Suvorov books, ww-2

PaulC, I recommend you that at least on issues that do not know to be more to be more cautious in your statements! Without being suspected by anyone in this forum as having any sympathy on hungarian army in WWII, I must be fair and admit that at least the hungarian Fast Moving Corps (who was positioned behind the VIII Corps) (who had 81 x 38M Toldi I light tanks, 48 x 39M Csaba armored cars and 60 x 35M Ansaldo tankettes) fought well (I mean in summer 1941), and there were no cases of hesitations or positions abandon or things like that... quite the contrary! So to speculate on this theme is not right because we don't have enough elements...

I'm not talking about the Hungarian army which fought well, but the political element. And I'd refrain from making such direct suggestions. If I said something, it means I can back it up.
Same story for Bulgaria.

Look at it from this point of view :

-Poland would be happy to be liberated
-Serbia too - Russian brothers
-Czech too- Russian brothers
-Bulgaria would jump sides - Russian brothers
-Greece also
-France also ( French communists were a force )
-Belgium the same

The big question is how would Germany react. Of course there would be resistance movements, but remember that the socialists were the largest force in Germany before 1933. Not only that, but communist uprisings happened in the early '20s sponsored by the Comintern trying to ignite the world revolution.

The NKVD had the means to pacify Europe and could count on the help of local scumsbags. Just like at us, the fight would be handled by our own internal security elements. In Germany a lot of Gestapo folks would simply pledge alliance to the new masters. They were like brothers anyway and had cooperation treaties signed as early as 1939. They could exchange opinions on how best to get rid of the undesirables and how to run concentration camps.

By the time Europe realize what communism and NKVD meant it was too late.

Then we have England. England in summer 1941 was in a serious situation. It lacked a land army to fight Germany and was under pressure on 3 fronts :
- Keeping sea lanes open
- North Africa
- Mounting pressure in East Indies

England was faced with the possibility of an extended war in which neither side could gain the upper hand : Germany lacked the air force and navy to force a crossing, England lacked the land army to challenge Germany. In other words a stalemate. That's why Hess flew to Britain, asking for peace. The strategic impasse was obvious to both leaderships.

When Hitler said : England's hope lies in the East, he wasn't bluffing. Since 1940, the British were mounting pressure through diplomatic channels on the Soviet Union to engage in the war. This efforts culminated in spring-summer 1941.
The British were asking the soviets to enter the war on their side, if not they threatened to conclude a separate peace with Germany and the Soviet Union will be left alone.

Now think about the issue : the British are urging the soviets to fight, to open another front and relieve pressure on them. But they aren't talking about a German attack on the Soviet Union. If Germany attacks, the Soviet Union will fight with or without the British requests. So what were the Brits asking for ? There is one answer : the Soviet Union to attack Germany.

Up until June 1941, the soviets ignored the British requests, then the tone changed radically. They asked, if we agree to this, what do you offer ? The british said : everything you want. Before the 1st shots were fired on the Eastern Front the coalition was formed.

So how will Britain react ? With soviet flags at every balcony and children singing thank you songs to papa Stalin.

Of course, once Europe replaced red flags with swastikas for red flags with sickle and hammer, they would realize they've changed a minor inconvenience for a deadly threat.

This post has been edited by PaulC on July 19, 2012 10:41 am

Some of us agreed earlier in the thread that the best direction of a Soviet attack would have been in the north, through the plains.

Yet the Soviets deployed most of their forces in the south.

You explained that by saying that Romania was a weak link and taking out the oil fields would have crippled Germany. A different explanation is that Stalin deployed them there because he expected a German attack in resource-rich and industrialized Ukraine, towards oil-rich Caucasus.

In the official timeline, after the German attack the Soviets launched no offensive against Romania with their forces in the south and kept them on the spot as long as possible, fighting hard in defense of Ukraine.

You explain that through the fact that elements of other german groups advanced in the north/centre. That raises 2 problems.

First, even if they did, you claim the southern front had overwhelming superiority here, why didn't it use it against the crucial strategic target - Romanian oil? Especially since you said losing the Romanian oil would have stopped German panzers in their tracks.

Second, if the action of the other army groups had such an obvious influence in the official timeline, why is it lacking in your scenario.

