Beating the Romanian aviation on 22.06.41?, provocative hypothesis!

In the case of the overthrow of the hypothesis procedure is simple. It is necessary to have to present some facts, evidence contradicting the hypothesis.

It is easy to say that this is nonsense. Anyone can say that!

Okay, if this is nonsesn, that is the case then the following evidence ...

1 ...
2 ...
3 ...

Waiting for concrete facts and evidence from you?


So to do ...

Regards,
mw

The starting subject of this topic is nonsense, indeed. No hard feelings - you don't need to get bitter about this.

Evidence no. 1: "...I don't think that is important if the Soviets were more efficient with few more shot down planes against Romanians on June 22, while in the other places they lost 1600 against almost no enemy losses." (quote from my previous message in this topic).

Evidence no. 2: Please read above the Evidence no. 1
Evidence no. 3: Please read above the Evidence no. 2

This post has been edited by Florin on July 25, 2014 02:24 pm

OK, here is the evidence in a 1, 2, 3 format:
1 - On 22 June 1941 Romania crossed the Prut with the aim to "take back Bessarabia".
2- A number of battles followed, some won by Romanians, some won by Russians. Yes, some Romanian planes were lost. We salute those who died after answering the call of their motherland.
3 - On 27 July 1942 Romania "took back the entire Bessarabia".
Win! Clear now?
So what if Romania "lost" a battle, the overall aim was achieved.
Radu

Here are two excerpts from my book 'From Barbarossa to Odessa', vol. 2, Part Six: Assessment (pages 183 and 185):





Gen. Dénes

This post has been edited by Dénes on July 25, 2014 04:18 pm

"The starting subject of this topic is nonsense, indeed. No hard feelings - you don't need to get bitter about this.

Evidence no. 1: "...I don't think that is important if the Soviets were more efficient with few more shot down planes against Romanians on June 22, while in the other places they lost 1600 against almost no enemy losses." (quote from my previous message in this topic).

Evidence no. 2: Please read above the Evidence no. 1
Evidence no. 3: Please read above the Evidence no. 2 "

As I said earlier the figure of 1600 is not absolutly true, this samaller figure did came itself but it was worked by heavy 1 dan and half work around o'clock of Germna crews form the Baltic states to the Romaina up to the noon of 23.06.1941 (336 shot down plus 800 abomdned/destroyed/damaged ect.). LW hard worked to achived this huge but smaller figure.
ARR did not, why, returned to my hypotesy.

Thanks in advance.
mw

I don't understand what your point is. Everybody knows that ARR on its own couldn't stand a chance against VVS. Despite the losses suffered, the actions of ARR played its minor role in the huge picture that was the start of the war in the East. But there is no conclusion that can be drawn from this. Look at the tremendous losses suffered by the ground forces of the Soviet Union. They were severely beaten in June-July 1941. Yet the war did not stop.

"I don't understand what your point is. Everybody knows that ARR on its own couldn't stand a chance against VVS."


Interesting is putting interesting questions, boring repetition of well known things.


My point was clearly laid out in the beginning.

Germany believed that the Romanian Air Force is so strong that the Romanians passed one part of the front. Romanian Air Force issued the equivalent of one weak "Fliegerkorps" to fight in the air.
GAL was more or less one weak German air korps or one Soviet mixed division.

Germany did not consider that the Romanian Air Force is strong enough to entrust the Romanians the all southern part of the front, so they sent IV Fliegerkorps.

Up to the 12:00 Moscow time Soviets air comanders were forbidden to attack Romanian terriotry at all. Very comfortable situation for LW and ARR.

Romanians fought in the air with the Russians on the same terms as Germany to other sectors of the front. MIG-3 or I-16, I-153, DB-3, SB were the same over Bessarabia or over Baltic States. Each modern Soviet plane had more then plenty technical problems, no matter of type. LW+ARR did have such problems.


Regards
mw

To Denes, thanks for the excerpts.

Excerpts from the book is not about, do not correspond to the main question and prove nothing.

Some of these figures are very controversial, for large cuts.


