Beius September 1944

I would be interested in details about the Hungarian attack on as well as the Romanian defence of Beius (Belényes) in September 1944.

As far as the Hungarian side is concerned I know that the "Zrinyi" assault guns of the 3rd Battery of the 1st Assault Artillery Battalion were directly involved in the attack with 10 assault guns under the command of 1st Lt Rátz. One Zrinyi was lost after rolling on a mine. As far as the Romanian side is concerned my knowledge is limited to what I have recently read in this website in the biography of Maj. gen. L. Mociulschi, i.e. that the town was defended by the "Crisuri group", the bulk of which was formed by the 3rd mountain division. According to this information the Romanian side had only one single anti tank gun to face the Hungarian armoured attack. Why was it so? My questions: 1) Chronology of the attack/defence, 2) Forces involved, especially in the defence of the vicinity, 3) Structure of the Romanian defence between Pocola (Biharpoklos) and Beius, 4) Where was at that time the anti tank gun company of the 3rd mountain div.?, 5) What was the model of the anti tank gun that was in position in front of Beius ?

You will find details about this subject as soon as the admins of this site will publish the 1st part of the interview I took from ww2 veteran Tucra Aurel who fought this battle.

I use this ocasion to kindly ask Victor to publish on the site the 1st part of the interview givind the fact that I dont know when I'll have time to take the 2nd part. 1st part is already taken on 11th of July if I rem well enough.

So, Victor, please, can you?

21inf,
Saturday I believe I will upload it.

Paul,
There are some details in gen. Mociulschi memoirs', but not much. I will look them up this weekend.

The 3rd Mountain Division was in the process of reorganization, re-equiping, training new recruits etc. It had escaped from Crimea, but without much of its heavy equipment, because of the hasty retreat in front of the 4th Ukrainian Front's offensive. Upon its return t oRomania, 4 battalions were created from the veterans to form the 103rd Mounatin Brigade, which was sent to the front in Moldavia.

Gen. Mociulschi was left with a part of his vetrans t oreform the division in Traqnsylvania. Thus, at the time the Axis offensive in Transylvania commenced, the process was not finished. This is why the division lacked the 39th AT company for example.

Furthermore, at the momment of the attack, the 5th and 22nd Battalions were subordinated to the Bihor Group and it took time for them to arrive. Mociulschi had at his disposal just the 6th, 11th, 12th and 21st Battalions, plus the 3rd Mountain Pioneer Battalion (who ). The 6th was deployed on the Northern approach, from Rosia. In the center was the 11th Battalion, which defended the road from Oradea through Rabagani. It was the most pressed of all. To the South was the 21st Battalion barring the pass through Soimi. The 12th Battalion and the 3rd Mountain Pioneer Battalion were kept in reserve.

As the battle progressed, on 16 September, the 22nd Battalion arrived at Beius and it was introduced into the first line on the main Western approaches besides the 21st, 11th and 12th. These were supported by the 1st and 3rd Heavy Mortar Battalions. That is where the main strike came from. The 6th Battalion and the 9th Mortar Battalion barred the aproach from the Remetea (North). Two frontier guards companieson secured the remote flanks and the Regional Battalion Codru (unit made up of locals with poor training and usually older than the average) backed them up.

The attack you are probably referring to took place the following day, on 17 September. The 11th Battalion received the brunt of the armored assault. Mociulschi goes on to mention one tank destroyed by the mine field, one set on fire by the pioneers and two light tanks/armored cars knocked out by the lone AT gun (unspecified type - aquired from the training units, thus probably a light 37, 45 or 47 mm gun), which was subsequently destroyed by the assault guns.

The 5th Battalion arrived in Beius later that day and Mociulschi used it and the 3rd pioneers to counterattack and disengage the rest of the division and pull out of Beius.

Thank you for the valuable information.

As a result of the attack I am referring to the rumanian troops withdrew from the vicinity of Beius. The attack started around 9 o'clock in the morning and on the same day, the rumanian troops left the vicinity. As a matter of fact, this attack must have taken place mid September 1944. I do not know the exact date (no reliable information). Based on your information it could well be the 17th of September. The reference to the (Hungarian) armoured vehicle destroyed by a landmine as well as the lone Romanian AT gun, which got knocked out makes it very likely. According to my sources, the attack was carried out by one Hungarian infantry battalion and one battery of assault guns (i.e. 10 Zrinyi assault guns, each armed with a 10,5 cm howitzer). This represents a considerable fire power. A witness statement also refers to AA automatic guns (probably Bofors of 40mm) used in direct fire in the attack. I have no information about the involvment of light tanks/armoured cars. As far as the assault guns are concerned, according to reliable witness statements, only one vehicle was destroyed (by a landmine). The Romanian AT gun fired on the attacking assault guns, but was not able to stop them due to its small caliber/the thickness of the armour of the Hungarian assault guns (frontal armour: 75mm). One assault gun ran over the AT gun. As a result the gun crew was probably killed in action. I assume that the 11th Battalion you are refering to belonged to the 3rd mountain division.

This post has been edited by paul panzer on October 03, 2007 01:48 pm

Yes, Paul, 3rd romanian mountain division was deployed in that battle.
Here http://www.worldwar2.ro/memorii/?language=ro&article=786 you can read the memoires of a sergeant from 3rd romanian mountain division who fought and escaped that battle.
The sergeant even remembers were was deployed the AT gun which was belonging to 6th battery.