PaulC, you are super optimistic about the course of events when they are favorable to the scenario you (and Suvorov) imagine, but become extremely pessimistic in terms of developments unfavorable to USSR... I could agree about Serbia, Bulgaria maybe, Greece, partially France and Belgium, even Slovakia (not sure), but I categorically disagree when you speak about Poland, Czech Republic, Danemark, Holland... not because they would have liked the German occupation, but because the Soviet Union was not liked there in 1941-42, and I am sure the soviet occupation regime would had been much worse than the german... I'm sure in this countries would have been formed quite quickly armed resistance movements, and soviet repression would have bring only larger problems to the soviets...

Your optimistic vision about the power of USSR and his repression forces had a huge influence on your approach... NKVD hadn't the capacity nor the means, even supported by the Red Army or the "local scumbags" to keep occupied Europe... obviously you did not read much about the resistance movements after 1945 in Eastern Europe... and the condition after the war were pretty different... and to talk about the alliance of the Gestapo with the Red occupants... I think you're so distant from reality with your oppinions, that logical arguments are in vain...
I must admit that I can't imagine a Germany defeated by the USSR in 1941 or 1942... so, an soviet occupied Europe is just a horror fantasy I can't imagine...

Who ? Where ? What had this ( your opinions ) anything to do with real soviet planning ? Are we in some sort of temporal loop ?

Which south ? Specify the region you're referring to.

Romania was targeted by the Southern front. But that's not where "most of the forces were deployed ". In fact the Southern front had around 15% of the soviet forces committed to invade Europe.

You're mixing things, nothing more.

Feel free to bring evidence to support your "explanation". Maybe in this way you could help the Russian Academy of Sciences and the General Staff who have been trying for the last 70 years to prove that they were planning to defend themselves. Unfortunately, they couldn't come with a single bit of evidence in that area. They know very well why, that's the reasons they avoided getting into details. The reason why until 1990 they claimed the Red Army was grossly inferior in numbers to the Wehrmacht. They somehow didn't knew how many divisions they had, guns, tanks, planes. With all the archives at their disposal, they had to avoid the details and especially avoid any mentions about deployment locations and plans.

You know why ? Because the moment you put the soviet forces on the map it becomes crystal clear they didn't thought of defense. Their intentions were purely offensive.

But as I've said, feel free to bring evidence to support your explanations.

In the official timeline the soviets weren't ready to attack. The due date for the deployment was July 10 . The German attack threw the deployment into chaos. Based on the new priorities, the forces were reassigned.
And by July 6-10 when the southern front would have been ready ( had they followed the deployment ), the priorities changed. The southwestern front no longer existed. The road to Kiev and Donbass was open.
Probably they thought about different things than charging an expecting enemy with no surprise on their side. Like trying to stop the Army Group south drive.

I've explained above why. Secondly, the cause and effect have a temporal delay. I'm not an oil expert, but in any industry you have a supply chain. Even if they've stopped the Romanian oil, it would take 45-60 days until the supply chain is emptied and the Wehrmacht starts to feel it. Probably even more since the Germans amassed reserves that took them until mid August. Secondly, they captured huge amount of soviet stocks, 1/3 of their daily quota came from soviet depots.
Where were the German forces in 45-60 days since the start of Barbarossa ? They fell behind the entire southern and south-western fronts which ceased to exist. The Germans reached the Dnieper in 60 days. Had the southern front charged into Romania, the path would have been even simpler for the Panzer Group I to fall behind it and cut its links with the rest of the soviet territory.

If I'm allowed, the idea of an soviet attack in Romania in early July is parallel to Wehrmacht's offensive in the Balaton region in march 1945. The OKH ( 1st Red Army echelon ) is in tatters, the road to Berlin is kept by meager forces ( Kiev and Moscow in our case ), but instead of reinforcing the Oder line, the Wehrmacht strikes with its last worthy reserve in Hungary ( Romania for the soviets ).
Neither of the scenarios made sense. By having the southern front conduct a fighting retreat the Soviets won time and evacuated over 1500 industrial complexes. They lost those forces but they saved the industry with the time gained. And that was key to winning the war.

This post has been edited by PaulC on July 22, 2012 06:36 pm

Because you surely like fantasy scenarios, please read this one:
http://bogatu.voceabasarabiei.net/?p=1361
it's taken also of this forum, from another topic started by contras if I remember well!

For Poland, Czech Republic we have hard evidence of 1945. The soviets were liberators.

