Suvorov books, ww-2

Wow! Stepping on a nerve here...
So you don't seem to grasp the hypocrisy in Hitler's line?

Speaking of historical facts, the single most important historical fact here is that Hitler attacked first. The rest are speculations.

After debating this on various forums, including AHF, over the last decade, this is usually the last line of defense.

As for speculations, I can point to some facts :
-quantity of weapons in the Red Army
-quality of said weapons
-no of units in the active army
-actual deployment as of June 22
-the deployment plan with several versions ( although no substance changes ) has transpired in the last years. The plan is proven true by simple checking disposition of the forces and the units involved.

Nobody can deny who had better and far more weapons than the RoW combined and where the Red Army troops were located.

As for Hitler's hypocrisy, the difference is he enslaved Europe without really producing weapons and when he got serious about "Guns instead of butter" his empire was 18 months away from oblivion.

Not really the same with the Soviet Union where millions ate rats and grass and in the end one another in order to buy technology from the west, build an industrial base not to improve the well being of the population but to build weapons.
In 1932-1933, years of terrible hunger in the bread basket of Europe, Ukraine, the Soviet Union produced over 3000 tanks a year . And the armaments production was just ramping up.

So in a sense, yes, I fail to see the hypocrisy. It's not even similar in extent and purpose. One gambled from victory to victory without really preparing for war and when the luck ended, the lack of preparation became obvious. The other masterfully directed European politics towards a fatalistically end and prepared for war with the sheer determination only absolute totalitarian states are capable. Even against the worst possible odds, the resources of the country and the preparation paid itself and war ended in Berlin.

This post has been edited by PaulC on May 28, 2012 02:31 pm

You're right, he produced bread to feed the poor in the countries he invaded. Only he lacked the means to fare as better as his homologous.

Even if Stalin wanted to attack sometimes in 1941 rather than 1942 or 1944, that doesn't change anything. It doesn't exculpate Hitler of anything, I don't know what you are talking about. And we all know by now that Stalin was a bloody tyrant, so if he wanted to attack in 1941 instead of 1942 doesn't make him more evil.

Without further ado I'd avoid quoting Hitler or Stalin for the sake of a civilized discussion. Imagine someone would come and start quoting Stalin about how Hitler enslaved Europe country after country and other such ramblings. It would be the perfect ingredient for a flame war.

This post has been edited by dragos on May 28, 2012 04:28 pm

So, if I understood well, you're part of the Solonin wing of the Suvorov's adherents... if there is such thing just joking, please don't mind!
Numbers again: do you know how many new tanks have reached the troops (Red Army) between 31st may and 21st june 1941? According to the source I quoted 206 tanks -41 heavy KV-1, 138 medium T-34 and 27 light T-40! So please tell me how in the world could the soviet industry fill the gaps in the troops endowment in the next two (or three) weeks until 6 july (Suvorov) or 10 july (you)
Because you say that the numbers Suvorov gave f.i. for 9th SuperShock Army (soviet version of Superman attributed to an army ) were to be achieved in July 1941... or maybe not? From the real 799 tanks (or 809 tanks) at his disposition to the dreamed 3341 tanks is a long way...
Related to the threat posed by the Soviet 9th Army from Bessarabia to Romania in late june-early july 1941 my answer is very simple: 7 infantry, 2 cavalry, 2 tank and 1 motorised divisions could not endanger the german-romanian front (add to this if you like the troops from the rear 4 infantry, 2 tank and 1 motorised divisions)! And I really do not overestimate the value of our troops by saying this...

I see the truth somewhere in between. Suvorov himself points Solonim as probably the best russian author on the topic. The difference is Suvorov wrote his books in the '80s without easy access to the archives and forced to use western data, soviet publications available in the west, soviet commander memoirs and a lot of inductive reasoning.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, cracks appeared in the archives and a lot of juicy reports and files started to surface. Of course, this were again inaccessible to Suvorov who has a death penalty still in place in Russia.

But the work was picked up the amateur historians in Russia. Of course, the national academy, the military publications did not know how many divisions, tanks, airplanes were in the Red Army until amateurs compiled the data. All of a sudden, the world heard figures which were mind boggling. There is a wave of amateur Russian historians who are clearing all the lies, propaganda and deception on the early years of the war.

As for the start of the war, Solonin and Suvorov agree on what happened before June 22 ( Soviet Union preparing an attack on Germany and its allies ). Were they somehow differ is the post-June 22 with regards to losses and defense abilities. One has to read their books to feel the differences.