Regards,
mw

I am also trying to figure out the "point" of all this.
Are you trying to prove that the Romanian Air Force was not as "big" as the Luftwaffe or the Soviet VVS? Anyone knows that.
Are you trying to prove that Romania did not heave enough planes to fight VVS? Anyone knows that.
Are you trying to prove that Romania on its own could not fight Russia and it needed German help? Anyone knows that.
Are you trying to prove that without German help Romania would be in trouble against Russia? Anyone knows that.
Are you trying to prove that the Russians were a strong oppnent? Anyone knows that.
I just have no idea what this is about.
Radu

You are mixing apples with oranges a bit here. There were 205 serviceable aircraft in GAL on 22 June 1941, but that includes as well the 2nd Observation Flotilla which had little offensive value and fighters. The number of serviceable bombers (excluding the long range recon squadrons) was 80, including 6 MB-210, which were deemed obsolete and kept in reserve. Thus the corect figure to which to compare the number of bomber sorties carried out by GAL that day is 74. 56 or 57 out of 74 is not the same thing as 56 or 57 out of "over 200". For the fighters, the figures are somewhat similar: there were only 76 serviceable fighters on 22 June in GAL and the number of sorties that day totalled at least 76.

The missions flown by GAl and IV. FLiegerkorps

GAL
- 0350-0520 hours-> 5th BG: 17 or 18 He-111H to Chisinau North and Chisinau South airfields and then to Tiraspol motorpool + 7th FG: 27 BF-109E, escort & strafing of Ialoveni airfield
- 0340-0525 hours-> 1st BG: 9 S-79B to Bolgrad and Bulgarica airfields + 8th FG: 16 IAR-80 escort & strafing of Reni airfield
- 1145-1315 hours -> 4th BG: 9 P.37 to Bulgarica airfield + 53rd FS: 6 Hurricane Mk. I
- 1050-1250 hours ->2nd BG: 13 Potez 633 to Bolgrad and Bulgarica airfields and railway + 5th FG: 12 He-112B
- around 1200 hours -> 18th BS: 8 IAR-37 to Ismail airfield + 5th FG: 8 He-112B
- there were also three recon missions flown each by one BF-109E celula of 7th FG and one IAR-80 of 8th FG which patrolled over Focsani area that day.

IV. Fliegerkorps
- 0320 - ? hours ->JG77 + I./LG2 equipped with bombs attack Soviet airfields
- 0320 -? hours ->KG 27 bombs Cernauti airfield
- 1000 - ? hours -> KG 27 +III./JG 77 + I./LG 2 to Kamenets airfield
- 1250 - ?hours -> Stab+II./JG 77 to strafe Balti airfield
- 1700 - ? hours -> KG 27 + I. LG 2 to Balti airfield
- 1820 - ? hours -> KG 27 + III./JG 77 to Balti airfield

The IV. Fliegerkorps did bomb in the afternoon as well, but it carried out only five bombing missions (one of which was not even Bukovina or Bessarbia, but in former Polish territory) + one strafing mission the entire day. GAL carried out five bombing missions and some strafing at Ialoveni and Reni until noon. Overall, pretty much the same number of missions.

The bomber losses were 2 Potez 633 shot down + 1 crash landed in friendly territory, 2 S.79B shot down, 2 P.37 shot down, 1 IAR-37 shot down + 1 crash landed in firendly territory -> 9 in total out of 56 or 57 and part of them due to heavy Soviet AAA fire.

In the afternoon ARR flew only recon and observation flights over Soviet controlled airspace, which also included some light bombing of Soviet troops close to the Prut line. Why didn't the bombings continue? Could be because of the losses suffered, but not only. Once the surprise, which in this part of the front did not turn out to be such a surprise, was gone there was little to gain in comitting already limited resources to attacking targets that were apparently heavily defended and that ARR thought it had already crippled according to the post-actions reports. Unlike the VVS which started to bomb civilian targets in Romania, ARR had no interest in attacking Romanians living in Bessarabia or destroying much of the infrastructure which the Romanian state would have to rebuild. The interest was strictly in military targets and since ground operations hadn't really started yet (with the exception of some bridgeheads over the Prut) and the airfields had already been hit, there weren't that many to go around under GAL's perspective.

Very interesting information.
I have to say that at the moment of meeting between Hitler and Antonescu on June 12, Hitler and OKW were convinced themselves that "the Soviet soldier had a limited capacity of resistance" and "belief in the desire of the Soviet population to throw off the yoke of Communism".
They did not need the reassurance of the Romanian dictator on something they already took for granted.

IAR 80 was much better than I-16. Evan PZL 11 was better than soviet Rata.

"IAR 80 was much better than I-16. Evan PZL 11 was better than soviet Rata."

Depends which type of I-16 are you thinking about? If type 5 OK, but later version with stronger engine and armament already not. Begining since type 10 from 1938, later type 18 and so on the last type 29

67. IAP had type 24 and 28, the last verisons produced in 1940.

If IAR-80s were so better over I-16s why its pilot could not defend Savoias in the first attack on Bolgrad and Bolgarica. There was 3 damaged IAR-80 after combat plus 2 total lost S.79B. Not good results as for such "excelent" fighter. One I-16 was shot down by defensive fire of S.79B - its pilot KIA.

