Suvorov books, ww-2

Indeed cainele_franctiror, I started reading it too! So far I have found not no answer, but questions over questions! I will pronounce on it, when I will read it all!

Finally, someone who actually reads more than Glantz's soviet propaganda !

This post has been edited by PaulC on June 04, 2012 07:37 pm

I didnt read that book, of Solonin, but i visited his website and read few things there. He seem the most realistic and documented author, and i was glad to see one of the things i writed here fit very well with what he say.

He is partialy agree with Suvorov (as he agree with hypothesis of Stalin preparation for a big invasion in Europe, and the huge build up of war industry and of red army) but he is clearly disagree with him (and with Glantz or with official soviet/russian historyography) about how red army was prepared for that war. And is about training and morale (which was i think much lower then our troops for ex, as a medium), because soviets wasnt at all as surprised by the Axis attack as Suvorov and official soviet and russian official history want to say, yet still suffered huge amount of losses.
And here i very agree with him, even if from what i read there (agree, just small paragraphs from his books) he leave aside some stuff as shortcomings of T-34 for ex.

Basically i think he said what i said too, Red Army would had lost the war if not Nazis idiot politics (especially the treatment of local population viewed as "subhumans" and who get on Stalin soviet side because of this), Hitler madness, Allied involvement and big space and resources that Soviets had. I think this is the order of things

I saw some interesting stuff there, he said that Romanians attacked the Soviets with an "aero museum" aviation (he mention Potez, PZL, Savoia Marchetti and so on aircrafts) yet soviet airforce having a huge numerical superiority and even a quality one and supported by an excellent AA defence managed to shot down just 12 aircrafts in the first days of attack.

I didnt saw any mention of IAR-80 however (which was better then I-16 and probably even then Mig-3 as dogfighter in low and middle altitude) but again i dont read the book just few paragraphs.

He is clearly more realistic then Suvorov however, even if isnt perfect either or have some mistakes too (in my opinion ofcourse).

This post has been edited by udar on June 05, 2012 10:02 am

Did you read Suvorov btw ? From our exchange in the past, I would say not. If this is the case, how do you know on what Suvorov-Solonim agree/disagree ?

FYI, Solonim agrees with Suvorov on 99% of the pre June 22 1941 topics. Where they disagree are the following fields after June 22 :
-soviet lines of fortifications : Suvorov says they were abandoned, blown up and/or covered by eart wrts to the Stalin line, while the Molotov line was build facing the enemy in open view, according to Suvorov, to help the invasion by providing direct fire on the enemy. Solonim states that the fortifications weren't destroyed, that most bunkers were opearational in one form or the other and that the Molotov line was more extensive than believed. I for one tend to agree with Suvorov on this topic : not only did the Germans not notice the Molotov line, but the Stalin line was in complete disrepair , troops that tried to occupy the bunkers did not have the keys, not even water barrels to keep drinking water. Suvorov brings examples from the memoirs of soldiers when they tried to use the existing fortifications as they fell back.
- causes of defeat for the Red Army ( this is the most important topic ) - Suvorov mentions the following reasons ( top to bottom in importance ) :
1. Deployment of the most important armies in bulges inside enemy territory, surrounded from 3 sides by the enemy and encircled by the German pincer movements soon after June 22.
2. Suicidal and worthless counter attacks based on the old plans, the Red Army didn't finish its deployment and was ordered to counter-attack which lead to disorganization and chaos.
3. Destruction of the airfields and depriving the Red Army of air reconnaissance, units , corps and entire armies acted on rumors of enemy air drops and nonexistent spearheads => result was total chaos and lack of battlefield oversight.
4. Lack of maps : the Red Army did not have maps to fight on its own territory. Suvorov gives several examples of army divisions without maps or army corps with 2 maps for 3 divisions, 50000 people and 900 guns when in reality they would have needed several thousands maps. Whole subunits got lost, not having maps. Artillery fire became impossible to coordinate, enemy movements couldn't be shown on the maps, coordination with partisans and aviation became impossible.
5. Weapons - offensive minded weapons - KV2 tanks, SU2 planes, BT tanks, paratrooper corps. As soon as the invasion started this weapons were abandoned in masses and production ceased immediately. You don't need KV2 to fight enemy fortifications on your own territory, the SU2 was defenseless, BT tanks were poorly suited for Soviet Union territory, being a "good road network" tank, which sacrificed armor, track width and powerful armament for speed and long range. The Soviet Union also had 5 paratrooper corp, all were immediately disbanded and used as regular infantry ( guard units ). Having spent billions to build airfields, thousands of aircraft to train them, they were all lost without glory in the swamps of Biellorussia.

