Suvorov books, ww-2

Radu I'm only partially agree with you!
Reported to the possible main targets of the USSR in Europe, you're right, for what to go around the Carpathians to the south and not to cross them directly in Transylvania, from Moldova!
But, if the main target is the oil industry (Ploiesti region) and further the entire Balkan area, then the better axis of penetration would be in Tulcea-Braila area!

PaulC, obviously I did not think about it... of course I know what the Germans did in France, and not only there! But... what I doubt is the Red Army ability to lead such an action in 1941, because I read a lot about their actions in Bessarabia in july 1940, when virtually no one opposes them! I know for example that the 18th Mech. Corps who should take action in northern Dobrogea according to the map had only light T-26 tanks on June, 22, with low chances to receive better tanks in the next 2-3 weeks... you know the characteristics of the T-26 so...

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/map..._June_22_41.jpg
According to this map, if it's correct, the 1st Armored Division "Romania Mare" was in a position to disrupt the action of the soviet 18th Mech. Corps... and in terms of combat equipment, the two large units were substantially the same! I refer here mostly to the soviet T-26 light tanks versus the romanian LT-35 light tanks! The best-equipped division of the three from the 18th Mech Corps was the 39th, with 209 T-26 and T-26 flamethrowers...

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on July 04, 2012 06:32 pm

I really fail to see the fuss about crossing the Carpathians. Radub is talking as if instead of 3 mountain brigades we had 3 mountain armies.

If in the mountain passes the VVS lands 1 Soviet air brigade for each crossing, how exactly would the Red Army have a problem crossing the Carpathians ? Even more, in that case, Moldova would have been the death cauldron of the Romanian 3rd, German 11th and parts of the Ro 4th army ( which couldn't fall back in Muntenia in a fighting retreat )

Do you realize that Colonel Starinov's Spetsnaz brigades were waiting to be dropped behind the Romanian lines ? You're talking as if the Romanian army was some kind of superforce when instead it was a fragile, poorly equipped, mediocre command that didn't shine in any sector ( ok, let's give some credit to artillery ). I'm Romanian, but I'm not drinking cool aid about how great we were. If we were we wouldn't have abandoned Transylvania and Basarabia without a fight.

Do you know how much equipment we lost there ?

puști și carabine: 52796 buc. ( equivalent of 4 divisions !! )
pistoale: 4480 buc.
tunuri: 1071 buc.
mitraliere: 326 bucăți
puști de calibru mic: 149 bucăți
puști: 1080 buc
mortiere: 40 buc
tunuri antiaerienă: 6 buc.
cartușe: 14296183 bucăți
grenade: 34309 buc
mine antitanc: 1512 buc
camioane: 15 buc
automobile: 38 bucăți
autobuze: 2 buc.
tractoare: 3 buc.
motociclete cu ataș: 4 buc.

The same army that didn't even attempt to defend itself but for isolated groups was supposed 1 year later to stop a massive soviet attack. I'm more inclined to believe that the reaction of the Romanian troops once they were overpasses by soviet mechanized units would be a complete rout and total disintegration. Just like at Stalingrad were after an initial resistance they were overwhelmed and the word of the day was "save qui peut " ( every man for himself ).
As always the Germans would have drawn the short end of the stick, staying in place and fighting just to be surrounded in a pocket around Iasi.
Even if by some miracles, some Romanian units attempted to block the passes they would have been cut from behind as the 12th soviet mountain army would cross from Galitia towards Debrecen and Satu Mare in an area where there were virtually no Axis forces.
Any thought that the Carpathians were a solid wall is pure fantasy. It's enough to look at the map and realize that they were actually a death trap, limiting the escape route of the Romanian 3rd and German 11th armies while being attacked from the rear, from Maramures and Hungary. Spetsnaz detachments would have easily cut the crosses through the Carpathians if it was needed.

This post has been edited by PaulC on July 04, 2012 06:38 pm

Related to the soviet actions in Bessarabia in july 1940... I know that with a flower there is not necessarily spring, to quote someone... but I read about at least two incidents, in which, facing a strong resistance of the romanian troops Soviet armored columns technical and numerical superior, withdrawn immediately! You have not answered why you think the Soviet air assault would have been succesfull, why do you think would be aimed the mountain passes and not the oil region of the Prahova Valley, how could the 18th Mech Corps be able to reach Ploiesti with so weak forces...

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/map..._June_22_41.jpg
According to this map, if it's correct, the 1st Armored Division "Romania Mare" was in a position to disrupt the action of the soviet 18th Mech. Corps... and in terms of combat equipment, the two large units were substantially the same! I refer here mostly to the soviet T-26 light tanks versus the romanian LT-35 light tanks! The best-equipped division of the three from the 18th Mech Corps was the 39th, with 209 T-26 and T-26 flamethrowers... [/quote]

I don't know how accurate that map is, but only looking at it, it's obvious the Soviet Union intended to attack Germany and Romania. Only look at how the units were positioned. Both the German and Soviet concentrations were in suicidal, from a defense POV, positions. At the forward tip of the bulges, concentrated on really small area, surrounded from 3 sides by the enemy.

