The Flamanda Maneuver

[dragos03]

Not true. General Mackensen (commander of germanbulgarian troops in Dobrogea) said after the war that if the Flamanda maneuver would have continued, his troops were doomed.
So it was a good plan. It was the only chance: a gamble to destroy an enemy who was superior in numbers.

[petru]

It is true that a great a plan without a proper execution is doomed from the beginning, but the Flamanda maneuver was a very daring operation, and the storm was really bad luck. The Austrians monitors appeared because of the storm (after the storm the level of the river was higher and allowed the monitors to approach the bridge and bomb it). Secondly the whole Flamanda area became a huge swamp and after the storm it was not possible to transport heavy artillery pieces and put them in the position to protect the bridge. It is true that Mackensen told Averescu had he continued the operation he would have been doomed, but the success of the operation required a working bridge, and there was no way of stopping the monitors. Therefore it was decided the cancellation instead of taking (un?)necessary risks.

As a parenthesis it is worth mentioning that only ten days later the 10th and 21st division stopped the German offensive at Predeal and the 22nd at Bran. An insuccess in the north was more important than a success south of the Danube.

[dead-cat]

QUOTE

Not true. General Mackensen (commander of germanbulgarian troops in Dobrogea) said after the war that if the Flamanda maneuver would have continued, his troops were doomed.   So it was a good plan. It was the only chance: a gamble to destroy an enemy who was superior in numbers.

in order to destory Mackensens army a commitment of more than 6 divisions was necesary not to speak about the lack of artillery. all this on bulgarian soil, where the absence of intact bridges and the interference from enemy warships would make resuplying extremly difficult. Averescu chose a remote place for the operation since the enemy would not expect him to do so. well guess why? because the enemy, just as Averescu was without doubt aware of the problems resulting from a crossing at that point. keeping at least 140 000 in fighting conditions requires a continuous logistical effort. actually to keep 1 man supplied in the field 1-2 other men are required to perfom the logistic tasks.

then as the force advances in Bulgaria it would be exposed to flanking attacks from both sides. and since by early october most of the fighting on the eastern front was done allready and the brussilov offensive definetly over, reserves would be available, especially in the german sector of the front which wasn't as much under attack.

by saying "if the operation succeeded" Mackensen assumed that the romanian army would be able to maintin her strenght throughout the entire operation. now the front in Transsylvania was allready crying for reserves and since the russians just lost about 1 million men during the brussilov offensive, not much help could be expected from them either (explains a bit the poor cooperation).and as i said, during october the army was reinforced by turkish units as well.

the proper moment to attack Bulgaria had been missed by at least 4 months, but even that is debatable since a strong buildup of troops along the bulgarian frontier would not go unobserved and even if the romanian army decided to act offensively in the south they had to divert forces to defend from a possible invasion from Transsylvania. and since late 1915 a rail link with Bulgaria has been established so shifting troops there and keep them supplied would not be impssible.

actually the best moment to enter the war was August 1914 when Bulgaria was still neutral and the main focus of the central powers was shifted to the western front. austria-hungary had troops tied up along the border with serbia and HAD to maintin the bulk of her army in Galicia. but that required a bit of gambling spirit since noone could guess how the frontier battles would end and if Germany suceeded in the west, Romania would be doomed too. but the political situation prevented an entry in august 1914 and the long bargaining in 1916 showed that the romanian gov. wasn't in the mood to take any risks.

another thing about the monitors. the austro-hungarian ones, at least the newer were a bit lighter than the romanian monitors and had a more shallow draught (1.3m vs 1.6m for the romanian ones) since they were build not only to operate on the Danube but on the Save as well and thus were better suited to operate in the shallow waters around Rahovo. it was not the storm which allowed the monitors to proceed, but it made things definetly easier. but as the website http://www.fortele-navale.ro/despre/istori...ic/marrodun.htm (the website seems to mix up the events of 1916 and 1917) reports, the largest damage was inflicted by the patrol boats Barsch and Viza whose mines hit the patrol boat "Cpt.Valter Maracineanu" which blew up. also these boats kept the troops on the bridge under fire and caused around 370 losses.

[dragos]

The Army Group "South" had 16-17 divisions, while Mackensen's forces were 8-9 divisions strong.