In all countries, even at us, the resistance started to assemble after 4-5 years. It didn't start at once. Katyn, Kolima, Dalstoi, Gulag, red terror weren't widely known at the time. There wasn't internet and mass travel.

By the time Europe realized they've traded a tyrant for another, the NKVD would have Europe with the Makarov at the back of the head.

LoL. They somehow kept the nations of the Soviet Union for 73 years, 1/6th of the Earth's size, they've must have known something.

FYI, the 3rd echelon of the Red Army consisted of NKVD forces. 3 full armies, 29, 30 and 31 were top to bottom NKVD forces.

Compared to the Einstatzgruppen of the SS, there wasn't any difference in the mission. The means were different however. The SS used 3000 people, the NKVD around 23 divisions, with 5 motorized.

Apparently more than you. Resistance started 4-5 years after the war. That was simple too late and irrelevant for the discussion.

You don't get it : security services are manned by a certain segment of the population. Not everyone is fit to serve in Cheka, NKVD, Gestapo or even our Securitate.
Sadists and butchers, the kind what they needed to break the spine of a nation aren't people who care about principles and have nationalistic feelings. They are cowards, they kiss the hand of the superior and behave brutally with those under them. The moment they feel that the regime is about to fall, they will happily exchange sides. Their nature is incompatible with nationalism and self-sacrifice.

Just as Himmler was offering his services to the new overlords ( in this delusion he thought the western allies would need him to police the destroyed Germany ) before Hitler shot himself, in the same fashion, Himmler would have kissed Beria and Stalin's hand for the right to police the destroyed Germany.
If the soviets are the new overlords, that's the hand the Gestapo and SD will kiss.

The Gestapo and the NKVD had a long history of cooperation. They even held 4 conferences on how to improve the cooperation and deal with undesirables.

There was even an official agreement called "General Agreement on Co-operation between NKVD and Gestapo" (signed in Moscow on Nov 11, 1938).

Inside a new order with an occupied Europe by the Red Army, the Gestapo would have not lay unemployed.

I can say the same, but the issue is not about logical arguments. It's about a firm grasp of the period and putting things into context. Once that is achieved, we can talk.

Remember what I've said : it's a matter of having the information and putting it into context.


FYI, there is a thing called Kremlin logbook which notes all the visitors to the dear leader. Stalin's logbook was published in the '90s and the detailed meetings are known : whom, when he entered and when he left.

The whole poisoning stuff is like our Pavel Corut, nice conspiracy SF, demolished by a simple ledger which shows Stalin's activity by the hour.

I remember earlier in the thread you saying (when I pointed out the rough relief in Romania/Central Europe/Balkans and that it would take some time for the Soviets to cross it) that the shortest and easiest route to Berlin was through the plains in the north. I'll try to find the exact quote but it's a long thread, might take some time.

I didn't say most of the forces were deployed in the Southern front. I said in the south. I would include the Southwestern front.

I think we've been through this before too. What exactly is the tool you use to establish whether a deployment is "purely" (!) defensive or offensive? Can a deployment be "purely" one way or the other? If it were a normal situation maybe that tool would be easy to find and use but when you have 2 countries that are building up troops on their border, which one is doing it "purely" for offense and which one is doing it "purely" for defense?

1. So you're saying evil genious Stalin, the mastermind who according to you had planned this trap ever since 1939 by playing Hitler and the Allies like stooges, that took Basarbia so he could be even closer to Romanian oild and that was ready to launch his ultimate invasion of Europe simply kept his overwhleming troops idle a rock's throw away from the Romanian oil and did nothing because.... the deployment was supposed to be over on July 10?

2. After the German attack the Soviets had another 2 weeks at their disposal to prepare and launch an attack against Romania, thus enveloping and crushing the German and Romanian armies against the Carpathians then reaching Ploiesti.

3. The way you presented the Soviet overwhelming superiority in the Romanian sector one would think the Soviets would launch such an attack especially if they had prepared plans for it it, train-loads of maps (remember the maps?) and their master strategist Stalin understood the importance of Romanian oil. The Germans only conquered Lvov on June 30. What did the Soviets do in 8 days about Romania?

Very likely, however this possibility seemed completely absent from your earlier scenario in which the southern front did charge into Romania and reached Bucharest in 2 or 3 days.

