Romania in WW 1, performance

Regarding the length of the front, it was about 1350 km, more than the length of the Western front. This meant that a much smaller number of troops was stretched thin. It is true that numberwise, the Romanian Army was in advantage, but this is hardly an advantage when the enemy has the superiority in artillery, machine-guns and equipment. The natural obstacles and fortifications had little importance when the firepower was so disproportionate.

And speaking of numbers, out of the 23 infantry divisions mobilized, only the first 10 were relatively well manned and equipped. The following 5 divisions were formed during the neutrality and had fewer troops and artillery and manned by reservists. The last 8 divisions were formed at mobilization, had the oldest artillery pieces and no machine-guns.

In my opinion it is wrong to consider that the Central Powers were taken completely by surprise by the Romanian intervention. It had already become clear that Romania was going to enter the war on the Entente side. See Falkenhayn's memoirs in this respect. On 29 July a convention was signed between himself, Hoetzendorf and colonel Gancev, the representative of the Bulgarian general staff, regarding operations in the case of a Romanian intervention. A week later the Turks adhered to the convention.

On 21 July, when the German Southern Army, the 12th and 7th Austro-Hungarian Armies formed the Archduke Charles Army Group, it was decided that the 7th Army take over the troops in Transylvania and prepare defensive positions until a new command structure was going to be formed at Cluj. The Mures and Tarnava Mica Rivers were t obe fortified as the main line of defense in case of a Romanian invasion. measures were taken to enlarge the transportation capabilities in present-day Southeastern Hungary and Transylvania, as well as in Northern Bulgaria.

On 8 August the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army was formed from the 61st Infantry Division, the 11th Cavalry Division, 9 battalions, 2 Landsturm battalions, one gendarme battalion, 7 batteries and various frontier guard and gendarme units. As "reinforcements" came the 51st Honved Division, reduced to a brigade after teh fighting at Kolomea, the 82nd Infantry Regiment, also decimated in Galicia, 3 Honved battalions, 4 Bosnian battalions, 4 dismounted cavalry squadrons, 4 artillery batteries and 2 aviation companies. The commands of the 71st and 72nd Divisions and of the 143rd and 144th Brigades were also brought to Transylvania. Obviously the forces facing the Romanian troops at the momment of the attack were small and were overwhelmed in the first phase. But the Central Powers were not exactly surprised, they were just unable to free up more troops from the other fronts.

Another issue brought up was how the Carpathian front was broken. It was more than experienced German mountain troops crossing at a point where the Romanian command did not expect it. There were in fact four German infantry divisions, two of which freshly brought from the Baltic region (and a fifth in reserve), and two cavalry divisions, supported by a lot of artillery against one Romanian infantry brigade.

It is true what was said about the Romania's join to war that: "never such a small country had a so much influence in a modern war as Romania in ww1"?

(niciodata o tara atit de mica nu a influentat atit de mult cursul unui razboi ca si intrarea in razboi a Romaniei in razboiul modial)

1. Yes. Hindenburg said that. And he mentioned in his memoir that never in history a state so small could have decide fate of two super-powers at that time. Romania, a country of just 1:20 ratio of population for combined Germany and Austrian-Hungary. But Romania lost that MOMENTUM due to very slow, painful advance in Transylvania, and Germany could bring fast enough from the West war-experienced divisions.

2. Victor is again right. Germany and AH expected to be attacked in Transylvania. For them it was a question of months (In his memoirs, Falkenhayn said he expected attack to start AFTER HARVEST. He was mistaken for less than a month and it shows his readiness to fight - and did it brilliantly - after being humiliated by Hindenburg and Ludendorff).

3. As regards Romania's performance in WW1, 1916 cannot be compared with 1917. Better prepared (machine guns, grenades, French instructors, cannons and planes, young and healthy conscripts), better motivated (promise of land reform, young officers promoted instead of old-fashioned ones). Everyting lead to a stalemate in 1917 and only Russia's defection (Brest-Litovsk) forced Romania to exit the war. And 8 divisions left to us were enough to pacify both Bessarabia and Hungary.

This post has been edited by mateias on January 20, 2008 04:48 pm

The Romanian was performance was bad! Romania had been preparing for war since in 1914. It could have named the moment to enter the war. It could have armed to the teeth for the right moment. it could have picked where to fight and where to defend. It had the advantage of numbers. It was a disaster. The fact the the Romanians held well (maybe 1/8 of Romanian land) in 1917 while Germany exploited Romanian resources does not make up for 1916!

That Romania did well politically after the war was more a function of general disintegration around her. 3 empires went bust in less than a year so someone had to profit. But didnt Bratianu see that once those powers regained their strenght, Romania could never retain what was won politically, not militarily in 1919!

Romania could not arm to the teeth. Check a map.

Romania did pick where to attack and where to defend, but war is fluid.

Romania could only have won politically. Its entry in the war was a political decision. We couldn't win militarily against 2 great powers, this was a collective effort and after each member did its part, the spoils were split. It was not pomana.

The Romanians being proud of their WW1 PERFORMANCE is like the Arabs being proud of their 1973 Yom Kippur war performance! Bottom line is they were soundly defeated in 1916. They held in 1917 then surrendered in 1918! Reminds me of Nasser bragging about Egypt crossing the canal in 1973. It was as if a miracle occured when in fact the Egyptians were surrounded and soundly defeated!

But Romanians learned the wrong lesson from the war. Instead of realizing how weak theri performance was they mistook their political gains as military gains whein in fact that never happened. This is not to impugn Romania sacrifices. Proportionally Romania lost more men in 18 mos. of war than France did in 48 months!

