20 years after....

In case of war, there were several layers of defense. First it was the regular army, then troops of interior, patriotic guards and the last, there were special troops of resistance, specially trained for urban and guerrilla warfare. Those troops were recruited from all branches of the military and had special training abroad. Every year or so they were called for so called "vacation" but they were forbidden to take their families with them. In case of war, they had to act in cells independently one from another, and were activated by special codes "packed" in messages send through mass-media (radio, television etc). Those were the troops that did the shooting after 22 December, the so called "terrorists". Many of them were caught, but all of them were released in January 1941.

Of course, there were the tragic cases of regular military shooting at each other, the most notable example being at Otopeni, due to confusion and fear. I don't think that it was a deliberate move, you have to consider that most of the army regulars were drafted guys, poorly trained and poorly motivated (during 2 years of service they were shooting 2-4 war cartridges for two times at the poligon, the rest of the time they were working in crop fields, mines and other patriotic duties). Another example of poor coordination happened at Buzau, a city with many military units. My father was at an aviation unit (choppers and transport airplanes) that was next to a map-making unit (geodezi). A car full of civilians had to pass in front of these units, but due to general confusion, the order was not passed to the next unit, and the car was filled with bullets (all civilians were killed).

There was an electronic war going on, they were receiving false targets on radars, and they were hearing on radios guys speaking in Arabic. Someone with knowledge of their equipment (which was of Soviet origin) were jamming them. They received an alert of a column of terrorist approaching the airfield in trucks, and two fighters were scrambled. Only by luck they managed not to bomb one of their own radio stations, because they saw some trucks and they took them for the "terrorists".

thanks, Dragos! Sounds like with the many layers, even under normal circumstances I'd imagine command and control issues would arise. Tragic outcome, in the first case you mention. And only good fortune averted perhaps worse in the second one!

I learn something new here everyday!

Happy New Year!
cheers,
cnfb

Hallo everybody,

Because you touch on the terrorist (better called the diversionists) problem, I'll try to sort them based on the victim number :
- those who give the false informations to the TV, on the phone, or spread the rumors -mostly army active or retired officers or connected to them;
- those who install the electronic/acoustic devices same as those who fire the few accurate shots in the head of their victims -the basic well-known terrorists- possibly the 404th Battalion teams or the special troops of the 236 Internal Network of the DIA.
- those who created the false aerial invasion scenario -the false war over Romania who made our AA Artillery & Rocket Units fire on our own aircraft and hellicopters and sometimes shot them down. I believe here were the GRU technicians from the mobile teams on Lada cars. So the Soviets.
The list is surely open to others, but right now these are the one who came to my mind...

http://s188567700.online.de/CMS/index.php?...d=119&Itemid=47

An interesting article about air force and AA defence activity during those days.

My opinion is that all was started by some foreign secret services (mostly soviets, probably some of their subordinates too, as hungarians, and maybe even some NATO ones as US was involved too), but peoples was already very unsatisfied with the regime. So, the popular revolt follow quickly, and the radio-electronic war and the psichological one was started to paralyze the country defense system as much as possible, to not be use at full strenght by Ceausescu, and in the mean time to make easy for a possible foreign armed intervention over the borders. Army pass on the peoples side, and on the revolution, but in the same time the army command (as gen Guse, the General Staff comander) give orders that nobody to be let to pass over borders, and army from frontiers to open fire if is necessary. This and the fact that peoples was still on the streets, make the ones who took the power (probably with soviets aproval) to feel insecure, and the "terrorist" (possibly from soviet special units too) show to appear, to send peoples back home and not disturb them. It is possible as well that some special units as those prepared for guerilla war in case of foreign invasion to enter in action. Beside that, civilians took weapons (mostly from Patriotic Guards stock), to fight too, and most of the soldiers was conscripts with couple months of army. So, it was a general mess, suported by disinformation war too. Anyway, western countries suported an intervention of Red Army (which was prepared even psychologicaly, wihth presentation of suposedly 60,000 deaths just in Timisoara ), but since army was ready to fight with them, and after their nasty experiance in Afghanistan, they didnt do that, and probably rely in a cover action. However, "perestroika" controled by soviets failled to be imposed in Romania, because peoples doesnt want just another form a comunism, but to get rid with all of this, and russians wasnt liked anyway, so keeping an aproach with them was hard. And soon the events from Basarabia make peoples to really hate them, and any influence of them in Romania was vanished, and no normal politician say openly that is close to them, even today (quite contrary, we help the basarabians with weapons and i think even pilots those days, during Transnistria war).

Hallo Udar,
If you are interested in the events around and about the revolution of 1989, I recommend you the 2 volumes written by Alex Mihai Stoenescu -
Istoria loviturilor de stat din Romania vol.4 (partea I + partea II) Revolutia din decembrie 1989 - o tragedie romaneasca. I found these the most documented books on this issue I ever read. Even if I read at least other 10 books on this theme. Because you tell off the soviet readyness to intervention I remember I heard once (a long time ago when the National Television of Moldova broadcast on TVR) that the soviet paratrooper division stationed until 1992 in southern Bessarabia (identified by the 98th Guards "Svirskaya" Red Banner order of Kutuzov Airborne Division Bolgrad-based, with units in Bolgrad, Chisinau and Veselyy Kut) was ready for action in 23 december 1989 (after it was alamed in 18 december)! Interesting fact that the soviet support for Romania, that gen. Guse rejected, was exactly a paratrooper unit (to fight the terrorists).

