time.

QUOTE


Yes, but what is the source of your claim that the Soviets had the "sappers in front of the units" when the Germans attacked?


Glantz.
"On the Western Front alone, only three of one hundred sixty sapper battalions on or near the front lines on June 22 were still functional five days later (p.165) "

Let's make a logical exercise :
-troops closest to the border had the least chances to survive, I suppose you can agree on that.
-soviet units of the western front were still existing on June 27 ( albeit running east and abandoning everything )
-sapper units ceased to exist by June 27 ( 3 out of 160 according to Glantz ).

The only logical explanation is that they were the first in contact with the enemy ( what you would expect if planning an attack ) and simply disintegrated.

This post has been edited by PaulC on May 18, 2012 05:55 am
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dragos
Posted: May 18, 2012 07:09 am
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Re Germany and USSR allegedly being allies. In the context of WW2, the term of alliance is more military oriented than economic and politic. A proper example of alliance is between France and UK or Romania and Germany, which involves military cooperation and joint operational command. Such terms cannot apply to relations between SU and Germany.
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dragos
Posted: May 18, 2012 07:19 am
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PaulC, I suggest you drop your aggressive tone. This doesn't add more weight to your arguments.
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