Suvorov books, ww-2

The question is, why Red Army increased more than 3 times in less than 3 years? It was almost 4 times, because at 21 June 1941, Soviet Army efectives were about 5,5 millions (without NKVD troops, their number was and is stil secret).

Victor, long as I don't have a comparative OOB of the two armies, and taking into account only the theoretical strengh (as on paper) of the soviet infantry and our mountain brigades, I believed that, at least in terms of infantry weapons, artillery and and motor vehicles the soviets were in advantage over our forces. But, as I do not know exactly how were equipped the soviet divisions from the Bukovina or Bessarabia area, I can only speculate on this.
On the other hand I admit that some information provided by Rezun are clearly erroneous -as f.i. the armored force of Romania. On page 215 of the Victor Suvorov's The last republic -he said that Romania had in 1941 only 60 FT-17 tanks, omitting the 126 Skoda LT-35 or the 75 Renault R-35. Although, honestly speaking, the only one who could stand in front of the light T-26 or BT tanks was the Skoda, that, perhaps, could beat them.

Off topic, but interesting -the eastern front military operations from the soviet point of view ...
http://english.pobediteli.ru/

Simple. They were prepairing for war. It was pretty clear that the storm clouds were amassing over Europe and the Soviet Union will eventually have to fight. Thus a series of reforms were initiated in order to increase and upgrade the standing armed forces. The process was slow and had many deficiances, as I already mentioned. between 1937 and 1939 the Red Army transitioned from a territorial-militia force to a regular-cadre system. On 1 September 1939 they passed a law for universal military service, which provided the theoretical manpower to start expanding the standing army.

Unfortunately for the Soviets, they were not ready for a ful-scale war when it eventually started. In April 1941, the NKO (Peoples' Commisariat for Defense) gave the order to bring 99 rifle divisions up to full strength (14,483 men).On 22 June 1941, only 21 were up to strength (after at least 2 months since the order was issued). The echeloned defensive deployment according to Vasilevsky's October 1940 plan had also begun.

Regarding numbers, on 22 June 1941, the Soviets had under arms 2,901,000 men in the Western part of the SU, from a total of 4,826,900 men. The NKVD troops were around 171,900 men.

A correction. The 8th Cavalry Brigade was not at around 9,000 men, but rather around 6,000.

Let me quote the effecives of Red Army:

1938: 1,513,400 men under arms
1939, August, 19: 2,000,000 (aprox)
1941, January, 1'st: 4,207,000
1941, June, 21: 5,500,000 men under arms

Those figures are without NKVD troops, who were responsable with border protection, escort, guard, operatives, and had proper aviation, marines and operatives troops.

That would make them mountain divisions not brigades.

On 15 March 1942, the mountain brigades were renamed mountain divisions. No major organizational change occured. Just the name. They were already almost as large as a division (especially since 1942, the Romanian infantry division shrank to 7 battalions).

For the exact strength of the mountain brigades in 1941, you can check:
Dutu A., Dobre F., Loghin L. Armata Romana in al doilea razboi mondial (1941-1945) - Dictionar Enciclopedic, Editura Enciclopedica, 1999

Edit:
1st Mountain Brigade on 22 June 1941 had 383 officers, 319 NCOs, 11,628 soldiers.
2nd Mounatin Brigade finished the 1941 campaign with 404 officers, 293 NCOs and 10,487 soldiers. It lost 74 officers, 44 NCOs and 1,808 soldiers. If you add them up you will surpass 12,000.
I have no data on the 4th Mountain Brigade, but it was very likely at similar strength.

Thanks Victor , it seams that i have underextimated the romanian mountain corps.

Even at battle of Nomonhan tank brigades sufered from mechanical breakdowns.
Acording to M. Kolomiets the 11th tank brigade ( Col. I.P. Aleeksenko ) lost 89 tanks between Aug 20 -Aug 30. ( on averege 9 tank/day ) to mechanical breakdowns.
But the soviets won.

That being said what does Soviet older tanks mean ?
Or should we asumme that except Kv and T-34 ALL soviet tanks are older tanks ?
Regarding the operational and staff intelligence section , after barbarossa stated the soviets disbanded the corps headquarters a placed the divisions directly under army control.

