Bessarabian soviet occupation 07.1940, How much time could we resist?

Hello! November 1939 is not the same as june 1940!
The list of units in Bessarabia in june 1940 is quite long, comprising much more than a few cavalry units! Try to read some miltary authors, quite recent:
OTU, Petre – Îmbrăţişarea Anacondei: politica militară a României în perioada 1 septembrie 1939-22 iunie 1941, Bucureşti, Editura Militară, 2006;
DUŢU, Alesandru, RETEGAN, Mihai (coordonatori) – Eliberarea Basarabiei şi a nordului Bucovinei. 22 iunie–26 iulie 1941., Bucureşti, Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 1999; (well, not so recent, but the best there is until now).
You'll be surprised at the fact that two whole armies (Armata 3 and Armata 4) were actually deployed there, east of Pruth!
Also, in the dictionary mentioned above, the units that were actually ON the frontline in june 1940 and got to retreat west are also mentioned!
DUŢU, Alesandru, DOBRE, Florica, LOGHIN, Leonida – Armata română în al doilea război mondial (1941-1945) : dicţionar enciclopedic, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 1999.

MMM,
I agree with you regarding the reading of latest books, and not only, about that subject,
But, at the same time, from my point of view, the map I was speaking about, seemed credible for the deployment of our troops for June 1940. Why? Because in any defensive operation, it's normal to keep your units in depth of the territory, so as not to expose them to encirclement in the border area, when the enemy break your line of defense. But as I said, you're right, as I remember a series of articles devoted to withdraw of our army from Basarabia and Northern Bucovina which I read once in Revista de Istorie Militara, where it was a list of weapons and ammunition abandoned or seized by the Soviets from our troops (list which was impossible if there had been so few units).
My question to you is : we should resist, regardless of consequences?

No, not really! It wasn't (still isn't) our way of "business"! It couldn't be done, not after what happened to Finland and Poland; not after France fell like the legendary castle of cards. The Romanians were in disarray after the fall of France, so it wasn't easy to try and resist, knowing already the outcome. What they didn't knew then was (IMO) that Transylvania and South Dobrodja would soon follow...

the political leaders of that time war realistic and did not think we could held agains the soviets for more then 3 month. the alliance with the west became nothing more then a useless piece of paper.
hungary wanted the entire transilvania, bulgaria wanted the entire dobrogea region. the soviets possible agreed with the all of the above and wanted to break romania into historical states (plus/extra bonus: bring the "liberating" comunism). the first step was the creation of the socialist republic of moldova and the creation of "moldovenism".
the only state the offered to bring troops was turkey.
war could possible mean the distruction of modern romania and the loss of every thing from 1848 till now. i personaly think that it was the best possible solution.

However, after years (and decades) of proclaiming that we shall defend every inch of Romanian land, this was too easy to let go!
It is indeed difficult to appreciate those times, but that is not an excuse!

Hallo radugb,
if in terms of decision taken I believe it was the right one, regarding the consequences of disobedience to the Soviet ultimatum, I'm not so sure your statement is likely...
Hitler sure don't liked us, but I don't think he'll let us be occupied and sovietized, (despite the king Carol II) nore let the hungarians take entire Transylvania! And surely, without german help, the Hungarian army would not be able to occupy Transylvania on his own! Don't you think?

In this matter I strongly recommend the volume (in Romanian - translation) Carol al II-lea şi teroarea istoriei (Carol II and the terror of history) by the French military historian dr. Christophe Midan. Published by Editura militară, the over 400 pages volume ( http://www.edituramilitara.ro/shopping/pro...ails.php?id=118 ) is a first (and abridged) volume of his monumental and richly documented PhD thesis, using the usually employed sources but also some new (for me, at least) documents from the French and Romanian archives. Moreover, Midan is the first non-Romanian historian who is challenging some quite well established historical interpretations (or perhaps I should say myths) concerning that troubled period, such as the general incompetence/ unpreparedness/disorganization of the Romanian HQ/General Staff, the alleged contra factual character of an analysis of Romania’s strategic alternatives from the Summer of 1940 (the military resistance alternatives), the speculative assumption of a war on many fronts in June 1940 and the “axiom” of a pointless armed opposition to the Soviets in 1940. He dedicates an entire chapter to analyzing the strategic options which Romania was facing in the Summer of 1940, on several levels (the probability on a war on more than one front, the possibility of a strategically and politically relevant stand made by the Romanian army in front of the Soviets, the scope of the Soviet offensive and the attitude of Germany towards this question.) and focusing on the June 1940 ultimatum.