This post has been edited by Imperialist on July 23, 2012 12:02 am

A map is worth 1000 words so here it is :



From North to South you have the
-Northern Front in Karelia
- Northwestern front limited objectives to attacking Prussia
-Western Front around Bialostock - striking between Army Group North and Army Group centre, bypassing Prussia and its fortifications and then turning North towards Gdansk, encircling Prussia and Army Group North
-Southwestern Front centered around Lvov, the main axis of attack centered around Krakow
-Southern Front against Romania

The northern plains weren't the best option for an attack because
-Prussia and its fortifications
-the rivers are wide and difficult to cross
-you're advancing through the 2 main German groups, with both flanks threatened

The main axis was in southern Poland because :
-there are no fortifications ahead
-the rivers are smaller in this region and can be easily crossed
-you're bypassing the German concentrations and your left flank is protected by the Carpathians, you're advancing in parallel with them
-you're facing 1 German Panzer group, not 3 as on the northern axis

Next time say that most forces were deployed in Europe, that's vague enough.

There are large differences related to the deployment and the behavior of the troops.

If you bother to look on the map you'll notice the two bulges, Bialostock and Lvov. This were packed with soviet troops. From the very start they are surrounded from 3 sides by the enemy. That is an offensive deployment, a vulnerable and risky position.
Conversely, the main German bulges were Lublin and Suwalki. Again surrounded from 3 sides by the enemy.

Both armies were positioned suicidaly at the very end of the bulges created in the enemy territory. Whoever attacked surrounded the bulk of the enemy by closing the bulges. The soviets being late to the party, they got the short stick and in 2 weeks, the 1st echelon was history.

Secondly, the behavior of the troops. If it's offensive, it's concealed and the troops are concentrated on the attack paths.
If it's defensive, there's no point in concealing it since it acts as a deterrent and the troops are dispersed ( not vulnerable to artillery and air power ) and they dug in . They dig non stop, they lay mines and use the fortifications available. In june 1941, neither the Red Army, nor the Wehrmacht did any of this. The Red Army removed minefields since it hindered their advance and also did not prepare the bridges for demolition ( if you attack you need them intact ).
The Wehrmacht crossed the Prut, the Bug, Dvina , etc on intact bridges. That is a clear sign of offensive deployment. If you're planning to defend, that would be criminal negligence.

I have the map of their deployment, the follow up results, testimonies of troops hiding in the forests and not digging trenches and laying mines. Please present your evidence on the "nature" of the Red Army deployment in summer 1941.

Hitler : Stalin's Stooge

Ignore it ? Having their attention at the huge disaster that was unfolding around Lvov and Bialostock ?
When you're house is on fire, you might overlook the coupon of the moment.

You're whole argument doesn't take into account the fact that the situation did not remain stable on the soviet side. The southern front was threatened by encirclement as the Panzer Group I was thrusting towards the south. My guess is that they waited to see how events unfold around Lvov and Bialostock , if the situation stabilized and the Germans were stopped, they would have attacked. It's only a guess on my side, but their actions seem to support this.



Do you see the huge arrow entitled PG1 ?

This possibility existed only if the Germans attacked. Were it the other way round, instead of racing to the south, PG1 would have bore the brunt of the Soviet invasion. 799 tanks vs. 5000+.

The 9th Army didn't fully retreat from central and Southern Bessarabia until late July. The 12th and 18th Army had left Northern Bukovina and Northern Bessarabia at the beginning of July and pulled behind the Dnestr.

The 1st Panzer Group did not reach Kiev until much later. There were at least 5 Soviet MCs supposed to deal with the 1st Panzer Group in the initial days: 4th, 8th, 9th, 15th and 19th (have I missed one?), by attacking its flanks. For all Stavka knew at the moment it ordered the counterattack, this should have succeeded and stopped the 1st Panzer Group (or even destroyed it, if we look at the on paper strength of the Soviet force). At the same time a strike with all available forces could have been ordered against Romania. This actually happened, only much later in July, when the situation was much worse for the Soviets. Initially, Tiulenev estimated there was a huge armored and motorized force across the river in Romania and asked to be allowed to pull back. The 9th Army started doing this until the order was cancelled and Tiulenev was ordered to regain the Prut line. With the Axis forces already inside Bessarabia and with the 18th Army retreated across the Dnestr, this proved to be unattainable and the end result was the eventual complete pull back of the Soviet forces from Bessarabia.