Solonim sees things differently, although in some cases he brings evidence in support of Suvorov's variant. :
1.Regarding deployment, he says that even if the deployment was poorly suited for defense, it was well positioned to counter-attack. The counter-attacks however failed miserably with whole units, mechanized corps and armies disintegrating.
2. The counter attacks failed because Red Army disintegrated under psychological and social changes, not due to enemy action. The first to flee from border region were the security, NKVD and NKGB men, and this caused the crash of the soviet system : free from repression, the soldiers dropped their weapons and headed towards their homes to divide the land and be as far as way as possible from the war. Units made of people from Ucraine, Baltic states, Basarabia, Bielerussia rebelled, shot their officers and scattered. Local people in this countries started armed insurrection, firing and ambushing the soviet units. The morale plummeted and the soviet soldiers deserted en masse, abandoning tanks, guns, airplanes and hijacking jeeps and trucks. Soviet representatives abandoned the border regions and fled east.
3. Solonin disagrees with the destruction of the VVS under enemy pressure ( simply too big for the tiny Luftwaffe attack forces ), they say it happened as pilots forcibly conscripted did not want to fight to defend soviet power and deserted. Those that flew, did not attempt to hinder the enemy.
4. Lack of maps - Solonin doesn't mentions this topic.
5. Weapons - he disagrees with the one sided nature of some of the weapons, pinpointing the Germans had nothing comparable both quality and quantity wise. Regardless of weapon destination, the Red Army should have inflicted massive losses on the Germans. It didn't happen for reasons other than quantity of weapons ( they were armed to the teeth ) or quality ( destination and parameters vs. German ones ).

What was new for me the the psychological meltdown of the Red Army. While I was aware that some units made of ucrainians and baltic people deserted , or that ucrainian insurrection groups started to fight the Red Army, I didn't comprehend the extent of the matter. The soviet power was hated first and foremost by its own people. They remembered the famine, the beatings, the torture, summary executions, the collectivization, the destruction of the villages and their ecosystem. They didn't want to fight for this. The only thing the repression system feared was a real, external enemy. They were the first to run and the population felt a sudden freedom, unheard of for decades. The army experienced the same : soldiers confronted with a real foreign enemy confronted their comissars and NKVD people and deserted en masse.

This post has been edited by PaulC on June 05, 2012 11:14 am

From what i understand, Soviet build up was clear, to both Suvorov and Solonin and i agree with that.
However Molotov line was about to be builded, replacing Stalin line.
Some lack of maps can be explained by the fact USSR just occupied those new teritories and didnt managed to give detailed maps of them to each and any division, regiment or batalion there. And i am pretty sure those units acting on older soviet areas had maps (that wasnt find many is another story, they might be just burned, retrieved with the retreating troops etc)

About the failure of red army, i agree with Solonin. It wasnt a matter of surprise, as Suvorov and official soviet/russian historyography say, trying to cover up the disaster, but a matter of lack of competent comanders, lack of cohesion (which was normal, both because of the type of society there and because the empire recruited soldiers with all kind of diferent ethnicities who didnt like the empire in the first place), lack of training, lack of morale.
As much as they was equipped with good weapons systems, in more and more large quantities, red army suffered from all those things i said above.

Stalin lackeys was on charge and they was mostly chose on reason of loyality, and not competence (unlike Suvorov i understand try to imply), it was a fear of independent thought and will to act on all levels of comand. Some was blocked by the axis assault, didnt know how to react, some was scared and run back, producing a cascade effect with disastous consequences. Lots of soldiers simply deserted, many was taken prisoners because the chain of comand was broken, their comanders didnt know how to act or was afraid to do it (those counterattacks that might block or even defeat the axis advance, and who wasnt done in much part, even if they had both the time and the means to do them), they lacked training and morale.
As Solonin said, the soviet soldier was at an even lower level then minor Axis soldiers, regrading the training and morale.