His conclusion - briefly and excessively synthetically summarized are:

A war on two fronts was a possibility, but very far from a certitude and rather unlikely.

A (at least) benevolent neutrality towards Romania was the most likely attitude of the third Reich.

The maximal scope of a Soviet offensive would (most likely) have been the occupation of the territory requested by the June ultimatum.

The might and the efficiency of the Soviet army were grossly overrated; its real status was signaled both by official diplomatically and military reports (the Romanian minister in Moscow, for ex., or a commander of one of the Romanian Army Corps) which were dismissed due to political reasons.

As a general conclusion, by resisting Romania would have lost nothing more than was anyhow lost by giving up to the blackmail - in terms of human, territorial and material losses. Any chances of a better outcome were in fact connected by how efficient and determined a political and military resistance would have been. And the opposite effect: the Romanian capitulation from June was the main cause for the following pressures and blackmails put forth by Hungary and Bulgaria latter that year.

So perhaps before dismissing this type of analyses of being a repudiated “what if” history one should think twice.

This post has been edited by Agarici on April 09, 2010 06:54 pm

In late September 1939, after the Soviet invasion of Poland, the territorial deployment of the Romanian army units underwent radical changes. By the Summer of 1940 the bulk of the forces were positioned at the Soviet frontier: according to Christophe Midan, 20 divisions and brigades belonging to the 3rd and 4th armies, plus several regiments - with the entire 4th army being allocated to the defense of Bessarabia.

As a feed-back to a memoir addressed by the chief of the General Staff (gen. Florea Ţenescu) to the political authorities - concerning the steps to be taken for the defense to a potential Soviet attack - the official answer arrived on 22 May 1940 and it said literally (according to the same C. Midan): “The army will fight on the Eastern frontier (Dnister) with its full capacity”. I think this quotation speaks for itself, not needing any further comments.

Thank you Agarici,
primarily for the book recommendation, which I also ordered now, and second for the specifications added, important -I think! I agreed to what MMM claimed, as I remember seeing a list of weapons and military effects lost or captured in Bassarabia and N. Bukovina in july 1940 by the soviet troops. But right now I still believe that a resistence to the soviet ultimatum could have been more dangerous for our country compared with what actually happened! The soviet military power was overwhelming, and far exceeded the resilience of our armed forces. After I read the book maybe I'll change my mind...

No, you don't need to change your mind, as the final outcome of a conflict with USSR would have been the same either way! But there is such a thing as "rezistenţă de onoare", which Carol II, having no such thing as honour, didn't really follow!

You're welcome!

The human and material losses were indeed impressive. The figures indicated by C. Midan are: 67.079 rifles/carabines, 6.134 pistols and revolvers, 1.080 light MGs, 277 MGs, 43 grenade throwers, 147 cannons and important quantities of ammunition and various supplies. The human losses totaled over 61.000 (dead, wounded, but mostly missing).

These figures enabes Midan to sustain that the losses following a potential armed resistance wouldn't have exceeded those occured during the cession of the province.

Most of the missing are probably Bessarabians, who decided to stay behind and not to retreat to Rumania.

Gen. Dénes

The "casualties" were: 9 killed, 5 wounded and 62,503 missing. "Missing" means Bessarabians that chose to stay behind in 99% of the cases. The Soviets had around 10 KIAs and probably some WIAs.