We know what the Germans were planning to do. But what were the soviets doing ? I'm waiting for the official history to explain this...

Anyway, back to the tanks : according to the map, the soviets had 3 tank concentrations.
Bukovina - 321 tanks excluding armored cars with 45mm guns. Facing this were 6 brigades, 3 mountain with no heavy weapons and 3 cavalry with no heavy weapons. But as Radub says, instead of drinking the tuica they will use it as Molotov cocktails and who cares about 300+ tanks..

Chisinau Area - 527 tanks

Southern Basarabia - 282 tanks

Still to come, the 27th mechanized corp which was 600km away heading towards the border with 280 something tanks IIRC.

If the map is correct, the 1st Romanian Armored division was near Buzau. From what I read, it was undergoing training and first combat was done only with 1 regiment, the other wasn't ready. Let's assume somehow, that by July 6-7 when the planned soviet attack came, they were in full battle condition, all 201 tanks ( if the figure is correct ).

Could the 200 LT35s fight the 500+ T26s and BTs ( let's assume by the time they meet, 1 third of the russian tanks were destroyed breaking through the lines ) ?
Let's look at the main characteristics :
-lack of radios on both sides - check ( 1 in 3 Russian tanks had one )
-limited training on both sides - check
-combat experience - probably more on the Russian side even if it wasn't actual fighting, but more maneuvering in 1939 in Poland and 1940 in Basarabia

What about the technical characteristics :
.........T26...........LT-35
weight 9.5t..........10.5t
armor 15mm.......25mm front / 15mm sides
gun 45mm/L46...37mm/L40
Engine 90hp..........120hp
Speed 30kmh......34kmh
Range 220/130....190/120km

Very evenly matched. Both had a 2 man turret, riveted armor plates.
The main difference was the gun : 45L46 vs. 37/L40
45L46 : AP 1.43kg round , 747m/s, penetration 38mm/500m at 90 and 31mm/500 at 60 degres
47/L40 : AP 0.85kg, 675m/s, penetration 31mm/500 at 60 degrees
Again evenly matched, although post penetration effects are superior for the 45nm simple because it was larger round, more energy and more explosive filler.

In the end, between 2 evenly matched opponents, the difference is made by the numbers and here the soviets have 2-3x superiority. Like I've previously said, the 1st armor could delay the advance in some bloody skimishes, but in the general scheme it would have been overrun. Were it for a dozen of KVs or T34s to appear, it would have been ugly. The 37L40 couldn't penetrate either of those tanks at point blank range. The KV in other engagement to save/ran out of ammo sometimes drove over the LT35/38, Panzer 1-4 cracking it with its weight like a nutshell. For us, it would have been like the fox in the chicken enclosure.

Please think this over thoroughfully and see if you really believe that a country with no experience in large scale air drops, with no thorough intelligence including aerial photographs for determining the suitable drop zones - if any, would be able to land an air brigade to take a mountain pass. I think the scene worth imagine: hundreds of parachutists hanging on tree tops along mountain sides

I'm not sure you realize, but you're talking about the country that developed the armed branch of military paratroopers in 1930 ! They were dropping brigade size forces as early as 1935 ! I suggest you read a bit about soviet paratroop forces, the largest in the world. The situation in 1941 was this - 2 countries in the world had paratroop forces : Germany and the Soviet Union.
Germany had the remains of 1 division. The Soviet Union had 5 ready and 5 forming paratroop CORPS and numerous independent brigades..


"In 1935 Yakir conducted military maneuvers in Kiev, with the Kiev and Kharkov military districts' forces. The major aim of these maneuvers was to test the theory of deep operations and the latest technology. A total of 65,000 troops, including 1,888 paratroopers, 1,200 tanks and 600 aircraft participated in these maneuvers. These were first maneuvers in the world that used combined operations of large tank, airforce and airborne formations. The troops acted along a front of 250 metres (0 mi) and a depth of 200 metres (0 mi). The representatives of major world armies attended the maneuvers. The British General Archibald Wavell reported to his government, "If I had not witnessed this myself I would never have believed such an operation possible."

FYI, Germany saw and copied the paratrooper forces from the Soviet Union.


From this very forum :

Allow me to :lol at your information : for months soviet reconnaissance planes circled over Romania exasperating Antonescu who was constantly sending diplomatic protests to Moscow. I'm pretty sure the GRU had all the details they needed. As always you're downplaying the Red Army as a bunch of imbeciles.

