Suvorov books, ww-2

This is the book I am talking about:
http://www.amazon.com/Before-Stalingrad-Ba...6478581&sr=8-25

Actually, I am referring only to the Bukovina sector, when I am saying that the Soviets were not strong enough. It is highly unlikely that the 2-3 Soviet mountain rifle divisions could breach the front defended by the 3 Romanian mountain brigades, one infantry division and 2 cavalry brigades. The terrain is rugged and favorable for the defense, with the exception of the Siret Valley. Historically, Soviet infantry did not fare too good in offensive operations against the Romanian infantry, especially against mountain troops fighting in their element. Why are you sure they could so easily breach the line?

Also, the Red Army of 1941 was a very different thing from that of 1944. The expertise of carrying out deep mechanized operations was not there and neither were the machines to do it successfully (tanks and trucks). There would be no "free entry into Romanian territory" with the forces they had at their disposal on our borders.

Ok, you lost me. What rivers need to be crossed in order to get from Northern to Southern Bukovina and advance down the Siret Valley? As far as one can see on the map, the Soviets already had a huge bridgehead south of the Prut because of the way the frontier was carved up. Also, this bridgehead is poised on the Siret Valley, which seems the easiest and most logical route for a force that would try to outflank the Romanian-German defence on the Prut line.

Their only problem was that they didn't have enough forces there to actually break the front, even with the "element of surprise" you mentioned. It makes perfect sense to assume that if the Soviets actually wanted to attack and outflank the defense on the Prut by striking in Bukovina, they would have concentrated a sufficient number of troops there. I am not familiar with any major Soviet offensive that relied only on the element of surprise, without having also a sufficient numerical and material superiority. Please feel free to mention it.

I'd agree if we were talking about books that cost 100-200$. But books that cost 30-40-50$ on Amazon are not out of reach for people in Romania. It's only a question of principles and determination. And maybe some patience.

We always refer at soviet troops who were in position at 22 June 1941. But must take to account the next programed build-up until 7 July, date for Suvorov/Rezun presumable attack. In this two weeks, could soviet army bring enough troops to initiate a devastating attack against Romania?

Of course it could - and it had done so, after Suvorov. His theories are "plausible", to say the least. The problem comes from two main things (IMO):
1. It overthrows most of the traditional theories regarding ww2
2. In the absence of "direct" proof from Soviet archives, it it is hard either to corroborate or to deny his "allegations".
End of Part I

This post has been edited by MMM on February 18, 2010 09:59 am

That was my point from the start.

On the first post on this topic i have asked:
Was the 9th army strong enough to invade romania as Suvorov writes ?
Or the 12th army was also needed ?

I was constanly reminded on this topic on how much tanks the 9th army had. I wanted to make the distinction that they are not amphibious and the 9th army lacks infantry to carve up a bridgehead to use them.

This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on February 18, 2010 01:21 pm

I have already mentioned the 16th mechanized corps of the 12th army.
And no, it does not make sense to concentrate more forces there. More than 600 tanks are enough for a surprise attack.

Here is one example :

After Bagration started the germans fail to appreciate the danger posed to A.G.C. ( after all , 4 of the the soviet tank army's were in Ukraine ).

IMHO the 12th army presents a similar treat to Romania in 1941. The presence of the 9th army ( with so many tanks ) in Basarabia forces us to defend the Prut river but leave us vulnerable from a attack from Bucovina.

Had more tanks bean deployed in Bucovina our defenses would be concentrated up north and fewer on the prut River. My guess is that since the prut river was a natural obstacle by itself , our deployment suited the soviets just fine.

That was my point from the start.

On the first post on this topic i have asked:
Was the 9th army strong enough to invade romania as Suvorov writes ?
Or the 12th army was also needed ?

I was constanly reminded on this topic on how much tanks the 9th army had. I wanted to make the distinction that they are not amphibious and the 9th army lacks infantry to carve up a bridgehead to use them.

osutacinzecisidoi,

Let's recapitulate. I asked contras why if the Soviets were supposedly preparing to attack Romania from Bukovina, why were there so few forces concentrated there. You intervened in the discussion and replied in his place that it was supposedly the element of surprise. Correct so far?

I considered my intelligence was insulted by this reply, so I stated the obvious by saying that the Soviets could care less about the element of surprise if they didn't have also a comfortable superiority for the supposed offensive. They did not have the usual comfortable superiority of the latter years. It is relatively easy to do the math.

To this you replied by switching the focus to Bessarabia, which wasn't the subject of the discussion I had initiated with contras. And now you say that you were constantly reminded how much tanks the 9th Army had? What does that have to do with anything of the above? My earlier post about the strength of the tank forces of the 9th Army was a correction of what "warhunter" has written in reply to your post in 2007 and which needed to be corrected, because it was a horribly false information. You replied that there was also the 16th Mechanized Corps, but my post was about Bessarabia and the 9th Army.