The report of forces was:
(Romanian-Russian / Bulgarian-German-Turkish)
Infantry battalions: 186 / 105
Cavalry battalions: 56 / 35
Artillery batteries: 148 / 70

The preparations for the operation were outstanding, they lasted immediately after the council of 2/15 September, until 18 September/1 October. A barrage was build on the Danube at Tabanul to prevent the enemy vessels. A campaign airfield was build at Dadilov. Several roads were constructed to assure the built-up of materails in the forcing sector. In addition 200 boats were prepared. 2 AA batteries were deployed for protection of the future bridge, and 2 artillery batteries were brought at Gostinu, to intervene in case enemy vessels would have passed over the barrage.

[dragos]

According to Romanian military historians, the flaws in the Romanian plan were:
- The forcing sector, even if logical chosen, did not take into account the season conditions favouring the flood of the holm, case in which the forcing of the river would have been seriously compromised.
- The offensive of the Dobruja Army should not have started concomitantly with the forcing of the Danube, but 2-3 days later, when the advance of the 3rd Army would have threatened the rear of the enemy, forcing him to withdraw forces from the front of Dobruja Army.

[dead-cat]

according to "The Roumanian Campaign" by Erwin Rommel:

QUOTE

... For this operation the crossing force, under Roumanian command (General Averescu), was to consist of five infantry and one cavalry divisions. The force in the Dobrudja was to consist of six Roumanian and two Russian (one actually consisted of Serbians) infantry divisions and one Russian cavalry division, all under Russian command (General Zaionchkovsky). The two forces were to operate independently, and the operation was to commence on 1 October. Some Austrian monitors (gunboats) were known to be in the Danube west of Orsova. Roumania had no boats which could effectively oppose them.

(from http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=cache:nW2...&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 goolge cache since the website reports a 404)

only 6 divisions were supposed to cross the danube and threaten Mackensens rear. this still leaves open the question how they planned to supply those forces in Bulgaria across a weak pontoon bridge under constant harrassment, without controlling a sizeable distance of the river upstream on both banks.

and btw. Gostinu isn't such a great place to deploy artillery since there is an island right in front of the village which forces the artillery to resort to indirect fire. also i belive having read that those batteries were only composed of 75mm guns since the swampy terrain prevented the efficient use of heavier calibers.

[dragos]

Earlier posted by me:

QUOTE

It was formed the Army Group \"South\" (commanded by Averescu), made of the 3rd Army and the Dobruja Army. The 3rd Army had the 10, 16, 18, 21 and 22 Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division. The Dobruja Army had the 2, 5, 9, 12, 15, 19 Infantry Divisions, 5th Cavalry Brigade and the Russian Corps, with 61 and 115 Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Cavalry Division.

QUOTE

and btw. Gostinu isn't such a great place to deploy artillery since there is an island right in front of the village which forces the artillery to resort to indirect fire. also i belive having read that those batteries were only composed of 75mm guns since the swampy terrain prevented the efficient use of heavier calibers.

I don't know the exact position of artillery at Gostinu, but one battery had 150 mm pieces.

[dead-cat]

maybe it's worth a trip in the summer when i go to RO to see my parents in vacation. perhaps i can rent a boat ...

[petru]

check this link. It is full of mistakes:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/romani...a_mackensen.htm


From the site:

QUOTE

A German-Bulgarian force sent hurriedly up from Tutrakan practically annihilated the attacking battalions.  The few who got back to the north bank of the river fled to Bucharest, where they caused a panic among the inhabitants.

What forces? The Romanians retreated because of the attacks on the bridge. The small detachments couldn’t withstand the Romanian divisions. It is true Bulgarians had some supplemental troops because of the transfer that was supposed to take place. Troops from Silistra and Turtucaia were supposed to go to the front and in their place militia was brought in. At the moment when the operation started both militia and regular garrison were in the area, but their number was not significant.

QUOTE

Eight Rumanian divisions had been taken prisoner or terribly shattered; the Russian forces sent to aid Rumania had been so often defeated that their fighting power was badly shaken; and positions on the lower Danube flanking Wallachia and the national capital had been won

Eight Romanian division? That's close to 200 000 man. The whole IIIrd Romanian army didn't have eight divisions.

QUOTE

That the Rumanians despaired of restoring the line was proved by their blowing up the great bridge across the Danube west of Cernavoda.

The bridge is still standing. We tried to blow it up, but we were not successful. However, we were able to blow the bridge over Borcea.

No offense, but I don't really think the German sources are too accurate (the reference is written after German records).

[dead-cat]

maybe they meant "troops from 8 divisions"

QUOTE

Source Records of the Great War, Vol. V, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923

ain't a german source and somehow i don't see a british/american having access and quoting german sources. the official army comuniquee says nothing like this.

