Suvorov books, ww-2

Given the fact that Romania's size was almost 20 times smaller than the size of the European part of the SU and it had a much higher population density, a road density just 30% higher (using your figures) is not astronomically higher. The Soviet Union didn't need paved roads through empty steppe just to match Western paved road density figures.

But again, this is besides the point. You said Russia had only dirt roads and was roadless. I pointed out that it is a generalization, to which you replied "joke of the century". I gave you the figures and now you're playing around with the figures in an attempt to back your initial fallacy. Russia was not roadless, the demands of Barbarossa were too much for Russia's road infrastructure. That's different! The demands of a Russian offensive in July 1941 would be too much for the Romanian road infrastructure too.

Given the fact that Romania's size was almost 20 times smaller than the size of the European part of the SU and it had a much higher population density, a road density just 30% higher (using your figures) is not astronomically higher. The Soviet Union didn't need paved roads through empty steppe just to match Western paved road density figures.

But again, this is besides the point. You said Russia had only dirt roads and was roadless. I pointed out that it is a generalization, to which you replied "joke of the century". I gave you the figures and now you're playing around with the figures in an attempt to back your initial fallacy. Russia was not roadless, the demands of Barbarossa were too much for Russia's road infrastructure. That's different! The demands of a Russian offensive in July 1941 would be too much for the Romanian road infrastructure too.

You're not arguing me; you're arguing all the German officers and soldiers, Romanian too, that fought on the Eastern Front. They said roads in Russia were horrible or missing completely.

As for your last comment, against Romania there were 3 mechanized corps. They would have sliced through the defenses quickly and expand in the south and across the Carpathians as mountain passes were conquered by paratroop brigades just like the airfields in Basarabia in 1940. Given the fighting that occurred in Moldavia in 1944, I wouldn't say Romanian roads hampered troop movements.

Saying Soviet road infrastructure proved unable to handle the huge demands of a large scale offensive like Barbarossa is one thing.

Exaggerating by saying Russia was roadless and had only dirt roads is another.

The Germans complained of many things, but in this propaganda movie, starting at 6:30, you can see them actually driving on the Minsk-Moscow "autostrasse":

http://youtu.be/2X1C54WGinA

Some of the 200,000 km of paved roads which according to some simply did not exist.

Saying Soviet road infrastructure proved unable to handle the huge demands of a large scale offensive like Barbarossa is one thing.

Exaggerating by saying Russia was roadless and had only dirt roads is another.

The Germans complained of many things, but in this propaganda movie, starting at 6:30, you can see them actually driving on the Minsk-Moscow "autostrasse":

http://youtu.be/2X1C54WGinA

Some of the 200,000 km of paved roads which according to some simply did not exist.

Indeed. And the moments at 4:45 - 5:17 must be entry on the autostrasse .... We're talking about early July 1941. The autumn rain, the rasputitsa , the snow, the cold are months away. Yet the blitzkrieg is getting bogged down. I rest my case about the road network.

This post has been edited by PaulC on July 03, 2012 05:13 pm

Yes, I noticed those moments too. That didn't stop me from posting the vid. Why? Because nobody argued those kind of roads or problems didn't exist. Who said all Russian roads were paved autostrasses? Not me. You however said all Russian roads were dirt roads and Russia was in fact roadless. Blatant exaggerations which I pointed out. Instead of admitting you got carried away in your rhetoric in order to stress your point you replied with "joke of the century" and continued to argue the unarguable.

Russia clearly had paved roads, as the vid shows, however the huge German offensive could not keep strictly to paved roads. There was fighting everywhere. The district and post roads (which made up most of the road network) were obviously unable to handle the amount of German heavy traffic, especially in poor weather. The same would happen in Romania (with the county and comunal roads which made up most of the road network) and other parts of Central Europe and the Balkans.

Did the roads stop the Germans by themselves? No. But they made life difficult for their offensive. Would the roads stop a Soviet offensive by themselves? No, but they would make it difficult. Your idea of a walk-in-the-park for the Soviets in Europe is unrealistic. You should also check how the weather was in 1941. FYI there were heavy rains and floods in Romania that summer, followed by severe winter.

PaulC, I agree that this task given to the USSR Southern Front was feasible! This was probably the only part of the Burian (Storm) plan (presented to Stalin by march 1941) that could be put into practice! The 9th and 18th Armies + 9th Independent Rifle Corps (Marine Infantry) from Crimea + 3nd Airborne Corps could defeat probably the romanian 3rd and 4th Armies... But let's not minimize the losses, at least if we consider the Romanian 3rd Army and the German 11th Army, which had a capacity of riposte later proven! The 2nd Mechanized Corps according to the Burian plan had to attack with his most powerful division, the 11th, in the sector occupied by the german 11th Army, which, like all (or almost all) German units, would have resisted with energy! Likely that troops of Romanian 3rd Army could have successfully opposed for a time to the Soviet 18th Army troops and the 16th Mechanized Corps, in an area with rugged terrain, favorable to defense! Possible the most successful Soviet attack might have been carried in Dobrogea and north-eastern Muntenia by the 14th Rifle, 18th Mechanized, 9th Rifle (Marine) and 3rd Airborne Corps helped maybe by the 27th Mechanized and other units from the inner Military Districts. But... please tell me where was (as location) in 22 june (where do you believe it could have been placed in july) the 1st Armored Division "Romania Mare" and if, f.i., her presence could have disturbed the soviet actions in north-eastern Muntenia?