Some units was better, some (many) was worse. And things didnt improved much during the war, not even in the last part. Just look at Kursk where soviets having all the cards suffered much bigger losses then germans.

Stalin and his men prepared the war very well as building the industry, occupying the best position they thought, equiping the army, and pushed to start it. However they lacked much as competence in military matters, as tactical and even strategical training for the army, building a cohesion, rising the morale and even lacking on some weapon carachteristics (i agree, they cant be good at everything). And as things didnt go as they thought will go, they was caught in a kind of surprise, didnt know how to act. Prety much all war they used outdated tactics of thrown masses of troops to overhelm the enemy, regardless of losses. They do use in some moments flanking maneuvres even on very large scale, but just on large open steppes, making use of their big numerical superiority both in men and weapons (tanks, artilery etc)

It was simply the nazis idiotic actions there, with their "supermen" vs "subhumans" doctrine that pushed many on Stalin camp, it was Hitler madness at some point and Allies involvement who grind down parts of german industry and diverted more and more german troops out of the eastern front by opening new fronts (Africa, Italy, France) that allowed soviets to win at the end.

This post has been edited by udar on June 08, 2012 08:11 am

I also want to highlight some elements, even if I still don't read entirely the book written by Mark Solonin! Although I don't contest any moment the qualitative and quantitative superiority of USSR over Germany in many types of heavy weapons (tanks, artillery f.i.), Germany had the advantage of a richer combat experience (not all units but certainly many), excellent command and motivated soldiers! But in the German army there were some new weapons like assault guns, armored personnel carriers, a.o. that have proven effective in the war (and after in other armies!) which should not be neglected! But obviously the Red Army would have been able to create great problems to the Germans (in 1941) if better lead, motivated and disposed in the field...

From what i read on Solonin website, i remember he mentioned somewhere that many german units was actually with no combat experience prior to Barbarossa, or with limited experience (like 2 weeks in France or Poland).

Soviet superiority both in quantity and quality was clear in 1941. They kept the quantity advantage all the war, even if without Allied involvement even that would be lost, and probably in a one on one battle with the Axis they would lose more armoured vechicles that they can produce.

As regarding quality, germans enjoyied a superiority in airplanes, Solonin said that soviet aviation counted little during all war period, compared with other branches.
Germans made at some point some good tanks too, at least on par with the best soviet ones (last P-IV variants, P-V Panter and P-VI Tiger and some other armoured vechicles, including armoured personel carriers).
But they benefited of better tactics and better trained soldiers, acting under a better suited battle doctrine. Sure, at some point they didt stand the pressure either and start crumble, but that wasnt the case in the first part of the war

I think most important in the summer and fall/autumn of 1941 was the total control of the air by the Luftwaffe.
In addition to bombing, it allowed reconnaissance and transport toward the advanced ground units.

Few days after June 22, 1941, the advancing German forces in the part of south Poland occupied by Soviet Union (east of Slovakia, today in western Ukraine) came under attack from three directions (south, north and east) from huge armored Soviet columns. The two or three days fight was very difficult for the Germans, but Luftwaffe eventually saved the situation.

Returning to German aerial superiority, well known reasons are the destruction on airfields of 1600 planes on June 22, and the inferior quality of Soviet airplanes, like I-16 etc.
The lesser known reason is that while many Soviet engineers were quite brilliant, Stalin was stupid enough to have most of them arrested and forced to work/create as prisoners, and some of them were even executed.
If you have time, the following movie is very interesting - in three parts:
First:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dYq2pdjlumc
Second:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJJirXbDF_I&feature=relmfu
Last:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqk-b7EtE20

This post has been edited by Florin on June 09, 2012 06:48 am

Surprising you agree with something. May I ask you what was the purpose of the buildup ? Surely they didn't bring the soviet people to wide spread cannibalism in the richest farmlands in Europe for the sake of building huge amounts of weapons only to lose them all in the first weeks of the war ? They had a very different purpose for that build up, one that cannot be ignored for long in mainstream history.

Actually they didn't had maps when fighting near Smolensk and Viazma too. And what's far more interesting there was nobody to make the maps : the topographic branch of the Red Army was decimated in the border battles in June/July 1941. What were they doing there ?