If several brigades are dropped at Tihuta or Prislop, cutting the escape route for the 3rd Ro and 11th German army, Northern Moldovia becomes a mouse trap. Looking at what they did in june 1940, to repeat it in july 1941 in key points was not only feasible, but planned.

This post has been edited by PaulC on July 04, 2012 07:57 pm

First of all, thanks to Radub for mentioning the Bf-109 E, an even better airplane that we had back then.

Now, few points for PaulC "wet dream" actions

- landing airborne troops somewhere in enemy teritory require to have air superiority at least, if not air supremacy. This was not the case for soviets in 1941, and actually they never used any significant air drops of parachutist units in WW 2, not even when they did had air superiority and was in offensive (1944-1945).

-paratroopers dont have heavy weaponry (thats why soviets even tried to make a flying tank for them and today both russians and americans developed light IFV to be droped with airborn troops), and beside a clear sky they need a precision landing so to be able to regroup and form a battle formation.
This isnt easy and is much harder to do that in mountain areas (thats why you didnt see such launching of paratroopers on large scale in such areas, in any war).

-we did had 4 brigades of mountain hunters, but who had a number of soldiers similar with a german or soviet or italian division, for which they was renamed as "divisions" during Crimeea campaign. Those was located in northern areas and seeing their combat record record in mountain-forested areas vs any soviet troops (and even german gebirgsjagers later) they was more then able to fight back the soviets (even in a superior number, remember is needed at least a 1 to 3 ratio, and have at least a similar technical and tactical training level, especially in such harsh areas) attempts to push in such areas.
Not to mention they know much better the terrain and was specificaly prepared to fight in such enviroment. Probably soviet paratroopers would not be able to regroup and form any significant battle groups, or would be slaughtered before to be able to do any such actions, is hardly possible the would be able to control the mountain passes with such actions (if they would be really able to launch those troops as planed which i doubt again)

-Spetznas didnt existed back then, and even if they would existed such soviet units wasnt any "super-soldiers" able to win just by jumping from a plane behind enemy lines. Others at least as good soldiers from other armies did that in other places, and not always successful.

-An attempt to land troops in Ploiesti area would be quite suicidal as it was one of the best protected areas in the world, AA wise.

-soviet tanks would need to fight in more cross country areas, not the large stepes of Ukraine or Poland, and would be forced to cross as well over FNG line (even incomplete as it might was). Soviet soldiers didnt show any remarcable combat qualities either, nor some great training or tactics (many times was lower then Axis soldiers, and i didnt mean germans here, as Solonin said)

This being said, i really doubt the red army will be able to ocupy all Romania in any short amount of time, it will take probably more then those 6 months presumed by Stavka in 1944, as in 1941 soviets had weaker tanks, less tanks, and less experience.

Dont look too much at what happened in 1940 with our army (or look just at the very few moments when some of our units fight back in those moments, even if nothing really big). Yes, it was a shame we retreated without a fight, but in the same time this decision was taken because if would'we fight, the enemy would be not just USSR, but its friend and ally back then too, the Nazi Germany and ofcourse its "puppets", Hungary and Bulgaria.

Remeber that even the much larger USSR win at the end being part and receiving the invaluable help of a coalition (US as the main suporter, but UK and others too)

This post has been edited by udar on July 04, 2012 08:15 pm

Though, let's say to those who would be too impressed, that the CORPS was the size of a division, without denying the scale of development of this branch in the Red Army!

This post has been edited by ANDREAS on July 04, 2012 08:11 pm

If an attack against AGS was so lucrative, Romania was a weak link and the prospect of crossing the Prut and fighting on the Carpathian line and in the FNG cauldron was not worrisome, why didn't the Soviets attack after June 1941 instead of sitting and waiting?

I also notice that in your scenario Germany's AGN and AGC seem non-existant or simply obliterated by the Soviets.

How about this quick scenario. Army Group South's mission would be to make it costly for the Soviets to cross the Prut and to conquer the urban areas in Moldavia but not at the cost of being cut off. AGS would make a fighting withdrawal to the line of the Eastern Carpathians and to the FNG cauldron, drawing the Soviets in. At the same time, AGN and AGC would launch a powerful attack (or counter-attack) towards Minsk. After AGN and parts or all of AGC reach Minsk, instead of advancing towards Leningrad/Smolensk they turn south, threatening to cut off the Soviet armies that have advanced inside Romania.

Though, let's say to those who that would be too impressed the fact that the CORPS was the size of a division, without denying the scale of development of this branch in the Red Army!