Suvorov says that on May 31 there were :
-636 KV soviet tanks (p 270)
-1225 T34 tank ( p191)

On June 22 1941 he gives the following figures:
-677 KV heavy tanks (p 270 )
-1363 T34 tanks ( p 291, Last Republic )

Subtracting the two to see the delta :
-41 KV tanks produced
-138 T34 tanks produced

They weren't meant to be filled. It is impossible task for any country to fill 29 mech corps just like Germany couldn't equip "only" 20 Panzer divisions.

Yawn. Sometimes I'm wondering whether debating with someone about books he didn't read is worthwhile :

Icebreaker, page 142
"On June 21 1941, in the 9th army there were 17 divisions, out of which 2 air force, 4 tank, 2 motorized , 2 cavalry and 7 infantry. On top of this it was planned to add the 27th mech corp under I.E Petrov. That mech corp was created in Turkmenistan and without being fully completed it was transferred west. After including it, the 9th army would have had 20 divisions out of which 6 tank divisions. Had they been fully equipped , the 7 army corps inside the 9th army would have had 3341 tanks"

Again you're looking at facts as they were on June 22. The soviets planned to attack around 2nd week of July by which time, the 27th mech corp would have been in Basarabia.

And it is pretty obvious you didn't look at the offensive plans regarding Romania. There were 2 armies positioned against Romania : the 9th and the 18th army, acting as pincers, one from Basarabia and one from Bucovina, encircling the Iasi region and northern Moldavia ( the German 11th army and Romanian 3rd ).



For the 9th I've already showed what forces they had, let's look at 18 army :

-16 mech corp ( 15th Tank division, 39th Tank division, 240th Mechanised division, 64th Fighter Air Division and 45th Mixed Air Division )
-17th rifle corp ( 2 mountain divisions, 1 infantry division )
-55th rifle corp ( 3 infantry divisions, 1 independent tank brigade )

What forces were in Romania ?
11th army :
-7 ( later 9 ) German infantry divisions
-4 Ro infantry divisions, 4th army corp

3rd Romanian army:
-mountain corp ( 3 brigades )
-cavalry corp ( 3 brigades )

4th Romanian army :
-8 infantry divisions
-1 cavalry brigade

4th was still mobilizing and most units arrived on the front line after June 22.

Grand totals for both sides:
-21 infantry divisions ( 9 German, 12 Romanian ), 1 mountain corp ( 4 brigades ), 4 cavalry brigades
-10 infantry divisions, 3 mountain divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, 8 tank divisions, 1 tank brigade, 4 motorized divisions

As for your comment regarding the forces positioned against Romania "could not endanger the German-Romanian front", is at best a joke. Against immobile, second rate infantry divisions, the soviets massed forces half of which were tank and motorized units. It would have been Khalkin-Gol take 2.

This post has been edited by PaulC on May 29, 2012 08:42 am

So the Soviets did not attack in 1940, while the British and French were still in the fight, nor during Germany's Balkan/Crete campaign in early 1941, but they were planning to invade in July, after Germany settled all major operations on the continent and turned its full force and attention towards the East?

The timing is strange too. Everyone says Germany should have attacked the Soviet Union earlier in order to avoid the autumn rains and winter weather, yet the Soviets wanted to attack in.... July. Did they want to spend their winter holidays in the Carpathians?

Also, earlier in the thread you talked about how good it is for defense to allow your enemy to advance and extend his lines of supply. Why didn't Hitler do that?

Fact is Hitler had his sights on Russia since the 1920s. And the Soviet Union had its sights on spreading communism in Europe since 1917. But in the context of 1941 Stalin could afford to wait some more. Hitler couldn't. As time passed the British Empire and the friendly USA would have mobilized their industrial might, the Soviet Union would have continued to arm, Germany would have become more economically dependent on the Soviet Union.

As far as i know, for example our mountain brigades was transformed in divisions on eastern front because the number of soldiers in which of one was close or similar with the number of soldiers from German, Soviet or Italian divisions.
The name "brigade" is so misleading, those brigades was close or similar in number of troops with a Soviet division. I think is similar for cavalry brigades.

Those mountain units prouve to be superior as well in combat capacities to similar units of Soviets and even Germans later, and is hard to believe that Soviets (who was usually defeated in battles in mountaneus areas as Crimeea or Caucasus) would be able to force a breaktrough in Carpathian areas.

Soviet Navy wasnt extraordinary either, despite its superior number, neither Soviet aviation (both had just two rather weak and failled attempts to bomb Ploiesti area or to attack Constanta).