In conclusion, after all this babble, if you don't read what is posted and reply in real relation to it, I would simply ignore the post. I no longer have the time and energy to waste on diversionary tactics.

1. The 16th Mechanized Corps was deployed only partially in Bukovina, which does not automatically mean that it would have been committed entirely against Romania. If the Soviet Union attacked it would attack also the German forces in Poland. There is no way of knowing if the entire 16th Mechanized Corps would be committed southwards

2. The 16th Mechanized Corps was equipped with 484 T-26 and BT tanks, not with 600. Its strength was:
Men: 26,920
Tanks: 482
Armored cars: 118
Artillery: 72
Mortars: 137
Vehicles: 1,177
Tractors: 193
Motorcycles: 91
Source: D. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, page 155

According to the same source, page 118, on average 29% of the Soviet older tanks required capital repairs on 15 June 1941 and 44% lesser maintenance. This seriously diminishes the actual combat strength of corps equipped with such models like the 16th Corps. In fact, during teh early days of Barbarossa, the Soviets lost a huge number of tanks because of mechanical failures and the impossibility to repair (lack of technicians) or tow them to a repair station (lack of appropriate tractors). The expertise of conducting and of executing armored operations in the style of those in 1943-45 simply wasn't there.

The newer Soviet mechanized corps, including the 16th, were missing a lot of key personnel, starting technicians to drivers, from qualified tank officers to staff officers. The 16th MC was among the several such Soviet units that even lacked an operational and staff intelligence section! I find very hard to believe that this unit, even if theoretically it was to be committed entirely against the Romania troops would be enough to break through the Siret Valley.

3. I asked for an example, and I quote,

Bagration does not qualify, because the Soviets had a considerable superiority in men and material, something which, for the nth and last time, they did not have in Northern Bukovina at the end of June 1941.

Like I said, the Soviets never relied solely on surprise.

4 and final. It would be indicated for Rezun's theory supporters to take a look at David Glantz's Stumbling Colossus to get a glimpse at the poor state the Red Army was in June 1941. It relatively obvious that there was no "grand offensive" planned for June-July 1941.

But everyone is entitled to an opinion. However, please start presenting some sources, otherwise there is no actual point in debating.

Correct, that is my opinion.

I did not intended to insult your intelligence. Every competent military comander
strives to acheive the element of surprise ( even if it has a comfortable superiority and more so when it does not ). Only idiots do frontal asaults against fortified lines and care less about cassualties.

This is wrong.
I did not switch anything, my intention was to present all the soviet tank forces on our borders, which your reply with "warhunter" did not.

???
.

I put a question few replies earlier.
"We always refer at soviet troops who were in position at 22 June 1941. But must take to account the next programed build-up until 7 July, date for Suvorov/Rezun presumable attack. In this two weeks, could soviet army bring enough troops to initiate a devastating attack against Romania? "

But even if the answer is yes, it is not a complete answer.
Sun Tzu said about two armies, main and second, main attacks on front, second outflanked, if enemy reply acordingly, the second become main and the main become second, in infinite posibilities.
Even Stalin was an evil genius, he was a genius. A military one.
If he wants to attack Romania from northern Bukovina, he will not put in position his tanks, even in the last moment, to not loose the surprise element. And this attack would take place not in 7 July, as Suvorov/Rezun presume, but later, because in 7 July Stalin would attack on the Prut river, to fix German-Romanian defence, and later, few days, maybe a week, would attack from northern Bukovina, outflanked German - Romanian defensive positions. Many of them would be taken from the rear, and nothing could stop them until Focsani and Galati's Gap (Poarta Galatiului).

@contras: For a speculative "Rezunian" theory, this sounds "reasonable"!
@Victor: I fail to see the difference between the Soviet forces in Bessarabia and the Soviet forces in Bukovina, since all could be directed against the rest of Romanian territorz, at whose new borders they were "waiting".

Other thing, Suvorov/Rezun said that in 1941, Red Army was at it's best, David Glantz, I understand he said that R.A. was at it's worst. As usualy, the truth is somewhere at the middle.
I do not believe that Red army was so bad, because it proves that: Halhin Gol (1939) and Winter War (1940) said much to me. Of course, in Winter War soviets lost 1 million men, but in 3 month they stabbed the Mannerheim fortified line, in winter conditions, blizzard and frost, temperatures up to -40C.

So you agree with Rezun that was a proof of its endurance. I just wonder whether it was wise (militarily speaking) to frontally attack during winter the Mannerheim Line - and also what other leader except Stalin could have got away with those losses...