The speaker was an ex-NCO of this Division, interviewed by Moldovan television later... Sorry, I can't remember his name or rank, even if I wrote it somewhere... The information regarding the division I found in 2004 on internet (not available anymore as I checked later).

Salut Andreas
And thank you for recomandations, i hear about Alex Stoienescu. And interesting to hear about about that soviet paratrooper division, and i remember some peoples from FSN or so asked for soviet help, but gen. Guse refused, and even give order to not let anybody pass over the border, if they still want to come, despite the romanian army refuses.

This post has been edited by udar on January 05, 2010 05:47 pm

i happened to have been on the streets in Timisoara back then and saw quite a number of hungarians carrying the romanian flag, myself being neither romanian, nor hungarian carrying one with the emblem cut out as well. haven't met any agent provocateur and from the 20th on no policeman until well after the new year. the bulk of the army of 1989 had a vast experience in harvesting crops and building villas for higher officers but precious little useful military experience, which became quite clear after the great many friendly fire casualties of the revolution. if an army (the soviet?) would have proceeded with an invasion, there was little that could have been done, revolution or not. which begs the question, why would they? especially during the days of glasnost and perestroika, romania being the last of all WP states. they didn't do anything about the GDR, CSSR or Hungary. why Romania then?

at no point were 60.0000 deths mentioned in relation to Timisoara. the highest number ever mentioned was 4.000 deaths in Timisopara by radio free europe on tuesday the 19th.
the 60.000 figure was brought forward at Ceausescu's trial, as an estimate of the total cost of lives of his regime, including the 80ies, 70ies and 60ies.

i've seen several soldiers with my own eyes who struggled while reloading an assault rifle. if the red army didn't invade (and there is no reason why they would, given that they didn't bother to do so in the GDR or the CSSR or Hungary) it was certainly not our exemplary readieness which stopped them, more likely the political consequences.

um what? what exactly did people vote for when they decided "not to sell our country" in 1990 and voted the crew of ex-nomenclaturists of the FSN while comrade Ilici campaigned for "socialism with a humane face". the entire pot-revoutionary regime until 1996 was nothing else than an attempt at "modern communism".

This post has been edited by dead-cat on January 05, 2010 06:11 pm

No, the 60,000 figure mentioned in the trial was not an estimate of total cost of lives including the 80s, 70s and 60s, it was clearly mentioned in connection to the events and deaths that happened until December 25 1989. Ceausescu was blamed for the killing of 60,000 protesters through his orders. True, not in Timisoara alone but throughout the cities that had protests.

this is the transcript as broadcasted on TV:

except the last point, all the other are not explicitly restricted to the december events.

except the last point, all the other are not explicitly restricted to the december events.

That is the brief list of what he was charged with, but if you look further into the transcript, you'll find this discussion:

They're clearly talking about the protests, the orders to shoot, the victims of those events, not 1980s, 1970s, 1960s.

look at the sentence
"ai auzit, in toate muncipiile tarii, cum le pronuntai dumneata, in toate municipiile pe care te laudai ca le-ai construit. S-au construit cu sudoarea poporului, indobitocit, sleit, toti oamenii de cul- tura, toate inteligentele le-ai persecutat, ca sa nu fuga din tara, sa ne lase pe mana dumitale."

even back then, i understood it, as referring to his entire reign.

100 victims wouldn't have made it look better though.

The 64,000 figure was mentioned in clear relation to the December 1989 protests, in relation to the shootings and who ordered them, who was doing the shooting etc.

Basically the judge mentions 64,000 killed in all cities during those events and then digresses to point out the way those cities were built - with the sweat of the people and the persecuted intellectuals. The thing you quoted above is that digression. Also note that the judge talks about the persecution of intellectuals to prevent them from running away from the country. It doesn't even say execution of intellectuals to give you a reason to connect those sentences to the 64,000 figure.

Myself I also carried a Rumanian flag with a hole in the centre in early January 1990, in Budapest, going from a public pro-Revolution meeting to a local pub. Unbelievably, that was already 20 years ago...

Gen. Dénes

i happened to have been on the streets in Timisoara back then and saw quite a number of hungarians carrying the romanian flag, myself being neither romanian, nor hungarian carrying one with the emblem cut out as well. haven't met any agent provocateur and from the 20th on no policeman until well after the new year. the bulk of the army of 1989 had a vast experience in harvesting crops and building villas for higher officers but precious little useful military experience, which became quite clear after the great many friendly fire casualties of the revolution. if an army (the soviet?) would have proceeded with an invasion, there was little that could have been done, revolution or not. which begs the question, why would they? especially during the days of glasnost and perestroika, romania being the last of all WP states. they didn't do anything about the GDR, CSSR or Hungary. why Romania then?