This left to debate just an attack from Bessarabia toward Moldova west of Prut river and aimed to reach Bucharest and Ploiesti area.

As the number of troops involved from both sides seem to be close i doubt that Soviets will advance too much, as the gap for such action will be through Focsani-Namoloasa-Galati line and they wouldnt had air supremacy either, maybe will even suffer on this regard.

This post has been edited by udar on May 29, 2012 10:53 am

Could Stalin know when Germany planned to attack in the west ? Was the ready army ready to attack on a few weeks notice ? Were the troops at the western frontier ? Did they have enough stocks of fuel, ammunition, supplies ?
The army just called in 3 million people in the army on Sept 1 1939 by reducing the recruitment age from 21 to 18. Were those 3 million trained by may 1940 ?
The war with Finland was just finished with an armistice, severe losses sustained, but also valuable lessons which needed to be applied.

Secondly, why would they want to fight while the British and French were still intact ? Stalin's main aim was to sovietize western Europe, not negotiate with France/Britain over Germany.

Germany delayed Barbarossa because late spring in Eastern Europe means snow, mud, swollen rivers, swamped airfields. Even during the war years, operations in february-april were a mess, everything bogged down in the mud.

As if with 60 tank and 30 motorized divisions they planned to advance 1km /day... You do realize that with the massive motorized forces, once breakthrough was achieved progress could be made at 40-50km per day. Budapest was 300km away, Berlin was 800km away, Bucharest was 180km away..

I think they planned to spend their winter holidays at the Munich or Geneva KrisKindle Market.

Do what ? Wait to be attacked ? He who has the initiative won 50% of the battle, read some Sun Tzu for the start...

True indeed; his attack was suicidal, he already lost on Sept 3 1939. Stalin applying logic failed to grasp that Germany had nothing to lose even if it was impossible to win. Up to the last moment, he couldn't believe Germany would attack suicidally and secondly he was aware of his superiority. Big mistake.

Why not post some real numbers instead of suppositions ?

Superior ? Are you joking ? Like the 3rd mountain division in the Caucasus ?
They might have fought better than the rest of the units, but to think they could stop an enemy with colossal superiority in firepower, tanks and airplanes is absurd.
They simply did not have the weapons needed to stop tanks. And against them were 3 soviet mountain divisions.

The Soviet Navy had a Danube flotilla for the 10km of shore they had. Says something about where they intended to use those ships. FYI, soviet marines landed at Chilia Veche and occupied it acting based on their offensive plans. There were lots of clashes between romanian monitors and russian ones. But in a defensive war, the russian position was undefendable and they were thrown back s the front retreated.

That is wishful thinking and repeating the same theme as "Dacians ruled the world". 1941 isn't 1812 when number of troops decided the battle. ~23 infantry divisions vs. 13 infantry and 8 tank + 4 motorized isn't a battle, it's a massacre of the 23. In ww2 the presence of tank divisions and motorized units decided the battle, not infatry divisions on foot, some of really questionable quality ( like ours ).

This post has been edited by PaulC on May 29, 2012 11:21 am

I am sorry, i dont have now the numbers. I read that in a book called i think "Istoria vanatorilor de munte - The history of Mountain Hunters" some years ago and i need to see if i find it again and so on. However, there was clearly said that during the eastern campaign our High Staff observed that others divisions had a similar number of soldiers with those Mountain brigades, so they was renamed Divisions instead of Brigades

Not just that Division, there was more. 2-nd Division i think was the spearhead of Axis advance in Caucasus and conquered the furthest point reached by Axis in Russia, town Nalcik in Caucasus. In Crimeea a Mountain Brigade (i think was still named like that at that moment) captured more then 10,000 Soviet soldiers (including an entire Rifle Division) in a single battle. I think Victor had an article where is said that first units to put their flag in conquered Sevastopol was a Romanian Mountain Hunters unit.
All comanders of Mountain brigades/divisions received Knights of Iron Cross medals, the highest German decorations, as well they was the only ones who received the highest possible Romanian medal. And von Manstein praised this units as among the best.
Not to mention that they defeated the German Gebirgsjagers too later, in Tatra Mountains, and Soviets was so upset and bothered by them that insisted after the war to be totally dismantled, which they managed to impose in 1961 (fortunately the Mountain Hunters was re-established again in 1964).