This witness statement is really interesting. I assume the 6th Battery had nothing to do with Compania 39 Anti-Car. I am trying to collect the missing pieces in order to write the attack on Beius. The fact that the 3rd mountain division was not complete at that time and in the process of being refitted seems to be a very important aspect, when one tries to measure the forces of the parties.
Aside from Maj. Gen. Mociulschi's memoirs of 1967 is there any monography on the history of the 3rd mountain division or do other witness statements exist (ideally it's good to talk to the witnesses with original maps and draw "tactical" drawing with them)?

This post has been edited by paul panzer on October 03, 2007 09:36 pm

I can put you in conection with mr. Tucra, the veteran who fought that battle, but I'm afraid you'll have to pay him a visit at Vascau, Bihor county.

Yes, according to Mociulschi's memoirs, the AT gun was crushed by the assault guns along with the corporal and soldiers manning it. And yes, it had nothing to do with the 39th AT Company.

The overall attack was much more complex than just one Hungarian battalion and one assault gun battery and was the climax of a battle which lasted for several days. That is probably the force which hit the 11th Battalion on 17 September, but the other 4 battalions of the 3rd Mountain Division were also engaged by Hungarian infantry on the outskirts of Beius that day. Some of them managed to retreat during the night through the mountain paths, because the main road through Beius had been taken by the assault guns.

The explanation for my very partial (and unilateral !) knowledge is that the witness statements of former members of the Hungarian assault artillery unit constitute my main source. The assault guns were engaged only one single day against Beius and then withdrawn just after the attack. The Hungarian forces I referred to are forces that were engaged directly against the vicinity on the day Beius was seized. I cannot exclude that other units were engaged in the neighbouring area. According to the witness statements the assault guns penetrated first into the vicinity and were followed by infantry at some distance (old problem of bad coordination between infantry and armoured vehicles). The assault guns probably played an important (or maybe even the decisive) role in the Hungarian breakthrough (this is merely a personal assumption). One light AT gun could do nothing against 10 assault guns manned by very experienced crews. I know that I am troublesome with my questions. Does Gen. Mjr Mociulschi expressly use the word "assault gun(s)" in his memoirs ? Is there a possibility to get a scanned version of the part of his memoirs dealing with Beius (since I assume that the book can no longer be acquired) ? As a matter of fact, I should talk to the veteran ! It would be very interesting to know more about the Hungarian attack ...and the Romanian counter-attack (according to the website Beius was retaken on 22 Sept.) !
The bravery of the crew of the Romanian AT gun must be stressed. The gun fired until the last moment . I assume the crew members were decorated posthumously.

This post has been edited by paul panzer on October 05, 2007 09:10 am

Would be interesting to determine the exact position/location of the AT gun on a large scale map as well as the names of its crew...

This post has been edited by paul panzer on October 05, 2007 12:31 pm

The AT gun was on the Beius - Pocola road. There is no info on the crew except that the commander was a corporal.

The word "assault guns" appears a couple of times, first when he mentions the destruction of the AT gun. Most of the time it's just "tanks". You must take into consideration the fact that this book was poublished in 1967 and thus probably subjected to serious "make up" by the Communist censors to whom tanks and assault guns didn't make too much difference, just mentioning 30 instead of 10.

Considering the information available I think that we are talking of one and the same attack. I consider the date referred to by Maj. Gen. Mociulschi (17 Sept) as a reliable piece information. The estimation of the ennemy's strength in the middle of an action is not an easy task so that I am not "shocked" by the reference to 30 tanks/assault guns. (instead of 10) I am more surprised by the reference to armoured cars. I will check this point.

My witness statement regarding the attack on Beius also refers to a lone machine gun firing on the Hungarian assault guns from the tower of a church in Beius immediately after the assault (I do not know the number of churches in Beius). The tower was subsequently destroyed by a shot of the howitzer of the very same Zrinyi assault gun that crushed the AT gun.

Besides, the witness statement gives the impression that the Romanian infantry that happened to fight in this area was not particularly experienced which suggests that there were not the old veterans of the 3rd mountain division. There is namely a reference to infantry running back on open field instead of taking cover, a classical error of unexperienced soldiers (... no man can run faster than a bullet/howitzer shell). On the other hand, the crew of the AT gun and of the machine gun were obviously more than motivated fighters. As I wrote before for the crew of the AT gun, they should have been distinguished.

This post has been edited by paul panzer on October 12, 2007 06:43 pm

Interviewing mr Tucra as participant of that battle as manning the 120 mm mortar, he told me that they were unable to reach the mortar in order to fire with it, because the enemy was already broke the infantry line. It gave me a impression of a surprise atack. I also have the information that a day before the Axis atack, romanian troops were supplied with a quantity of alcohol from Beius, but they had nothing (or very little to eat) in the previous 3 days.

Romanians were warned by a romanian gendarme from Rabagani about the arival of 4 enemy tanks, who intented to atack romanian positions next morning. But the romanian captain was drunk and he acused the gendarme of desertion, trying to shoot him for that reason. The gendarme left romanian position, but no one believed him about the 4 enemy tanks, even if mr Tucra says that they hear engine sounds somewhere in the front of romanian positions.

Mr Tucra also testify that when the line was broken, the bulk of the soldiers ran on the road in order to escape and a great number of them were killed on the road. He himself was retreating thru corn fields and woods towards Vascau.
It is also a reality that the experienced soldiers of 3rd mountains were killed on eastern front, very few returning from there.

Like I said, most of the experienced troops of the 3rd Mountain Infantry Division were on the front in Moldavia, with the 103rd Mountain Brigade.