[petru]

QUOTE

ain't a german source and somehow i don't see a british/american having access and quoting german sources. the official army comuniquee says nothing like this.

The book is an 1923 book and I don't think at that moment there were availbale too many documents. In my opinion there is a collection of documents and oficial prints (there are 7 volumes). I think the text was copied from a German source (probably Mackensen). That is why I said German. I found the book and I will check it (probably in weekend). I also think in the text there is something like "our troops..." which I supposed meant "german troops".

[dead-cat]

need to check if Mackensen wrote any autobiography from 1919-1923.
the text sounds more like a newspaper article written somewhere around feb.-march 1917.

btw. an austrian newspaper wrote after the occupation of Bucharest that about 150 000 romanian soldiers would be in the custody of the central powers . often quoted figures for the entire war are about 122 000 POW so i wonder if the rest died while in custody and was added to the KIA/MIA #.

so i guess the 8 divisions POW actually meant soldiers from 8 diffrent divisions (possibly including russians).

[petru]

QUOTE

need to check if Mackensen wrote any autobiography from 1919-1923.

Yeah, it is worth checking. If he did I couldn't find it. I know Falkenhayn did, but I couldn't find either.

QUOTE

btw. an austrian newspaper wrote after the occupation of Bucharest that about 150 000 romanian soldiers would be in the custody of the central powers . often quoted figures for the entire war are about 122 000 POW so i wonder if the rest died while in custody and was added to the KIA/MIA #.

150000 is a little too high. The greatest defeat was at Turtucaia (around 30000 POW), nothing comes close to Turtucaia. At Neajlov they claimed 20000 POW, but I think it is too high. Still I found no numbers for this battle.

QUOTE

so i guess the 8 divisions POW actually meant soldiers from 8 diffrent divisions (possibly including russians).

The context was that 8 Romanian divisions were destroyed or shattered on the southern front by the time Flamanda maneuver was on. This is way too high. A few days after Turtucaia an other claim of 30 000 POW appear from the same source. I wonder whether this represents in fact romanian civil population or people involved in administration and they were counted as POW. Except the division at Turtucaia no other Romanian division was completely destroyed by then.

[dead-cat]

POWs published in army comuniquees are usually belivable. there might be error margins of 5-10% when captured regiments are counted twice etc. but usually they're not very far off. the most often quoted figures for Tutrakan are 22 000.

[Victor]

QUOTE

and btw. Gostinu isn't such a great place to deploy artillery since there is an island right in front of the village which forces the artillery to resort to indirect fire. also i belive having read that those batteries were only composed of 75mm guns since the swampy terrain prevented the efficient use of heavier calibers.

There were two batteries near Gostinu: one with 75 mm another with 150 mm guns. There is an opening of about 300 m between the Tabanul and Lungu Islands, which could permit the guns south of Gostinu to cover with fire the area close to the bridge. The channel on the right side of Tabanul Island was pretty shallow and probably they did not expect the Austrians to pass through there. There were also a 102 mm guns battery, a 120 mm guns battery and section and a 120 mm howitzer battery near Flamanda.

QUOTE

but as the website http://www.fortele-navale.ro/despre/istori...ic/marrodun.htm (the website seems to mix up the events of 1916 and 1917) reports, the largest damage was inflicted by the patrol boats Barsch and Viza whose mines hit the patrol boat \"Cpt.Valter Maracineanu\" which blew up. also these boats kept the troops on the bridge under fire and caused around 370 losses.

The patrol boat no. 8 Valter Maracineanu was hit by a current mine on 3 December 1916 and sunk. It is part of a different story.

The two patrol boats Barsch and Viza made an attack on the bridge on 2 October between 8:30 and 9:00 am. They managed to score several direct hits on the bridge and temporarily stop the transit. The Barsch was hit and had 3 dead and 5 wounded onboard. After the Austrian patrol boats retreated, two monitors appeared at 10:45 am: the Bodrog and the Koros. Bodrog received 5 direct hits which took out the electrical system and the command post. Koros was hit 14 times, the deck was pierced, the main steam pipe damaged and so was the command turret.

During the night of 2/3 October, the Austrian monitors made another attempt to attack the bridge but were repulsed by the Romanian artillery. At 8:00-9:00 am a barge loaded with explosives was sent towards the bridge. It was sunk by the Romanian artillery.

After this, the Szamos and Leitha advanced with difficulty through the artillery barrage and launched six current mines, which made three breaches in the bridge. After 15:00 the Austrians launched another two barges. Only one hit the bridge, but by this time the retreat was already over.