Did you ever heard the saying that "one could loose a battle, but is important to win the war?"

Your comparison is inappropriate.

Having a mixed performance or even losing militarily but winning politically is called a good result. The US never lost militarily in Vietnam yet it lost politically.

On what do you base your claim that the wrong lessons were learned? Learned by whom? The military, the politicians, the regular Romanian citizens?

Finally, are you a Romanian?

Romania won politically in 1919. But even a fool could have seen that unless France remained more powerful than Germany and/or Russia, Romania could never hold those gains.
The wrong lesson was: IT DOES NOT MATTER WHAT YOU WIN POLITICALLY IF YOU CANT DEFEND THOSE GAINS MILITARILY!

feic( ), Romania was able to defend these gains against her neighbors with territorial claims (except USSR), however no minor nation could defend on its own politically or militarily against the play of great powers.

So your statement "IT DOES NOT MATTER WHAT YOU WIN POLITICALLY IF YOU CANT DEFEND THOSE GAINS MILITARILY!" is wrong.

Romania could defend these gains militarily against Hungary and Bulgaria.

First of all, do not use Caps Lock when writing on the forum, because it can be interpreted as shouting. You should try to bring forward arguments to support your opinion. Shouting harder than the other guy only works if you are 6 or younger. I assume we are all adults here, so let's act accordingly.

My initial impression that your knowledge on the events is limited seems to have been correct and unfortunately it doesn't seem you took the time to document yourself on the issues, not even by reading the posts in this very topic. This makes me think that you aren't really interested in a discussion and learning and you just have an agenda. If this is the case, then we are wasting our time here.

Now, let's discuss the ideas you put forth.

1. Romania could not have armed itself to the teeth as you claim in the two years it had at its disposal simply because it lacked the capabilities to produce the weapons and munitions it needed and it was very difficult to buy it from foreign suppliers with the war waging all around Romania.

2. Romania could not have named the momment to enter the war because it first had to obtain the written assurance that its demands will be met by the Entente (obligations which the Entente only partially and belatedly fulfilled).

3. The numerical superiority with much poorer equipped troops has little value in WW1. One should compare the number of heavy artillery pieces and of machine-guns, not to mention the quality of the troops. Like already mentioned, only 10 of the 23 infantry divisions could have been considered adequate. And the numerical superiority disappeared slowly as the Romanian units suffered heavy losses when fighting a techinically and tactically superior enemy.

4. True, Romania could have picked were to fight and were to defend. IMO it should have attacked southwards and not into Transylvania.

Another factor which you seem to ignore is geography. Practically the Romanian Army had to defend a bulge inside the enemy front, longer than the Western Front. And unlike the Central Powers it could not afford to lose territory before reinforcements arrived.

5. It was more than 1/8 of the territory: about 1/3. In 1918 Romania had to sue for peace, because Russia sued for peace. Without the supply routes through Russia, Romania was completely isolated. One cannot fight without ammunition. Especially since in the same time the Romanian Army was fighting and disarming Bolshevized Russian troops behind the front line.

The Romanian front drew Central Powers' troops and ressources, which could have otherwise been used on other fronts. Would you please explain how you reached the conclusion that the losses of 1916 outweight the resistance in 1917?

Regarding the 1918-1919 period, without military action and force it is doubtful the political victory would have been of similar magnitude. The Romanian state remained untouched by Communist anarchy in those years thanks mainly to its army. This was the basis on which everything else was later built. The same Army later occupied Transylvania and made its way to Budapest, toppling the Bela Kun regime, and defended the Eastern frontier against Bolshevik intrusions. Wecan go into details if you are itnerested.

Regarding the idea of defending militarily the gains, you should not expect a country the size of of Romania to win alone a war against a major power like the Soviet Union.

Hungary was always a German friend. Romania was more Machiavellian. It would be a German friend when it suited Romania to be a German friend. So Germany would support Hungary against Romania. Similarly Russia would support Bulgaria as against Romania. Romania became dependent on French support after WW1! And that was worth what? Bratianu was very short sighted in NOT seeing this.
Anyway my comment were directed against the Romanian military efficiency not the political situation. The Romanians were basically defeated in 4 mos., despite having substantial defensive barriers aiding them. And remember this was WW1: the king of all defensive wars. In WW1 almost all battles were won by the side on DEFENSE.

This is rather naive. Actually Hitler and Stalin supported whoever suited their interests, I would not call friendship any relationship between Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union with any other country. You should take time to read a bit more about these dictators, as Machiavellian is an adjective better suited to their kind of policy.

"in the ww1 almost all battles were won on defence"
It seems to me that hatered clouded your reasoning.

feic( ) i'm so happy that you said that!
it gives me the oportunity to remind you that to have a mountain on your back doesnt mean you got a defensive position, when the battle is fluid and one is engaged with enemy, fighting from motion.

when the romanian position were prepared for defense, no one passed thru them: it is the case of Oituz. Let me rem you the romanian troops motto from Oituz: "No tresspasing here!" (sounds silly in my english "Pe aici nu se trece!" )

As for defensive battles (if you want to see, which is obvious you dont), there are Marasti and Marasesti battles, where Mackensen broke his back, in open plain!!! Their oponents, surprise for you , the Romanians!!! So another defensive battle, won by romanians

It is seems that you dont like Romania and romanians, but no one ask this from you. Dont be afraid, you are not alone, but all of you have to live with that: romanians are here and they will stay here as they was from the begining . Even Machiavellic as you said so nice

Have a nice day!