Secondly, FYI, they had maps. Only the Western Front lost 200 million maps in the first days of the war . They were at the border in train echelons and set on fire by retreating Red Army forces. Why didn't they try to use them ? Because it's hard to defend Odessa and Minsk with the maps of Ploiesti and Krakow.

Your ignorance of Suvorov is sublime. He's not trying to cover up the disaster and certainly he isn't taking the official soviet historiography ( this must be the most absurd claim I've ever hear on Suvorov, says something about your knowledge of the topic at hand ). He is trying to explain the disaster and his arguments are pretty clear and convincing and he brings evidence to back his claims. Solonin does the same. The truth is somewhere in between.

Why not read his books and save us from your erroneous understandings ?

Go read his book Epurarea / The purges and the matter is settled.

Very strange as before June 22 they knew perfectly what they had to do. Suvorov brings examples of soviet commanders acting in the deployment phase and sure as hell they weren't confused or didn't know what to do. Everything worked like clockwork. June 22 comes and disaster, they don't know what to do and are confused. And you don't wonder why order turned to disorder ? Eveybody knew they were going for war with Germany, yet when the war started they were shocked. That's because a German attack wasn't expected at all and came from the blue.

Where did he say that ? Tell me the page so I can read also. Surprisingly, German reports on the Red Army combat performance at individual level are praising. And that's in the middle of a full disintegration of the Red Army!

While the tactical performance of German units was unmatched by any allied army, soviet losses in the second half of the war were well within their replacement capability. German ones weren't.

And at Kursk, the soviets had for the first time a severe quality disadvantage, their tank guns being completely outclassed by the 75 L43/48/70 and the 88L56. In the open steppe, superior optics and guns made life miserable for defenders.

Oh my, you must have a fever since you're saying exactly what Suvorov is.

This is debatable. While certainly the Red Army never matched the Wehrmacht in individual unit performance, they ended the war in Berlin. It's like in football when the game doesn't start 0-0 , but 3-0 in favor of the Wehrmacht and in the end they still lost. With a soviet attack if would have started 0-0. I'm pretty sure nothing could have stopped the tidal wave of the Red Army, there was simply too much men, equipment, supplies from the west and a ruthless command structure which didn't care about losses.

I would connect the problem of the alleged Soviet attack to the key element of surprise (for the Germans of course)! And here comes the Kursk element -the soviets knew about the german plan and have taken steps accordingly! I do not see in any way a Nazi Germany taking defensive measures in the summer of 1941... For the germans the soviet plans were no suprise, Hitler was well aware of Soviet aggressive actions towards the Balkans (including here Romania) in mid to late 1940 and was very irritated... so he prepared for war... Germany was never in his history in defense, she always attacked or was trying to do so... how could you imagine the german armies being in defense positions in summer 1941 I don't know... F.i. I could imagine no german armies in Europe, as they could be deployed in Middle East against the British... but German armies in defensive, no... not in 1941... The image of the soviet tidal wave is a old soviet dream of the cold war, born maybe in 1941... but no connection with reality... Europe is simply to strong (even divided) for them... they will always dream about it imagining they were the mongols... they weren't... Welcome to reality!

I was agree since the begining that Stalin has preparing for war. What i wasnt agreeing is that he was ready for it in 1941. In fact seeing how red army did all the war, i think Stalin and his gang overestimed their possibilities and they wouldnt had the success they dreamed off even if they would be able to start the war in their terms and the moment they will chose

Well, many soviet commanders wasnt quite an example of competence. If many echelons lacked maps is the sign they wasnt ready for war. I dont know what maps of Ploiesti they had actually, and in the same time i really doubt they lacked any maps of Odessa, or that the troops there had no clue about the area

There was other factors, pointed out previously, that lead to the poor performance of the red army back then, and the presumly lack of maps is on the bottom of the list

Yes, he is trying to cover up the disaster, i am sorry if you are unable to see the big picture. The difference betwen him and the official soviet and then russian historyography propaganda is that one say USSR and red army wasnt ready for war, so it was suprised by german/axis assault, and the other one said the red army and USSR was fully ready for war, but just for a 100% offensive war (this is really silly) so was surprised by the same invasion. And so was unable to fight back, because they was some kind of programed robots who didnt know to fight in any other way except to invade Europe. This Suvorovian logic is too out of reality to be seriously taken in consideration.