The t-26 tank was the most widespread tank in Ussr motor poll. Production lasted from 1931 to 1941. Total production figure 10,300.
1931- 100
1932-1366
1933-1312
1934-1062
1935-1203
1936-1273
1937-550
1938-736
1939-1295
1940-1346
1941-47
Source:
T-26. The Heavy Fate of the Light Tank -M.Kolomiets 2007

2066 twin-turreted tanks were produced between 1931-1933 (20%).
If 29% of the soviet older tanks required capital repairs, than it's safe to asume that these models would be on the top of the list.

But these models were a small improvement over the british Vickers 6 ton tank and after 7 years of active service, the soviets would be beter of without them.

EDIT:
From the BT series, 620 were BT-2 (model 1932) and 2108 BT-5 (model 1933 ), roughly 32 percent of the total BT production.

So to qoute Suvorov :

What tanks are considered obsolete ?

This post has been edited by osutacincizecisidoi on March 08, 2010 09:39 am

Your approach is correct osutacincizecisidoi!
I think speaking in ridiculous about the light tanks T-26 or BT-5 or BT-7 is wrong, and the Soviets are first interested in creating this image. I do not see why this mistake is made in the west, since the Germans themselves used the Pz.-II or the Skoda LT-35 light tanks, who were not superior to the soviet light tanks mentioned above.

You are comparing apples with oranges. Nomonhan is but a small skirmish compared to a supposed all-out invasion of Europe, just like the Japanese Army is inferior in every aspect to the German Heer of June 1941.

There is one thing to be able to sustain a certain percentage of losses in a battle limited in terms of space and numbers engaged against an enemy that never really knew throughout the war how to effectively fight against an armored attack or how to carry one out. There is a totally different thing to engage in the largest military invasion in history against the best land army of 1941.

Regarding the "older tanks", Glantz is refering with this term to the T-26 and the BT series. I don't remember using the word "obsolete".

Regarding 16th MC's situation, I was using it as an example of the lack of prepardness of this unit (and many others) and thus the lack of means to carry out the offenssive Suvorov imagined. I fail to see what logical link is between this and the abolition of the rifle and mechanized corps in the Red Army. The less informed or gullible reader might misinterpret this information.

The corps structure was disbanded by Stavka on 15 July 1941, out of necessity. There simply were not enough experienced commanders for several levels of the classical division/corps/army structure, so the Red Army simply eliminated the corps level and put army commanders in charge of several divisions and the remnants of the former tank divisions, which because of the huge losses were much reduced in size. All the new tank formations being created were only at brigade level. The motorized rifle divisions were transformed into rifle divisions, due to the lack of trucks. Only in 1942 would the mechanized corps return, but in a different structure.

So,to sum itup. The Soviets only disbanded the corps because they were forced to, not because it was something planned. In case of an invasion it is only logical and common sense to presume they would plan to use the mechanized corps they had only recently created and, to do this, they would need all the specialists they lacked on 22 June. Simple.

Let's not fall into conspiacy theories.

Both the Pz II and the Skoda LT-35 (btw it had superior armor to the T-26 or the BT) were equipped with radios. This alone renders them superior from operational point of view to the Soviet models mentioned. Take into consideration the fact that none of the four was invulnerable to the guns of the others.

Those who perpetrate the idea of a Soviet attack in 1941 must also bring arguments on how the Soviet Union would be able to logistically support an attack on a huge front with deep objectives.

The Germans had their own logistical problems to supply all of the armies in operation Barbarossa.

A certain level of motorization was required to support fast offensives in the initial stages, especially since the railroads between Soviet Union and the rest of Europe were of different gauges. The Soviets lacked this kind of motorization. Only by the lend-lease program they received enough trucks and vehicles that would support large scale operations.

Under such circumstances, in 1941 one can imagine that after the initial breakthrough the Soviet offensive in the West would rapidly lose steam and would eventually bog down, only to remain exposed to deadly counterattacks carried by highly mobile units.

Just for the sake of the argument: let's clarify those "deep objectives": we aren't talking about the distance from the "new fronteer" to Moscow, but to - let's say... Berlin and Ploiesti, for example! - that should've been enough to bring the German war-machine down to its knees! And the roads were (still are) much better west from Russia...
Simply: the Red Army had a much easier task than the Wehrmacht: less distance to the target(s) and much less area to occupy; when starting at the 1941 borders, of course...

If soviets attacked in 1941, they would be benefits of the lend-lease program, too, because they would be allies to UK, and later US. (they beaten Japan in 1939 at Halhin Gol).
The distances between new borders and their targets, as said MMM, wre shorter, and, full of roads and railroads.