I pretty sure that they will crush quickly those 3 Soviet mountain divisions, and tanks, maybe for your surprise, are pretty useless in mountains. The mountain passes can be blocked much easy, and a mountain range covered in forests is pretty invulnerable at tank attacks. Our mountain troops was at least as good equiped for battles in such areas as the Soviet ones, i dont see any colosal superiority there

I doubt as well that Soviet aviation will make much of a difference, as i sad at that point (1941) even IAR-80 was superior to I-16 and even Mig-3 Soviet aircrafts. At least as maneuvrability and training and skills of pilots (see what happened during the couple Soviet attempts to bomb objectives here and during the fights during recovery of Bessarabia). Even if the Soviet air force will dominate thru numbers, i doubt they will had a significant air supremacy, able to help in big way the land battles

I was talking about Soviet attempt to attack Constanta, which ended with the sunk of destroyer Moskva if i am not mistake. I doubt they was able to mount a successfull large scale landing operation. See what happened in Crimeea too at their first attempt to land there

Not sure what Dacians have to do in this discussion. And well, you say the number of troops dont decide the battle, but it was precisely the number of troops who helped Soviets to win the war (beside other factors as Allied help and so on). Just imagine how many soldiers they had, if they had at least 10 millions deaths (not counting the wounded and prisoners).

Sure, tanks playied a big role too, but. How many tanks had Soviets ready for an invasion in Romania at that moment? How many tanks we and Germans had here? What type or model of tanks had they?
Sure, our infantry divisions wasnt very well prepared, not much AT weapons, less or even much less training and cohesion compared with previously mentioned Mountain Hunters units (or even cavalry ones). I do think however then Soviet ones wasnt far from them, at least as training, cohesion and morale, even if probably better equiped as artilery especially.
Yes, it will be hard to resist without a really fortified line FNG and without good maneuvres and so on. But i doubt the Soviets, as the numbers of their troops and ours show in your presentation, would be able to conquer much of Romania. Maybe large parts of Moldova, possible, but i doubt that with just those troops they will get more. Or they will be able to keep it much without reinforcements. Remeber, this is 1941, Germany and its puppets Hungary and Bulgaria arent anymore a possible invader, but Germany at least will come to our help, and our army will be focused just on the east front.
To have a successfull invasion i think Soviets needed a 1 to 3 ratio in their favour, and some air supremacy too. Tanks cant advance without infantry support, tanks cant go up in the mountains, and i doubt the Soviets will send some 2-3 millions soldiers just for Romania (if we can rised at that moment around 700,000 - 1 million)

This post has been edited by udar on May 29, 2012 02:01 pm

I think the war against France lasted around a month, not a few weeks.

Anyway, if the answers to those questions are negative, then Stalin lost a major opportunity to attack in a very favorable situation. With that opportunity lost, why would he attack in an unfavorable situation?

According to you he wanted a prolonged, WWI-style slugging match that would have exhausted the countries involved and thus help spread communism. You can't have that if you allow Germany to concentrate 90% of its forces on one front and to knock Britain and France out of the fight. Something doesn't fit right.

The point wasn't why Germany delayed Barbarossa, but that June 21 was considered late. And yet the Soviets allegedly wanted to attack in July.

Bucharest was not 180 kilometers away! Not even if the Soviet divisions grew wings and flew through the air in a straight line.

I had in mind what you said earlier:

A Red Army attack without the German army in eastern Poland would mean a clash between an intact Wehrmacht, close to its supply and a Red Army which is moving away from its supply lines.

The fun never stops. A month is 4 weeks or "a few weeks" in everybody's calendar. Ok, yours not, I got it.

Let's play your theme and assume Stalin would attack right when the German army is busy in France, like May 20.
When should he start preparing for attack ?

Because his name was I.V Stalin ( Dhuszgasvili ) not Michel de Nostredame ( Nostradamus ).

Wrong. He wanted France and England on their knees. He got that. That's why Molotov congratulated Hitler for the wonderful victory in the west.

It was late for the Germans who had in front of them endless russian steppe with no roads, no facilities, only mud, cold and snow.

OTOH, central Europe, even in autumn and winter is manageable and the distances are small. There are roads everywhere, good, solid roads and bridges, railway network very developed, a land of riches where each house had a few pigs, a few cows, dozens of chickens, with wine, potatoes and ham in every cellar.

To put on the same level the task confronting the Wehrmacht and that of the Red Army is absurd. The Wehrmacht was riding into hell, the later into capitalist paradise.

Of yes, 260km is around 6 hours driving for the BTs. Very reassuring.

This is so out of context and the lengths you go to prove abtruse points is amazing.
The original context was "what was preferable for the Red Army - to meet the Wehrmacht at the frontier and try to destroy it in pincer battles or while it was in the west/not planning to invade the SU and thus meet , probably, in western Poland "

How this bears any connection to how the Wehrmacht would have wanted to deal with the Red Army is beyond me. And history showed how the Wehrmacht wanted to deal with the SU : preempt them and try to destroy the Red Army near the border.