There was time enough for the Soviets to strike against Romania in the early days of the war. They just didn't.

In late june 1941, the soviet 11th Tank Division, 21st Tank Regiment had one T-34 medium tank battalion and one KV-1 heavy tank company combat-ready and the 22nd Tank Regiment had one BT-5 light tank battalion combat-ready, so the division had in fact only two tank battalions and a tank company ready for action! In late july the 22nd Tank Regiment should receive new T-34 tanks to form his own medium tank battalion. The endowment plans of the 11th Tank Division set out the forming of another T-34 medium tank battalion in the 21st Tank Regiment and a KV-1 heavy tank battalion until the end of the year 1941, so the so that the entire combat strength would have come to 158 T-34 and 31 KV-1 and also BT-7 fast tanks with the number reduced following the decommissioning of older models (BT-2 and some BT-5). The other tank division of the corps, the 16th Tank Division, would be not substantial strengthen according to these documents, because his tank fleet was in proper technical condition. I speak here about the tank divisions of the 2nd Mechanised Corps of the Red Army dislocated in Eastern Bassarabia in june 1941. To have an idea normally a tank regiment (of a tank divison) should have one heavy tank battalion, two medium tank battalions and a light flamethrower tank battalion but surely very few regiments of the Red Army were close to the established TO&E. But more interesting is the fact that even under the old organizational chart (tank brigade) many of the new formed tank divisions were incomplete (have not 3 tank battalions as they should have)! Obvious that some of them exceeded their german counterpart in number of vehicles but their mediocre or even poor technical condition (some of them), their incomplete organization influenced their efficiency in action as their ennemy could easyly see!
The source of this information is a document that I will post immediatly I'll received it from a friend who had access to the public archives of Odessa.

This post has been edited by aidan zea on July 24, 2012 11:47 am

aidan zea your informations are confirmed (in part) by what can be found here:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/for...s/2mk.htm#start - Strength of the 2nd Mechanised Corps on July, 20, where it's written that the 11th Tank Division had 10 heavy KV tanks, 46 medium T-34 tanks, 5 light T-26 and 120 light BT tanks from which only 20 were operable (5 from 6 BT tanks were unoperable)! I have always sustained that the 2nd Mechanised Corps from the 9th Army was surely not ready for battle, for a offensive battle as Suvorov imagined!

Why I don't find it surprising that you don't see any logical fallacy in inferring battle readiness by referring to a post-factum date ? By July 20, the 2nd mech corphad already engaged in battles and was subjected to air strikes.

And how come one line above, on July 12, we have

The corps had the latest BT tanks with motor hours that exceeded anything the Germans had. Half of the BTs were the latest BT7M with 500hp diesel engines and outstanding mobility characteristics, all manufactured since 1939.
At an average speed of 30kmh the BT's they could cover 3000-3500km, enough to get to Munich. They suddenly turned inoperable in 1 week.

This post has been edited by PaulC on July 25, 2012 05:24 am

Well PaulC, if you pretend you're objective, you will easily see that in this table:
Strength of the 2nd Mechanised Corps on June 22 and on Aug. 1 , 1941
tanks endowment with the 11th Tank Division is almost the same (have 4 T-34 tanks less) with that of 20 July 1941! The Division who suffered some losses seem to be the 16th Tank Division (who have 23 tanks less) so, what are you talking about? The 2nd Mechanized Corps was removed from battlefield according to this source in 10 July 1941 after 9 DAYS OF COMBAT? And after 9 DAYS OF COMBAT the 11th Tank Division have 83% of his light tanks (BT-7 and even BT-7M) unoperable? And we speak here about the only tank division from the SUPER SHOCK 9TH ARMY who had T-34 medium and KV-1 heavy tanks! You have left silent? Helloo! The army who was supposed to conquer Romania and the Balkans have his best tank division in this situation? Sure you have every right to contest this source but...it fits very well into the overall picture of the eastern front in summer 1941!

The degree of operability of a tank is directly related to those who handle him, the mechanics, the technicians, the engineers... and is more than likely that technical problems of the BT fast tanks were earlier then 2nd July 1941 when they enter combat! I also have informations that the 2nd Mech Corps had mostly BT-7 and even BT-7M but this fact says nothing by itself!