Especially as Solonin said that red army wasnt that much taken by surprise (not to mention that Stalin knew, thru spies as Lucy network, or Richard Sorge, even the estimated date of german attack). Axis assault wasnt able to take out all the red army troops, quite many, from aviation to tanks and infantry and so on was out of reach of invanding forces in the first stages of invasion, but still didnt know how to react, how to fight back, some disintegrated, many deserted

As i said, i really doubt Rezun hypothesis that Stalin eliminated just incompetent commanders. For God sake, i read somewhere that soviet trops in Finland has going to attack holding hands and singing patriotic songs, under comissars supervision. And many was from southern Russia, less used with the areas there. This isnt at all some sign as soviet commanders in the eve of WW 2 was some competent ones.

In fact, look at their way of fight during all WW 2, even when they had not just the quantity but some quality too on their side, and still suffered lots and lots of losses

Thats another sign of lack of combat abilities, morale, training etc. As Solonin said, it was quite possible to be done counter-atacks all over the front line, red army still enjoyied superiority in troops, weapons and in some instances in quality of those weapons. Many soviet troops from all categories wasnt touched in first phases of invasion.
However, they was unable to react because:
1- they was afraid to do something without orders from higher echelons
2- they really wasnt prepared for a war with a strong enemy
3- many wasnt at all happy with the life in USSR, an empire who tried to bring together many nationalities who didnt want to be there, and who imposed too a social life forged by terror, gulags and NKVD

I read this in one of the paragraphs from his book, on his own website, i dont remember which one, and i am sorry i dont have time to re-read and check again all those.
I really doubt the germans had much praise for red army at that moment, few individuals or individual units performance was covered by the rapid fall of red army on huge areas, with rapid german advance and millions of deads and prisoners from red army.

Soviets didnt had any severe quality disadvantage at Kursk. The bulk of german tanks there was made by P-IV, with few Tigers and even less Panther tanks (which wasnt yet fully ready anyway). The bulk of soviets was T-34, arguably a better tank then german P-IV. And soviets had more tanks there, and had KV tanks too, able to knock out even Tigers, had a prepared position with mine fields, trenches, way more artilery, more aircrafts, more infantry etc. etc.

Soviet losses in the second half (and even in the first half) of the war were within their replacement capability because:
1- allies involvement who diverted german troops from eastern front to north Africa (well, this because of italians failures too), Italy and then France
2- allies bombardments who grinded more and more the german industry
3- lend lease agreement, from which soviets received almost 13,000 armoured vechicles (and many other things necessary for war)
4- huge space to retreat (if USSR would be as big as France for ex. would be defeated imediatly at that point)
5- big population, used mercilessy as cannon fodder (and i think as much as because they disregarded the lives of common people and they dont know many other tactis anyway)

I do agree with Suvorov when he say that Stalin prepared for war, and pushed the things in that direction, thru Hitler as breaker of "capitalist world" possible to unite against USSR.
I agree that Stalin prepared the things from technical point of view.
What i dont agree is that Stalin prepared all the things as perfect as he (or Suvorov) might think it was.
Even from technical point of view not all soviet weapon systems was well suited for that. From tactical point of view, soviets was a disaster, able to fight and win just against much smaller and less equiped oponents, by flooding their positions with troops, tanks and artilery.
A WW 1 style tactic, fight with more modern weapons.

Many soldiers wasnt too prepared or trained, and morale was low or fall quickly when the situation worsened. Fear (of bolshevik repression system) was the one who keep them together, and when a bigger fear (enemy soldiers near them and ready to take them out right then) shows up they disintegrated as cohesive units (with few exceptions). Or for some, it was the ocassion to get rid of soviets, an allien empire who just occupied them.
This was the situation at the begining of war.

Later on nazis stupid politics with "superhumans" and "subhumans" draw many on Stalin side, who pushed some patriotism pedal now and get rid of "spread of communism and liberation of workers" slogan. This and the allies involvement playied the bigger role and helped soviets win (and occupy in the process the former nazi german controled or allied areas in eastern and central Europe, meaning occupying that power vacuum there).

I dont think Stalin and his gang realised the drawbacks or weaknesses of soviet army at that moment, even if they planed a full assault in Europe and builded lots of weapons for that. The hard win war in Finland gived them an alarm signal however, so they probably tried to fix something, based as well on the presumtion that germans will fight a longer period in west.
The quick fall of France caught soviets still unprepared, and unable to face well the axis assault.