Maybe you should read the private conversation between Hitler and Mannerheim :

That what Hitler says is correct can be seen from documents regarding the November 1940 negotiations. We were told Stalin is afraid and trying to buy time to be ready, instead he's making ( through Molotov ) demands which were impossible for the Germans.

Hitler tells Molotov Finland is important because of the nickel and wood imports. Molotov says : it's in our sphere and we can do what we want with it.
Hitler tells Molotov Romania is important because of the oil.
Molotov wants not only Romania, but Red Army basis in Bulgaria and in the Dardanelles. On top of that, bases in the Skagerak straits in Denmark (!!)

How does this aggressive stance of the Soviet Union fit under the "we want to avoid war at any cost/neutral/peace loving SU/ Stalin buying time " dogma ?

Stalin did 2 massive blunders in all his preparation :
-he occupied the Baltic States, Basarabia, Bucovina - while this were agreed under the pact, the germans did not expect a military occupation and annexation in the SU
-he asked for more, he got greedy. All of a sudden, the division set in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was outdated, that was last year, this is today's demands which were pure blackmail and would have meant Germany to cede vital strategic assets.

The very moment the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic States and Basarabia was the wake up call for Hitler : this isn't what we agreed. Early July 1940 , even before battle of England started, was the pivotal moment; the threat posed by the SU was material and Hitler had to act. That was when first strategic plans started to be prepared.
The 2nd moment was after the November 1940 discussions. Not only didn't the SU back down, but they raised the stake, making unacceptable demands. The only way forward to settle this was war.

This post has been edited by PaulC on May 29, 2012 07:08 pm

"A few weeks" is rather imprecise. Could be 2, 3, 4. If it's a month call it a month.

We are in 1941. Stalin knowns what happened in 1940. Stalin knows what happened in early 1941 (Balkans/Crete). What does Nostradamus have to do with him realizing the conditions on the continent have changed radically?

So if Stalin did not attack in 1940, thus missing very favorable strategic conditions (German army all in the West, Britain and France still in the fight), why would he attack in 1941 when Germany turns East?

No, I clearly recall you saying Stalin signed the Pact with Germany so that Germany would start the war (the "trap" in your view) and then saying that he wanted a prolonged war in the West like in WWI and that's why he helped Germany to weather off the British blockade (the grand plan to weaken all 3 Western countries). Now you're saying no.

First of all, I doubt the roads in Eastern Europe were any better than those in Western Russia. Bridges can be destroyed, railways tore apart.

Secondly, you seem to think the Russian steppe was a big problem in winter time yet somehow the hilly and mountainous terrain in East-Central Europe is supposed to be a walk in the park in winter weather.

Thirdly, I doubt Soviet planners wouldn't try their best to avoid winter. The over-optimistic arguments you bring wouldn't stand a chance in front of Soviet army planners that still remember the winter in Finland. So... why July?

260 km... by air maybe. Did the Soviet divisions have wings?

PaulC, as you learned from your mentor, you play with numbers hoping to impress the assistance! You oppose an alleged super strong soviet invasion force (I will speak later about it!) to the real romanian-german force present in the field in end june 1941 to fit the scenarios you ( Rezun, Solonin & Co) have in mind! And because you (many generals formed around a map -f.i. Hitler too) believe that war is a thing determined by the numbers (of divisions, soldiers, tanks, etc.) how come the 2nd Mechanized Corps (the strongest of them all -see the TO&E for the 18th Mech. Corps and the 27th Mech. Corps!) was not able to repel over the Pruth river the german-romanian troops in july 1941? I hope you know that the 2nd Mech. Corps received such an order in early july 1941 and fought alongside the 35th Infantry Corps (Red Army) against german-romanian troops! From 22nd june to 3rd july the 2nd Mech. Corps have kept intact his fighting capacity, his combat manpower armor and vehicles were at full capacity! A couple of days later he was used together with the 48th Inf. Corps in a different operation, that failed too! No, that's surely a lie, isn't it? And you believe this unit could march and and destroy on his way all german&romanian forces in 6 (or 10) july in Romania? Good news is that you're not alone, Rezun probably believe it too (or just said that to sell his books?)!

BTW, the distance from Bucharest to Iasi is 420 km, to Botosani 450 km, to Husi 330 km. From these cities to the current border with Rep. of Moldova there are another 10-30 km. These distances are by road, using today's roads.