WWI in Romania

Wartime recollections of Dimitrie Dimancescu (1896-1984)

http://www.turkeyswar.com/campaigns/romania.htm

Dimitrie Dimancescu's memories were the subject of the documentary movie "Hill 789", made by his son and his nephew. In this movie they mentioned the fight against Rommel's unit during the battle of Oituz. It is a very interesting movie, it can be seen online.

Unfortunatelly, the young Dimăncescu who made "Hill 789" died not quite long ago when he was participating to the making of another historical documentary in Romania...

I'm very sorry, RIP!

About neutrality period, between 1914-1916:

http://www.cristiannegrea.ro/?p=387

Interesting, betrayed before the first shot:

http://www.cristiannegrea.ro/?p=434

among countless other victimizations:

which is fantasy. there have been russian offensive operations in galicia in sept. 1916.
there are several books that go into detail regarding the Brusilov offensive, for example Timothy C. Dowling's "The Brusilov Offensive", which could provide the author of that blog with some sorely missed insight, regarding the bespoken operation (and perhaps other things).
although i'm rather sure my well heeded recommendation will fall on deaf ears, as it happens usually in cases of conspiracy theorists.

I also had no long time ago the "pleasure" to speak on Internet with Cristian Negrea about one doubtfull information he used on one of his articles. I just pointed to him that one info he used was not in reality sustained with documents and could be a misinterpretation until one would point the original source of the info. He had a deaf ear and not having a behaviour of a real historian, so I stoped to read his blog anymore.

Who had the opportunity to read more books written in the era, including memoirs of generals who led the military operations of 1916-1917, knows that not only external causes (the strength, leadership and better training of the enemy) but especially internal causes (poor quality of the officer corps, betrayal, the services poor organisation, a.o.) led to the tragic outcome of the end of year 1916! So I also don't believe in this theory, being a form of escape from responsibility for the defeat!

it's a genuine problem; authors of books, articles,blogs and whatnot quoting (and sometimes misquoting and that on purpose) sources (or sometimes hearsay) that strengthens their point, on the other side disregarding anything that might contradict them, which turns the effort (if it ever was one) from a research discussion (if ever intended) into propaganda.

I haven't read the article entirely, but it seems to be pretty much based on thesis put forward in book of N. P. Comnène (and not Conene, as it appears at the end). I inherited from my grandfather the original issue of the book, which was published in France in 1918. I believe the date and place of the publication says enough to draw a conclusion on the theory what the actual purpose of the book was.

It is clear that the Russians were unhappy with the Romanian entry into WW1, because, unlike the Western Allies, they had to actually support it with troops and transportation of supplies, none of which they had enough for themselves. But from here to the supposed conspiracy it's a long way.

From a Text-Book : The (Admiral) Kolchak interrogation
[...] I came to the Emperor ... He also instructed me on the status of things on the front, mainly in connection with the entry into war of Romania, that extreme care Him, due to the fact that Romania, as can be seen, was not quite ready to start a war, and its entry may not give favorable results " - This only will make lengthen our already large front left flank: we have to enter with our troops in Romania and to extend the front almost up to Danube. This will be a new heaviness for our Army and positive results are unlikely to give."
[…] and also said the Emperor, " - I totally do not sympathize to enter now into war Romania, I'm afraid this will be a not profitable enterprise, which only prolongs our front, but the French allied's Command insists on this, they require Romania to enter, at any cost. They sent a special mission to Romania, ammunition, and we have to yield to the pressure of the allied's Command.”

Anyway, with the war problems was dealing The Tsarist Stavka, not realy Mr. Stürmer

This post has been edited by Petre on January 14, 2013 04:32 pm

from Michigan War Studies Review - Germany's Decisive Victory: Falkenhayn's Campaign in Romania, 1916 [M.A. Thesis: Eastern Michigan University, 2004].
Without being a specialist in WWI issues, I share the same opinion on the failure of the offensive campaign in Transylvania in late summer-autumn 1916.

From a text in russian : Kulitchkin S.P. "The new ally (Military-historical essay)"

[…] The newly appointed commander of the all theaters of war - General Joffre, was looking forward to an inevitable outflow of German divisions from the Western Front. Russia reacted more reserved to the Romanian intervention and proposed two good options for common actions.
The first : a joint strike of the British and French troops from Salonika and of Russian-Romanian troops from Dobrogea towards disable Bulgaria, "then the Transylvania Theater, threatened from the north by Russian and from the south by the Salonika group and the Romanian troops, will fall by itself.”
The second : a possible Russian-Romanian strike from Moldova to the north-east (?) in the rear of the 7th and 3rd Austrian armies, taking them into a bag, and going out to the flanks of all hostile groups, south of Pripyat.
But, as was most often the case in this war, the British and French rejected our proposals and settled on the third, the most unpromising version – an independent Romanian offensive in Transylvania.
We also proposed to strengthen the Romanian Army in the south in Dobrogea by at least one Corps. Russian Stavka, again as usual, meekly agreed this.
I still do not understand what guided "the great strategists" of Entente to taking such a decision. They knew very well that Romanian army, who long time did not fight, bad-prepared (especially the commanders), weakly armed, was not only able to successfully attack, but to successfully defend. One of the many mysteries of the First World War.


This post has been edited by Petre on January 22, 2013 11:45 am