This post has been edited by udar on June 13, 2012 06:12 pm

It was reminded in a previous post that Richard Sorge and other spies informed NKVD about what was going to happen.

I am adding that Goering was not at all pleased with the idea of attacking Soviet Union, so on his own he informed the British, hoping that through them Stalin will get aware, and Hitler will back off.
Well, the British did their part - they informed Stalin, who considered it as a mischievous attempt to drag Soviet Union into war.
As mentioned in a documentary, the invasion of Soviet Union was the worst kept secret in history. Fortunately, the greatest ace in Hitler's sleeve was Stalin's stupidity.

This post has been edited by Florin on June 13, 2012 08:29 pm

Actually, according to Solonim, these are pure myths. Not only did Richard Sorge and other spies give wrong information, but it was impossible from a timing point of view for them to offer valuable clues that even the OKH did not set.

The information passed along ( interesting that nobody shows what messages the spies actually delivered ! ) was to say it politely, full of "crap". It contained a mixture of half truths and outright fabrications, not to say conflicting from one week to another. And active German disinformation measures only amplified the confusion of the NKVD. They were nowhere near as proficient as claimed by post-war propaganda.

That's actually irrelevant. The whole problem is divided in 3 parts :
-did the Soviet Union leadership want to occupy Europe and enforce communism ? The answer is yes.
-Did they actively prepared for this ? Again the answer was yes.
-When did they plan to invade ? The answer is July 1941.

Whether they had any chances of success or not, it's irrelevant. That we can only speculate. However, the previous 3 points are facts and can be proven. And that's Suvorov's thesis which to your surprise, you seem perfectly in match.

Don't you understand they've lost 200 million maps in only 3 regions ? 200 railway carriages of maps. Can you imagine that ? A train 3km long loaded only with maps. They were prepared for war and had the maps, only for the wrong war and the wrong maps.

All those high quality maps became less useful than toilet paper the moment the Germans invaded. Since they couldn't be used on soviet territory they were set on fire.

A military topographic map isn't your typical school map. You have on it lots of terrain details from bridge size to river width, land, tree height and diameter, everything.
Do you have any clue how artillery fire is conducted ? How many maps do you think are needed for an artillery battery ?

Lack of maps is one of the most important factors in the defeat. How do you direct your forces ? Pointing with the finger ? How can the unit staff direct units, pinpoint enemy position without maps ?

What you totally fail to grasp is that post June 22 Red Army performance offers no indication of what was planned before June 22. That they planned to attack and prepared accordingly is proven by facts. Whether they would have succeeded or disintegrated at the contact with the Wehrmacht are only speculations which in no way says anything about what they planned.
Your reverse logic is totally flawed.

As i said, i really doubt Rezun hypothesis that Stalin eliminated just incompetent commanders. For God sake, i read somewhere that soviet trops in Finland has going to attack holding hands and singing patriotic songs, under comissars supervision. And many was from southern Russia, less used with the areas there. This isnt at all some sign as soviet commanders in the eve of WW 2 was some competent ones.

In fact, look at their way of fight during all WW 2, even when they had not just the quantity but some quality too on their side, and still suffered lots and lots of losses

Again save us from your doubts and speculations and read the book. After you've read it, you're entitled to support or contradict his arguments. Until then, you're simply posting opinions and you know what they say about opinions.

The problem is that they did not have any defensive solution planned. Confusion reigned supreme the moment the Germans attacked and the Red Army lost tactical awareness. They didn't know where their units or where the enemy was. They received multiple contradicting orders each day and units disintegrated by moving in circles like a drunk man. Most of the time they didn't manage to get in the launch position to fulfill an order that they received another one totally different. Solonim does a good job at explaining how control was lost and the Red Army ceased to exist like a viable fighting forces.

How convenient.

Why don't you read Halder's journal and his entries about soviet pockets of resistance and lack of freedom to maneuver unlike France ?