at no point were 60.0000 deths mentioned in relation to Timisoara. the highest number ever mentioned was 4.000 deaths in Timisopara by radio free europe on tuesday the 19th.
the 60.000 figure was brought forward at Ceausescu's trial, as an estimate of the total cost of lives of his regime, including the 80ies, 70ies and 60ies.

i've seen several soldiers with my own eyes who struggled while reloading an assault rifle. if the red army didn't invade (and there is no reason why they would, given that they didn't bother to do so in the GDR or the CSSR or Hungary) it was certainly not our exemplary readieness which stopped them, more likely the political consequences.

um what? what exactly did people vote for when they decided "not to sell our country" in 1990 and voted the crew of ex-nomenclaturists of the FSN while comrade Ilici campaigned for "socialism with a humane face". the entire pot-revoutionary regime until 1996 was nothing else than an attempt at "modern communism".

Well, i think is a little wrong to base all just on your limited opinion on what you saw saw then, and not have a wider perspective. However, since i wasnt in Timisoara, i know just what i read, meaning that was some provocateurs too, who brake windows of magazines, incited the peoples, etc. But in the same time i dont deny the fact that peoples was revolted for real, and wasnt at all like sheeps controled by someone, but did that from their inner feelings.

About a possible soviet invasion (it wasnt other army around able to do that) now. My opinion is that USSR (or especialy KGB) know for some years that they lose the race with USA, and can't compete anymore. The west surpassed them quite very much in economy, and US in technology, and they was threatened to lose so even the military point of view of Cold War, and the balance created in arm race. So, they come with the "perestroika" idea, meaning to calm down the west (USA especialy) advance, and have some time to regain their breath. Because, they already doesnt have a total control on comunist countries (quite contrary with China for ex.), and not even in Warsaw Pact, where Romania was just a "de jure" member, but "de facto" was out since 1968 at least, and in some of this countries was predicted just troubles in the future (in Poland already foreign influences as pope one for ex. was increasingly strong), political and other ways. So soviets intervened for a "perestroika" like change in all this countries, not for impose another hard comunism style. They wanted to change the comunist block acording with their ideas, and in the same time to keep an control of those countries as much as possible, as a kind of buffer zone betwen them and west (they manage to do that just with some of the former soviet republics after the break of USSR). So, a possible intervention in Romania was to change the things acording with their ideas, or in their favour, Ceausescu having a different politic anyway, and Romania as well being on another orbit. West as well was obviously interested in get rid of Ceausescu.
So, yes, FSN "gang" come in power with the acord of soviets, trying to implement their doctrine, but they (soviets) didnt control the things as they wished, since russians was if not hated, at least disliked by most of the population and to be close to them was suicidal for anyone on power especialy after the events in Rep Moldova started, and nationalism errupted. So, Iliescu even if at first wanted to make a kind of perestroika here, suported the basarabians fight as well and quickly move on from the first attempts to be friendly with russians (politicaly speaking).

About romanian army in 1989, i am aware that it wasnt very well trained, or even equiped (even if in some more elite like units the situation was better), but the defense plan then was to use the army the slow down the enemy invasion until reserves and patriotic guard was fully mobilised, meaning maybe millions of peoples, guerrila warfare in cities and mountains areas etc. which make any invasion succes to be very hard, if not impossible to achieve. So, that was the idea of a possible intervention, to support the rise on power of some from the FSN group, but since some like gen Guse rejected any possible ask for such, and even gived order to fire if someone pass the border, soviets didnt intervene like that, but rely propably on some cover actions but they didnt manage to control totaly the things, Militaru, their man, was needed to be quickly get rid off him, to not disturb too much the army and this react, as well another problems was in january 1990 if i remember correct, the events from Tg. Mures, then "mineriada", the war in Transnistria, so all the soviet influence disapeared quickly.

if the whole perestroika thing was a soviet conspiracy to get out of the arm race then it doesn't explain the infightings in the leadership of the CPSU in 1985, nor the Andropow and Chernenko choice and not to speak about the communist attempt of a coup d'etat in 1991.

then how comes, the same trick didn't work in Lithuania, Estonia or Letonia?
or the Ukraine, which was much more important, given the Sevastopol naval base to say the least, than the poor moldova rep.?

if the army was't much of a deterrent, what makes you think a bunch of factory workers out of training, poorly equipped would compensate anything? the "patriotic" guard was even less in position to offer any usefull resistence than the army.
yes i see legions of married men hiding in the woods with an AK-47 at best, while their wives and children are at the red army's mercy.
that's just like the romanian saying, getting drunk with clear water.
Tg. Mures was comrade Ilici's justification why the securitate is still badly needed and the "mineriade" showed 2 things: the abysmal lack of political culture of the overwhelming majority of the population and the methods comrade Ilici was ready to use to secure his regime.
it capitalized on 2 things. the respective animosity of the szekely and romanian population and the hostility of the "worker and peasant" towards the intellectual. now if that's not class struggle! the entire bunch of reds composing the "communist internationale" of the 1920ies would've been proud.

This post has been edited by dead-cat on January 06, 2010 04:24 pm

You hit the nail straight on the head...

Ditto

Tritto (if there is anything like that).

Gen. Dénes