A soviet corp had 3 brigades for a total of 7700 men, division size if you want.
What's interesting is their equipment , each brigade has 1 light machine gun per platoon, 12 50mm mortars , 6 82mm mortars, 10 45mm AT guns, 4 heavy machine guns and 6 quadruple AAMG. They could rain some fire on enemy positions defend strategic spots if needed even against tank attacks.
The 3rd paratrooper corp with 3 brigades was positioned against Romania. They had 2 tasks : secure the mountain passes and cut the oil flow to Germany.



This post has been edited by PaulC on July 05, 2012 04:47 am

If an attack against AGS was so lucrative, Romania was a weak link and the prospect of crossing the Prut and fighting on the Carpathian line and in the FNG cauldron was not worrisome, why didn't the Soviets attack after June 1941 instead of sitting and waiting?

I also notice that in your scenario Germany's AGN and AGC seem non-existant or simply obliterated by the Soviets.

How about this quick scenario. Army Group South's mission would be to make it costly for the Soviets to cross the Prut and to conquer the urban areas in Moldavia but not at the cost of being cut off. AGS would make a fighting withdrawal to the line of the Eastern Carpathians and to the FNG cauldron, drawing the Soviets in. At the same time, AGN and AGC would launch a powerful attack (or counter-attack) towards Minsk. After AGN and parts or all of AGC reach Minsk, instead of advancing towards Leningrad/Smolensk they turn south, threatening to cut off the Soviet armies that have advanced inside Romania.

For several reasons :
- the Lvov bulge was a deathtrap. Panzer Group 1 struck from Lublin towards Cherkassi and then using the Dniepr as a left flank headed south to trap the South and Southwestern fronts.
- At the same time, the remaining 3 Panzer Groups were situated north of the Pripiat marches where soviet forces were weaker. This was the direct road : Brest - Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow. This forces Stavka to move troops from the south fronts to the western front.
-In Ucraine armed insurection started; soviet troops were fired from any rooftop. Lvov was freed by Ucrainian nationalists before the Germans arrived. The situation is explained in Solonin's book. The Red Army had the option to stay and be surrounded or run back and try to escape. They choose the 2nd variant and this was the end.

As for AGS and AGC, the bulk of soviet forces was concentrated against AGS. Look at the map to see how they planned to encircle it in the Lublin pocket. It would have been ugly, but I believe the soviet would have prevailed for this :
-5x superiority in tanks
-superiority in artillery
-a VVS attack o Luftwaffe airfields would have caused significant casualties, probably offering them air superiority over the combat zones
-countless reserves in men, tanks, planes while the Germans had very small reserves ( 11 infantry + 1 motorized division )

In a sense, what happened to the soviets would have happened to the Wehrmacht. The main groupings surrounded on the flanks, fuel stores, ammunition dumps set on fire, Luftwaffe having heavy casualties, options reduced to stay, fight and be encircled or try to escape.

This post has been edited by PaulC on July 04, 2012 08:47 pm

We're not talking about maneuvers here. Think of the difficulties faced by the US and British paratroopers that had to drop on relatively flat land. Droping paratroopers in mountaineous terrain, covered by woods, was just an impossible scenario.

You keep putting words in my mouth over and over again. When did I say the Red Army was a bunch of imbeciles? The fact that they were not capable of everything you think of does make them imbeciles? You can be sure of everything you want, but don't expect others to share your opinions and take your words for granted. Instead of using chat-style acronyms and assuming an arrogant atitude of all-knowing, you would better come with sources or documents to support with statements.

And the Germans landed on Eben Emael with helicopters, did they ? Or maybe in Crete ? Crete is as flat as Baragan, isn't it ?
FYI, the difficulties for US and British paratroopers were called 2 Waffen SS armored divisions. Anything else is your imagination.

First of all, let's settle things : you had no idea about the role of the Soviet Union in the development of paratroopers.

You said :

- that is simply ignorant.

The Soviet Union WAS the ONLY country in the world which practiced large scale air drops AND combined ( paratroopers + mechanized forces ) weapons tactics. They did it 10 years before the war started. No OTHER country came close to matching that. They were light years behind.

First United States Army Airborne Test Platoon , the forerunner of the U.S. Parachute Troops, is commanded by Lt. (later B. Gen.) William T. Ryder, USA was created in 1940 (!!!!) when German paratroopers were capturing impregnable fortresses and the Soviet Union was dropping since 1 year brigades at Khalkin-Gol, in Finland at Petsamo, behind the Mannerheim line and on our heads in Basarabia.

What's more : the Soviet Union had over 1 million persons trained as parachutists. They were so many that in a defensive war ( paratroopers aren't needed in this scenario ) they were used as regular infantry. That's how the Guard Units appeared. The best manpower of the Soviet Union was used as regular infantry. Units could gain Guard status in 2 ways :
-from the start if made from the airborne corps
-as reward for combat achievements ( regular army units ).