+ 1 Blenheim shot down a little earlier too by I-16, as for "old" + "inferrior" fighter he achived quite good outputs. It was only begining, next 2 missions and the next ARR losses done by the same obsolete I-16s.

IAR-80 did not achive any sounds results against I-16s on the first day of war, rather losses.

regards
mw

2 Victor.

ARR actually fought against two regiments and one fighter squadron: 4., 67. IAP, and 96 OIAE. Had no contact with bomber regiment . The Soviet air force bombing sorties started in the afternoon and evening on June 22, but no contact with ARR fighters at all.

67 IAP and 96 OIAE were the main perpetrators of losses among ARR units. 4. IAP shot down 1 reccon. Blenheim.

The efficiency of German attacks on Soviet airfields was the result of several repeated attacks (at least two, three or more). Russians in the early morning attacks did not bear huge losses. Their losses have begun to grow rapidly in the afternoon on June 22 and the next day morning. The resulting withdrawal of a number of regiments at airfileds lying in the interior of the country. The Russians left behind at border airfields a number of aircraft, many of them were servicable or less damaged (repairable state).

Losses of GAL on 22.06.14


1. - 0350-0520 hours-> 5th BG: 17 or 18 He-111H to Chisinau North and Chisinau South airfields and then to Tiraspol motorpool + 7th FG: 27 BF-109E, escort & strafing of Ialoveni airfield

No lossses - only this mission was so succesful.


2. - 0340-0525 hours-> 1st BG: 9 S-79B to Bolgrad and Bulgarica airfields + 8th FG: 16 IAR-80 escort & strafing of Reni airfield.

ARR losses: 2 lost S.79B over enemy territory (no 1, 17 of Esc. 71) plus 1 damaged during take off (no 13) plus one damaged during landing, plus next 3 IAR-80 damaged fighters (reapairable).



3. - 1145-1315 hours -> 4th BG: 9 P.37 to Bulgarica airfield + 53rd FS: 6 Hurricane Mk. I

Losses: 2 PZL P.37, no losses among fighters



4. - 1050-1250 hours ->2nd BG: 13 Potez 633 to Bolgrad and Bulgarica airfields and railway + 5th FG: 12 He-112B

Losses: 3 Potez (no 1, 4, 19) over Soviet territory plus one (nr 20) seroius damage and force landed behind own line + 2 damaged He 112 (1 belly landed) of 16 He 112 (not 12 He 112?)


5. - around 1200 hours -> 18th BS: 8 IAR-37 to Ismail airfield + 5th FG: 8 He-112B

9 IAR-37 of Esc 18 + 8 He 112 B. Losses: 2 IAR-37 no 22 (by A/A or fighter?) i no 39 by fighter, force landed - total loss.

- there were also three recon missions flown each by one BF-109E celula of 7th FG and one IAR-80 of 8th FG which patrolled over Focsani area that day.



In addition to the bombers losses were large losses among reconnaissance aircraft: 3 Blenheim in combat and one more Blenheim in non combat plus a pair of IAR-39 damaged. It is also a serious loss.

In fact, in relation to the owned aircrafts ARR (GAL) had done quite a little combat sorites - 124 is not so much plus 18 or so a reccon. sorties. Not impressive results as for such potential about 250 comabt planes of which 203/205 servicable.

On the other hand, the Soviet had done: 55 IAP - 155 combat sorties, 67 IAP - 117 combat sorties and 4.IAP - 94 combat sorties. 96.OIAE - at least 20 combat sorties.


67 IAP had 64 I-16 type 24, 28; 26 of which were not servicable on 22.06.

The Russians used a quite small force to cause ARR so serious losses on 22.06.41, that it gave up the attack in the afternoon on Soviet targets.

Regards,
mw

It depends also of each pilot 's value, experience and circumstances. For example, cpt Petre Constantinescu of Grupul 6 tells there were, in 1944, american P 51 Mustangs (!!!), flewd by unexprienced young pilots, shut down by IAR 80. And to not forget the memorable day of 10 june 1944 when a lot of P 38 Lightning were destroyed by IAR 80 of Grupul 6. You prefere a very technical discussion, of course in theory theese american planes were MUCH MUCH better than IAR 80, but the war is not an abstraction, as I said, it depends of pilot's value, experience and situations.