While this part probably was the easiest, remember that against Romania, the soviet concentrated less than 15% of their forces.
Even the 1st strategic echelon is obliterated while punching through the German defenses, behind the 1st strategic echelon was the 2nd echelon, behind the 2nd was the 3rd, behind the 3rd there were another 5,5 million men raised in 1 week after mobilization declared. Halder complained they considered 200 Soviet Divisions and by early august they've destroyed 360 already. He didn't realized then he had another 300 in front of him. The mobilization potential of the Soviet Union was 34 million men and they've used 27 million during the war. Almost 1/3 of the German population.

What was behind the German forces in Poland ? What was behind the Lublin grouping of Army Group South ?

Behind the troops for Barbarossa, there was one central OKH reserve, the 2nd army behind Army Group Centre , 11 infantry divisions and 1 motorized division.
Was this immobile unit with no fully tracked AFVs able to stop the several mechanized corps expanding from 2 directions 600km apart ( Lvov and Bialostock bulges ) ? Once the mechanized corps penetrated the line, the German army simply did not have a 2nd echelon, a 3rd echelon, they had an immobile force consisting of 12 divisions with no tanks.

In Germany itself there were 31 replacement divisions (in process of being trained and equipped ), 3 infantry, 1 motorized and 2 panzer that were recovering. In all 257 fully tracked AFVs ( tanks and SPs ). For reference, a soviet mechanized division had 275 tanks, a soviet cavalry division had 64 tanks.

The plan envisioned the main strike at the junction between the German 54 infantry corp and the Romanian c3 infantry corp at Ungheni. For the northern part, they again targeted the weak spot, the junction between Romanian 3rd army's mountain corp ( 3 mountain brigades ) and cavalry corp ( 3 cavalry brigades ).
The idea was simple : strike at the Romanian forces on the flanks of the German 11th army since we were seen as the weak spot.

This is the wording of the Operation Groza plan ( sorry for the English, but I'm using Google translate from Russian ) :

The plan is so logical and simple.

The soviet superiority in artillery and tanks was staggering. And cavalry doesn't defeat tanks, that's for sure.

The Romanian Armored unit, the 1st reference I ever saw about it was August 5 when it was attached to 5th army corp in the siege of Odessa. Whether this force could have disturbed soviet actions in southern Moldavia my opinion is that at best they could have delayed some of the soviet thrusts, but in the general scheme it would have been quickly overrun.

Looking to the map I notice that they forgot the strongest soviet large unit -the 2nd Mechanized Corps, which should have been probably placed (on the map) somewhere above the 35th Rifle Corps (location after 22nd June). From my point of view without being a qualified person the spearhead of the soviet thrusts should have been in Tulcea-Galati (the main) and Radauti-Siret (the second) and not as the map shows Ungheni -Iasi, an area that was, with no doubt, strongly defended!
In terms of overwhelming Soviet superiority in armored vehicles that's no doubt, but except the 11th Tank Division from the 2nd Mechanized Corps who had "the famous couple" KV-1 & T-34-76 the other divisions (armored and mechanized) had only light tanks, that could be penetrated (destroyed) by any antiarmour guns (even light guns) available to the Romanian and German armies (divisions)!

As all plans are on paper.

Go to Google Earth and look at Europe. The South is all rugged, the North is relatively flat. The "reason" why the Russians went North instead of South is because they were headed for Berlin and Western Europe in general. The Carpathians/Balkans/Tatra/Alps mountains are a "wall". If they went South (Galati) they would have to cross a lot of mountains in order to go West. But by going North, they avoided all those mountainous obstacles. For the Russians Romania was a strategic quagmire in the case of a "westward push".
Radu

Hi to all forum members!
because I am passionate about World War II and this site and forum was recommended to me, and also this topic preoccupied me for several years, I will say a few words...
I'm sure that USSR, better said Stalin, was eager to continue the work of Bolshevization started by Lenin, but despite the massive armament policy started in the 30's, I do not believe that he truly believed that he can conquer Europe, beating Germany... Germany that defeated France and UK, won everything he wanted, and prepared for war in the east. Stalin knew that very well! Stalin was intelligent and cunning, as it was cruel and hard! And USSR do nothing what Stalin wouldn't like (and believed)! If plans of attack were possible or not is connected with the question whether Stalin believed them possible or not! I would explore more Stalin's personality to answer that question!