The T34/76 is inferior to the PIV 75 L43/48 in a static employment where the 2nd can engage at longer ranges. At Kursk, the soviets waited for the Germans. The Germans advanced, stopped, scanned the battlefield and engaged targets from ranges the soviets couldn't fight back. For example, the Panthers engaged soviet tanks from 1500m and more with their high velocity 75mm guns.
Secondly, the main soviet AT gun, the 45mm, was incapable of dealing with the Tigers and Panthers.

So what exactly are we arguing then ?

This doesn't have any influence on whether they intended to attack or not.

Could very well be so. However, I don't agree they had such weaknesses.

Here I see things differently : Khalkin-Gol proved the Red Army could perform blitzkrieg style offensive warfare with mechanized units. They showed proficiency in obliterating the Japanese army which fought stubbornly and with typical fanaticism. And the Japanese learned the lesson so well, that even when the German Army was near Moscow, they've refused to intervene.

Finland was a totally different play : fighting in winter near or at the artic circle, over land full of forests and lakes with no roads, against fortified lines prepared for 20 yeas.
It was a horrible endeavor, which demanded the impossible. And on top of this, they didn't prepare for the war. They expected the finns to give up. The reality was totally different : soviets tanks couldn't use the swampy terrain, mines and obstacles everywhere, troops had to stay without shelters in the arctic winter at -30/-40C. Artillery couldn't spot the enemy bunkers under the snow and the infantry couldn't clear the mines.
Like Suvorov said, imagine a medical unit trying to cut a soldier's leg blown off by a mine at -30C in the tent, when outside it's -40C. Any injury proved fatal in minutes due to the cold.

But they've learned. In less than a month, from January to February, they've changed their tactics, they've brought adequate supplies, they started to act as a cohesive force and did a task which was impossible for any other army : break a fortified line in the finish swamps and forests in ARTIC WINTER.

At the same time, the Wehrmacht was conducting trials to prove that they can't carry combat operations in winter, and they were talking about Winter in northern France, not Finland.

No wonder that later in the war, the Germans learned the hard way how to fight in winter. Maybe Hitler should have sent 20 Pz I and II ( why not even III or IV ) in Finland together with an infantry regiment, to fight there. Their reports would have been a joy to read !

FYI, there's a book called Hitler's Artic Warfare where Wehrmacht operations in the Arctic region are described. In the artic tundra, swamps and forests, the Wehrmacht advanced 20km from its starting point. It had to cover 80km to conquer Murmansk and cut the western supplies to the Soviet Union on the Northern path. The famous AlpinJagers couldn't advance more than 20km in 2 years of war and they didn't had a Mannerheim line in front on them. They also attacked in summer, when you had 15-20C plus, not -40C.

Let me quote from the book, p 90 :

That says everything about who achieved the impossible 18 months before and who was a good weather/terrain army that was very lucky on top of that. And the luck ran out in the very first days of the war in the Artic.

This post has been edited by PaulC on June 14, 2012 08:06 am

The answer for Suvorov maybe. But i agree with the first two parts

Let me see if i get it right. Soviets had 200 millions of maps ? All related with regions as Ploiesti, Warsaw, and so on? And they lost every and each of them, acording to Suvororv?
And red army doesnt have any map of their teritories, like Ukraine, Bielorussia and so?
Allow me to doubt this

Trust me, i saw military maps and detailed enough topographic maps. What you said there, that they know the size of the bridges, the width of rivers, roads and so on, they surely know all that about them in soviet teritory. To build such logistic on their western frontier they needed to bring the tanks, artilery, trucks and so on from the more interior areas, and they needed to know on which roads to do it better. Even for a invasion in Germany they need to know the best routes in USSR to send the reinforcements and supplies.
Not to mention they had there the Stalin line (for which they surely had detailed maps and topographic works. This line was specificaly build as defensive line, troops was surely trained for defence there and know well the area. This line was largely abandoned after USSR occupied new teritories and Stalin intended to build a new line in west, Molotov line, another defensive line.

I doubt again that in less then a year soviet army lost and forgot all maps for Stalin line defence, forgot how to fight a defensive battle, and had no clue or maps about the areas inside of USSR.

This is just silly and an attempt of Suvorov to cover the failures

Red army was very well in position to do counter-attacks or flanking maneuvres (so offensive actions) against axis assault. After the first phase of Barbarossa soviets still enjoyed superior numbers of troops and materials, and even superior quality in some aspects. Yet they wasnt able to do right any of those. Not to mention how stupid is to think that the many troops untouched of the first attacks wouldnt be able for defence.