I seriously doubt that in case of resistance the numbers of KIAs and WIAs would not have been higher than 14 people. The "missing" were mostly recovered one year afterwards.

I haven't read the book, but I will probably buy it after reading the abstract you made of it.

However, here I disagree. The Soviets were up for grabbing whatever it was possible to grab. Evidence:
1. It took Hitler's direct intervention to stop them from requesting the entire Bukovina.
2. Herta was not included in the ultimatum, but was taken nevertheless because of the maps the troops received.
3. On 25-26 October 1940, at 0100 hours, four Soviet monitors landed marines on the Daleru, Tataru and Maican Eyots, located at the mouth of the Chilia branch of the Danube. There was a skirmish with the few Romanian frontier-guards, which left six dead behind, before they retreated in front of the Soviet numerical superiority.
4. There were skirmishes on the Prut during climax of the Transylvanian crisis in the summer of 1940. For example, see:

Royal Decree No. 156bis/27 January 1941
The Virtutea Militara Medal peace version 2nd class awarded to:
serg. Dumitru Damian
cap. Vasile Arion
fruntas Vasile Cretu
sold. Marin Dumitrascu
sold. Dumitru Gradinaru
sold. Ioan Calugaru,
who distinguished themselves during the attacks made by the Russians with superior forces on the Tiganasi and Ocrub posts on 11 August 1940.

In conclusion, it is my opinion that the Soviets would have advanced as far as it was possible under the military and political conditions of the time.

I haven't read the book, but I will probably buy it after reading the abstract you made of it.

However, here I disagree. The Soviets were up for grabbing whatever it was possible to grab. Evidence:
1. It took Hitler's direct intervention to stop them from requesting the entire Bukovina.
2. Herta was not included in the ultimatum, but was taken nevertheless because of the maps the troops received.
3. On 25-26 October 1940, at 0100 hours, four Soviet monitors landed marines on the Daleru, Tataru and Maican Eyots, located at the mouth of the Chilia branch of the Danube. There was a skirmish with the few Romanian frontier-guards, which left six dead behind, before they retreated in front of the Soviet numerical superiority.
4. There were skirmishes on the Prut during climax of the Transylvanian crisis in the summer of 1940. For example, see:

Royal Decree No. 156bis/27 January 1941
The Virtutea Militara Medal peace version 2nd class awarded to:
serg. Dumitru Damian
cap. Vasile Arion
fruntas Vasile Cretu
sold. Marin Dumitrascu
sold. Dumitru Gradinaru
sold. Ioan Calugaru,
who distinguished themselves during the attacks made by the Russians with superior forces on the Tiganasi and Ocrub posts on 11 August 1940.

In conclusion, it is my opinion that the Soviets would have advanced as far as it was possible under the military and political conditions of the time.

I consider the book being a remarkable synthesis, from several perspectives. It would however be interesting to have acces to the full thesis (1.000 pages of text and 200 pages of anexes). In the preface, the author promises (in somewhat vague terms) another volume in the future. We shall see, since this one was published by Editura Militară in 2009.

Victor, in August 1940 the situation was again entirely different. Midan details the Soviet military pressures, convergent with the Hungarian ones and with the more or less explicit German threats - facts which are already known from several different sources. There is an idea of an implicit reciprocity - the Soviet pressures as a pay-back for the concerted German-Italian advices in favor of the cession from June 1940. The author point is that accepting the ultimatum in June made a option for resistance in August/September almost an impossibility, from political, military psychological reasons.

Denes, most of the figure of the human losses represents the missing. And Victor - the fact thet the Soviets grabbed as much as they could is true again, from my perspective the 1940 "Bessarabian offensive" being the perfect incarnation of Stalin's "wave-like" political and military doctrine - to advance incessantly till a determined resistance is met. And in his book Midan is presenting a series of cases with which he arguments his assertion that, in the majority of the cases when Romanians had put up a resistance, the Soviets stopped pressing forward.