I hope you're not insinuating that you can't wage offensives with light tanks. If that would have been the case, Germany's offensives should have been stopped in Poland and France which had similar, but more numerous AT equipment compared to our divisions.
In accordance with Soviet Deep Operation theory, the Red Army planned the attack in layers. The 1st echelon will punch through ( supported by heavy breakthrough tanks ), the 2nd will expand and support the 1st flanks while the 3rd wave usually constituted of mechanized units would expand in the operational space.
The exploitation force was a combined weapons structure involving airborne units and mechanized forces. For our armies, once front line penetration was achieved, we were doomed. We simply weren't ready for highly mobile warfare that the mechanized corps could launch. You don't keep pace with the BTs and BA10s while on foot or with cavalry.

Secondly, there was no organized defense. German and Romanian units removed mines and barbed wire and were hiding in the woods, just like soviet ones. Nobody was digging trenches and fortified positions. Nobody planned to stay long in that position.

This is the same "wishful thinking", of you and/or of Stavka, even if i think Stavka didnt thought things are that easy as you present them. Or Rezun try to present them, i saw once too what he writed about the events of 1968 related with Romania, kinda weird ideas (or well, in KGB/GRU "maskirova" lines), and dismissed by real documents as those presented by Larry Watts for ex.

Soviets wouldnt be able to control the mountains, at least not for quite a significant period, surely not as quickly as you imply.

Airborne trops need to have air superiority first, which soviets was hardly able to obtain if we look at how things worked in first stages of Barbarossa, even against what Solonin named "Romanian air museum aviation". He however avoided to mention IAR-80, an airplane clearly superior to soviet I-16 and its variants, which was the backbone of soviet air force at that moment. Not to mention the AA defences

Then they (airborne troops) dont have heavy weaponry, and ofcourse tanks can't go in the mountains and forested areas.

And they didnt know the areas and would have to fight with specialized Mountain troops who prouved during the WW 2 to be amongst the best in the world

Light soviet tanks (the majority of tanks in use then, especially in a presumable offensive against us in 1941) would be vulnerable to pretty much any AT weapon we had, including AT rifles (so smaller calibres), Molotov cocktails and so on.

FNG line, even if not fully ready, was good enough that in combination with Danube Delta, Carpathians and troops available in 1944 to form an obstacle able to make the Stavka to consider they need at least 6 months to overcome Romania (probably downgrading at maximum the estimations).

A landing in Dobrogea by soviet marines from soviet fleet is out of question, soviet war fleet wasnt able to do almost anything even acting alone for just attacking Constanta. Actually suffered quite an important loss and never dare to do it again.
I really doubt they was able to mount any significant landings there.

Soviets will get stuck here then during the winter (which was a hard one) unable to use at fully their superior number of tanks. Sure, probably next year would be able to conquer all the Romania, but i am not sure at all they would like the price, or they would be actually able to acomplish that, with the dificulties they will encounter on other fronts (as against germans).
A comparation with germans in France or Poland is wrong, as germans was clearly better from tactical pov and using of combined arms (tanks, infantry and tactical aviation), not to mention that all their tanks was equiped with radios and have better ergonomy compared with soviet tanks (even if T-34 was clearly better as fiability and armour)

This post has been edited by udar on July 04, 2012 03:44 pm

I hope you're not insinuating that you can't wage offensives with light tanks. If that would have been the case, Germany's offensives should have been stopped in Poland and France which had similar, but more numerous AT equipment compared to our divisions.
In accordance with Soviet Deep Operation theory, the Red Army planned the attack in layers. The 1st echelon will punch through ( supported by heavy breakthrough tanks ), the 2nd will expand and support the 1st flanks while the 3rd wave usually constituted of mechanized units would expand in the operational space.
The exploitation force was a combined weapons structure involving airborne units and mechanized forces. For our armies, once front line penetration was achieved, we were doomed. We simply weren't ready for highly mobile warfare that the mechanized corps could launch. You don't keep pace with the BTs and BA10s while on foot or with cavalry.

Secondly, there was no organized defense. German and Romanian units removed mines and barbed wire and were hiding in the woods, just like soviet ones. Nobody was digging trenches and fortified positions. Nobody planned to stay long in that position.

I do not understand the point of this "wall of text".
I simply explained why, on the map you posted, the overrwhelming bulk of the Russian Army went over the northern border of Romania rathher than veer south. No insinuation, just simple observation - this actually happened, it is not some kind of pie-in-the -sky armchair general theory.
Radu

The I.A.R.80 was not a "major player" during Barbarossa. They scored air victories, indeed, but they were not the "champions". Also, not all of the few existing planes were sent to the frontline during Barbarossa.
If there was a "modern" Romanian plane in Barbarossa that was ignored by Solonin (and you too ;-) ), then that would be the Bf.109E, which was responsible for the largest number of Romanian air victories in the "1941 campaign".
Radu