Yes, but my opinion are not based just on that book, there are other authors, even Solonin. You should read too his website at least

As i said, i doubt thet plans for defence of Stalin line was suddenly forgotten or lost, thats silly.
Red army lost tactical awarness and strategic initiative because wasnt prepared well for war, it wasnt a well oiled machine functioning flawless, but who failled because of surprise. It failled because wasnt as good as some propaganda say, their training, morale and cohesion was low, especially when they encounter a strong enemy or was surprised. A good army enjoying the soviet superiority would be surely able to halt the axis advance much quickly, right in 1941

Yes, but more close to the truth (maybe i make some time to search again for that quote) then "germans thought the Romanian army become fragile after couple days of fight" or "soviets used just (or mostly?) T-60 and T-70 at Stalingrad" as i saw some opinions here

There wasnt a huge difference at posibility of knock down the target betwen a P-IV with 75 mm gun and a T-34 with 76,5 mm gun. What might lack as range T-34 supplied by much better armour compared with P-IV. And much better mobility. However what soviets lacked was training, tactic and coordination, even combat abilities. Thats why they lost so much compared with others
Panther was very few at Kursk, and not fully battle ready either and Tigers make less then 10% of german tanks there.
And soviets had defensive lines with enough Zis-76 mm guns to hold off german tanks if so. Plus more KV heavy tanks and SU tank hunters

Well, if Stalin and his gang realized their weaknesses, it might have, as they wouldnt rush to attack.

That says everything about who achieved the impossible 18 months before and who was a good weather/terrain army that was very lucky on top of that. And the luck ran out in the very first days of the war in the Artic.

First, few things about Khalkin-Gol

-it was fought in large open stepes, with soviets enjoying a large superiority in tanks, and even in troops on that local sector they attacked.
-the losses of both sides are heavy debated and vary quite much.
-japanese wasnt scared by the outcome, but they was pushed in other direction by the oil embargo imposed on them. Siberia (at that point) was just a wasteland without resources (except wood), but southeast Asia (Indonesia, Brunei, Malaiesia etc) had necessary resources (and especially oil) to make the japanese war machine running.
-a large part of japanese army was tied in China, which, you know, was by itself a huge country with a population several times bigger then USSR, and japanese war there wasnt quite very easy

And now few things about what japanese considered about it

Edward Drea - "Japan's Imperial Army" - page 202:

"The cease-fire and Soviet restraint during the fighting, demonstrated by limiting their operations to the immdeiate contested area, reconfirmed the army's impression that the Russians would back down when confronted by force. Japanese staff officers derided the Red Army's plodding tactics and its amateurish deployments during the fighting, views that meshed with confidential assessments of Soviet fighting ability, largely stereotypes predicated on presumed national characteristics."

Didnt looked too afraid, didnt?

They even prepared for another offensive against Rusia (from same book page 216)

In mid 1941 an attack to eliminate the northern threat to Japan would require the following:

"Stage one would mobilise 16 divisions to wartime strength, stage two would also add 6 more divisions,including 2 from the China front.
The mobilisation requirements were staggering. The 12 divisions currently in Manchuria would need 500,000 more troops in addition to their associated animal transport, supplies,and equipment to reach wartime strength.To move those forces to the continent would require at least 800,000 tons of shipping,tie up one-third of Japan's domestic railroad capacity,and monopolize the entire resources of the South Manchurian Railway for two months.."

(page 217) "The latest the invasion could begin was September 10 because the campaign had to be concluded by mid-October before the harsh Siberian winter closed in and made large-unit operations impossible."

Sure, japanese was affected by that battle, but not as much as to be scared and afraid by the red army, as soviet propaganda try to imply again. Japanese was basicaly in no position to attack there, because was too spread on other fronts, and considered a war for resources in south and keeping China is more important then attacking Siberia

About Finland, well, soviets attacked in winter precisely because the swamps to be frozen, so they be able to pass them even with tanks.

The fact they was weak tactically and didnt know how to make a good use of their big superiority in troops and all types of weapons show exactly they wasnt well prepared for war.
Germans didnt use any significant forces in north, compared with central and even southern european front.

This post has been edited by udar on June 14, 2012 10:11 am